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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between rights and duties in the field of fetal 
gene therapy and assesses if the current regulatory position within England and 
Wales is compatible with the intergenerational aspects of scientific progress within 
fetal gene therapy (FGT).  Within the field of genomics, the fetal junction has 
become a site where gene therapists are developing a range of medical techniques, 
such as fetal gene therapy and in utero stem cell therapy.  Utilising such techniques 
raises questions about the intergenerational aspects of scientific progress and how 
intergenerational rights can reshape regulation.  The thesis focuses upon these key 
questions:  Are the intergenerational issues of FGT taken into account by both direct 
and indirect stakeholders?  Can intergenerational issues override the reproductive 
rights of the mother?  Have intergenerational issues impacted upon the clinical 
applications implicit and manifest in this work?  Addressing such questions is 
important because the conflict between the rights of the mother, fetus, clinical 
researchers and society have the potential to delay progress in FGT. 
 
In addressing these questions the thesis utilised thematic analysis of relevant 
regulatory institutional documents, from international declarations to regulatory 
guidelines; and semi structured interviews of identified FGT practitioners to identify 
areas of potential conflict.  Following the data collection and analysis, the field data 
identified five key areas of potential conflict, which were then assessed using the 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) as proposed by Alan Gewirth (1978) and 
later altered by Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001).  The thesis will argue that the 
field data shows that established regulatory principles such as human dignity are of 
limited value in relation to FGT.  In other areas such as informed choice, autonomy 
and intergenerational equity the PGC is applied to define and partially resolve the 
outstanding areas necessary for consistent ethical and regulatory guidance in FGT.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the rise of gene therapy during the 1960s and early 1970s, the idea of 
correcting dysfunctional genes has been a pursuit of many scientists.  However, 
additional information about the genome was needed to develop gene therapy and 
this was the inspiration for the Human Genome Project (HGP).  The HGP started in 
1990 and sought to sequence the whole human genome.  It was completed in 2003 
and promoted increased research activity in genomics by expanding the current 
knowledge of genetics and diseases, which in turn has opened the door for 
interventions such as somatic gene therapy (Hernandez 1999).
1
  However, despite 
the prospect of gene therapy leading to cures for  many genetic diseases, gene 
therapy has encountered scientific challenges which have slowed down its 
development.  The most significant challenges to the development of gene therapy, 
and stem cell transplantation, has been the immune response of the patient to the 
genetic intervention causing the intervention to be rejected (Santore, Roybal et al. 
2009).  Therefore, gene therapy has sought to exploit many properties that the fetus 
possesses in order to overcome these difficulties.  These properties include: an 
immature immune system and the unique healing property within the fetus which 
increases the chance of therapeutic vectors attaching to the cells; and early 
prevention of clinical manifestation of disease (Turner and Fauza 2009: 477).  As a 
result, Fetal Gene Therapy (FGT)
2
 has developed in order to overcome the technical 
difficulties of postnatal interventions. 
 
Nevertheless, utilising FGT raises questions about the intergenerational aspects of 
scientific progress and the way that scientific progress can reshape how rights and 
duties can be regulated.  For example, in utero choices are intergenerational as they 
engage directly with the next generation through the fetus, which is the ‘fulcrum’ or 
‘pivotal point’ between generations.  Therefore, questions regarding rights and duties 
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 Somatic cells are any body cells that compose the tissues, organs, and parts of that individual other 
than their germ cells (National Institute of Health 2011b). 
2
 There is more than one spelling of fetus that is commonly used: that of fetus and foetus.  However, 
fetus will be used as this is more commonplace within the literature of FGT. 
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towards the next generation and beyond are explicit within FGT.  The rights and 
duties of future people through medical criteria such as ‘the fetus as a patient’ 
challenges the extent that autonomy can be exercised in relation to the maternal fetal 
conflict (chapter 4) (Savulescu 2007).  In researching possible intergenerational 
issues within FGT several key elements could be explored, including conflicting 
rights and duties, access to such technologies and further institutional effects of FGT 
such as in the realm of sport.  However, the thesis will focus upon rights and duties 
within FGT, how these rights and duties are perceived or established as well as how 
scientific progress impacts upon them.  Other important aspects, amongst many, 
include how maternal rights are viewed in relation to the fetus and whether 
researchers have to take into consideration anything other than obtaining results.  
Current regulation and practice needs to be examined to ascertain whether they are 
sufficient to cope with FGT as it develops.   
 
The thesis will argue that within the data collected, established regulatory principles 
such as human dignity are of limited value in relation to FGT.  The thesis will 
highlight that the current regulatory and practical application of FGT cannot 
sufficiently take into account some of the key issues within FGT.  Despite the 
majority of regulation coping with the potential pitfalls of FGT it is clear that certain 
regulatory restrictions and/or positions do not provide adequate consideration to 
particular prevailing issues, such as the regulation of germ line technologies
3
 and the 
interplay between abortion and the practice of FGT. 
 
The international development of FGT is also important given the globalised nature 
of science (Glasner and Rothman 2001).  The majority of fetal therapy innovations 
and legislative changes emanate from the USA.  Within the United States a father, 
for example, may have a legitimate right to consent or object to treatment.
4
  The state 
of Michigan has moved towards prosecuting excessive drug use by pregnant women 
and enforcing certain duties upon mothers within pregnancy.  Also the American 
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 Germ cells are those cells involved in reproduction such as an oocyte, sperm cell or one of their 
antecedent cells (Debyser 2003, National Institute of Health 2011b). 
4
 Code of Federal Regulations: Title 45 - Public Welfare, Part 46, Protection of Human Subjects, 
s.46.203. 
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Academy of Pediatrics has issued guidance to clinicians about how to deal with 
refusal of treatment by mothers for their fetus.  The guidance results in mothers 
being forced to change their consultant if they go against the consultant’s treatment 
suggestion (American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics 1999).  These 
changes clearly indicate the impact that rapid scientific progress in the field of in 
utero knowledge has had upon law, ethics and society.  The same may be said for 
FGT as Table 1 clearly indicates the rapid ascent of FGT from initial confirmation to 
potential clinical trials.  Therefore, as FGT progresses towards clinical practice what 
rights and duties are taken into account becomes important because the way that 
FGT is framed will influence whether any legislative or regulative change is needed, 
as has been seen within the USA.  In assessing that change understanding what 
issues FGT potentially possesses becomes important because regulation may not 
cover all areas that FGT could impact upon.  This factor can lead to reactive 
regulation such as was clearly seen with the prohibition of reproductive cloning.   
Table 1.  Selective timeline of fetal gene therapy 
Year Event Implications 
1990 The first to use an in utero approach in 
applying a replication-incompetent 
retrovirus vector to fetal rats in utero 
(Hatzoglou et al 1990). 
A large number of 
successful in utero 
gene experiments now 
conducted. 
1997 Fetal interventions now viable due to 
development of diagnostic and genetic 
testing. 
Fetal intervention for 
therapeutic basis 
becoming technically 
viable within humans. 
1999 Phase 0 FGT proposal by Dr French 
Anderson within the USA due to gene 
therapy and fetal technique 
developments. GTAC issues guidance. 
Potential ethical and 
legal issues being 
highlighted by 
significantly quick 
progress of FGT.  
2003 First successful therapeutic application 
of gene transfer in utero within rats 
performed (Seppen, van der Rijt et al. 
2003). 
FGT can now progress 
towards human 
clinical trials. 
2011 High level of transgene expression in 
cardiac and skeletal muscles (Mattar et 
al., 2011). 
Human clinical trials 
now a real possibility. 
2012-
14 
First FGT clinical trial in UK to be sent 
for ethical approval. 
Potentially first 
human application of 
FGT in the world.  
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It should be noted that the law of England and Wales must be placed in its European 
context despite the room left to Member States (the margin of appreciation) to 
regulate fetal rights.  However before outlining the regulatory position, section 1.2 of 
this chapter will give definitions of some of the terminology used within the thesis. 
Defining words such as rights and duties will clarify the remit of these terms and 
avoid confusion later in the thesis.  Section 1.2.3 then outlines how the author 
wrestled with some of the concepts within the thesis and section 1.3 investigates the 
way that the progress of FGT is challenging the current regulatory position before 
concluding in section 1.4.  However, before the definitional issues are addressed an 
important brief note is needed about FGT. 
1.1.1 A note about fetal gene therapy 
It should be noted that FGT is a practice that is not aimed at germ line interventions 
either advertently or inadvertently.  However, germ line interventions will be 
referred to in order to produce a progressive and more complete thesis that could be 
used if FGT does ever choose to utilise germ line interventions in the distant future.  
Therefore, the reader should be reassured and not jump to the conclusion that FGT is 
a practice that currently seeks to actively alter a patient’s germ line, or that it might 
do so in the future.  
1.2 Definitional issues 
1.2.1 Defining fetal gene therapy 
Although FGT appears to be a relatively straightforward concept, it still needs 
defining.  ‘Fetal’ can refer to an unborn or unhatched vertebrate, especially after 
attaining the basic structural plan of its kind (National Institute of Health 2012).  
Major leaps in human FGT such as developments in surgical interventions and 
techniques in human fetuses, especially fetuses with congenital diaphragmatic 
hernias, have been a direct result of animal experimentation, with lambs being 
considered a suitable model for fetal surgery (Jancelewicz and Harrison 2009).  
However, ‘fetal’ within FGT refers to an unborn human that is past the 56th day of 
gestation (Soanes 2001: 330) and therefore FGT should preclude embryology from 
the remit of the thesis.  However, there are issues that are relevant to pregnancy in 
general and so embryology cannot be completely ignored within the debate about 
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FGT.  It should also be noted that terms such as ‘in utero’ and ‘prenatal’ are used 
which encompass both embryonic and fetal stages of development. 
 
The terms fetal surgery, fetal therapy and FGT can be misleading because any fetal 
intervention also involves the pregnant woman.  For example, maternal-fetal surgery 
has been used to describe the same procedures that are covered by ‘fetal surgery’ to 
show the relevance of the mother within any fetal intervention (Wu and Ball 2009).  
However, the term fetal surgery does not exclude the mother from the debate and 
therefore the same can be said for ‘FGT.’  Defining gene therapy will also be 
important. 
 
Gene therapy is a medical technique that seeks to deliver genetic material to a cell in 
order to generate a therapeutic effect by correcting an existing abnormality within 
the host cell (David and Peebles 2008: 204).  Gene therapy utilises gene transfer, 
which is the introduction of genetic material into cells that can be of a different 
origin (Debyser 2003) and would be used to treat those conditions that may not be 
amenable to  stem cell transplantation (Roybal, Santore et al. 2009).  These 
conditions are essentially (but not exclusively) non hematopoietic (blood) disorders, 
such as cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy and central nervous system disorders 
(Wagner et al 2009).  Gene therapy can be performed either ex vivo or in vitro, but is 
essentially accomplished through delivering the wanted genes through viral vectors 
such as retroviruses and adenoviruses (Senut and Gage 1999).  More recently, HIV 
has been used as a viral vector but there has also been a shift towards using non viral 
vectors (Santore et al 2009).  Therefore, it can be said that FGT is the use of gene 
therapy in order to benefit a fetus.  The term ‘benefit’ indicates that the fetus does 
not have to be the direct recipient of the gene therapy, because in certain 
circumstances the recipient of the gene therapy will be the pregnant woman for the 
benefit of her fetus.  She in turn benefits in that she will then, hopefully, have a child 
with a less serious debilitating condition or none at all.  
1.2.2 Clarifying rights, duties and interests 
It is clear that rights and duties will be a major element within the thesis.  
Elaboration of the difference between rights and duties as well as the difference 
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between competing and conflicting rights will serve to provide a background to the 
thesis.  Firstly, the differences and relationship between rights and duties must be 
identified as this will help identify and resolve tensions between agents later within 
the thesis.  Within this thesis rights emerge as an important factor.  Rights can be 
either positive or negative.  A ‘positive’ right is the right to do something or have an 
action facilitated by someone, but there are also negative rights (Carter 2007).  A 
‘negative’ right is the right not to be interfered with, or the right to omit doing 
something (See Carter 2007).  Therefore, a positive right in this instance is the right 
to have medical treatment.  However, positive rights are not absolute as they can be 
overridden by another agents competing or conflicting right, as well as other 
enforceable duties.  An example of this is the conscientious objector within the scope 
of the Abortion Act 1967,
5
 where a female’s right to abortion cannot compel a doctor 
to treat her if the case falls within the conscience objector category. 
 
Duties must also be defined and addressed.  Duties arise from both positive and 
negative rights.  These duties are known as correlative duties and have been referred 
to as negative and positive duties (Gewirth 1978, Rawls 1971).  Generally, duties are 
seen as the duty to refrain (negative) and the duty to provide active assistance 
(positive) (Gewirth 1996).  In certain circumstances this distinction makes little 
difference, but positive rights and their correlating duties pose a further question: 
when is it justifiable to coerce or infringe an agent’s right in order to fulfil another 
agent’s right? 
 
As mentioned above, both competing and conflicting rights could be relevant within 
the thesis and therefore also need defining.  Competing rights are where two or more 
agents are claiming the same right but against each other.  Therefore, the right of 
agent A can only be satisfied by the same right of agent B not being satisfied 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2006).  The classic medico-legal case is seen in that of 
the conjoined twins in Re A
6
 whereby part of the many conflicting dimensions of the 
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 Abortion Act 1967 s.4. 
6
 Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147. 
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case was the competing aspect of Mary and Jodie’s right to life.7  Resolving 
competing rights entails a balancing act between the agents. 
 
Conflicting rights, on the other hand, is where two or more agents are asserting 
different rights to the same issue.  The conflict between the reporting of medical 
information under Article 10 and Naomi Campbell’s right to private life under 
Article 8 in Campbell v MGN Ltd
8
 is a classic example of conflicting rights whereby 
a balance between rights is needed rather than a balance between agents. 
 
Within the thesis ‘interests’ are also important because there is a debate surrounding 
what an interest is and who has a relevant or sufficient interest.  Within public law 
this is known as locus standi.
9
  An interest can take many forms.  For example, the 
Oxford dictionary has five definitions of an interest ranging from the feeling of 
wanting to know or learn about something or someone to a group or organization 
having a common concern (Oxford Dictionaries Online 2012).  It can also be a right 
over land (Martin 2001) or those who are the primary, direct beneficiaries such as 
society as a whole or specific populations or entities who are unable to carry out 
research on their own behalf (Butcher 2000: 12).  These wide definitions encapsulate 
many groups of people, such as public interest groups, the media, the government, or 
anybody who just likes science.  An interest can be a powerful tool which can result 
in a successful defence against privacy actions
10
 or require government bodies to 
consult or inform certain citizens or groups of citizens.
11
  However, within the thesis 
an agent has an interest where another being has a duty towards them (Pattinson 
2002: 2).   Therefore, an interest can arise out of rights and can be in competition or 
conflict. An agent in this context refers to a being with agency, with agency referring 
to the ability or the capacity to conduct themselves within the world.  How an agent 
is established is discussed in section 5.7. 
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 See the leading judgement of Lord Justice Ward in Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation) [2001] Fam147.  
8
 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. 
9
 Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31(3) (formally called the Supreme Court Act 1981 but now cited as the 
Senior Courts Act 1981 by virtue of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005).  
10
 Data Protection Act 1998 s.32(1). 
11
 Coughlan & Ors, R (on the application of) v North & East Devon Health Authority [1999] EWCA 
Civ 1871. 
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1.2.3 Wrestling with terminology 
There are some concepts which will also be subject to debate, such as the distinction 
between therapy and enhancement. It should be noted that the thesis makes a 
distinction between therapy and enhancement.  Despite some academics suggesting 
that the distinction between therapy and enhancement is blurred (For example, see 
Colleton 2008, Kamm 2005, Schwatz 2005) the thesis is dealing with therapeutically 
aimed technologies as defined by those scientists involved in the research.  
Nonetheless, engaging with a definitional and ethical debate surrounding the 
distinction of ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ creates a debate outside the remit of the 
thesis.  The distinction between germ line and somatic interventions helps focus the 
intergenerational aspect of the intervention because somatic interventions affect only 
the next generation, whereas germ line interventions affect all future generations.  
The distinction between germ line and somatic interventions casts doubt over the 
limits of parental autonomy and creates an avenue for limited autonomy in favour of 
social ethics or justice (Buchanan et al.  2000).   
 
It became apparent while working with the data that several terms were causing 
problems for various reasons.  These terms were: mother, individual, patient, and 
agent.  They all intersected at some point, therefore causing significant imprecision 
and ambiguity within the thesis.  It became clear that the term ‘mother’ was being 
used when other terms such as ‘pregnant woman’, ‘expectant mother’, ‘mother (as in 
future mother)’, ‘agent’ and ‘individual’ could be used interchangeably.  The 
following examples will demonstrate the complexity in using such terms within an 
emotionally charged area. 
 
The Abortion Act 1967 uses the term pregnant woman, yet the leading American 
case Roe v Wade
12
 refers to the harm to a mother.  Fetal matter is considered 
maternal tissue regardless of whether that fetus has been born (Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority 2009).  However, the media appears to use the terms 
‘mother’ and ‘pregnant woman’ interchangeably to describe pregnant women.  For 
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 Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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example, one Telegraph article is titled ‘Abortion 'doesn't harm mothers' mental 
health'’ (Adams 2011), but then the title of another article is 'Pregnant women have 
asked for terminations because they did not want their holidays spoilt' (Dalrymple 
2012).  The two articles are referring to the same point of pregnancy, but seemingly 
change terminology in order to emphasise their point within the articles.  The media 
are not the only source of the interchangeable use of terms.  Medicine refers to tissue 
collected from pregnant women as ‘maternal tissue’, yet ‘maternal’ is clearly a term 
derived from motherhood.  Academics use terms such as maternal fetal surgery (Wu 
and Ball 2009), fetal surgery (Farmer 2003, Harrison 1993) or fetal therapy 
(Nicolaides and Chitty 2011) to refer to the same procedure.  Therefore, it is 
important to be consistent within the thesis, because the meaning behind each of 
these terms could lead to criticism of the author’s ethical position even though the 
use of any of these terms within the thesis is ethically neutral.   
 
Other terms were also problematic.  The term ‘individual’ became problematic 
because identifying who is an individual (or patient) was not ethically or practically 
certain.  The term fetus is a classic manifestation of such a dilemma.  The work of 
Chervenak and McCullough (1994, 2008, 2009, 2011) shows that the term ‘patient’ 
can refer to a fetus as well as a mother.  Recent media reporting of sex selective 
abortions once again highlights the interchangeable use of the term fetus and baby 
(Adams 2011) which has implications on who is termed an individual.  Therefore, 
consistency in the use of such terms is needed.   
 
The resolution of these issues was not a simple or straightforward task and involved 
many conversations with supervisors and interviewees.  It should be noted that 
within the thesis the use of the term mother or fetus does not reflect the ethical 
position of the author or indeed the ethical position of the being in question.  When 
referring to an ethical principle the term agent will be used instead of the term 
individual.  However, the term individual will be used when referring to any agent, 
possible or not, within a clinical setting.  The term mother will be used instead of 
pregnant woman or individual to reflect the literature, but also in the majority of 
cases birth is still a realistic proposition, which the term mother reflects.  When 
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considering issues that could affect the fetus if it was deemed a patient then the term 
patient will be used.  
 
Given the multidisciplinary nature of FGT, it was clear that using the specialist 
words of every practitioner involved, or even using generic terms such as researcher 
or clinician, did not serve to be inclusive enough or truly reflect the multidisciplinary 
nature of the work conducted within FGT.  Therefore, the term FGT practitioner is 
used.  A FGT practitioner is someone who works at any stage of the development of 
FGT.  Therefore, the term is inclusive of those who are solely laboratory based right 
across to those who are clinically based and those who are in both settings.  
However, the terms researcher and clinician will be used when a distinction is 
needed between the two disciplines.  
 
Other definitions which are needed to contextualise the thesis are intergenerational, 
next generation and future generation.  Intergenerational refers to an issue that has a 
possible or proven implication between two or more generations; next generation 
refers to the immediate genetic offspring of an individual including those in 
gestation; future generation refers to any generation of genetic offspring.  It should 
also be noted that the term therapy within the context of clinical trials is 
experimental treatment rather than certified therapy.  However, the term therapy is 
not an indictment upon whether the treatment will work or not, but refers to the 
therapeutic aim of the work/research being conducted.  For the readers reference 
these definitions can be found in Appendix G.  Having identified these issues, the 
thesis aims to follow the same consistency. 
1.3 Thesis structure and research questions 
In chapter 2, the historical development of FGT is outlined.  The development of 
FGT is contextualised relative to current fetal surgery and gene therapy, but also 
identifies the future direction of FGT.  As Table 1 clearly indicates, the emergence of 
FGT as another treatment option within pregnancy raises possible theoretical issues 
because of its rapid ascent from its initial use to potentially clinically trials.  Issues 
such as how to control technology (Ellul 1964, Winner 1978) and potential practical 
issues within future FGT place pressure onto regulatory and ethical thinking.  
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Therefore, when the Department of Health (DOH) in 2007 states that: ‘No human 
clinical trials of in utero gene therapy have ever taken place in the UK, nor is this 
considered to be feasible in the next few years (BBC News 2007);’ does not mean 
that these issues must not be addressed.  Such statements quickly become redundant, 
thus forcing regulators to engage with rapidly progressing technologies such as FGT 
before they reach the clinical trial stage. Therefore, chapter 2 provides a foundation 
to the thesis in order to explore and discover the practice and regulation of FGT and 
whether FGT is adequately regulated.  
 
What emanates out of these issues is that within FGT intergenerational issues are 
relevant to: those who create in utero practices involving stem cell and gene 
technologies; the regulation of fetal therapy; the thoughts of those who provide, 
access and are affected both directly and indirectly by the treatment of future 
generations.  Therefore, the overriding research questions are:  
 Are the intergenerational issues of FGT taken into account by both 
direct and indirect stakeholders?   
 Can intergenerational issues override the reproductive rights of the 
mother? 
 Have intergenerational issues impacted upon the clinical applications 
implicit and manifest in this work? 
 
Having identified that intergenerational issues are relevant then the key players that 
emanate from FGT are regulators, FGT practitioners, patients, indirect communities 
and society in general.  However, given the breadth of the stakeholders that the 
intergenerational issue affects the reproductive rights and duties can be viewed 
through that of the legislator/regulators,
13
 FGT practitioners, patient and patient 
groups.
14
  Despite the views of patients being relevant within reproductive rights, 
patient explicit views are not the contention of this thesis.  It is how patients’ rights 
are manifested and controlled through institutions such as the legislator, judiciary 
and supranational bodies that are of interest.  Therefore, the focus of the thesis will 
be within the spheres of regulators, institutions and FGT practitioners. 
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 It is not the contention of this thesis to address the issue of whether a government reflects the will 
of the people. 
14
 If such groups exist beyond those for specific in utero conditions, such as spina bifida. 
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Exploring an area of emergent science presents its own methodological problems 
because it challenges traditional methods of social science such as sampling and 
whether one data collection tool is adequate to provide enough data to explore fully 
(Hesse-Biber 2011).  Therefore, a multidisciplinary approach will be used to mediate 
such fears.  Chapter 3 indicates that documentary analysis and semi structured 
interviewing of FGT practitioners are the most appropriate research methods at this 
current time.  Once FGT progresses from the laboratory to the clinic, it would then 
be appropriate to approach patients about their experiences.    In order to provide an 
informed approach to the interviewing the documentary analysis was conducted 
before the interviews were scheduled.  The documentary analysis includes an 
exploration of current positions within medicine and law towards fetal rights, 
establishing a founding principle within regulation and an exploration of FGT 
regulation. The chapter will also discuss ethical and access issues.  Importantly, it 
will show that the thematic approach to analysing the data through Nvivo is an 
appropriate method in the given circumstances. 
 
Chapter 4 then explores whether within FGT there is a divide between the mother 
and fetus, which is categorized as the maternal fetal divide.  The maternal fetal 
divide is seen through the biological difference between mother and fetus, but also 
embraces the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept.  The maternal fetal divide is important as it 
outlines current medical and legal views towards pregnancy, thus establishing 
whether future FGT will impact on the current maternal fetal position.  The ‘fetus as 
a patient’ concept emanates from the viability of the fetus and the acknowledgement 
of the mother to continue a pre-viable fetus to term (See Chervenak and McCullough 
2007).  The term ‘fetus as a patient’ is based on the pre-viable fetus but 
acknowledges the future child which, given the lack of legal status afforded to a 
fetus, creates uncertainty regarding the rights and duties of not just a mother but of 
both prospective parents.  Even if FGT does not challenge the legal status of a fetus, 
per se the intergenerational effect of such practices must be considered.  FGT is seen 
as a potential ‘cure’ for debilitating conditions because of the above mentioned 
problems with postnatal interventions, thereby making the fetal junction the best 
opportunity to cure a condition.  Therefore, if the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept is valid, 
in choosing not to correct a condition parents could be seen as breaching their duty 
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towards the fetus, and more importantly the future child.  Therefore, issues regarding 
the prevention of harm within pregnancy become relevant, for example case law and 
the debate regarding the accountability of mothers’ actions within pregnancy.  
 
Within England and Wales the fetus has no legal rights
15
 and fetal material is 
considered as maternal tissues (Human Tissue Authority 2009).  A mother’s refusal 
of treatment emanates from the concept of autonomy and cannot be challenged 
unless that person is deemed incompetent under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  It is 
clear that pregnancy per se does not automatically render a woman incompetent.
16
  
Therefore, the choice to refuse fetal treatment is treated as the right to refuse 
treatment upon her own body and cannot be held responsible for the outcome upon 
the fetus.
17
  Where an individual is incompetent the ‘best interest’ test is used in 
order to identify if the procedure can be done without consent.
18
  The maternal fetal 
divide is important because by identifying the current practices dealing with 
pregnancy one can evaluate if the future progress and regulation of FGT can be 
sustained within that model.   
 
Due to the prospective nature of the thesis chapter 5 seeks to identify what, if any, 
ethical principle underlies FGT.  The thesis identifies that human dignity is one such 
dominant underlying ethical principle.  In trying to elaborate upon the definition of 
human dignity, it becomes evident that an ethical theory or principle is needed.  
Through the analysis of ethical theories associated with human dignity, it emerges 
that the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) as proposed by Gewirth (1978) and 
later amended by others (Beyleveld 2012, Beyleveld and Brownsword 1998, 
Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001) would be an appropriate ethical framework to 
critique the issues discovered within the data. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 conclude the documentary analysis and chapters 8 and 9 present the 
results of the interviews conducted with FGT practitioners.  It is clear that within the 
documents human dignity is used both explicitly and implicitly.  However, human 
dignity appears to lack an explicit definition and is reliant upon implicit recognition 
through concepts such as autonomy.  The consequence upon the maternal fetal 
divide is that within the clinic the mother is paramount.  In other words the fetus has 
no rights, only interests, which despite the ray of light indicated within 6.6, the 
mother’s autonomy is paramount.  Nevertheless, those interests can act as a restraint 
upon the remit of research and ultimately restrict maternal choice within the clinic, 
thus exercised within a paternalistic bubble.  However, these restrictions appear to 
emanate not just from safety concerns, but also from fears about the impact upon 
human dignity.  When these restrictions are expanded upon, it appears that the 
possible reason why there is an apparent affront to human dignity by certain 
techniques, but not others, is that the restrictions are not consistently applied.  For 
example, uncertainty and foreseeability of research appear as possible reasons to 
prohibit germ line activities despite these concerns being equally applicable to 
somatic interventions.  However, technologies utilising somatic interventions are still 
permitted.  Despite such contradictions, the data misses out key issues such as 
barriers to progress and confidentiality, which are explored within the interviews. 
 
In order to make the comparison between the two data sources easier the interview 
data structure followed the documentary data.  The interview data does confirm the 
documentary analysis by confirming that the mother is paramount within FGT.  
However, through chapters 8 and 9, it is evident that the term human dignity is not 
explicitly used by FGT practitioners.  The lack of explicit definition was alluded to 
within the documentary analysis, with the interviewees establishing that they did not 
use human dignity explicitly.  It confirmed the documentary analysis that human 
dignity is manifested and protected through the use of other concepts such as 
autonomy and informed consent.  The interview data also highlights further issues 
that cannot be seen within the documentary data, such as the interplay of abortion 
with FGT treatments.  The interplay between the two highlights the fragility of 
scientific progression and the way that FGT is also dependent upon public 
perception.  The data also indicates how to implement regulatory principles with the 
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consequence of the inherent uncertainty of FGT being mediated by a convincing 
argument.  Consequently, the comparison of the interview and documentary data 
lead to the following issues being identified: 
1. Human dignity is not a useful concept within the practice of fetal gene 
therapy despite appearing to be so within regulation. 
2. Is the paternalistic bubble that maternal choice is situated within, 
ethically correct according to the PGC? 
3. Can a mother’s autonomy be overridden by fetal interests given that 
the point of intervention is the only viable point of correction? 
4. Are the current regulatory restrictions upon FGT practitioners 
justified?  
5. Does the inherent uncertainty within fetal gene therapy meet the 
criteria for informed consent or render it ineffectual given that the 
nature of that uncertainty will affect future generations and their 
future autonomy?  
Therefore, within chapter 10 the PGC is applied to the differing relationships in 
order to uncover possible conflicts and resolutions within each identified issue.  By 
doing so it will apply the resolution of those relationships to the five key issues 
identified.  What emerges is that the majority of regulation and practice is ethically 
permissible.  However, the term ‘human dignity’ does not significantly add to the 
FGT debate and should not be used beyond reference within preambles.  Issues 
concerning abortion and germ line technologies must be readdressed, as well as the 
way that regulators apply principles such as uncertainty and foreseeability within the 
clinic. 
 
Chapter 11, the concluding chapter of the thesis focuses on several key issues, 
reaching the conclusion that specific issues such as long term follow-up and abortion 
need regulative changes in order to maintain an ethically consistent practice.  These 
changes should be in line with the PGC, and include:  
1. The removal of ‘human dignity’ from regulation, including its 
indirect application;  
2. Make the prohibition upon germ line technologies conditional, 
therefore allowing FGT practitioners to conduct germ line research 
within animals once knowledge deficits have been satisfied;  
3. Further investigate how abortion, informed consent, long term follow-
up and confidentiality can be maintained and regulated ethically. 
4. Reconsider how far bodily integrity can be respected where abortion 
is no longer an option and treatment is only available within 
pregnancy;  
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5. Review of research funding in relation to long term studies of fetal 
gene therapy. 
1.4 Conclusion 
FGT has the potential to revolutionise how therapy is conducted and to provide cures 
to previously incurable conditions. The aim of thesis is to highlight and address key 
issues that the current regulatory system has either failed to address or consider 
because of the rapid progress of FGT.  By utilising the fetus as a site of intervention 
it raises intergenerational questions regarding aspects of scientific progress and how 
it can reshape the way that rights and duties can be regulated.  Documentary analysis 
of the relevant regulatory institutions and the qualitative interviewing of practitioners 
will be analysed through the ethical framework proposed by Alan Gewirth.   From 
this it will be concluded that the currently imposed rights and duties do adequately 
take into account ethics, scientific progress and the rights of others.  The thesis will 
conclude by providing resolution to the problems identified above, as well as 
suggesting areas where further research should be conducted.  Although the thesis 
sets an ambitious task which seeks to explore difficult methodological and 
theoretical territory, given the current stage of FGT such an approach is needed in 
order to keep FGT practitioners, regulators and other parties up to date and informed 
because of the rapid scientific progress of FGT.  Therefore, the findings of this thesis 
will help those stakeholders in their efforts to move FGT from the laboratory into the 
clinic.  
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2 The Emergence and Current Practice of Fetal Gene 
Therapy 
2.1 Introduction 
Given some of the challenges that gene therapy has encountered, for example its 
inability to stop the manifestation of some conditions such as cystic fibrosis, FGT 
has the potential to overcome these challenges and fulfil the promises of gene 
therapy.  FGT is a unique area where a large number of medical professions come 
together in aid of a fetus.  A team  may  consist of paediatric surgeons, 
neurosurgeons, obstetricians, fetal medicine specialists, ultrasonographers, 
radiologists (with regard to vector delivery), MRI specialists, neonatologists, 
anaesthesiologists, geneticists, biochemists, assistants (nurses) and other personnel 
(Demirkan and Cevik-Demirkan 2004).  For each intervention, the impact of FGT 
upon medical staff is therefore widespread and encompasses many different skills 
and expertise.  Combining the multi-disciplinary nature of fetal surgery with gene 
therapy is where science fiction becomes a reality (Demirkan and Cevik-Demirkan 
2004).  FGT is rapidly becoming a discipline in need of review particularly because 
the advances that are being made re presenting specific ethical and legal challenges.  
FGT must therefore be explored to see whether the current regulatory systems are 
adequate to meet these challenges. 
 
This chapter will consider four themes relevant to the development of FGT for the 
purposes of this thesis: the historical development of FGT; the techniques and 
medical knowledge associated with FGT; current regulation; and finally prospective 
aspects of FGT.  These are important for the thesis as they outline the development 
and potential progress of FGT and establish that FGT is a fledgling practice that 
raises many questions that the thesis can address and why the multidisciplinary 
approach will be needed. 
 
Firstly, the need for FGT will be established in order to confirm FGT as an important 
tool for resolving specific technical issues.  These first two issues are central to the 
thesis as they establish a remit for the practice of FGT and to confirm the current and 
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future importance of FGT.  Once these fundamental issues have been addressed, then 
the short, but progressive development of FGT will be introduced.  It will be shown 
how FGT has evolved from a relatively unknown experimental practice into the 
emergent international practice nearing clinical trials.  
 
After outlining the historical development of FGT, some basic medicine around the 
development of an embryo, inheritance and vectorology is given.  Understanding 
inheritance will provide a basic background to the importance of genetic testing and 
explains the differences between the tissues that are targeted by therapy.  
Vectorology is an important technical area to understand as it is the method of 
administering genes within gene therapy.  Therefore, vectorology and inheritance 
will be outlined (although it should be noted that although inheritance is important, 
genetic defects can also occur due to genetic mutation).  After this, the current 
developments within FGT will be presented as well as the current regulatory 
framework that governs FGT outside the clinic (Outside the clinic in this context 
refers to the rules governing the technical aspects of FGT).   
 
Finally, as FGT progresses into the clinic the future mechanics of FGT, as well as 
issues surrounding the progress of FGT must be examined because as technologies 
develop there is a danger of technology controlling regulation rather than regulations 
controlling technology.  In highlighting these issues the need for a prospective 
methodology is identified and this provides the link to the next chapter where the 
methodology for the thesis will be established.   
2.2 Why use gene therapy upon a fetus? 
Postnatal gene therapy has encountered technical hurdles within the human body.  
The biggest of these hurdles is host vs. graft competition.  However, using gene 
therapy upon a fetus has its advantages because:  
 Induction of graft tolerance can occur in a fetus due to its 
relative immunologic immaturity. 
 A fetus’s unique wound healing properties. 
 FGT results in the early prevention of clinical manifestation of 
a disease (Turner and Fauza 2009: 477). 
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The most important of these relates to the normal development of the immunological 
system, which creates a window of opportunity where engraftment of a transgene
19
 is 
theoretically possible (Surbek et al 2008).  The ‘window of opportunity’ which 
Surbek et al (2008) refer to, makes genetic inventions through FGT a distinct 
possibility because within the window of opportunity the fetus’s immune system has 
not fully developed, thereby in theory eradicating the problems that patients post 
birth suffer due to having developed immune systems (Surbek, Schoeberlein et al. 
2008).  Long term tolerance of the engrafted transgene can also be induced 
prenatally (Wagner, Schoeberlein et al. 2008). 
 
It should be noted here that within animal studies significant progress has been made 
in the last decade which show promising signs in relation to haemophilia disorders, 
cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy and central nervous system disorders in humans 
(Santore, Roybal et al. 2009).  However, one has to recognise that the results of 
animal studies cannot definitively identify the outcome of FGT within humans.  
Therefore for progress to be maintained research must be conducted upon human 
subjects.   
 
However, as FGT progresses nearer to clinical trials, concerns have been raised over 
the use of FGT.  These concerns include mutagenesis,
20
 germ line transmissions and 
disruption of normal development.  The most pertinent is mutagenesis due to the 
viral vectors used within FGT to secure engraftment (Wagner et al 2009).  There is 
also the concern over the use of germ line gene therapy.  Even if the gene 
intervention is not specifically targeted at  the germ line, which develops and is 
compartmentalised by week seven of gestation, the germ line could potentially be 
affected (David and Peebles 2008).  If normal development is disrupted then this 
creates issues around postnatal litigation and treatment, if the fetus comes to term.  
However, before those issues can be addressed within the clinic, FGT must develop 
into a practice that is capable of being used as a legitimate therapy.  It is the 
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 A gene that is taken from the genome of one organism and introduced into the genome of another 
organism by artificial techniques (National Institute of Health 2011b). 
20
 The occurrence or induction of mutation (National Institute of Health 2011b). 
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development of FGT to the point of clinical trials that currently makes it an emerging 
technology with huge potential. 
2.3 The development of fetal gene therapy 
FGT is an amalgamation of the techniques used in fetal surgery, fetal therapy and 
gene therapy.  Therefore, the development of FGT has been possible because of the 
advances in fetal surgery and gene therapy, consequently the development of FGT 
must also be contextualised within the developments in those fields.  Fetal medicine 
can be traced back to Greek and Roman scholars who conceived the idea of a 
miniature man inside the mother’s womb (Han and Hwang 2001).  The father of 
medicine Hippocrates concluded that the fetus urinated in utero and that the uterus 
must therefore be full of fetal urine (Han and Hwang 2001). However, fetal 
intervention was not possible then and it would be some time before that was so.  
 
According to the pioneers of modern day fetal surgery, Dr Michael Harrison and Dr 
Tim Jancelewicz, the origins of fetal surgery started out as an experimental timeline 
in the 19
th
 Century with experimental animal preparations which were used to make 
observations on living mammalian fetus (Jancelewicz and Harrison 2009).  The 
experiments and studies were conducted mainly on guinea pigs, with the first 
successful fetal surgery in 1925 on a guinea pig fetus (Han and Hwang 2001).   
 
In the 1960s (Albert) William Liley emerged as the ‘father’ of fetal therapy.  His 
pioneering intrauterine transfusion for Rh disease in fetuses in 1961
21
 was later 
perfected successfully in humans in 1963 (Casper 1998, Nicolaides and Chitty 
2011).
22
  It was out of the discouraging results of hydrops fetalis,
23
 that lead Liley to 
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  Rhesus (Rh) condition is a condition where there is a difference between the mother and fetus 
concerning the Rh antigen. Blood can be Rh positive or Rh negative. If your blood lacks the Rh 
antigen, it is Rh negative; if it has the antigen, it is Rh positive. Problems can arise when the baby's 
blood has the Rh antigen and the mother's does not as the mothers antibodies filter across the 
placenta, the mother's body may make antibodies that attack the baby's blood which can cause the 
baby to have anaemia, jaundice, erythroblastosis fetalis (a blood disease) and ultimately fetal death 
(Casper 1998; American College of American Congress of Obstetricans and Gynecologists 2009).  
22
 The work of Liley cannot be underestimated, as his work on the fetus has been used and cited by 
the Supreme Court of Justice in the USA landmark case on the right to abortion: Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
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consider and attempt intra-abdominal transfusion of the fetus (Liley 1963).  The 
procedure enabled relatively safe and efficient maternal-fetal transfusions, making 
Rh conditions within pregnancy less threatening and resulted in a decrease in the 
fetal mortality rate when the procedure was utilised (Casper 1994).  Later in the 
same year, Freda and Adamsons at Columbia University, New York, carried out a 
similar procedure through an open exchange to transfuse an in utero fetus (Freda and 
Adamsons 1964).  In 1964 Adamsons, Freda and Liley convened at Columbia 
University for a full year to continue the work together.  The collaboration lead to 
ideas and innovations, such as the prospect of open uterus surgery, that would shape 
fetal surgery (Casper 1998).  It was this ground-breaking research and techniques 
that were developed for the diagnosis of genetic and physical abnormalities that lead 
to the development of techniques such as open fetal surgery; fetendo fetal surgery; 
and fetal image-guided surgery
24
 were developed.     
 
Accurate diagnosis of a fetal anomaly allows appropriate counselling and transfer to 
a tertiary unit, planned delivery, and specialised neonatal therapy (Kumar and 
O'Brien 2004).  This was primarily through the development of real time ultrasound 
imagery, which in the 1970s reported the first in utero diagnosis of the above 
congenital anomalies (Han and Hwang 2001).  However, the evolution of genomics 
has introduced prenatal testing, and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis techniques 
which have both lead to conditions being diagnosed earlier and easier than before.  
For example, since the advent of Pre Natal Diagnosis (PND), diagnostic techniques, 
such as amniocentesis
25
 and chorionic villus sampling,
26
 with more recent non 
invasive techniques such as cell free fetal DNA, technologies are being used as more 
than 90% of structural and chromosomal abnormalities arise in pregnancies without 
                                                                                                                                          
23
 Hydrops fetalis is a serious condition, where abnormal amounts of fluid build up in two or more 
body areas of a fetus or newborn and is a complicated form of Rh Disease (Rauch 2006). 
24
 For a full description and videos of these techniques in operation see The Fetal Treatment Center 
(2009a). 
25
 In amniocentesis, a sample of the amniotic fluid is removed and analysed. It is the most common 
invasive prenatal diagnostic procedure undertaken in the United Kingdom. Most amniocenteses are 
performed to obtain amniotic fluid for karyotyping and the majority are undertaken from 15 
completed weeks (15+0) onwards (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2005). 
26
 Chorionic villus sampling (CVS) is usually performed between 10 and 13 weeks of gestation and 
involves aspiration of placental tissue rather than amniotic fluid. CVS can be performed using either 
percutaneous transabdominal or the transcervical approach. Transabdominal CVS can be performed at 
gestations greater than 13 weeks (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2005).  
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any obvious risk factors (Kumar and O'Brien 2004: 328).  Therefore, genetic testing 
is creating more accurate and earlier diagnosis of conditions which may occur, 
depending on the condition.  It should be noted that the development of PND means 
that genetic analysis can occur within the first trimester of pregnancy and the advent 
of non invasive genetic tests could result in positive tests leading to an increase in 
genetic related abortions.  In addition PND coupled with increasing PGD and adult 
genetic testing could lead to FGT being redundant in relation to serious genetic 
conditions.  However, ‘therapy’ would seemingly still have a place despite these 
developments.  
 
Prior to 1997, fetal surgery was considered exclusively for fetuses with life-
threatening anomalies (Pierro 2003: 195), but with the increase in accurate 
diagnostic equipment, the criteria for fetal surgery was now no longer restricted to 
that of life threatening anomalies but included progressive anomalies such as spina 
bifida (Jancelewicz and Harrison 2009).  It was the advance into correcting relatively 
common birth defects that has raised the possibility of fetal surgery for a much 
greater number of patients (Chervenak and McCullough 2007).  Fetal surgery was no 
longer focused within a few highly specialised areas but became relevant to a wider 
patient base.  The consequence for FGT has meant that FGT can be targeted at 
congenital abnormalities as well as those that could affect the fetus. 
 
There were early signs that FGT could be successful where adult gene therapy could 
not.  In 1990, Maria Hatzoglou et al (1990) were the first to use an in utero approach 
in applying a replication-incompetent retrovirus vector to fetal rats in utero.  Their 
work showed that it mediated expression of human growth factor, which was 
significantly more effective than the application of the same vector within an adult 
animal model.  The success of Hatzolglou’s et al (1990) work lead to a large number 
of successful in utero gene experiments, which demonstrated gene delivery to 
virtually all fetal tissues (See David, Themis et al. 2003).  It was not until 1997 that a 
curative gene therapy protocol for cystic fibrosis by prenatal injection of an 
adenovirus into the amniotic fluid in mice was identified (Larson, Morrow et al. 
1997).  However, the research of Larson et al was substantially criticized in the 
literature at the time and later research has indicated that cystic fibrosis cannot be 
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replicated in the circumstance that Larson et al concluded (Buckley, Waddington et 
al. 2008).   
 
Meanwhile, in the USA Dr French Anderson with his team of experts had gone one 
stage further by performing gene therapy in a four year old with Severe Combined 
Immunodeficiency secondary to a genetic defect in the purine catabolic enzyme 
Adenosine DeAminase [ADA-SCID] (Blaese, Culver et al. 1995).
27
  The key to this 
advance was the advent of useful retroviral vectors that permitted relatively high 
efficiency gene transfer and stable integration (Blaese, Culver et al. 1995).  After 
conducting their first human gene therapy trial in 1990 (Blaese, Culver et al. 1995) 
the group started to consider the possibility of using such therapy within the fetus 
due to perceived immunological advantages.  Delivering a foreign protein or therapy 
to the fetus can take advantage of immune tolerance which is induced during fetal 
life. This was not a new concept and was first proposed nearly 60 years ago 
(Billingham et al., 1953, 1956).  However nobody had ever tried it.  Dr French 
Anderson therefore forwarded a clinical phase 0 proposal to the National Institute of 
Health Office of Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (Office of Recombinant 
DNA Activities 1999).  
 
At the same time, against the background of the human genome project,
28
 within the 
United Kingdom (UK) the Gene Therapy Advisory Committee (GTAC) conducted 
its own review of the potential of prenatal (fetal) gene therapy.  Under its New and 
Emerging Technologies (NETS) sub group it utilised the core principles that were 
used by the Clothier Committee, which sought to look into the issues and ethics in 
gene therapy in general (Clothier 1993).  These core principles were: 
a) gene therapy is research and not innovative treatment; 
b) only somatic therapy should be considered; 
c) in view of safety and ethical difficulties germ line interventions are 
off limits at present; 
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 ADA-SCID is a condition whereby the enzyme which catalyzes the conversion of adenosine to 
inosine is deficient; therefore, causing a form of severe combined immunodeficiency disease as a 
result of the accumulation of toxic metabolites which inhibit DNA synthesis (National Institute of 
Health 2011b). 
28
 The Human Genome Project has been described by the Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist 
Walter Gilbert as ‘a vision of the grail’ (Gilbert 1991:83). 
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d) gene therapy should be restricted to life threatening disorders where 
no current alternative effective treatments are available; 
e) patients should take part in gene therapy research trials only after a 
full explanation of the procedures, risks and benefits and after they 
have given their informed consent, if they are capable of doing so; 
and 
f) recognising that some people, including young children, may not be 
able to give such consent, therapeutic research involving such patients 
must not put them at disproportionate risk (Gene Therapy Advisory 
Committee 1998: 3). 
Using these core principles in conjunction with recommendations from the Clothier 
Committee report they considered that no new ethical issues were raised by in utero 
gene therapy or stem cell interventions. 
 
The first use of FGT was recorded in 1999 (See Zanjani and Anderson 1999), but the 
first widely accepted confirmation of FGT was provided by the correction of several 
different disease phenotypes in relevant animal models (Coutelle, Themis et al. 
2005).  It was not until 2003 that the first successful therapeutic application of gene 
transfer in utero was performed by direct injection of a lentiviral vector (Seppen, van 
der Rijt et al. 2003).  Later FGT then progressed to  show long-term expression of 
proteins at therapeutic levels and induction of immune tolerance (Waddington et al., 
2007) in both small (Waddington et al., 2004), and large animals (Tran et al., 2001) 
and cured congenital disease in some animal models (Mehta, Abi Nader et al. 2011). 
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Table 2.  Timeline of recent fetal gene therapy developments 
 
Adapted from (Mehta, Abi Nader et al. 2011)
29
 
                                                 
29
 AAV, adeno-associated virus vector; cftr, cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulating 
protein; EB, epidermolysis bullosa; eGFP, enhanced green fluorescent protein; EIAV, equine immune 
Organ 
targeted Animal model Vector and transgene Delivery route Outcome Year
Gut Mouse, rat Adenovirus, retrovirus, AAV IA
Low level transduction of the intestine (Holzinger et 
al. , 1995; Douar et al. , 1997; Boyle et al. , 2001; 
Garrett et al. , 2003)
1995
Lung, gut
S489X cftr 
knockout mousea
Adenovirus encoding h-cftr IA
One study reported improved survival but not 
replicated by two further studies (Larson et al. , 
1997; Buckley et al. , 2008; Davies et al. , 2008)
1997
Liver Guinea pig Adenovirus encoding β-galactosidase UV High level liver transduction (Senoo et al., 2000) 2000
Liver
Late-gestation 
macaque
Adenovirus, lentivirus and retrovirus IP, intrahepatic
High level liver transduction (Tarantal et al. , 
2001b; Lai et al. , 2002; Lee et al. , 2005; 
Tarantal 2006)
2001
Lung Mouse AAV1 or AAV2 encoding eGFP IP
Short-term expression of luciferase evaluated by 
bioluminescence and ex vivo luminometry of tissue 
homogenates (Lipshutz et al., 2001)
2001
Lung Rabbit AAV2 encoding luciferase IA
Luciferase expression in amniotic membranes, 
trachea and pulmonary epithelium (Boyle et al., 
2001)
2001
Liver MPS type I dog
Retrovirus encoding canine α-L-
iduronidase
Yolk sac and 
peritoneal cavity
Detection of enzyme activity at birth (Meertens et 
al., 2002)
2002
Liver
Crigler-Najjar type 
1 syndrome rat
Lentivirus encoding bilirubin UDP-
glucuronyl-transferase
IP and intrahepatic 
injection
45% reduction in bilirubin levels for up to 1 year 
(Seppen et al., 2003)
2003
Liver
Early-gestation 
sheep
Adenovirus IP, intrahepatic
High level transduction of the liver after IP 
compared with intrahepatic injection (David et al. , 
2003a,b)
2003
Lung
Early-gestation 
sheep
Adenovirus encoding β-galactosidase IA by USS
β-galactosidase expression in skin, placenta, 
membranes and airways (David et al., 2003a)
2003
Lung
Late-gestation 
macaque
AAV2 encoding eGFP IA
Low level eGFP expression scattered throughout 
airways for over 1 year (Garrett et al., 2003)
2003
Skin
Early-gestation 
sheep
Adenovirus IA
Expression in superficial epidermis (David et al., 
2003a)
2003
Liver
Haemophilia B 
mousea
Lentivirus encoding hFIX Vitelline vessel
Permanent cure of haemophilia with immune 
tolerance to exogenous hFIX (Waddington et al., 
2004)
2004
Lung Mid-gestation sheep Adenovirus encoding β-galactosidase
Tracheal injection by 
USS
Widespread, strong transgene expression in fetal 
trachea and bronchial tree (Peebles et al., 2004)
2004
Muscle
GSD type II 
(Pompe disease) 
mouse
AAV1 encoding acid α-glucosidase IP
Strong transgenic protein expression in diaphragm 
muscle, restoration of contractile function (Rucker 
et al., 2004)
2004
Muscle Mouse
EIAV encoding β-galactosidase, 
AAV vectors encoding β-
galactosidase
Vitelline vessel 
injection, IM and IP 
injection
Yolk-sac vessel delivery targeted the liver and 
heart, IM transduced skeletal muscle and IP 
transduced the diaphragm; expression was 
observed for over 15 months (Gregory et al., 2004)
2004
Brain
Mucopolysaccharide 
type VII mousea
Adenovirus encoding β-glucuronidase
Injection of lateral 
ventricles
Prevented pathological lysosomal storage in 
neurons and glia for up to 4 months (Shen et al., 
2004)
2004
Eye
Leber congenital 
amaurosis mousea
AAV1/2 encoding RPE65 gene
Transscleral 
transchoroidal 
subretinal injection
Restoration of visual function (Dejneka et al. , 
2004; Williams et al. , 2006)
2004
Skin Mouse Adenovirus, lentivirus IA
Expression in superficial epidermis and lung 
(Buckley, 2005); lentivirus conferred transgenic 
protein expression in basal epidermal stem cells into 
adulthood (Endo et al. , 2008)
2005
Heart
Mid-gestation 
Rhesus monkey
Self-inactivating lentivirus encoding 
eGFP
Intramyocardial 
injection by USS
Long-term and strong eGFP expression in 
myocardium and pericardium (Tarantal et al., 2005)
2005
Skin
Herlitz junctional EB 
mouse
Adenovirus and AAV encoding 
laminin-5 protein
IA
Laminin-5 expression but no effect on lifespan of 
mouse (Muhle et al., 2006)
2006
Eye
Leber congenital 
amaurosis chicken
Lentivirus encoding GUCY1
*
 B gene
Injection of ventricle 
of neural tube
Restoration of visual function (Williams et al., 2006) 2006
Gut
Early-gestation 
sheep
Adenovirus encoding β-galactosidase
Intragastric injection 
by USS
Widespread transduction of intestine and gut (David 
et al., 2006a)
2006
Liver and 
HSCs
Mouse Lentivirus encoding h-α-globin Vitelline vessel
α-globin expression in liver, spleen and blood 
peaked at 4 months, but then declined (Han et al., 
2007)
2007
Blood Mouse AAV1 and AAV2 Human FIX
Sustained hRX expression in the absense of an 
immune response for haemohpilia b (Sabantino 
2007)
2007
Lung Rat
Adenovirus and lentivirus encoding 
eGFP
Lung parenchyma 
injection by USS
eGFP expression only in interstitial cells (Henriques-
Coelho, 2007)
2007
Muscle
Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy mousea
Adenovirus encoding murine 
dystrophin
IM
Regeneration of muscle fibres, prevention of muscle 
damage (Reay et al., 2008)
2008
Uterine 
artery
Mid-gestation sheep
Adenovirus encoding VEGF/β-
galactosidase
Uterine artery 
injection
Efficient transduction of the uterine arteries, 
increased uterine artery blood flow (David et al., 
2008)
2008
Blood Mouse Lentivirus vitelline vein injection
Sustained transgene expression and correction of 
prothrombotic phenotypes in congenital thrombotic 
thromnocytopenic purpura (Niiya et all 2009)
2009
Muscle
Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy mouse
AAV8 encoding minidystrophin IP
Reduced muscle pathology and functional benefit to 
the transduced diaphragm (Koppanati et al., 2010)
2010
Spinal cord Mouse EIAV encoding β-galactosidase
Intrathecal injection at 
E16
Transduction of dorsal roots and dorsal root ganglia 
(Rahim et al., 2010a)
2010
Nervous 
system
Mouse AAV9 encoding GFP
Vitelline vessel 
injection
Global transduction of nervous tissue throughout the 
brain, eye and peripheral nervous system (Rahim et 
al., 2010b)
2010
Liver
Early and late-
gestation sheep
AAV8 encoding hFIX IP injection by USS
hFIX expression in blood up to 6 months but no 
immune tolerance (David et al., 2011)
2011
Liver
Late-gestation 
macaque
AAV5 and 8 encoding hFIX UV injection by USS
hFIX expression in blood and liver for at least 1 
year, non-neutralizing immune response (Mattar et 
al., 2011)
2011
Muscle
Late-gestation 
macaque
AAV9 vector UV injection
High level of transgene expression in cardiac and 
skeletal muscles (Mattar et al., 2011)
2011
Skeleton Mouse AAV9 vector
Uterine artery 
injection
Enhanced mineralization was demonstrated on X-
ray images of the chest and forepaw in lethal murine 
Hypophosphatasia. (Sugano et al 2012)
2012
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It is evident from Table 2
30
 that there have been many developments in the last ten 
years.  As stated earlier changes in vectorology have made some of the recent 
advances possible (See Mckay, Rahim et al. 2011).  It should be noted that FGT 
progression has not been linear.  The development of gene therapy has been hindered 
by several incidents, most notably the  deaths of Jesse Gelsinger
31
 and Jolee Mohr.
32
  
These incidents have had a negative effect on the progress of all gene therapy 
protocols (Deakin, Alexander et al. 2009).  FGT also has had its own issues where a 
high incidence rate of liver tumours in fetal and neonatal mice was observed after the 
application of early third-generation equine infectious anaemia virus vectors with 
self-inactivating configuration (Coutelle 2008).  One also has to consider that any 
treatment in pregnancy is clouded by high profile incidents involving pregnancy 
such as the Thalidomide and Epilim.
33
  Despite not being a FGT trial, these incidents 
highlight the possible negative media and public reaction to an adverse result.  
Despite these concerns, FGT is progressing again.  The progress of FGT as seen in 
Table 2 and the currently identified organs which would be targeted at a prenatal 
phases of development, indicates that FGT will progress to the clinic because of the 
increasing success in animal models.  In order to understand how FGT has reached 
this point some basic medicine in terms of fetal development, inheritance and 
vectorology will now be explored.  In doing so, the process and development of FGT 
as a practice can be contextualised, and at the same time it can provide information 
to be used later in the thesis to enable understanding of the debates surrounding 
regulation. 
                                                                                                                                          
anaemia virus; GSD, glycogen storage disease; hFIX, human factor IX clotting factor; HSCs, 
haematopoietic stem cells; IA, intra-amniotic; IM, intramuscular; IP, intraperitoneal; MPS, 
mucopolysaccharidosis; UV, umbilical vein; USS, ultrasound.  
30
 Up to date as of Spring 2012. 
31
 Jesse Gelsinger, died in a Phase 1 dose escalation study involving ornithine transcarbamylase 
deficiency which it has been debated was a result of poor subject selection which if executed safely 
and efficiency would have resulted in Jesse not being a trial subject (Kimmelman 2008). 
32
 Jolee Mohr died during a clinical trial using gene therapy to treat rheumatoid arthritis, but later tests 
showed the death was not a result of the gene therapy (Tanne 2007). 
33
 See (BBC 2002) for details upon the thalidomide incidence which resulted in birth defects between 
1957 and 1961; and (Hirsh 2011) for details regarding the soon to be dropped Epilim case where  the 
users of the epilepsy drug ‘Epilim’ during pregnancy alleged that the drug caused the birth defects in 
their children. 
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2.4 Basic medicine and fetal gene therapy techniques 
2.4.1 Introduction to fetal development 
After fertilisation has occurred between the male and female gametes the embryonic 
development stage starts.  At 36 hours after chemotaxis
34
 and fertilisation the ovum 
begins mitosis until it reaches the blastocyst stage at day 5 of development 
(Pawlowski, Sheehan et al. 2007).
35
  Here, the embryo is merely a group of identical 
cells, all with the potential to become any part of the embryo.  At day 6, implantation 
occurs and the embedded embryo starts to develop its central nervous system after 
about 14 days of development.  It is at this point of development that the primitive 
streak
36
 is visible (McLaren 1986: 15).  The neural tube begins to close after 22–23 
days, and by day 42 the cerebral cortex begins development.  By day 56, the fetal 
stage begins (Tortora and Grabowski 2001). 
Table 3.  Timeline of fetal development 
End of  
Month  
Approximate 
Size 
and Weight 
Representative Changes 
1 0.6cm Eyes, nose and ears are not yet visible.  Vertebral column and 
vertebral canal form.  Heart forms and starts beating.  Body 
systems begin to form with central nervous system begin form 
from the primitive streak by day 15. 
2 3cm 
1g 
Eyes far apart and fused.  Nose is flat.  Ossification begins 
while limbs become more distinct with digits being formed.  
The internal organs continue to form and immune system is 
still underdeveloped. 
3 7.5cm 
30g 
Eyes almost fully developed but with fused eyelids.  
Ossification continues.  Limbs are now fully formed and fetus 
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 Orientation or movement of an organism or cell in relation to chemical agents (National Institute of 
Health 2011b). 
35
 An undifferentiated embryonic cell that has developed for five to six days after fertilisation 
(National Institute of Health 2011b). 
36
 An elongated band of cells that forms along the axis of an embryo early in gastrulation by the 
movement of lateral cells toward the axis and that develops a groove or ‘streak’ along its midline 
through which cells move to the interior of the embryo to form the mesoderm (National institute of 
Health 2011b). 
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has detectable heartbeat.  Unfelt fetal movement occurs and 
urine starts to be excreted. 
4 18cm 
100g 
Rapid body development while taking on human features and 
joints begin to be formed.  Fetal immunocompetence is 
established (13-16 weeks).  Head is disproportionate in size 
compared to body 
5 25-30cm 
200-450g 
Head becomes less disproportionate.  The fetus also begins 
more frequent movements which start to be felt (the 
quickening).  Continued rapid body development 
6 27-35cm 
550-800g 
Head becomes even less disproportionate to body and eyelids 
separate.  Substantial weight gain and skin is wrinkled. 
7 32-42cm 
1100-1350g 
Head and body more proportionate despite wrinkled skin.  
Birth now would be premature but capable of survival.  Fetus 
begins to rotate to upside-down position.  Testes start to 
descend to scrotum 
8 41-45cm 
2000-2350g 
Subcutaneous fat is deposited and skin becomes less wrinkled 
9 50cm 
3200-3400g 
Additional subcutaneous fat and nails continue to grow 
 (Tortora and Grabowski 2001: 583) 
A basic timeline of fetal development can be seen in Table 3. From day 56 of 
gestation the fetus develops in the mother’s uterus in a sac, which develops from a 
thin membrane formed by the eighth day of fertilisation called the amnion (Tortora 
and Grabowski 2001).  The sac fills with amniotic fluid, which is initially from the 
mothers blood, but is predominately filled with fetal urine and contains essential 
nutrients for fetal development (British Medical Association 2004).  From week 
eight, until the fetus coming to term, the fetus grows in length up to 20 times and 
increases in weight by 1700 times (See Table 3).  Around week 12  the fetus  starts 
to develop its own movements and resembles something 'human' like (Cunningham, 
Gant et al. 2001), but it is not until week 32 that the internal organs are almost fully 
developed (British Medical Association 2004).  The normal term time is 40 weeks, 
although some babies have been known to survive after as little as 22 weeks of 
gestation (New Scientist and Reuters 2007).  To further understand FGT the next 
section gives a brief explanation of inheritance and vectorology. 
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2.4.2 Understanding of inheritance and vectorology 
Each human being inherits 46 chromosomes arranged into 23 pairs (British Medical 
Association 2004).  Pair 23 of these chromosomes determines our sex with XX for 
female and XY for male.  Half of the chromosomes in a fetus are inherited from the 
mother and half from the father.  However, a child also inherits maternal DNA from 
plural mitochondria that are situated within the cytoplasm of the oocyte from which 
they develop from (Howard Hughes Medical Institute 2006). 
 
Each chromosome that makes up a pair is called a homolog and contains genes that 
control the same trait (Tortora and Grabowski 2001).  Genes that control the same 
trait are situated on the same location on homologous chromosomes and are called 
alleles.  These can be either dominant or recessive, and can affect both the genotype 
(genome) and phenotype (physical or outward expression) of a person (Tortora and 
Grabowski 2001).  The example of eye colour shows the different permutations of 
genotypes and phenotypes (see Table 4). 
Table 4.  Results of punnett square for brown or blue eyes 
Alleles present
37
 Genotype Phenotype 
BB 
Homozygous 
dominant 
Brown eyes 
Bb Heterozygous Brown eyes 
Bb 
Homozygous 
recessive 
Blue eyes 
 
Genetic diseases can by inherited either through sex determining chromosomes or 
through genes that are located on a non sex determining chromosome called an 
autosome (Senut and Gage 1999).  As stated above, the inheritance of genetic 
conditions is not as simple as eye colour since conditions can be monogenetic, 
                                                 
37
 B = dominant allele; b = recessive allele 
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polygenetic and multifactorial.
38
  An individual will inherent a genetic condition 
from the germ cells of their genetic parents, though it should be noted that genetic 
conditions can arise as a result of new mutations which neither parent has and can 
result in incomplete development of organs. 
 
Within the body there are two types of cells: somatic and germ line.  Somatic cells 
are any body cells that compose the tissues, organs, and parts of that individual other 
than their germ cells (National Institute of Health 2011b).  Germ cells are those cells 
involved in reproduction such as an oocyte, sperm cell or one of their antecedent 
cells (Debyser 2003, National Institute of Health 2011b).  Any therapy therefore 
targeted at somatic cells will not be inherited by the next generation.  In order to treat 
any of these types of body cells vectorology must be used to transfer the correctly 
functioning gene into the host’s cells. 
Table 5.  Table indicating the scientific properties of various vectors currently used 
within gene therapy 
 
(Debyser 2003: 497) 
Vectorology is the use of a vector, often a virus, in order to correct dysfunctional 
genes.  A viral vector is a protein particle derived from a replicative virus that 
                                                 
38
Monogenic conditions relate to, or are controlled by a single gene and especially by either or both 
allelic pair, whereas polygenic or multifactorial conditions have characters or a mode of inheritance 
dependent on a number of genes at different locations (National Institute of Health 2011). 
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contains genetic information in the form of RNA or DNA (Debyser 2003: 495).  
There are non-viral vectors as well but the success of these vectors has been limited 
(Mckay, Rahim et al. 2011).  The main classes of viral vectors are adenovirus, 
Adeno-Associated Virus (AAV), retrovirus (such as HIV), lentivirus, Herpes 
Simplex Virus (HSV) and naked DNA (See Table 5).  The choice of viral vector is 
determined by the size of the gene of interest, the required duration of gene 
expression, the target cell and biosafety issues (Debyser 2003). 
Diagram 1.  Diagram illustrating how gene therapy using an adenovirus works 
 
(National Institute of Health 2011a) 
Vectors are used to act as a carrier of a new ‘correctly functioning’ gene into the 
host’s DNA or cell nucleus (depending on whether an integrating or non integrating 
vector is used)
39
 in order to rectify their dysfunctional gene.  This process can be 
seen in Diagram 1 for a non integrating vector called an adenovirus.  Full integration 
and therefore the length of expression are determined by the vector used.   
 
Having outlined the basic medical and technical aspects of FGT, and introduced the 
idea of correcting genetic conditions in utero, a logical next question to ask is for 
what conditions can this be used?  In order to answer this question regulation is 
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 Integration within this context refers to vector integration into the hosts DNA. 
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important as not only does it provide the answer to this question, but it helps outline 
procedures and responsibilities that must be adhered to. 
2.5 Regulating fetal gene therapy outside of the clinic 
As identified within 2.3, FGT is a subspecialty of gene therapy and therefore gene 
therapy regulation is applicable to FGT.  However, due to its specific and unique 
target for treatment it has additional regulation that is not applicable to gene therapy 
in general.  The legal definition of a 'gene therapy medicinal product' is any 
biological medicinal product which has the following characteristics: 
(a) it contains an active substance, which contains or consists of a 
recombinant nucleic acid used in or administered to human beings 
with a view to regulating, repairing, replacing, adding or deleting a 
genetic sequence; 
(b) its therapeutic, prophylactic or diagnostic effect relates directly to 
the recombinant nucleic acid sequence it contains, or to the product of 
genetic expression of this sequence.
40
 
 
It should be noted that the definition of a gene therapy medicinal product no longer 
includes vaccines against infectious diseases.
41
  Legally, any product that is 
classified as a gene therapy medicinal product is classified as an Advanced Therapies 
Medicinal Product (ATMP) under the Advanced Therapies Regulation.
42
  These 
regulations were translated into domestic regulation by the Medicines for Human 
Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004.  Any gene therapy medicinal product that is 
manufactured or supplied within the UK is covered by the Medicines Act 1968.  
Where the medicinal product is for human use Directive 2001/83/EC is also 
applicable.
43
  
 
                                                 
40
 Directive 2003/63/EC (amending Directive 2001/83/EC) and European Commission Directive 
2009/120/EC of 14 September 2009 amending Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use as regards 
advanced therapy medicinal products (Directive 2009/120/EC). For full directive titles see Appendix 
F - List of Analysed Documents. 
41
 Directive 2009/120/EC Article 2.1. 
42
 Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007. ATMP's can include any of the following medicinal products for 
human use: (1) a gene therapy medicinal product, (2) a somatic cell therapy medicinal product, or (3) 
a tissue engineered product. Regulation (EC) 1394/2007 Article 1. 
43
 Amended by Directive 2002/98/EC, Directive 2003/63/EC, Directive 2004/24/EC and Directive 
2004/27/EC. 
33 
 
Where FGT practitioners are conducting clinical trials involving a gene therapy 
medicinal product they have more general responsibilities in conducting their clinical 
research, as identified in the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004.  Under these regulations, all clinical trials involving Medicinal Products, 
including ATMPs, must have a clinical trial authorisation granted by the Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).  Where a medicinal product 
will be used across Europe approval from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
will be required.
44
  The MHRA will assess the safety of the trial as well as regulatory 
compliance (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 2010).  In addition, an UK clinical 
trial cannot commence until a Research Ethics Committee (REC) has provided a 
favourable opinion for the study (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 2010).
45
  For 
all gene therapy protocols in the UK GTAC is the only UK ethics committee 
empowered to approve clinical trials of gene therapy medicinal products.
46
  
According to GTAC guidelines, in order to be ethical, the risks of the physical 
procedures would need to be known (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 1998: 6).  
They will weigh up the foreseeable risks and inconveniences against the anticipated 
benefit for the individual trial subject and other present and future patients (Gene 
Therapy Advisory Committee 2010).  As with all gene therapy the intervention must 
only be to somatic cells.
47
  Any intervention that seeks to alter the germ cells of the 
patient or third party is deemed illegal.
48
  All efforts to prevent inadvertent germ line 
alterations must be taken (Clothier 1993).  However, such regulation relies upon 
current scientific knowledge and the presumption that any germ line alteration would 
be against human dignity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Regulation (EC) 726/2004 and European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/83/EC of 
November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (Directive 
2001/83/EC). For full title of European legislation see Appendix F - List of Analysed Documents 
45
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 s.14. 
46
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 s.14(5). 
47
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 s.19(1). 
48
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 s.19(3). 
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Table 6.  List of organs that are currently being targeted by fetal gene therapy 
(Mehta, Abi Nader et al. 2011: 729) 
Additional regulation is in place for FGT indicating that a target disorder or disease 
would need to be life threatening, or associated with severe disability, and for which 
no suitable treatment is available after birth, in order to justify intervention in utero 
(Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 1998).  Therefore recent relatively successful 
advances in adult gene therapy for haemophilia b (Nathwani, Tuddenham et al. 
2011) would mean that an in utero approach would not be permitted.  Nevertheless, a 
FGT practitioner could develop a fetal approach to treatment for conditions in organs 
such as identified in Table 6.  Such regulations mean that the only point of 
intervention, which would rectify a future child’s condition, would be in utero.  In 
developing a fetal approach the mechanics of delivering the product must also be 
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identified and, therefore, a prospective look at FGT in the clinic is necessary.  
However, in looking forward issues surrounding emerging technologies, scientific 
progress and regulation must also be addressed since these issues will help guide the 
methodology of the thesis. 
2.6 Looking forward 
In looking forward towards prospective clinic trials of FGT, and then future 
normalisation of FGT as a viable practice, various issues arise which include: the 
viability of FGT as a practice; will it be successful; and will the public accept it.  
However, two predominant issues arise that are relevant immediately to regulation:  
How can it be done? And, is regulation capable of regulating scientific progress? 
2.6.1 The theoretical mechanics of future fetal gene therapy 
interventions 
Currently the options available to those who are in  receipt of their own genetic 
information before pregnancy has occurred have preventive options such as: (i) 
having no children, (ii) taking the risk and hoping that their child will be unaffected, 
(iii) adopting a child, (iv) using assisted reproductive technologies such as prenatal 
diagnosis with selective abortion, or sperm donation, or the use of pre-implantation 
diagnosis after in vitro fertilisation of intracytoplasmic sperm injection (Fletcher and 
Richter 1996, Pembrey 1995).  Nevertheless, in the future FGT will be another 
treatment option and the following questions would need to be answered: Is the 
disease in question amenable to treatment? Would the treatment be preferable to 
termination or non intervention where there is a valid pre clinical model? Do FGT 
practitioners’ feel after considering factors, such as risk/benefit calculations, and the 
chance of ethical approval, that a mother’s consent is still valid? Would the 
intervention occur at the correct time (Mattar, Choolani et al. 2011)?  These 
questions are not an exhaustive list but merely indicate the complexity of questions 
that must be asked.  For example, Diagram 2 indicates the imperative of time within 
the mechanics of any future FGT intervention. 
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Diagram 2.  Flow diagram illustrating the future mechanics of fetal gene therapy 
within the clinic 
(Mattar, Choolani et al. 2011: 1262) 
It is clear from Diagram 2 that the mechanics of any FGT whether in vivo or ex vivo 
will have to occur early in pregnancy, near the end of the first trimester, but possibly 
into the second trimester.  Therefore, the availability of prenatal diagnostic tools 
such as amniocentesis and ultrasound are critical in diagnosing these conditions early 
enough within pregnancy for an effective treatment regime to be implemented.  
However, the implementation of that treatment strategy could change as FGT 
progresses and develops.  It is the development of a technology that can cause 
regulatory problems. 
2.6.2 Regulating fetal gene therapy and scientific progress 
Although the current FGT regulations appear to be already decided it is clear that 
emerging or developing technologies pose different questions for regulation as they 
progress from the laboratory to the clinic and then into normalised medical practice.  
In identifying the theoretical mechanism of future FGT, as well as the broader 
regulatory framework that FGT would be governed by, there are still further issues 
about the ability of  the current regulations to cope with the transition from the 
laboratory into the clinic. 
37 
 
 
Statutes and regulations, almost by definition, are designed to handle regulatory 
concerns existing at the time of promulgation.  It is not surprising that emerging 
technologies often exacerbate regulatory gaps or introduce new concerns that create 
new regulatory lacunae  (Mandel 2009: 6).  These developments have the ability to 
outpace the capacity of individuals and institutions to adapt (Winner 1978: 3).  As 
Ellul notes, these types of technologies potentially could change tradition and the 
way in which we live in order to accommodate these new technologies (Ellul 1965).  
As a result tradition is banished to the past due to the necessity of new techniques 
(Welsh 2000). Technologies such as FGT have the ability to shape humans rather 
than being shaped by humans.  This has been interpreted by some as the rise of 
autonomous technology (Winner 1978).  These technologies can lead to future 
shock
49
 because of the greatly accelerated rate of change, thus leading to a negative 
impact upon society (Toffler 1971).  Although this thesis is not arguing that 
technology is autonomous in the way that either Ellul or Winner suggest, important 
issues arise out of their work relating to how to regulate such areas and how to 
investigate such emergent technologies in order to control them, and thus stop the 
development of autonomous technology (Winner 1978).  For example, in the effort 
to wrest back control one should evaluate the danger of what might happen in the 
next half-century, and distinguish between what humanity wants to keep and what it 
is ready to lose (Ellul and Bromiley (trans.) 1989). 
 
In order to manage the dynamic of emerging technology promise versus risk, it is 
important to move the point of first regulation earlier in a technology’s development 
(Mandel 2009).  In other words ethical analysis and debate should happen before the 
technology advances.  However, within the governance of scientific progress, 
evolution and flexibility must still be possible, otherwise in trying to control 
scientific progress there is a danger of stifling it completely.  Progress inevitably has 
uncertainty within it that can only be known through investigation.  However, areas 
of scientific progress, such as FGT, can polarize debate and, hence, opinions about 
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 Future shock is a time phenomenon that arises from the superimposition of a new culture on an old 
one, yet within one’s own society (Toffler 1971). 
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how an area should be regulated.  This is partly because progressing technologies are 
problematic and have persistent uncertainty surrounding  potential risks (Falkner and 
Jaspers 2012: 2).  It is potential rather than quantifiable predicted risk that has the 
ability to hinder progress.  
 
It appears, therefore, that within areas of scientific progress such as FGT an 
explorative stance should be taken, because there is no current human practice that 
could address the uncertainties and potential risks, and could be used here in order to 
achieve an understanding of FGT.  This explorative stance, however, causes 
methodological problems such as sample size and population identification, but it 
would  seek to redress the one direction exchange that could occur due to the 
potentially autonomous technology (Ellul 1965). These methodological issues will 
be returned to more fully in chapter 3, but they highlight the difficulty of trying to 
regulate within an area that is predominately reactionary to current practice.  They 
also  illustrate that the regulation currently in use  is potentially inadequate to cope 
with emergent or progressing technologies (Mandel 2009).  Therefore, addressing 
how scientific progress is currently managed is a fundamental theme that must be 
addressed. 
 
One such method within regulation to control such technology is the precautionary 
principle.
50
 There is no universal definition of precautionary principle, but the 
purpose of the precautionary principle is to create an impetus to take a decision 
notwithstanding scientific uncertainty about the nature and extent of the risk (Health 
and Safety Executive 2002: 2) At a regulatory level precautionary principles have 
been seen as paralyzing (Sunstein 2003) as well as drawing a growing amount of 
negativity within certain debates such as climate change (Giddens 2009).  It is 
argued that such a principle would lead to halting scientific progress because not all 
risks can be contained, thus the most precautionary approach should be adopted 
(Sunstein 2005).  Those, such as Sunstein prefer a cost benefit analysis, which is 
heavily dependent on market pressure and scientific evidence (Sunstein 2003, 2005).   
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 As opposed to precautionary reasoning which is used to identify a possible agent (see 5.7.2). 
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However, risk-benefit analyses, may be of limited value because they rely heavily or 
entirely upon what can be quantified (Kopelman, Resnick et al. 2004).  They can 
also lead to catastrophic damage when damage does occur (i.e. the Gulf oil spill) as 
well as having underlying questions regarding who an expert is and what is 
considered expert scientific evidence (for the example of herbicide farmers regarding 
the use of 2, 4, 5 – T (Irwin 1995)).  However, precautionary principles do not have 
to be zero risk principles, but can aim to achieve lower or more acceptable risks or 
hazards (World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology 
2005).  This can be achieved by taking into account the possible uncertainties and 
evaluating the impact of those potential uncertainties.  The precautionary principle 
can control potential problems that progressing technologies might pose, as well as 
take into account more than scientific uncertainties, because it shifts the burden onto 
those wishing to progress technology and thus helps control technology (Kopelman, 
Resnick et al. 2004). 
2.7 Conclusion 
Developments within gene therapy and the ever increasing ability to diagnose both 
physical and genetic fetal abnormalities have meant that FGT is becoming more 
applicable.  FGT is a practice with huge potential despite its uneven development 
which has been due to incidents which have significantly impeded experimental 
medicine concerning gene therapy and prenatal therapeutic approaches.  These in 
turn have had a knock on effect upon FGT.  However, it has developed now into a 
practice in its own right out of the developments within fetal therapy and gene 
therapy.  Despite this development it is still very much in its infancy as no clinical 
trials have been conducted to date.  Therefore the practice still remains one without 
human application and which, it has been shown, would be limited to certain medical 
conditions.  Nonetheless this restriction has not stopped the implementation of 
animal models and the identification of the future mechanics of prenatal 
interventions.  These proposed future mechanics seek to operate within the rules of 
consent that currently operate within medicine despite the two not necessarily being 
compatible.  Some of the issues already highlighted in this chapter will be addressed 
in the following chapters.   
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It is apparent in addressing the issue of trying to regulate FGT as a practice that is 
progressing into the clinic that FGT has the potential to expose regulatory gaps, 
something which technology always seems to do.  It is this regulatory challenge 
rather than the scientific challenges to the progress of FGT that the thesis will 
explore.  In order to explore the regulatory challenge the starting point within an 
emerging area must be to establish a methodology. Given the uncertainties within 
exploring an emerging area it is clear that the methodology must take a broad 
multidisciplinary approach in order not to restrict the analysis of potential data.  This 
exploration becomes easier having established a basic understanding of the historical 
development of FGT, as well as outlining the basic techniques involved within a 
potential future practice.  The next chapter will present the methodology adopted in 
the thesis. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
After conducting the literature review, several key areas arose relating to FGT.  
These key areas included: personnel who created in utero practices involving stem 
cell and genetic technologies; the regulation of FGT; the thoughts of personnel who 
provide access to such technologies; and personnel who were affected, both directly 
and indirectly, including current and future generations.  Within those areas it was 
clear that there were emerging themes that lead to the following research questions:  
 Are the intergenerational issues of FGT taken into account by both 
direct and indirect stakeholders?   
 Can intergenerational issues override the reproductive rights of the 
mother? 
 Have intergenerational issues impacted upon the clinical applications 
implicit and manifest in this work? 
 
In identifying that intergenerational issues are relevant to FGT, the impact of those 
issues upon FGT must be investigated.  From the above research questions, the key 
figures that emanate from FGT are: regulators, FGT practitioners, patients, directly 
affected third parties such as future parents and those indirectly affected, such as the 
public(s).  However, given the breadth of the stakeholders affected by the 
intergenerational issue the reproductive rights and duties can be viewed through that 
of the legislator/regulators, FGT practitioners, patient and patient groups.  Despite 
the relevance of the explicit views of patients within reproductive rights, those views 
are not the contention of this thesis because the current position of FGT means that 
those patients do not yet exist.  Nevertheless, those patients’ views are implicitly 
dealt with within the thesis through the analysis of autonomy.  Therefore, 
consideration of their possible positions is taken into account.  Having identified 
relevant parties and concepts from the literature review, the next phase was to 
identify data collection tools to answer the research questions. 
 
This chapter will outline the following: why a multidisciplinary approach has been 
taken and the tools used (3.2); the robustness of both the documentary and interview 
data (3.3 and 3.4); identify access and ethical issues (3.5 and 3.6); and finally 
introduce the analytical framework (3.7).  It will then conclude and lead into the data 
chapters. 
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3.2 Identifying data collection tools 
Evolving technologies present different challenges to social research.  They extend 
the boundaries of qualitative and quantitative research because they change the way 
in which we view human life as well as influencing the research questions that 
should be asked (Hesse-Biber 2011).  Therefore, as FGT seeks to answer new 
questions the answers lie beyond any single discipline.  From a methodological 
perspective, emerging technologies change the way in which sampling is conducted, 
how a sample is identified and what a representative sample might be (Hesse-Biber 
2011).  As identified above, identifying patients is still not possible because no 
criterion has been established to identify them.  Taking into account autonomous 
technology and the potential inability to regulate, a different method is needed to 
explore progressing technologies because as technology progresses it challenges 
traditional social science methods (See Diagram 3).  There researchers must develop 
new research skills (Hesse-Biber 2011).  One such method that can cope with the 
challenge of progressing technologies is a multidisciplinary approach. 
Diagram 3.  Interplay between emergent technologies and methods 
 
(Hesse-Biber 2011: 9) 
Consequently the thesis adopted a multidisciplinary approach which included:  
exploration of legal instruments, an ethical theory as an analytical tool, social 
scientific tools to identify and access stakeholders, such as regulators, and the use of 
documentary analysis and semi structured interviewing of FGT practitioners.  The 
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aim of utilising such an approach was to clarify issues as well as highlight possible 
issues that need resolution.  For example, chapter 5 identifies the maternal fetal 
divide which highlights the intergenerational aspect of medicine and scientific 
progress within medical legal practice.  The next generation is then explored within 
the prospective regulation of FGT and the views of FGT practitioners in order to 
identify any further issues, such as long term follow-up.  Following the identification 
of issues from both sources, the PGC is used as an analytical tool with which to 
evaluate whether a particular issue presents ethical problems and how it may be 
resolved.  Therefore, the PGC also identifies if the maternal fetal divide may warrant 
re-evaluation in relation to issues such as long term follow-up. 
 
Having identified the broader research tools, the more specific tools for the thesis 
were identified.  The initial data collection methods identified were: interviews, 
observation, and documentary analysis.  However, the data collection methods used 
were that of semi structured interviewing and documentary analysis.  These methods 
were chosen because the practice of FGT is still in its infancy and has not reached 
the point of clinical trials.  Therefore, participant observation and patient 
interviewing would be impractical at this stage.  
 
It was felt that acquiring a picture of regulation before conducting the interviews 
would be helpful in providing vital background information, as well as providing 
areas which could be questioned within the interviews.  Therefore, the documentary 
analysis was conducted first.  The regulatory picture is often communicated through 
documents such as legislation, codes of practice; therefore, documents can help fill 
out and confirm what the interview data reveals.  As Silverman (2006) identifies, 
there are four advantages of using textual data:  
1. Richness.  Close analysis of written texts reveals presentational 
subtleties and skills. 
2. Relevance and effect.  Texts influence how we see the world and the 
people in it and how we act. 
3. Naturally occurring.  Texts document what participants are actually 
doing in the world – without being dependent on being asked by 
researchers. 
4. Availability.  Texts are usually readily accessible and not always 
dependent on access or ethical constraints.  Because they may quickly 
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be gathered, they encourage early data analysis (Silverman 2006: 
157). 
 
Conducting the document analysis first also helped inform the interview process and 
identify what questions should be included..  For example, it was clear from the data 
that the definition of human dignity and its use within the clinic should be included 
within the interview, because of its frequent explicit and implicit use within 
regulation.  It was also clear that questions regarding fetal tissue engineering should 
be excluded, because it fell outside of the remit of thesis. 
 
The documentary analysis was divided into textual analysis of medical and legal 
literature regarding fetal interventions, exploration of a general overarching principle 
in bioethics (namely human dignity) and then an exploration of prospective FGT 
regulation.  The first two modes of analysis narrow the field to concentrate on the 
maternal fetal divide and the PGC.  The maternal fetal divide provides a reference to 
the present day, thus a benchmark with which to assess if FGT will change current 
thinking.  The introduction of an ethical analysis is returned to within chapter 10, 
where it provides an analytical tool to assess whether regulation and the maternal 
fetal divide can withstand scientific progress. 
 
Semi structured interviewing was chosen as a data collection method in order to fill 
in any gaps left by the documentary analysis.  More importantly the interview data 
collection method was used to confirm whether the picture gained from the 
documentary analysis was one being reflected within the world of the FGT 
practitioners.  However, interviews do not provide the complete view of whether or 
not intergenerational aspects are influential within a FGT practitioners world; but 
they can still provide access to the meanings and values that persons attribute to their 
work (Miller and Glassner 2004).  Such information can then be used to ascertain 
what issues are important to FGT practitioners.  The interviews were semi structured 
in order to provide consistency throughout the interviews and make the analysis of 
the data more credible as there was an underlying theme throughout the interviews.  
Importantly, using this technique does not hinder the narrative/opinion that can be 
extracted from the interviewee (Thorne 2000).     
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Given the multidisciplinary nature of the thesis and different data collection methods 
triangulation (Keats 2000) was used to compare the results from the different data 
collection methods. This can increase the reliability of the conclusions drawn from 
the data since both collection methods focus on the same social phenomena 
(Atkinson, Coffey et al. 2003).  It also gives a more detailed and balanced picture of 
the situation, which each individual data source cannot do on its own (Altricher, 
Feldman et al. 2005: 114).  Therefore the credibility and reliability of the 
conclusions should be increased (Bazeley 2002).  Although, triangulation has been 
criticised due to over simplifying social reality and ignoring the reflexivity of the 
researcher (Atkinson, Coffey et al. 2003); such obstacles can be overcome by being a 
reflexive researcher and acknowledging the limitations of triangulation.  However, 
without triangulation this thesis cannot address the scientific progress of FGT 
because the differing viewpoints on FGT are all needed to explore the impact of 
FGT.  Without using triangulation and a mixed method approach all of these 
different perspectives would not have been considered.  Triangulation has given the 
thesis an overview of social regularities from a larger sample (the documents) while 
understanding personal perspectives through detailed study of a smaller sample (the 
interviews) (Bazeley 2002).   
 
The interviews were conducted with FGT practitioners between October 2010 and 
April 2011.  A FGT practitioner was any person who worked with and/or researched 
FGT.
51
  These qualitative interviews were conducted with university based FGT 
practitioners, eliciting narrative reconstructions about their work, particularly the 
influence of human dignity, regulatory and intergenerational aspects within their 
field (DeVault and McCoy 2002).  The FGT practitioners were selected by purposive 
sampling, which relies on the researcher selecting the sample due to the traits that the 
potential candidates will possess, which within this study means being involved with 
FGT (Bryman 2008: 458). 
 
13 interviews were conducted consisting of 10 males and 3 females from either 
clinical or scientific backgrounds.  Due to the small and exclusive nature of the 
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sample, the data will be presented in a neutral way and a slightly asocial approach 
was used to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees.  Within the sample there 
was a range of field experience from two to over 30 years of research.  The sample 
covered five nationalities thus showing the international nature of FGT within the 
UK.  There were two distinct backgrounds with the interviewee either having a 
predominantly clinical experience (nine interviewees) or a predominantly basic 
science experience (four interviewees).  Four of the interviewees were currently 
conducting their PhD’s.  However, only one interviewee followed the ‘typical’ PhD 
route, which followed directly after undergraduate work.  The three other PhD 
interviewees had embarked upon specialised training before conducting PhD 
research.  Therefore, years of experience rather than educational status was drawn 
upon to distinguish the interviewees.  The interviewees were a pleasure to interview 
and once the data was obtained, the interviews were transcribed and analysed 
thematically.   
3.3 Robustness of the data: documentary data 
Before assessing the documentary data, the types of documents that were used in the 
thesis must be identified.  A document within the context of the thesis refers to 
legislation, both primary and secondary; International Conventions and Declarations; 
regulatory reports and case law from the Jurisdictions of the European Union (EU), 
ECtHR and England and Wales.  These documents were needed because the UK is 
located within a web of international institutions, which can directly influence 
regulation (such as through EU regulations) and indirectly through position 
statements (such as through the UN).  In addition, given the globalised nature of 
FGT, these institutions have provided international guidance upon the area of 
biotechnologies which cannot be ignored. 
 
In order to gather the appropriate documents from the sources mentioned and once 
the literature review was completed, a list of appropriate documents was made.  It 
was initially made by referring to key words within Halsbury law.  Then through 
using the key word search, narrowing down to a specific point such as ‘Conduct of 
Clinical Trials: Good clinical practice and protection of clinical trial subjects.’  
Within that section a list of appropriate legislation could be ascertained.  Appropriate 
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textbooks such as Grubb (2010) and Jackson (2009) were also used to ascertain 
relevant case law.  Consequently, the list grew to over 200 documents.  However, 
within that list, annotations were made in order to justify the inclusion or exclusion 
of those documents within the list.  For example, Directive 98/32/EC was not 
included because it deals with issues regarding the selling of medicinal products to 
the public, which was not the concern of the thesis.  In doing so, the documents 
listed could be initially analysed to ascertain their relevance to the research 
questions.  As a consequence of looking at the relevance of certain cases, the 
formulation of the final list used within the thesis also grew in a biological way, 
because of the way that cases refer to other cases, which may be relevant or have 
precedence over the case being tried.  Therefore, some documents did not appear 
within the initial document list, but were included within the final list of documents, 
which can be seen in Appendix F - List of Analysed Documents.  The use of search 
engines such as Westlaw helped discover cases that the literature had not uncovered 
due to apparent insignificance.  For example, the case of Peters v University 
Hospital of Wales NHS Trust
52
 is just as important as Burton v Islington Health 
Authority
53
 and Mackay v Essex Area Health Authority.
54
  The Peters case was found 
through the case finder tool within Westlaw due to being specifically related to the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976.  Having a flexible basis for the 
document source before and during the analysis, meant that a more encompassing 
and focused sample could be created, thus resulting in a more valid and 
representative document sample. 
 
Having acquired the documents in question, Scott (1990) proposes the use of four 
criteria with which to assess the quality of a document that is being researched: 
1. Authenticity.  Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 
2. Credibility.  Is the evidence free from error and distortion? 
3. Representativeness.  Is the evidence typical of its kind and, if not, is 
the extent of its untypicality known? 
4. Meaning.  Is the evidence clear and comprehensible (Scott 1990: 6)? 
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 Peters (a child suing by his Mother and Litigation Friend Alyson Peters) v University Hospital of 
Wales NHS Trust [2002] WL 31257309. 
53
 Burton v Islington Health Authority [1993] Q.B 204. 
54
 Mackay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 1 Q.B 1166. 
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The documents used within the thesis would fit into what Scott terms as ‘official 
state documents’.  Representativeness relates to the sample of the documents and is 
dealt with above.  In using documents as a source of data one has to accept that there 
is an implicit assumption that institutions publish texts that are in some way either 
true or false, or that each document itself represents a reality of its own (Silverman 
2006).  Such a question relates to Scott’s questions about authenticity and credibility.   
  
When using documents as a source of data there is the underlying assumption that 
documents, such a legal judgements, reveal something about an underlying social 
reality, to the extent that when institutions publish documents they are 
representational of that institutional reality (Bryman 2008).  However, the writer of a 
document, as well as the reader, is likely to have a particular view (political, 
academic etc) that they want to convey; thus, bringing the question of authenticity 
and credibility into question.  Authorship of official documents is often a common 
criticism of official documentation.  Sources of documents often lack an implied 
authorship, which tries to create an independent reality outside of the individual 
reader or observer (Coffey and Atkinson 2004).  For example, when reading EMA 
guidance scientific certainty appeared prevalent until questions were asked regarding 
safety and long term follow-up.  Therefore one must accept that despite the 
impression of objectivity that some documents may state issues such as political 
motivation or scientific certainty must be taken into consideration (Scott 1990).   
 
Generally, utilising documents as a source of data can lead to unobtrusive measures 
in which neither the sender or receiver is aware that the document is being analysed 
(Weber 2006).  Such a general statement in relation to legalistic or regulatory 
documents is not explicitly true as documents from legislative sources are expected 
to be scrutinised by those involved in some way, such as barristers, solicitors, 
business and the general public.  Despite the claim that documents should be 
available for analysis by social science researchers (Bryman 2008), and not just for 
personal reflection: 
One must be quite clear about what they [documents] can and cannot 
be used for.  Documents are ‘social facts’ in that they are produced, 
shared and used in socially organised ways.  They are not, however, 
transparent representations of organizational routines, decision-
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making process or professional diagnosis.  They construct particular 
guides of representations using their own constructions (Coffey and 
Atkinson 2004: 58). 
 
Therefore, no matter how ‘official’ a document is it cannot be taken to be firm 
evidence of what they report (Coffey and Atkinson 2004).  The ‘facts’ in legal 
judgment is a classic example of this as ‘the facts’ within a case are what the judge 
deems has occurred based on the rules of evidence.  Case law also has the added 
inadequacy of only presenting cases in conflict.  For example if in Vo v France
55
 Mrs 
Vo had decided not to pursue her case to the ECtHR that does not mean her ‘case’ 
did not occur, merely that it did not need judicial intervention to resolve.  Therefore, 
the ‘facts’ of any case must still be contextualised more widely. 
 
Despite documents being ‘social facts’, in that they are produced shared and used in 
socially organised ways; they are not transparent representations of decision making 
processes or of professional diagnosis (Coffey and Atkinson 2004: 58).  However, a 
documentary reality is fundamental to the practice of governing, managing and 
administrating forms of society, such that business, government, professions and 
agencies, (such as GTAC), use documents as a form of action (Dorothy 1974).  
Therefore, regardless of whether a document truly reflects the facts or practice of an 
organisation one can say it is authentic and credible in its representation of a social 
practice or reality. 
 
Through reading documents a researcher can ascertain answers to their research 
question.  They can also gain an understanding about how medical practice should be 
regulated.  In fact, legal cases act as the link between the regulatory authorities 
interpretation of legislation; because, no matter how clarified and crystallised 
legislation is, the implied readership of any document brings their own cultural 
knowledge and unique biography to the text which needs adjudication (Coffey and 
Atkinson 2004).  Therefore, the meaning of a document through language and text is 
important.  However, case law provides clarification to the majority of abstract 
concepts within regulation, which is built upon rules of interpretation within legal 
                                                 
55
 Vo v France (Application no. 53924/00). 
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systems.  For example, where an ambiguous term such as ‘reasonableness’ is used 
the judiciary have three rules, which they can use to establish what Parliament meant 
by the term.  These rules are the literal,
56
 golden
57
 and mischief rules.
58
 The choice 
of which rule to use is subject to each judge’s own interpretation, but ultimately if 
the result is one Parliament did not intend then Parliament can provide further 
guidance upon the area.  Therefore, unless legislation or further guidance has been 
enacted, one can assume that the judicial interpretations of the legal elements of a 
case are valid. 
 
When using documents as a source of data, one has to be aware of ‘genre mixing’ 
(Fairclough 2003).  For the present purpose this means that documents can be used 
to transcend more than one specific topic or point, by linking other specific points 
together within the same document.  Within the multidisciplinary thesis there are 
elements of ethics, medicine, sociology, law and politics.  A classic example of this 
is the case Re MB.
59
  It is a leading case about consent to medical treatment, but it is 
also about the rights of a pregnant woman and a fetus within England and Wales.  It 
also analyses the various implications for the interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) within medical treatment.  Some 
documents may be difficult to read as each document anticipates which genre it may 
be read in (Fairclough 2003).  For example, science and legislation mix within 
specific gene therapy protocols such as Directive 2001/18/EC as the draftspersons 
anticipated who would read the regulations.  Thus technocratic language specifically 
aimed at scientists was prominent, thus making it difficult for a non-scientist to 
understand.  This is not to say that documentary data should not have been used here, 
since it provided useful and potentially valuable resource for the thesis, but 
recognising potential genre mixing should be acknowledged as a potential issue, 
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 Where a judge may read the words within the act as their literal meaning within the context of the 
act and give them that one meaning, regardless of the result (Martin 2001). 
57
 Where the literal rule gives an absurd result, ordinary words must be given their ordinary meaning 
and technical words must be given their technical meanings; unless an absurdity would result from the 
application of the rule (Martin 2001). 
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 Where a later Act has been implemented with the objective of resolving a previously defection in 
law, and there is an ambiguity in the apparent application of the Act, the mischief rule can seek to 
address the defect or mischief for which the Act was passed to remedy (Martin 2001). 
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especially within cutting edge areas of science which potentially transcend fixed 
barriers. 
3.4 Robustness of the data: interview data 
Inevitably when using a data collection method such as interviewing, the credibility 
of such data is called into question.  These questions include: 
a) ‘How do we know the informant is telling the truth’, and are the truths 
we are interested in stable across situations and perspectives?  
b) The ‘incompleteness’ of interview data as compared with the data that 
could be gained from participant observation.  
c) The difference between what people say and what they actually do 
(Hammersley 2005: 1). 
 
Given that Social Science frequently uses interviews as a means of data collection, 
‘truthfulness’ could be seen as a major problem (Atkinson, Coffey et al. 2003).  
Finding the ‘truth’ behind interview data is problematic because one must accept the 
transmission of epistemic properties thesis (Lackey 2008),
60
, which highlights the 
problem of subscribing meaning to words and beliefs in transmitting their position to 
the listener (Lackey 2006).  This can be affected by: the current emotional state of 
the informant; the informant’s hypothetical reaction to questions posed; the actual 
tendencies of the participant within the given situation (Dean and Whyte 2003: 351).  
Therefore, cross questioning the interviewee, combined with other interview data 
will make this concept consistent throughout, thereby eliminating it as a substantial 
problem.  In accepting that one can transmit their epistemic position and properties 
in speech to another listener or reader, then the information acquired is valid (Lackey 
2006). 
 
Within verbal interviewee responses there can be distortion of expression and use of 
language (Audi 2006).  In order to overcome this issue accepting each interview as a 
form of evidence or account creates a reliable form of interview data.  The problem 
of distortion can be avoided by using dictionaries, both linguistic and technical (in 
terms of medicine and genetics) as well as giving clarification of issues within the 
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 That it is necessary for a speaker A to have knowledge of p so they can transmit p via testimony to 
a hearer B, or as Lackey describes:  In order to give another person a full bucket of water, I must have 
a full bucket of water to hand over, which also applies to knowledge (Lackey 2008: 47). 
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interview.  Triangulation methods such as cross examination through questions 
focused on the same variable, or in other instances concerning FGT, can increase 
confidence in, and validity of, the interview data (Denzin 1989).  
 
In seeking to understand the veracity of these interviews the 'truth value' of a 
qualitative study should be evaluated by its credibility rather than by internal validity 
as measured within quantitative/scientific research methods (Appleton 1995).  
Therefore, the question is: how plausible or credible is the interviewee’s opinion 
(Atkinson, Coffey et al. 2003)?  In assessing the truth or credibility of interviews one 
must consider the factors that can be expected to influence the interviewee’s 
reporting of any given situation under the interview circumstances (Dean and Whyte 
2003: 352).  Such factors include: the motives behind the participant’s responses; the 
lack of spontaneity and reduction of the participants’ freely expressed opinions; the 
desire to please the interviewer with their answers; and idiosyncratic factors which 
may result in only certain facets of the respondents’ feelings being expressed (Dean 
and Whyte 2003: 352-353).  However, of more concern is the use of institutionally 
constructed answers (DeVault and McCoy 2002: 767).  Therefore, recognising 
quoted standard policy as an answer, which may not be their own opinion or typical 
of their working practices, is of fundamental importance.   
 
Within interviews, the reactivity and neutrality of interviewers is an issue because 
the interviewer is an integral part of the process (Marshall 1996).  Different 
researchers will have different influence over the interviewee (Arksey and Knight 
1999).  Nonetheless, the interviewer is an integral part of the process (Marshall 
1996); therefore, interview data has been criticised because non verbal 
communication and explanation can result in bias (McCormack and Hill 1997).  
However, being an active interviewer can elicit better interview data than a neutral or 
passive interviewer.  Therefore, recognising that as an interviewer you are a 
participant, dominating the interview with one’s own views and preconceived ideas 
about the views of the participant can be avoided (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 19).  In 
recognising the role of the interviewer in this way, meant that leading questions 
could be avoided; thereby, resulting in data that is a closer reflection of the 
participant’s views: 
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The interview, unlike most other techniques, requires interpersonal 
skills of a high order (putting the respondent at ease, asking questions 
in an interested manner, noting down the responses without upsetting 
the conversational flow, giving support without introducing bias); at 
the same time the interviewer is either limited or helped by his or her 
own sex, apparent age and background, skin colour, accent etc 
(Oppenheim 1992: 65). 
  
Therefore, to increase the validity of the interview data, rapport, trust and openness 
between the interviewer and interviewee was built (Arksey and Knight 1999).  In 
doing this within this study, the participants had the freedom to express the way that 
they saw the influence of intergenerational aspects within FGT  
 
In recognising that there is a difference between what people say and what they do, it 
must be conceded that there could be missing data from interview data.  It is argued 
that within a scientific setting, one can only acquire the tacit knowledge of a practice 
through participant observation (See Collins and Evans 2007).  However, the 
interviewee’s account is treated as constitutive; therefore, ‘reality’ is constructed in 
the telling of the account and is not independent of it (Hammersley 2005).  
Therefore, one can treat each interview as having their own validity subject to the 
investigation of any factual claims, thus providing consistency between interviews.  
Critically, as stated above, FGT is not at a stage where one can observe a patient in a 
clinic in terms of in utero therapies.  Therefore, any complementary ethnographic 
work could be considered post thesis. 
 
As identified in 3.2 13 interviews were conducted.  This appears to be a small 
number of interviews.  However, FGT is an emergent field which has few groups in 
the world devoting their primary research time to FGT.  Therefore, the world 
population size is below 500 interviewees.  Across Europe there are four research 
groups devoting their time to FGT.  Therefore, despite the initial 13 interviewees 
appearing to be an insufficient size, it emerges as a high percentage amount of not 
only FGT practitioners in the world, but an even higher percentage of those who are 
frontier FGT practitioners.  In addition, all 13 interviewees are part of the FGT 
potential first world clinical application that will occur in the near future, thus 
making these interviewees part of a small and elite population group with significant 
professional weight within FGT.   
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Once the 13 interviews were conducted the data was transcribed.  In order to get 
closer to the interview data the interviews were transcribed by the author of this 
thesis.  The interviews were transcribed verbatim, or as close as possible.  For 
example, within one interview outside building work made some comments 
inaudible, therefore could not be transcribed.  Typically due to the interviewees’ 
working constraints the interviews aimed to be no more than an hour long.  Yet, due 
to both interviewer and interviewee getting engrossed within the discussion the 
interviews were on average 65-70 minutes long. 
 
There are also difficulties in representing speech as text, because there are an endless 
number of decisions that must be made.  Although these decisions appear mundane, 
they have serious implications for how we might understand discourse and frame 
reality (Tilley 2003: 758).  Decisions over what is coded, categorised and used, 
influence what ‘story’ is portrayed to the reader (Silverman 2004: 127).  This is 
affected by the large number of intuitive analytical decisions made (Gorum 2004).  
Therefore, consistency is pertinent, not just within data collection but through the 
whole research process (Rubin and Rubin 2005).  Therefore, transcription quality 
was an issue to ensure that the data was the verbatim accounts of what transpired 
(Poland 2001).  In order to achieve the verbatim account, after the interviews were 
transcribed the interviewees were given several options in terms of how they were 
represented within the thesis.  As a result, a more clarified account is gained with 
issues regarding misrepresentation of the data being avoided. 
 
Qualitative interviewing with purposive sampling, invokes issues of generalisation 
and representation.  Within the context of FGT, representation is not necessarily a 
major problem within the UK because of the small community of FGT practitioners.  
Generalisation and representation could become a more pertinent issue with regards 
to the international aspects of FGT.  However, given the small number of 
international groups working specifically upon FGT, as well as the collaboration of 
the research groups interviewed with other FGT groups makes generalisation less 
problematic.  However, generalisation is problematic due to the small, specific 
nature of the project within the larger context of science and technology, especially 
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with regards to qualitative research (Payne and Williams 2005).  This is an accepted 
limitation of the project.  However, given the small and close nature of FGT, one can 
ascertain practices which are relevant to all FGT practitioners by situating the 
findings within the wider context of research such as gene therapy (Perakyla 2004).  
Therefore, the extent to which the findings from the thesis are relevant to settings 
other than the one from which they are derived, the transferability of the research is 
increased (Jones and Sumner 2007).   
 
Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the data collection methods 
several other methodological issues must be addressed.  These include issues of 
access, ethics and analysis.  The chapter will now address these issues in order and 
then be concluded.  
3.5 Access issues 
There were no problems in acquiring documents for this study as they were readily 
available through resources such as Westlaw, Lexis Nexus, the government online 
legislative site called opsi.gov and other regulatory bodies.  Given the use of 
CAQDAS (see below), the only relevant access issue relates to electronic access to 
documents that are not available to the public in that form.  However, in such 
circumstances paper copies of the documents were available through either 
interlibrary loans or through contact with the appropriate authority.  Those 
documents were then scanned into the programme, thus solving the issue. 
 
Having used purposive sampling to identify possible research participants an 
immediate and very serious problem occurred.  Due to the narrow definition of FGT 
the potential interviewee sample was a select few, not just in the UK, but within 
Europe.  The consequence of such an exclusive and elite ‘club’ presented a potential 
major issue over access.  When the potential pool of interviewees is so small, getting 
the initial approach wrong could result in being locked out and potentially 
blacklisted.  Therefore, the possibility of acquiring no interview data at all was a 
relevant consideration. 
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Other associated issues that could have potentially limited access to the interview 
sample were that: elites may often be unwilling to give up time, if they consider that 
that time can be spent more productively on ‘proper’ non trivial projects (Zukerman 
2003); and, medical researchers having their own intricate networks, which are often 
obstructive, unless accessed through a gate keeper of some sort (Odendahl and Shaw 
2002). 
 
Access to the intended interviewees was not as problematic as initially feared.  Due 
to the readily available information, gathering contact details was easy and freely 
available.  There was a high return rate and general willingness to be involved in 
such a project.  That enthusiasm translated into the interviews and helped the 
collection of truly interesting and intriguing data.  The arrangement of the interviews 
was also not as problematic as expected.  Due to the status of the interviewees 
flexibility was needed on the interviewer’s part to ensure that the interviews could be 
arranged.  Nevertheless, the interviewees were all accommodating in trying to make 
the best arrangements for all parties involved.  
 
Interviewing elite scientists in any field requires ‘studying up’ on knowledge about 
the field, which social scientists have been accused of not adequately taking into 
account (Ostrander 2003).  A major part of the ‘studying up’ was done through the 
fundamental understanding of developmental biology, inheritance, and review of the 
Clinics in Perinatology especially on FGT as demonstrated in the literature review of 
the thesis.  The preparation was useful especially given the specific scientific 
language used within the interviews as well as references to particular incidents that 
have affected the discipline.  This helped build rapport and lead to further interesting 
conversations. 
3.6 Ethical issues  
The basic ethical principle governing data collection is that no harm should come to 
the respondents as a result of their participation in the research (Oppenheim 1992).  
Therefore, when conducting qualitative interviews several key areas of research 
ethics should be adhered to: informed consent, confidentiality, anonymity and data 
storage. 
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When conducting the interviews, the interviewees were provided with a participation 
information sheet about the thesis (See Appendix A – Participant Information and 
Consent Form); therefore, making it possible to obtain informed consent of the 
participants and safeguard their privacy and welfare (Arksey and Knight 1999).  The 
participant information sheet covered: the aim and purpose of the research, identified 
the interviewer, contact details, topics the interview will cover, their rights, 
safeguards to confidentiality and anonymity, and the right to withdrawal at any time 
and dissemination of information (Arksey and Knight 1999).  Given the problems of 
transcribing interview data, in order not to misrepresent the participant’s views, they 
were given the right to check the transcribed interview. 
 
Informed consent within the thesis was not particularly problematic because of the 
interview sample.  Therefore, the key ethical concern when utilising a qualitative 
interview technique is adhering to the principles of confidentiality and anonymity.  
The two concepts are often spoken of together but are in fact two separate concepts.  
Within the thesis anonymity refers to the process of not disclosing the identity of an 
interviewee in relation to a particular view or opinion; whereas confidentiality is the 
process of not disclosing to other parties opinions or information gathered in the 
interview process (Clark 2006).  With regards to confidentiality the British 
Sociological Association states: 
Personal information concerning research participants should be kept 
confidential.  In some cases it may be necessary to decide whether it 
is proper or appropriate even to record certain kinds of sensitive 
information (British Sociological Association 2002). 
 
Therefore appropriate precautions were taken due to the small sample population to 
avoid the chance that individuals  could be easily identifiable by using sensitive data 
as this could have lead to ‘reluctant’ interviewees (Alder and Alder 2002).  This 
emanates from the idea that the interviewee may sustain professional loss as a result 
of revealing possibly unprofessional or non-compliant research practices if these 
become public knowledge.  Therefore, protecting the identity of the interviewee is a 
high priority (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000), and links to the concept of 
anonymity.  Because of the small sample anonymity plays an important role in 
assuring that the interviewees will not suffer loss.  In order to achieve as much 
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confidentiality as possible blanket anonymity was used.  Therefore, specific data 
relating to location, research area and location of the research group was made 
anonymous.  Because of the unique nature of the thesis the research location was 
also made anonymous in order to fully protect the interviewees’ identity.  As 
mentioned above, this was due to the possibility of identifying the interview 
participants, but also due to confidentiality.  There are ethical issues with data 
storage within a digital age and the personal information concerning research that 
must be kept confidential.  The British Sociological association states: 
Appropriate measures should be taken to store research data in a 
secure manner.  Members should have regard to their obligations 
under the Data Protection Acts [...].  In some cases it may be 
necessary to decide whether it is proper or appropriate even to record 
certain kinds of sensitive information (British Sociological 
Association 2002). 
 
To ensure that all personal information as well as the interview data itself, will be 
kept secure, the data will be kept on data encrypted hard drive for five years subject 
to the Data Protection Act 1998, University regulations and the British Sociology 
Association guidance on ethics. 
 
The ethics of documentary analysis is rather more straightforward.  In general, the 
ethics of utilising documents within research is not accompanied with an in depth 
ethical review, especially in relation to policy documents which have be vetted and 
checked, and unlike using electronic blogs (Sixsmith and Murray 2001).  However, 
anonymity of legal cases as well as misrepresentation of documents should be 
considered. 
 
When collecting together relevant legal cases the reporting of such cases are subject 
to judicial proceedings and institutional vetting.  Within judicial proceedings, Article 
6(1) of the ECHR
61
 means that openness is a fundamental issue within judicial 
proceedings (Mlola 2008).  However, all cases must be balanced within the context 
of Article 8 of the ECHR and thus medical information and the identity of the patient 
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 The right to a fair trial which is incorporated into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
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is considered as being an uncontroversial topic (Mlola 2008).
62
  Therefore, where 
parties have been stated as a synonym or letter, anonymity has already been executed 
within the case itself.  However, that does not mean that sensitive information of 
minors or none competent patients is not made public, but provisions for the 
protection of vulnerable individuals has to be taken into account and weighed up 
against the public interest.
63
    
 
Another valid consideration is how ethical is it to construe documents or interview 
data when it may not be possible to have all necessary information.  
Misrepresentations can occur when the researcher does not have available the totality 
of communications or documents (Sixsmith and Murray 2001).  However, given that 
the documents utilised here were all publically available without any redactions, 
misrepresentation should not occur in this thesis if the quotations used are not 
presented to exclude the important context and message that document is trying to 
portray.  As with interview data, constructive misrepresentation of opinions is 
unethical and should be avoided. 
3.7 Analytical framework 
For the interview data a thematic approach was taken.  The thematic framework of 
analysis followed the mechanics of analysis that are similar in all thematic analysis: 
 Decide on a theme. 
 Decide what counts as evidence of a theme. 
 Code a passage to indicate that the passage is an example of 
that theme. 
 Relate what types of people said which themes and relate to 
other interview data (Gorum 2004: 189-190). 
 
The approach taken to the analysis is comparable to that taken by Cribb et al (2008), 
with the data being collected before applying the above thematic approach.  
Grounded theory is often associated with the analysis of qualitative interviews and 
the practice of grounded theory is implicit within a thematic approach.  However, a 
thematic approach does not commit or contract the analyser to produce a deductive 
theory from the data.  The analysis is complemented by the semi structured 
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interviewing.  The themes that were chosen related to the literature review that was 
conducted prior to the interviews, with sub themes being used to obtain a more 
comprehensive analysis of the data (Aronson 1994).  Therefore, in order not to stifle 
the emergence of themes a holistic approach was also used in conjunction with 
literature related themes.   
 
Documents are normally viewed as little more than containers of ‘content’, that are 
sources of information, whether that be textual, imagery, or another document (Prior 
2003, 2009).  It should be noted that when conducting a literature review, as well as 
specific research into documents from legal institutions content analysis is 
conducted.  However, it is not conducted in the typically structured social science 
manner.  According to Hall and Wright (2008) empirical legal methods, such as case 
law rhetoric, are standard applications of social science methods.  Hall and Wright 
advocate a quantitative content analysis of legal sources, which would systematically 
select, code and quantitatively analyse documents.  However, such an approach in 
the given circumstances would focus upon a pseudo measurement, which would fail 
to appreciate the value or subtleties of case law and regulation (Mendelson 1963).  
Law is practice built upon interpreting language, which is not a precise practice; 
therefore, using a tool that seeks to be precise and certain appears to be flawed. 
 
A particular problem with using content analysis with legal documents is that there is 
an assumed equality between the documents (Hall and Wright 2008).  Such equality 
does not exist between cases, legislation and regulatory guidelines.  Such documents 
are not only subject to their institutional hierarchical chain, but interact with each 
other at a national level.  One must also situate a case within England and Wales, 
relative to the jurisdictions of Scotland and Northern Ireland, which can be heavily 
persuasive; but, also within a context of the EU, Council of Europe and worldwide 
institutions.  These hierarchies appear linear (see Appendix C – Institutional 
Structure), but issues surrounding precedent and the binding of previous judgements 
(See Appendix D – UK Court Structure) indicates that cases conducted within the 
same court may result in different changes in the law.  Therefore, content analysis of 
like cases does not necessarily pertain to strong conclusions.  The creation of a ‘kick 
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back to Parliament’ clause within the HRA 199864 further complicates the interplay 
between the documents. 
 
However, utilising elements of a quantitative content approach adds to the analysis 
and evaluative outcome of the thesis, as tools such as word frequency and key word 
frequency result in favour of who can provide useful information.  For example, 
human dignity appears as a key component within the thesis, yet in the sample cases 
within England and Wales ‘dignity’ only appears twice.  Concepts that stem from 
dignity such as autonomy and the right to life appear much more frequently.  
Therefore it is essential to use a thematic and interpretative approach within the 
content analysis.  Content analysis can also utilise a more qualitative approach.  
Qualitative content analysis comprises of searching for underlying themes within the 
documents in a more interpretative manner than its quantitative sibling (Bryman 
2008).  Therefore, content analysis within the thesis refers not just to quantitative 
content analysis, but also qualitative content analysis because of the nature of the 
documents that have been selected.  By utilising a qualitative content analysis 
approach, akin to the thematic approach taken within the interview data; the ability 
to compare and contrast between the documentary and interview data became easier 
because the data results were directly comparable.   
 
From this method a series of dominant themes arose from the data.  They included 
human dignity, intergenerational interests, autonomy, safety, foreseeability, funding, 
and uncertainty.  However, within the interview and documentary data the emergent 
themes were centred on two distinct themes: human dignity and scientific progress.  
Therefore, each data set was divided into those two categories.  Within each 
category, each theme was elaborated upon and referred back to the maternal fetal 
divide to analyse the consequences for future regulation.  That process was 
conducted in a similar manner for both documentary and interview data thus making 
comparison of the data sources easier (chapters 6-9).  
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The analysis was conducted with the help of the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS) program Nvivo.  Within the Nvivo programme the 
data was coded according to theme and sub themes according to the system 
explained above.  The key to utilising any CAQDAS program is to understand that 
CAQDAS programmes provide useful and helpful tools for storing and organising 
work.  They also provide useful insights into the data gathered, but only as far as the 
user of that CAQDAS programme has inputted the information themselves.  In other 
words, merely using a CAQDAS program is not analysis (Coffey, Holbrook et al. 
1996).  Nvivo, like any other CAQDAS program, has its own strength and weakness 
that should be taken into account (Barry 1998).  Nevertheless, because the data was 
analysed thematically, utilising a CAQDAS programme made the process, 
comparison and analysis of the data with a code and retrieval system easier to 
retrieve data in relation to themes as well as looking at occurrence of a theme in 
relation to several key indicators such as position, qualification and gender.  
However, due to confidentiality issues (outlined above) unfortunately the extent to 
which those results could be used was limited. 
3.8 Conclusion 
To conclude, the methods used within the thesis were documentary analysis and 
semi structured interviews.  Each data source has its strengths and weaknesses, but 
together the data results will be stronger and more reliable than had only one data 
source been used.  There will always be issues about the use of each data source.  
For example, documents will always go out of date as quickly as they are printed, 
thus the ‘reality’ they paint is in constant change; and, there will always be the issues 
with interview data regarding truth and whether one can transfer information about 
what they do through words.  There were ultimately few if any ethical or access 
issues concerning the thesis.  The thematic approach provided a useful tool to apply 
to both sources and also provided a flexible mode of analysis that ensured 
consistency between the two data sources.  By conducting the document analysis 
before the interviews it helped inform the areas for discussion, as well as providing a 
sound platform which was used to either confirm or rebut the picture gained from the 
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documents.  The use of the CAQDAS programmes proved to be an excellent tool for 
comparing the two data sources. 
 
Having collect the data and analysed it, the next step was to organise the results and 
report on them.  The following six chapters are the result of the multidisciplinary 
approach adopted to analyse how the scientific progress of FGT interplays with 
rights, duties and regulation.  Chapters 4 and 5 provide the focusing of the thesis and 
provide useful data for chapters 6 to 9.  Chapters 6 to 9 form the social scientific 
engagement with the field.  It was decided that because of the symmetry between the 
data sources as well as the distinct divide between the data relating predominately to 
human dignity or the research procedure; that the results should portray those 
similarities and distinctions.  Therefore, each data source, documentary (regulation) 
and the interview data, has two chapters: one relating to human dignity; and the other 
relating to scientific progress.  Because the documentary analysis was conducted first 
the comparisons are drawn within the reporting of the interview data.    
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Data Chapters: 
4 The Maternal Fetal Divide? 
4.1 Introduction 
Having seen that FGT is a recent development, new and interesting debates have 
been raised in accordance with its advances.  For example, within FGT there is often 
debate surrounding who is the patient and what interests are being considered?  Is 
there a conflict of interests where a mother refuses fetal beneficial treatment?  In 
trying to establish answers to such questions the maternal fetal divide is important.  
The legal and medical institutions that are examined within this chapter may have 
different approaches to the maternal fetal divide but they both draw guidance from 
the principle of autonomy.  The different approaches to the maternal fetal divide 
emphasize different aspects of the possible divide and different ways of resolving 
conflicts.  A comparison between the development of the legal and medical 
constructions also indicates areas where medical development impacts upon legal 
institutions.  Importantly for the thesis it identifies current medical and legal 
perspectives of the fetus which can be used to ascertain how rapidly progress can 
impact upon regulation (chapters 6 and 7) and practice (chapters 8 and 9). 
 
As stated in 1.2.1 FGT could be a misleading concept as it fails to highlight the 
mother within the procedure (Wu and Ball 2009).  However, within medicine, law 
and sociology the role of the mother is a key component when discussing the fetus. 
Identifying the maternal fetal divide is important as it frames the ethical and social 
debates and, as will be shown, it is not only the possible moral, theoretical or 
philosophical divides that are important, but also the physical divides. 
 
In analysing the maternal fetal divide, several key perspectives emerge.  These 
perspectives include: medical, philosophical, legal and ethical positions.
65
  Within 
these different perspectives the maternal fetal divide is based upon the moral status 
of the fetus.  However, even where the fetus has no legal or moral status, other 
operating duties may infer that the fetus has interests; thereby creating a conflict 
                                                 
65
 It should be noted that there are religious constructions of the maternal fetal divide.  However, the 
thesis will focus upon the four perspectives mentioned. 
65 
 
between the mother and fetus.  The main focus of this chapter will be upon the 
evolution of the maternal fetal divide within the institutions of law and medicine.  
The philosophical debate will be conducted in chapter 5, where Gewirth’s Principle 
of Generic Consistency, will be introduced as the ethical framework of analysis. 
 
It should be noted that within this chapter the maternal fetal divide encompasses 
more than just what medicine tells us about pregnancy as it includes the rights and 
interests of the fetus according to those other than the mother.  In other words, the 
divide is facilitated by the medical practitioners, courts and other interested parties 
that claim there is a divide, or conflict, to be resolved.  In highlighting interests, 
defining interest becomes important.  As discussed within1.2.2, an agent has an 
interest when another being has a duty towards them. 
 
The first section (4.2) will situate the maternal fetal divide within the context of 
medical decision making within England and Wales, which means identifying 
autonomy.  It will not analyse whether or not the concept of autonomy is justified or 
correct but it will identify the key components of the concept. Section 4.3 will 
investigate the medical perspective of the maternal fetal divide.  It will highlight 
birth (4.3.1), biological factors (4.3.2) and introduce the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept 
(4.3.3) as formed by Chervenak et al (Chervenak and McCullough 2003, 2011, 
Chervenak, McCullough et al. 1994).  Once the fetus as a patient has been discussed, 
the final section 4.4 will discuss the legal perspective of the maternal fetal divide.  It 
will discuss the debate surrounding abortion (4.4.1) and refusal of medical treatment 
(4.4.2) focusing upon the leading case of Re MB (4.4.3)
66
 and human rights (4.4.4) 
and show how those areas inform the maternal fetal divide.  
4.2 Autonomy of the patient  
Within the 20
th
 century, the right of a competent patient to make their own decisions 
about their medical treatment has arisen as a fundamental concept so that it needs 
little explanation about it underpinning a patient’s interest in self determination and 
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bodily integrity (Scott 2002).
67
  This principle is better known as patient autonomy.  
This principle is in stark contrast to paternalism where a decision about a person’s 
medical treatment is not made by the patient but by another competent authority, 
such as a doctor.  That is not to say that paternalism is not an issue within the 
decision making process of a patient.  However, medical ethics has migrated away 
from the paternalistic ‘doctor knows best’, to that of individual autonomy, thus 
placing more pressure upon the fiduciary duty
68
 of doctors (Jackson 2006).  Now, 
doctors should use their expertise to advise patients about the relevant choices 
available to them, letting the patient decide on the course of action to take (Brooks 
and Sullivan 2002). 
 
Within medicine treatment of a competent patient cannot occur unless they have 
given consent to the proposed treatment, thereby respecting their autonomy and 
bodily integrity (Jackson 2006).  The decisions taken by that person should be 
respected, even if it conflicts with medical advice or results in their own death.
69
  In 
terms of refusing treatment, the law and codes of ethical practice emphasize that 
adults with mental capacity can refuse medical treatment (BMA Ethics 2009).
70
  
Without their consent the medical intervention will be illegal and the physician in 
question will be liable for trespass to the person and maybe guilty of criminal 
charges.
71
  The right of a patient to make their own decisions is now directly 
protected by various articles within the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), such as the 
right to life (Article 2) and the right to a private and family life (Article 8) (Mason, 
McCall Smith et al. 2006).
72
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 A person, such as a trustee or doctor, who holds a position of trust or confidence with respect to 
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 See Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
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The right to make one’s own decisions is dependent on having capacity to do so.  
Any adult
73
 that presents themselves within a medical situation is presumed to have 
capacity and this is thoroughly ingrained within law
74
 and medical practice (See 
British Medical Association 2009, General Medical Council 2009b).
75
  However, a 
person is deemed to lack capacity if they are unable to: understand the information; 
retain the information; use or weigh the information as part of a decision; 
communicate that decision.
76
  Those under the age of 16 are automatically presumed 
to lack capacity.
77
  However, under certain conditions, those under the age of 16 will 
be able to consent to treatment by being ‘Gillick’ competent.78  For those under 16 
years old, the right to refuse medical treatment can be overturned by a Court of 
Protection Order.
79
  If a person is deemed incompetent, then medical treatment can 
be conducted without the consent of that person if it is deemed in the best interests of 
that patient
80
 and considered the least restrictive alternative.
81
  The best interests of a 
patient includes taking into account the beliefs of the person in question, the person’s 
past and present wishes and other factors.
82
 
  
Within medical situations, ‘patient autonomy’ is often referred to and therefore the 
term ‘patient’ is also a concept that will show a divide and possible conflict within 
decisions made during pregnancy.  The term ‘patient’ is often synonymous with 
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being ill (Thomson 1986) but within the thesis it will be used not to infer illness but 
merely an agent receiving a doctor’s service.83  However, within the context of the 
FGT, often the mother is not ill; it is the fetus that needs the direct medical 
intervention; for example, a fetus suffering with a congenital hernia.
84
  In not making 
illness a necessary condition of the term ‘patient’, it allows for the term ‘patient’ to 
be used in relation to the mother, as well as the fetus (as will be shown below). 
 
The terms ‘patient’ and ‘patienthood’ also create correlating duties for a physician, 
of which fiduciary duty and patient autonomy are of key importance (Buchanan 
2008).  The fiduciary duty inferred by the patient’s status becomes important within 
a medical setting as an ‘individual’ does not infer personhood, which can be seen 
when the fetus is treated as a patient.  Having given ‘patient’ a remit, the debate 
surrounding the maternal fetal divide can be conducted.  Pregnant women can use 
many sources of information or moral guidance to view the maternal fetal divide and 
religion can help inform how a pregnant mother may view the maternal fetal divide.  
However, in making an autonomous decision that may be informed by a person’s 
religious orientation, the decision is made within the sphere of medicine.  Medicine 
is both a practice that self regulates, but also one regulated by the law.  Therefore, 
how medicine approaches the maternal fetal divide must be examined firstly from a 
medical perspective and then from a legal one. 
 
4.3 Medical perspective on the maternal fetal divide 
Within medicine the maternal fetal divide can be seen on several different levels 
which have all contributed to debate on the maternal fetal divide.  One can either: 
view pregnancy chronologically so that birth is the only divide between mother and 
fetus, or; take a biological view of pregnancy, right down to genetics and the 
interaction between mother and fetus, or; try and assess the number of patients they 
are dealing with, which introduces the fetus as a patient concept.  Each will be dealt 
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with in the corresponding order and will start with what is physically the most 
obvious divide that occurs between mother and fetus: that of birth. 
4.3.1 Birth 
The most fundamental divide between mother and fetus is birth, whether that is 
naturally or through a caesarean section.  Conservatives may argue that a fetus and 
baby are essentially the same, whether inside or outside the womb (Singer 1993).  
However, there is little debate surrounding the use of birth as the division of a 
mother and her fetus.  Once born, the fetus is considered a child; therefore, morally, 
socially and legally the maternal fetal conflict becomes that of a child’s best interest 
versus parental autonomy.  It is not the contention of this thesis to examine gene 
therapy upon children, but the area is still connected to the issue of FGT.  
Nonetheless, one must look further within the institution of medicine to see how the 
possible maternal fetal divide is treated.  Another way of considering if there is a 
maternal fetal divide is to view pregnancy biologically.  If so, it can indicate how 
emergent medicine could possibly view the maternal fetal divide. 
4.3.2 Biological perspective on the maternal fetal divide 
From a purely genetic perspective, when a woman is pregnant there are two 
genetically unique entities occupying one visible body.  However, the idea that the 
fetus acts as a parasite until the right time is not strictly true.  Despite immunological 
reasons why the fetus and mother are two distinctly separate entities, there is 
interplay between the two entities.  The relationship between mother and fetus, 
which has often been referred to as a parasitic relationship, does not reflect the true 
relationship between mother and fetus, which is closer to that of parabiosis or 
symbiosis (Liley 1983).  In fact, it has been recorded that changes in maternal 
emotions can alter the heart rate of a fetus (Liley 1972).  Therefore, the relationship 
is a two way affair within pregnancy.  For example, it is acknowledged that the 
placenta induces many of the hormones, including hCG (human Chorionic 
Gonadotropin) and HPL (Human Placental Lactogen), that regulate pregnancy 
(Lunenfeld 2004). 
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However, despite the perceived separation between the fetus and mother, the advent 
of genetic technology challenges the view of two distinct separate entities.  
Genetically, the fetus and mother are different, but fetal DNA can be detected within 
a pregnant women’s blood stream and tested through cell free DNA technologies 
(Wright and Chitty 2009).
85
  However, the DNA is fragmented and therefore limited 
in use (See Norbury and Norbury 2008).
86
  Despite the interaction and evidence of 
fetal cells within a pregnant woman, the pregnant woman’s immune system can still 
react as if fetal cells were foreign cells and induce a ‘graft vs. host’ response similar 
to that within gene therapy.  Although not clinically proven, it highlights the 
immunological response of a mother to her own fetus (See Johnson and Bianchi 
2004).  In short, the mother’s body is placed under extreme demand and does not 
biologically gain a benefit from the fetus.
87
   
 
The traditional view of the placenta keeping mother and fetus completely separate is 
not strictly true.  A substantial amount of maternal T cells (white blood cells), 
transcend the placenta into the fetus (Mold, Michaëlsson et al. 2008).  The result is 
that the fetus becomes immunological tolerant to the mother’s cells, while also 
priming the immune system of the fetus before it is born (Reinberg 2008).  
Therefore, there is interaction between the two genetically separate entities because 
the fetus is dependent on the mother for nutrition.  The fetus cannot live without the 
mother (until the point of viability, see below), but the mother can live without the 
fetus.   
 
If a mother wishes to carry the fetus to term, the fetus has a degree of control over 
inducing labour.  Labour is onset by the fetus realising hormones, which inhibits 
menstruation before labour and also induces birth (see above).  In fact, Liley claims 
that the fetus is actively in charge of pregnancy (Liley 1983) and therefore has its 
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own personality (Liley 1972).  It is through representations of the fetus as an 
individual with agency and biological control over pregnancy that one can find the 
historical foundations of the maternal fetal conflict (Casper 1998).  The fetus 
biologically and visually through ultrasound technologies presents the FGT 
practitioner with a dilemma.  How does a FGT practitioner approach the two 
biologically separate entities?  How many patients are they treating, especially when 
the treatment proposed is purely for the benefit of the fetus alone?  In trying to 
answer these types of questions, the fetus as a patient emanated as a viable solution 
to these questions. 
4.3.3 The fetus as a patient 
As stated earlier the term patient is flexible and has been used to refer to a fetus that 
a doctor is treating and has as their primary concern.  In order to establish the fetus 
as a patient, the fetus should be framed as a distinct, separable and separate from the 
pregnant woman’s body in which it resides in (Casper 1998).  However, it will be 
shown that being distinct, separable and separate patients does not mean that there 
are two independent persons or patients.  By introducing the fetus as a patient 
concept, how it came to be used within medicine and how it is formulated, its effect 
upon the maternal fetal divide can be discussed.  In order to introduce the fetus as a 
patient concept proposed by McCullough and Chervenak, the concept must be placed 
within the technological developments that have occurred since the concept resulted 
from such developments within fetal surgery.  The fetus as a patient (or fetal patient) 
is a concept that has been developed within the last 40 years.  Developments in fetal 
diagnosis and therapy, which have increased fetal outcomes in cases such as 
congenital diaphragmatic hernia, illustrate how three trends have facilitated the move 
to the concept of the fetus as a patient within the FGT debate (Harrison 2003).  The 
trends were possible due to: technological developments in imagery such as the real 
time ultrasound imagery in the 1970’s, which could diagnose in utero congenital 
anomalies (Han and Hwang 2001) in two, three and now four dimensions (real time 
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three dimension) (Churchill 2006); and the development of less invasive techniques 
such as fetendo (The Fetal Treatment Center 2009).
88
  
 
The first trend was the movement of fetal surgery towards physiological 
manipulation instead of anatomical repair (Jancelewicz and Harrison 2009).  The 
second trend was a result of technological developments into less invasive surgical 
techniques whereby fetal surgery could move from open fetal surgery, which 
impacted heavily upon the mother and her pregnant status (Harrison 2003).  This 
meant that fetal surgery could be used for fetal benefit with minimal maternal harm.  
And finally, the establishment of fetal interventions as clinical trials rather than just a 
practice manifested through clinical descriptions and/or retrospective analysis 
(Jancelewicz and Harrison 2009).  
 
To reflect these medical changes the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept was developed by 
fetal therapists to alert themselves, and patients, to the reality that treatment of 
pregnant women can have significant implications for their fetus (Dickens and Cook 
2003: 87).  Referring to the fetus as a ‘patient’ rather than an ‘unborn child’ helpfully 
highlighted the beneficence rather than rights-based nature of obligations toward 
early life (McCullough and Chervenak 2008).  However, the fetus does not have an 
independent moral status from others, which can generate obligations (Chervenak, 
McCullough et al. 2004: 222).  The term ‘patient’ is not based upon the intrinsic 
independent person, but upon whether or not one can gain a benefit from the 
application of clinical skill by a physician, whereby a human presents him/herself for 
treatment that will be more beneficial rather than cause ‘harm’ (Chervenak, 
McCullough et al. 1994: 5). 
 
The ‘fetus as a patient’ concept moves the maternal fetal divide debate within FGT 
away from issue of rights to the more fruitful terrain of the moral obligations of the 
clinician to the pregnant woman and fetus (Harris 2000).  The debate is shifted away 
from independent rights  to that of dependent moral status (Harris 2000).  The major 
advocates of the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept view dependent moral status as human 
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beings having obligations to protect and promote an entity’s interests because that 
entity is in a social role that has been created and structured for that purpose 
(Chervenak, McCullough et al. 1994). 
 
It should be noted that the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept proposed here differs from the 
unborn or fetal patient used by Liley (1972).  Liley used the increasing biological 
knowledge surrounding pregnancy to infer a ‘natural’ fetal patient through biological 
determinism; thus, legitimizing fetal personhood (Casper 1998, Liley 1972).  The 
fetal patient, in this instance, utilised key physiological and behavioural 
developments of the fetus to support the patient status placed upon the fetus (Casper 
1998).  The ‘fetus as a patient’ that McCullough and Chervenak propose throughout 
their work draws elements from the principled approached proposed by Beauchamp 
and Childress (2001).  They propose that medical ethics consists of four principles: 
autonomy, non-malfeasance, beneficence, and justice.
89
  These principles become 
important when the fetus is deemed a patient, because the pregnant woman's 
beneficence based obligations to the fetal patient can and should justifiably restrict 
her autonomy (Fleischman, Chervenak et al. 1998).  The two initial factors needed 
for the fetus to become a patient are: 
1. It is presented to the physician or other healthcare professional, and  
2. There exist clinical interventions that are reliably expected to 
clinically benefit the child and, later, the person that the fetus is 
expected to become once born (McCullough and Chervenak 2008: 
37). 
The ‘fetus as a patient’ concept depends on the viability of the fetus and the 
acknowledgement of the mother to continue a viable fetus to term (See Chervenak 
and McCullough 2007).  Therefore, the dependant moral status of the fetus is not 
based upon intrinsic characteristics of the fetus, but upon viability and ex utero  
support thorough technology and biology (Chervenak and McCullough 2009).  
Within England and Wales, a fetus is considered viable once it has commenced the 
24
th
 week of gestation.
90
  Legally, any fetus that is born dead after this point is no 
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longer considered a miscarriage, but a still birth.
91
  Once the fetus is viable it 
acquires interests, which include: avoiding premature death, disease and 
handicapping conditions; hence, when its interests are threatened, it becomes a 
‘patient’ (Harrison, Golbus et al. 1984). 
 
However, the fetal stage of development starts after 56 days of gestation, therefore 
the pre-viable fetus has to be considered.  As the prefix ‘pre’ suggests, the fetus 
would be unable to live if it was born at this stage of its development.  In order for a 
pre-viable fetus to be considered a patient, an extra criterion is needed.  The pre-
viable fetus is a patient as a function of the pregnant woman’s decision to confer the 
status of ‘patient’ upon the fetus (Chervenak and McCullough 2009, 2011).  More 
importantly, there is no obligation upon the pregnant woman to confer the status of a 
patient upon a pre-viable fetus, just because there is a potentially applicable and 
beneficial fetal therapy available (Chervenak, McCullough et al. 1994: 6).  However, 
with the rise of early genetic interventions, which can be seen as purely for the 
medical benefit of the fetus, the pre-viable fetal patient is important. 
 
Concepts are more than dictionary definitions or necessary entailments which 
someone wishes, but encompass the patterns of reasoning that lie behind it.  These 
patterns can include the conversational implications and interpretational 
predispositions that animate its use (Lyerly, Little et al. 2008).  Consequently, 
despite practitioners claiming that the ‘fetus as a patient’ treats both mother and fetus 
as the one patient; it is inescapable that the fetus as a patient depends on two distinct 
patients.  The fetus as a paradigmatic patient is an entity that is individuated 
physically and fully separate from others (Lyerly, Little et al. 2008).  Therefore, it 
should be considered that by treating the fetus as a patient means that the fetus, in 
theory, acquires the right to protection, thus making the threshold of viability 
irrelevant.  An irreversibly comatose patient has a right to protection regardless of 
their brain function or malfunction.  If being a patient includes the right to 
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preventative care, damage to the fetus should be avoided even before viability (Van 
Bogaert and Dhai 2008).  Therefore, the fetus as a patient could extend the conflict 
between mother and fetus throughout the gestational period. 
 
Throughout the development of the fetus as a patient within prenatal medical 
practice, the emphasis is on the autonomy of the mother.  As Dickens and Cook 
(2003) state: 
Those who appoint themselves physicians to fetal ‘patients,’ and then 
favour the interests of such ‘patients’ over the duties they owe to the 
pregnant women who came to them for conscientious care and advice, 
place themselves in a conflict of interest, and profoundly betray their 
true patients and professional responsibilities (Dickens and Cook 
2003: 87). 
 
Therefore, the mother is still paramount within the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept, 
especially where she has confirmed the status of patient upon a pre viable fetus.  In 
fact, subject to a declaration of incapacity upon the mother, the mother’s decision 
upon the course of treatment is still paramount above that of the fetus (Chervenak 
and McCullough 2003, 2007, 2011, Chervenak, McCullough et al. 2004, Chervenak, 
McCullough et al. 1994).  Therefore, despite the possibility of two patients, there is 
still only one ultimate decision maker.  In fact, as ubiquitous as the construction of 
the fetus as a patient is, not all practitioners will view or define the fetus as their 
primary or secondary work object (Casper 1998: 119).  However, within the USA, 
from where many of the leading FGT practitioners originate, the American College 
of Obstetrics and Gynaecology has issued guidance on how to approach the maternal 
fetal divide, if there is a conflict.  It states that physicians should  
(1) respect her autonomy, regardless of the consequences; or  
(2) counselling and/or referral to a colleague (who is willing to oblige 
or at least willing to repeat counselling); or  
(3) request a court order (and over-ride her autonomy)(American 
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology committee opinion 1999: 
214).   
In fact, with regards to research that is purely for the benefit of the fetus, consent of 
both parents is needed.
92
  Therefore, the maternal fetal divide is heightened when 
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physician and maternal patient are in conflict over the physician’s recommended 
course of treatment. 
 
As stated above, there is no obligation for the mother to see the fetus as separate 
from the mother within the proposition of patienthood.  Autonomy of the patient 
only refers to patients that are persons.  Considering that the fetus as a patient 
concept depends on more than clinical expertise; the maternal fetal divide becomes a 
divide between mother on one side, and fetus/physician on the other.  Therefore,  
reference to the fetus as a patient creates a possible conflict between the mother and 
fetus, as well as between the mother and clinician (Noble and Rodeck 2008: 222).  It 
could be considered that a clinician can, under the fetus as a patient concept, have 
two patients with competing interests.  For example, ‘patienthood’ is a normative 
status that connotes concrete expectations for professional engagement: physicians 
are duty-bound to be fiduciaries of their patients (Lyerly, Little et al. 2008).  When 
the benefit of treatment is purely for the fetus, then under strict interpretation of fetal 
patienthood, the FGT practitioner would under their fiduciary relation with the fetus 
recommend treatment.  Under their fiduciary duty to the mother, they should 
recommend abortion.  Therefore, the fetus as a patient creates a divide between 
mother and fetus, but relies upon autonomy to resolve the conflict. 
 
Ultimately, the fetus as a patient concept is a concept that changes the way in which 
FGT practitioners address issues within FGT.  For example, treatments given to the 
mother are also put in terms of their prospective benefits and risks for both the 
women and for their fetus, as the therapist has duties towards both (Dickens and 
Cook 2003).  It moves the maternal fetal divide from a biological or ethical problem 
to a practical one.  Nevertheless, when the maternal fetal divide becomes a conflict, 
it is up to legal institutions to decide what the maternal fetal divide is.  Therefore, 
how the maternal fetal divide is legally constituted helps create the environment 
upon which the maternal fetal divide within the clinic is formalised.  In order to 
ascertain the judicial view of the maternal fetal divide, the relevant legal topics must 
be identified.  These are the cases surrounding abortion and the refusal of treatment 
because these are the cases where it is being advanced by another party that there is 
conflict between the interest of the fetus and mother.  Once those areas are identified 
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then each area can be dissected to reveal that the legal perspective on the maternal 
fetal divide is one established at birth and, therefore, does not exist except in limited 
circumstances such as infant destruction. 
4.4 Legal perspective on the maternal fetal divide 
Within the legal system of England and Wales the development of the maternal fetal 
divide has been bound up with the debate surrounding the legality of abortion and 
enforced caesarean sections.  The political and legal debate is immediately connected 
to these practices; therefore, both frame the maternal fetal divide (Casper 1998).  The 
civil and criminal debates surrounding the legal status of a fetus form one continuous 
account of the legal status of a fetus.  In discussing the possible maternal fetal divide, 
the debate is framed within the conflict of medical opinion and maternal want.  In 
other words, the cases that are reviewed are only cases where these two opinions 
differ.  These cases are important for the thesis as they will help frame the answers to 
the research questions as well as assist in understanding whether there is legal room 
to manoeuvre if the practice of FGT is pointing in a different direction.  
 
The case law establishes common themes surrounding the regulatory approach to the 
maternal fetal divide.  These themes are abortion, refusal of treatment, and human 
rights.  In order to assess these areas, the relevant case law will be identified and 
explored in the above order.  The abortion and refusal of treatment cases involve 
cases from England and Wales, but because of the nature of human rights, the human 
rights cases include rulings from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
After analysing each case the legal perspective will lead to the conclusion that, due 
to the mother’s autonomy, the maternal fetal divide does not exist except in limited 
circumstances.  Even at a European level, there is a reluctance to enforce that the 
fetus is a legal life under the ECHR.  Therefore, the maternal fetal divide starts at 
birth. 
 
As stated earlier in the chapter, it is the right for the mother to act autonomously over 
her own body that has emerged as the key element in defining any conflict between 
mother and fetus.  In acting autonomously, the legal debate is concerned with the 
right to refuse treatment as well as to receive medical services, which directly affects 
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the fetus in areas such as abortion.  These rights can be seen as negative or positive,
93
 
which makes abortion a useful area to explore to ascertain if there is a divide and/or 
conflict at a legal level.  However, the case law refusal of treatment includes 
treatment of incompetent pregnant women, which also provides significant evidence 
as to how the maternal fetal divide is framed.  Classically, case law regarding the 
enforcement of treatment to incompetent pregnant women concerns caesarean 
sections.  However, the maternal fetal divide is also prevalent within abortion law.  
Given the interplay with FGT and abortion as a ‘treatment option’ abortion law and 
how abortion law has developed is extremely important because potentially any 
intergenerational interests would impact on abortion being a viable option where 
FGT is available.   
4.4.1 Abortion 
An historical perspective on the law surrounding abortion is the best way in which to 
understand the current abortion regulations.  It outlines the progression from abortion 
being an illegal practice before the 20
th
 century, to essentially abortion on demand, 
under certain conditions, under the Abortion Act 1967.  This account includes 
looking as far back as Coke’s 17th century definition of murder.  This is important 
for the thesis as it establishes who are defined as legal people capable of protection 
under English law, and thus potentially how FGT could be regulated.  Historically 
within the abortion debate the fetus had no rights or interests until the point of 
quickening
94
 which, once it had occurred, curtailed the mother’s autonomy.  
Essentially viability and humanity was shown to exist at the point of the quickening, 
thereby creating a conflict between the mother and fetus where the mother did not 
wish the pregnancy to continue.  Therefore, the biological ‘life’ of the fetus could 
override that of the mother’s autonomy. 
 
Despite abortion post quickening being illegal at this point in history, a fetus was not 
considered a person and did not accrue any rights until being born.  Therefore,:   
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If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth 
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the child dieth in her 
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe; this is a great misprision, 
and no murder . . ."(Coke 1628-1644: Pt. III, ch. 7, p. 50). 
 
This was because the fetus was not a reasonable creature, in rerum natura.   The case 
of Attorney-General's Reference (No.  3 of 1994)
95
 confirms that the above stance is 
still applicable today.  Therefore, until the damaged fetus is born, there is only one 
‘person’ that an accused is criminally liable to, except in certain circumstances. 
 
Nonetheless, the criminal law included restrictions upon maternal autonomy within 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  Section 58 made it unlawful to 
administer a poison or noxious thing to procure an abortion; while section 59 
prohibits supplying or procuring poison or instruments for the purpose of criminal 
abortion.  Viability no longer applied as medical knowledge had proved that the 
quickening was no longer a special point within pregnancy.  Therefore, the maternal 
fetal divide rested purely on the knowledge of being pregnant.  Fetal interest in a 
continued pregnancy to birth was paramount over the mother’s autonomy and bodily 
integrity.  Further legislation made it illegal to procure an abortion of a child that was 
capable of being born alive, with the person being served with a charge of ‘child 
destruction’.96  Viability, once again became the point at which a fetus gained 
protection from being wilfully terminated by its mother.   
 
However, within R v Bourne,
97
 a 14 year old girl became pregnant following a rape.  
With the consent of both parents Dr Bourne performed an abortion upon the girl and 
was subsequently charged under the 1861 Act.  Dr Bourne was acquitted with the 
trial judge linking the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant 
Preservation Act 1929.  Importantly, the case recognised that the priority within the 
maternal fetal relationship is that of the mother, not the fetus.  Therefore, legislation 
reflected the change towards autonomous decision making with the introduction in 
the Abortion Act 1967.  The change in legislation reflected the ability of medical 
practitioners to perform abortions safely as well as changing attitudes towards 
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women’s rights.  As far as the criminal proceedings are concerned the maternal fetal 
divide can still be seen in recent cases that have placed weight upon damage and 
trespass to the pregnant woman rather than on pure harm to the fetus as a person.
98
 
 
The criminal law does, however, recognise the maternal fetal divide.  The Attorney-
General's Reference (No.3 of 1994), indicates that there is a maternal fetal divide 
because: 
(i) B caused the death of a person, the child, S.  Otherwise he could 
not have been convicted of manslaughter. 
(ii) He did so by an act done with intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm to a person, the mother.  (Metcalfe 1997: 831) 
The maternal fetal divide is reflected in third party intervention within the criminal 
law but not where the mother chooses to inflict injury. For example, a person will be 
guilty of murder and infant destruction where injury inflicted to a victim also results 
in the death of their fetus. The conviction of Carl Whant for the murder of Nikitta 
Grender and the infant destruction of her fetus highlights the divide between mother 
and fetus at law (BBC News 2012).  This is partly due to the amendments made by 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, which uncoupled the Infant 
Preservation Act 1929 from the Abortion Act 1967, thus removing the ‘capable of 
being born’ limitation and hence liability of abortions of fully handicapped children 
(House of Parliament 1990).  Therefore, despite Coke’s definition of murder not 
being applicable to fetuses because they are not ‘people’ clearly criminal liability, 
not just civil liability, can be imposed under the Infant Preservation Act 1929.  Using 
the term ‘infant’ rather than fetus implies that beyond viability the divide is more 
than an emotional divide, and seeks to protect the fetuses because they will be 
infants.   In order to further assess if there is a maternal fetal divide or conflict, the 
maternal fetal divide must be viewed through the lenses of medical decisions. 
 
After 24 weeks, the ultimate decision of curtailment of fetal life can only be where; 
the fetus has a serious genetic disease; the continued pregnancy will cause permanent 
physical or mental injury to mother; the benefit of a continued pregnancy places a 
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greater risk than an abortion.
99
  However, the initial limit under the Abortion Act 
1967 was 28 weeks, but this was reduced following an increase in knowledge about 
pregnancy (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2007).
 100
  Yet 
the same amendment meant that a ‘life’ could be ended if there were sufficient 
conditions, thus highlighting not only the tension between restriction of choice and 
autonomy as medical knowledge develops, but also the importance of scientific 
progress upon the regulation of choice and autonomy.  Therefore, there could 
potentially be an impact upon FGT regulation as it progresses. 
 
Abortion places the maternal fetal divide debate within the frame of positive rights.  
However, that is merely one aspect of the maternal fetal divide within the law of 
England and Wales.  Importantly for the thesis, it is the negative right of autonomy, 
or right to refuse, that is of paramount importance to the maternal fetal divide.  The 
debate surrounding negative rights moves the debate away from the regulation of 
abortion and into the general regulation of autonomy within pregnancy. This is 
important as the research questions clearly indicate that there is a question about 
enforcement of treatment for the sake of future generations.  If this is occurring 
within case law then an avenue for enforcing treatment in the interest of future 
generations would be possible.  If this is not so then regardless of the benefit of a 
treatment, maternal autonomy would place the maternal fetal divide solely in the 
hand of a mother and no other interested party.  Interestingly, the evolution of 
significant case law appears from 1992 in the case of Re T,
101
 through to the cases of   
Re MB,
102
 and the exception to this in Re F (In Utero).
103
  This latter case, however, 
is dealt with within Re MB,
104
 which is the leading authority on the maternal fetal 
divide. 
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4.4.2 Refusal of treatment 
It was not until 1992 that the legal system within England and Wales had to address 
the possibility of an exception to the principle of autonomy within competent women 
(Scott 2002).  The possible exception to the principle of autonomy was mooted by 
the case Re T.
105
  Re T concerned a 34 week pregnant woman who had been admitted 
to hospital due to a road traffic accident.  Although not part of a religious group 
herself, her mother was a Jehovah's Witness.  One afternoon, when only her mother 
was with her, she stated spontaneously to a nurse that she did not want a blood 
transfusion, that she had been a Jehovah's Witness and retained some beliefs.  She 
reiterated her refusal to blood transfusions both to the midwife and to a doctor.  Her 
fetus was delivered still born.  Later T’s condition deteriorated and she was sedated 
and placed on life support.  The case primarily considered patient autonomy; how to 
assess capacity to consent and if there is any undue influence upon a person’s 
consent; due to her pregnant nature, the case considered the rights and interests of 
the fetus against the refusal of blood transfusions by Miss.  T: 
An adult patient who, like Miss.  T, suffers from no mental incapacity 
has an absolute right to choose one rather than another of the 
treatments being offered.  The only possible qualification is a case in 
which the choice may lead to the death of a viable fetus.  That is not 
this case and, if and when it arises, the courts will be faced with a 
novel problem of considerable legal and ethical complexity.
106
 
 
At the time of Lord Donaldson’s statement, the Abortion Act 1967 was amended by 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 s.37, which reduced the time 
limit for medical termination of pregnancy from 28 weeks to 24 weeks.
107
  The 
caveat of viability was quickly challenged in Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment),
108
 where Sir Stephen Brown P was called to adjudicate whether doctors 
could override a refusal of treatment by a pregnant woman on religious grounds.  
Although the case was swiftly banished to legal history, the case drew criticism for 
allowing the declaration of the doctors to treat S without her consent.  The case also 
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drew criticism for Sir Brown P’s wrongful interpretation of the American case Re 
AC,
109
 which involved very different facts.
110
  Several cases involving incompetent 
women followed this judgement with enforced caesarean sections being carried out 
as treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983 s.63.
111
  The maternal fetal divide 
was alive with regards to caesarean sections, placing the legal force with the fetus 
and its interest in living.  However, the question of whether or not viability was 
enough to invoke a conflict between mother and fetus which was able to override a 
competent mother’s negative right to treatment was not fully reconsidered until the 
case of Re MB, thus consigning Re S to the history books.  
4.4.3 Re MB 
MB was a pregnant woman who refused blood transfusions both before and during 
her pregnancy because of her needle phobia.  When she was 40 weeks pregnant it 
was found that the fetus was in the breech position.  The serious risk of brain damage 
or death to the baby was explained to MB if the fetus was delivered vaginally.  She 
agreed to have a caesarean section, she was admitted to hospital where she and her 
partner agreed to the operation and signed a consent form.  However, when 
successive attempts were made to carry out the operation she panicked at the last 
moment because of her needle phobia and withdrew her consent.  Finally, when MB 
was in labour and not responding to either the midwife or the consultant, she once 
again consented to, and then refused anaesthesia.  The health authority subsequently 
applied for and was granted a declaration from the High Court that it would be 
lawful for the consultant gynaecologist to operate on her, using reasonable force if 
necessary.  Later that night the Court of Appeal dismissed the patient's appeal from 
that order, reserving its reasoning till the following morning.  In the leading 
judgement by Butler Sloss LJ, the maternal fetal conflict was addressed, firstly by 
assessing the case law that preceded the case stating: 
There are decisions, which give some acknowledgment to the effect 
harmful acts have upon the fetus[...] [However,] none [..] lends any 
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support to the proposition that the court should take into account the 
interests of the unborn child at risk from the refusal of a competent 
mother to consent to medical intervention.
112
  
 
Butler Sloss LJ, then went on to address fetal interests within pregnancy and if the 
court can protect those interests.  She states: 
The fetus up to the moment of birth does not have any separate 
interests capable of being taken into account when a court has to 
consider an application for a declaration in respect of a caesarean 
section operation.  The court does not have the jurisdiction to declare 
that such medical intervention is lawful to protect the interests of the 
unborn child even at the point of birth.
113
 
 
She reiterated dictum from Re F (In Utero), involving a pregnant woman who was 
mentally disturbed and led a nomadic existence. The local authority was concerned 
that she would neither take sufficient care nor seek medical attention for the 
wellbeing of the child at the time of birth and thereafter.  The local authority applied 
for the fetus to be declared a ward of court.  The local Authority lost on the grounds 
that because a fetus was not a person, a writ could not be issued on the fetus’ behalf.  
However, Re F (In utero) also considered the possibility of the court being asked to 
order delivery of the baby by caesarean section.  Balcombe LJ stated: 
If Parliament were to think it appropriate that a pregnant woman 
should be subject to controls for the benefit of her unborn child, 
then doubtless it will stipulate the circumstances in, which such 
controls may be applied and the safeguards appropriate for the 
mother's protection.  In such a sensitive field, affecting as it does 
the liberty of the individual, it is not for the judiciary to extend 
the law.
114
  
 
Re F (In Utero) confirmed the decision taken a year earlier in the case of C v S,
115
 
whereby a father sought to stop his girlfriend from obtaining an abortion.  However, 
it was held that the fetus had no status and the rights of a fetus are crystallised at 
birth.
116
  No other party could interfere with competent maternal choice unless 
parliament felt it appropriate.  Therefore, Re MB confirmed that within the institution 
of law and medical decisions, despite dealing with two entities, there is not a 
division between mother and fetus when the mother is deemed competent.  In other 
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words, there is only one set of interest to take into account, that of the mother’s.  
Therefore, where the mother is competent no other interested parties such as fathers 
or ‘future children’ can override a mother’s choice regardless of the benefit to 
anyone/anything else.  Therefore, regardless of how good fetal therapies are they 
cannot be enforced upon a mother.  The case highlighted the possible influence of 
human rights within refusal of treatment cases, which must be considered at a 
supranational level because under the Human Rights Act 1998, the decisions of the 
ECtHR are directly applicable to the maternal fetal divide within the UK.  To assess 
the supranational level, once again the case law involving the fetus and decisions 
regarding pregnancy will be analysed, which results in the maternal fetal divide once 
again being dependant on birth. 
4.4.4 Human rights and the maternal fetal divide 
In 1951, the UK ratified the ECHR,
117
 which binds all ratifying nations to 
convention rights and rulings of the ECtHR and European Commission of Human 
Rights (Bradley and Ewing 1997).  The UK is also a signatory to the EU, which acts 
at a supranational level over the UK and is separate from the ECHR.
118
  The 
regulatory competence of medicine within the EU falls under the Treaty on European 
Union, implying that such protection falls within the competence of national 
legislation and, therefore, not strictly of concern at the EU level.  The ECtHR, also 
applies a margin of appreciation with respect to their decisions in relation to 
convention rights.
119
  Therefore, the ECtHR is a useful tool for analysing the 
maternal fetal divide. 
 
It was not until October 2000, through the HRA 1998 that convention rights were 
enshrined within the domestic law of England and Wales.  The rulings of the ECtHR 
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and European Commission, pre HRA are still applicable.  However, applicants must 
still exhaust all avenues of appeal before an application to either court is admissible.  
More recently, under the Lisbon Treaty there is a Charter of Fundamental rights, 
which runs parallel to the ECHR and should adopt the same interpretations and case 
law of the ECtHR  (The Law Society 2008).
120
 
 
The earliest case where the maternal fetal divide was called into question was in 
Brüggemann and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany.
121
 The European 
Commission on Human Rights had to consider the relationship between the pregnant 
woman and her fetus in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, the right to 
respect for private and family life.  Two German women challenged the criminal 
restrictions upon abortion in West Germany.  The Commission found that there are 
limits to the Article 8, because: 
Pregnancy cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the sphere of private 
life.  Whenever a woman is pregnant, her private life becomes closely 
connected with the developing fetus.
122
 
 
The Commission did not find it necessary to assess, or conclude, whether or not the 
fetus has rights within Article 2, but the judgement was the first of many with 
regards to the maternal fetal divide.  Article 2, the right to life, has been a key factor 
in the maternal fetal divide debate because neither life nor human had been defined 
within the ECHR;
123
 therefore, a fetus could potentially have a separate, 
conflicting/competing interest in the right to life from that of its mother.  The 
question of whether the status of a fetus is separate from its mother, and therefore 
engaging competing rights, was raised within the case of Paton v United 
Kingdom,
124
 where the maternal fetal divide was considered in relation to Article 2.  
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In 1978, Mrs Paton found out that she was eight weeks pregnant and decided to have 
an abortion.  Her husband did not agree with the proposed abortion and applied for 
an injunction to prevent the abortion from being carried out.  Having exhausted all 
appeal avenues within the legal system of England and Wales, Mr. Paton then 
applied to the ECtHR to rule upon the matter.  The case alleged many ECHR 
infringements, but is relevant to the maternal fetal divide by identifying the legal 
interpretation of a fetus in relation to the ECHR.  In identifying if the Article 2 of the 
ECHR applied to the fetus the court identified that: 
The ‘life’ of the fetus is intimately connected with, and cannot be 
regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant woman.  If Article 
2 were held to cover the fetus and its protection under this Article 
were, in the absence of any express limitation, seen as absolute, an 
abortion would have to be considered as prohibited even where the 
continuance of the pregnancy would involve a serious risk to the life 
of the pregnant woman.  This would mean that the ‘unborn life’ of the 
fetus would be regarded as being of a higher value than the life of the 
pregnant woman.  The ‘right to life’ of a person already born would 
thus be considered as subject not only to the express limitations 
mentioned in paragraph 8 above but also to a further, implied 
limitation.  [...] The Commission finds that such an interpretation 
would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.
125
  
 
The interpretation of Paton was followed in Re F (In utero) and C v S.  Therefore, 
the maternal fetal conflict is only acknowledged and that is all.  A fetus has no legal 
rights and nor does any other party where a mother is competent and making a 
decision voluntarily.  However, Paton did not issue a definitive decision upon a 
viable fetus as the question of viability was considered to fall outside the remit of the 
case.   
 
The most recent decision of the ECtHR that is relevant to the maternal fetal divide is 
the case of Vo v France.
126
  Following the medical negligence by her doctor, Mrs Vo 
suffered injury to her amniotic sac, which in turn required the termination of her 
pregnancy, which she maintained she fully wanted.  The fetus was on the borderline 
of viability when the termination occurred.  It was argued that Article 2 of the ECHR 
applied to a fetus at this stage of development.  The doctor, who performed the 
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procedure, was charged with causing unintentional injury, but was acquitted on the 
grounds that the fetus was not, at that stage, a human person.  On appeal, the 
acquittal was upheld by the Court of Cassation within France, thereby exhausting all 
Mrs. Vo’s remedies within the French legal system and appealing to the ECtHR. 
 
The convention, however, is clear upon the status of the fetus.
127
  However, given the 
technology that is now available more than 50 years after the original convention 
was written, and the Paton case, it does not completely answer the question of the 
maternal fetal divide.  The court drew precedent from X v United Kingdom,
128
 where 
a husband petitioned the European Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the 
fetus that his wife wished to abort. 
[I]f one assumes that this provision applies at the initial stage of the 
pregnancy, the abortion is covered by an implied limitation, 
protecting the life and health of the woman at that stage, of the ‘right 
to life’ of the fetus.129  
 
The above statement reaffirmed the decision of Paton and within the Vo case the 
judgement went further in identifying the implication of the ECHR for the fetus and 
states: 
[I]t is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to answer 
in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for 
the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.
130
 
 
The Vo case highlights that there is no moral conscience about the status of the fetus 
across Europe.  More importantly, it signifies that for the purpose of the ECHR, the 
right to life does not apply to the fetus in  law.  The Court is still not willing to 
answer the question of whether a fetus is a person or answer questions in relation to 
viability. 
 
Therefore, the fetus is not considered distinctly separate or different from its mother.  
The comments provided to the court in the Vo case, indicated that this should be the 
case even when fetal damage occurs (Center for Reproductive Rights 2003).  Thus, 
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the maternal fetal divide is essentially ruled out apart from the possibility of 
viability.  Nonetheless, the language used by the ECtHR frames the maternal fetal 
debate in relation to competing interests, but has yet to rule in favour of a fetus; 
therefore confirming that fetal interests are not of concern with regards to maternal 
rights.   
 
In fact, other pieces of legislation related to fetal issues confirm the lack of maternal 
fetal divide.  In terms of property rights, despite the biological difference between 
mother and fetus, the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) considers that fetal tissue is of 
maternal origin; therefore, whether fetal cells are extracted for analysis, or are 
removed from a stillborn fetus, the cells are still considered maternal tissue (Human 
Tissue Authority 2009: [157]).
131
  The same consent rules apply to fetal tissue as to 
the mother’s tissue, and due to the sensitivity attached to research on fetal material, it 
is good practice to always obtain consent for the examination of fetal tissue and for 
its storage or use for all scheduled purposes (Human Tissue Authority 2009). 
 
It is worthwhile identifying that a mother has no civil culpability for decisions made 
while pregnant once that fetus is born.  According to the Congenital Disabilities 
(Civil Liability) Act 1976, if a child is born disabled as a result of an action or 
actions during the pregnancy or birth, the child may sue the person responsible but 
not the mother.
132
  The only instance is contained within section two whereby the 
mother owes the same duty of care to the fetus as she does to any other road user.  
The reason for the exception is due to compulsory car insurance (Jackson 2006).  
The legal construction of the maternal fetal divide is best summed up by Butler 
Sloss: 
Although it might seem illogical that a child capable of being born 
alive is protected by the criminal law from intentional destruction, 
and by the Abortion Act from termination otherwise than as permitted 
by the Act, but is not protected from the (irrational) decision of a 
competent mother not to allow medical intervention to avert the risk 
of death, this appears to be the present state of the law.  Moreover, if 
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the competent mother by refusing medical intervention is delivered of 
a handicapped child, she cannot be sued by that child for her decision 
not to take steps to protect it at the moment of birth.
133
  
 
Therefore, the maternal fetal divide is acknowledged within law in relation to fetal 
interests, but the result is that there is effectively no maternal fetal divide until the 
birth of the fetus.  Only in certain criminal circumstances is the maternal fetal divide 
an important enough issue that regulation creates a divide in order to prescribe 
liability to more than one entity.  In comparison to the development of knowledge 
surrounding pregnancy, it appears that the legal maternal fetal divide has not 
developed in accordance with principles such as the fetus as a patient or the 
development of medical knowledge surrounding pregnancy.  Rather case law is 
centred under legal personality and autonomy.  The importance of this is that there is 
a danger that FGT could progress in line with medical practice and the legal maternal 
fetal divide could be left behind, as identified by Ellul (1965) and Winner (1978). 
4.5 Conclusion 
The fundamental difference between the construction of the maternal fetal divide 
within law and medicine is the way that the interests of the fetus are taken into 
account.  The fetus as a patient within medicine creates a divide between mother and 
fetus, which is beyond the biological divide of pregnancy.  It recognises and tries to 
treat two patients, despite claiming only to treat one combined patient of mother and 
fetus.  The advent of FGT makes the maternal fetal divide even clearer, as 
increasingly it is the fetus that needs treatment, with the mother receiving treatment 
as a proxy.  Because of the fetus as a patient concept the maternal fetal divide results 
in ‘parental’, not just maternal, consent being an issue for FGT practitioners within 
the USA.  However, within the legal institutions of England and Wales, although 
FGT practitioners may utilise the fetus as a patient model to try and treat the fetus, 
there is no divide at law, except within a few exceptions.  In other words, until birth, 
despite the acknowledgement of two sets of competing interests, at both the UK and 
European Human Rights level, the rights and interests of the mother are paramount.   
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No other parties are relevant, even when a mother is making a decision which 
conflicts with their duties.  In fact, the lack of maternal fetal divide within the law is 
shown by the way that fetal tissue is treated as maternal tissue, not tissue in care of 
both parents.  If the maternal fetal divide was apparent within the legal institutions of 
England and Wales, the medical and legal debate within pregnancy would centre on 
weighing up maternal and fetal interests, not viability or birth.  As a result of the two 
different constructions of the maternal fetal divide a tension is created between not 
only mother and fetus, but between institutions.   
 
The maternal position appears not to have developed as viable therapies that can be 
administered safely to mothers have been developed, yet medical knowledge has 
been influential in restricting maternal choice.  The reduction of the abortion limit 
under section 1(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 from 28 weeks to 24 is a clear indication 
of that.  However, medical knowledge of fetal therapies has not had the same impact 
in terms of enforcement of treatment. 
 
These principles are important because in order to assess the regulation of FGT and 
answer the research questions, the maternal fetal divide helps establish the 
implications of the data as well as establishing the relevant parties within FGT.  
They also provide an insight into how the legal interpretation of the maternal fetal 
divide has progressed in accordance with the rise of autonomy rather than with the 
rise in medical knowledge surrounding the fetus.  This indicates that an autonomy 
orientated position would evolve within the clinic rather than a fetus orientated 
position.   However, biotechnologies have also had power to impact upon choice 
within the clinic.  The next chapter will investigate ethics as a method to mitigate the 
impact of progressing biotechnologies, and provides the philosophical foundation to 
the debate about the maternal fetal divide. 
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5 Justifying the use of an Ethical Principle 
5.1 Introduction 
Having seen in chapter 4 the medical and legal manifestations of the maternal fetal 
divide that operate within FGT, regulating and practicing in such an area can be 
potentially precarious.  It is clear from international declarations, academic writings 
and other associated documents that ethics is seen as one way to regulate progressing 
biotechnologies, which would include FGT.  Ethics can codify societal responses 
towards such areas, assess whether current regulations are adequate to the demands 
of scientific progress and can promote responsible uses of science (Directorate-
General for Research and Innovation 2012).  Theorising about ethics helps provide 
consistency, identify what guidelines or standards should be used to make 
appropriate judgements, and help guide the correct application of the appropriate 
theory (LaFollette 2007).   
 
Importantly for the thesis, utilising a prospective theory, which can go beyond the 
current risk and safety factors reduces the real danger of polarising opinions when 
technologies and/or practices are introduced and discussed is preferable (Peterson 
2001).  Considering that technology has the power to produce long term 
consequences beyond the ‘now’ as well as have its own autonomy (Ellul 1965, 
Winner 1978), an ethical theory should not be contingent upon time or place (Groves 
2006).  This is important when considering the intergenerational aspects and long 
term consequences of FGT whereby applying an ethical critique to the debate will 
clarify issues that may be technically feasible in the future (Peterson 2001).  To add 
legitimacy to the ethical analysis that follows in this thesis a connection must be 
made between ethics, the practice of medicine and the regulation of FGT. By 
identifying the connection an appropriate ethical theory to analyse FGT emerges 
which is presented in the last sections of this chapter.   
 
Section 5.2 of this chapter looks at the international influences on FGT and shows 
that within the globalised industry ‘human dignity’ emerges as a guiding principle in 
both international and domestic regulatory practices, including patients’ rights. 
Section 5.3 asks what is human dignity and examines the question under Schulman’s 
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four categories. Section 5.4 evaluates different moral theorists in order to find a 
foundation for human dignity. Here Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC) emerges as the standard with which to assess whether human 
dignity has been violated.  The PGC has been used by several academics in bioethics 
as well as in human rights theory and in the assessment of reproductive issues 
(Beyleveld 2012, Beyleveld and Brownsword 1998, Beyleveld and Brownsword 
2001, Kohen 2005, Pattinson 2002).  Section 5.5 explains and presents the PGC in 
three stages.  This is followed by an examination of the Contingency argument, the 
Principal of Proportionality and the Precautionary Principle.  The final section 5.8 
presents the marginal groups under PGC before the conclusion of the chapter. 
5.2 Human dignity as a guiding principle 
Post World War II there have been many international instruments designed to 
protect human rights.  These instruments were a reaction to the eugenic practices of 
Nazi Germany.  The first international instrument to condemn such human atrocities 
was the Charter of the United Nations 1945 where the preamble states:  
We the people of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small. 
 
Shortly after the introduction of the Charter of the United Nations 1945, the United 
Nations proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.  Within 
Article 1, the term ‘human dignity’ appears, by proclaiming that ‘all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’  In 1950 the ECHR was ratified but 
this, however, made no explicit reference to human dignity as the foundation of 
human rights (Beyleveld and Brownsword 1998).  In fact, human dignity and 
freedom were only confirmed by the ECtHR as being the very essence of the 
convention in 2002.
134
  However, other international declarations including the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) saw the 
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foundations of freedom, justice and peace as being intrinsically linked with human 
dignity.
135
  These instruments are relevant to patients’ rights but are less applicable 
to the practice FGT.  Therefore, more specific international instruments must be 
investigated to ascertain whether human dignity is relevant to FGT.   
 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1997 states ‘Practices, which 
are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings shall 
not be permitted.’136  The declaration also states, that germ line interventions could 
be contrary to human dignity.
137
  Such statements are relevant to the practice of FGT 
because germ line interventions may provide the best solution to eradicate certain 
genetic conditions within FGT and therefore understanding if germ line interventions 
truly violate human dignity is of importance.  Although the UK is not a signatory to 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, the Preamble requires 
signatories: 
To take sure measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity 
and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with 
regards to the application of biology and medicine. 
 
This was confirmed a year later by the Council of Europe Protocol in relation to 
human cloning.
138
  Therefore, at a European level, human dignity is a fundamental 
part of regulating biotechnologies.  Internationally, UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, continues the theme of human dignity 
within bioethics.  The principles of respect for human dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms appear as foundations to the declaration.
139
  Human dignity 
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appears eight times within the declaration as a guiding principle; therefore, it is a 
fundamental concept within biotechnology and FGT. 
  
Although within the UK there is a heterogeneous and multi-layered framework, 
which sees a conflict between utilitarianism and ‘human rights’ (Rendtorff 2002), the 
concept of dignity is still prevalent.
140
  It is evident within consultation documents 
regulating new genetic technologies that academics within the UK utilise the term 
‘human dignity’.  For example, the first report from the Joint House of Commons 
and House of Lords Committee, concerning the Human Tissue and Embryo’s Bill141 
stated: 
A total of 38 of the 42 comments (90%) raised objections to the 
creation of hybrid embryos altogether.  Several did so, on the basis of 
religious, ethical or moral convictions, regarding it as “contrary to 
human dignity” [...] (Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill 2007: 109). 
 
The concept of ‘human dignity’ has not just been utilised by academics and others 
giving evidence for consultation, but also by the committees charged with ultimately 
scrutinising bills.  For example, earlier in the assessment of human reproductive 
technologies the House of Commons Science Committee stated: 
The demand to regulate morally controversial techniques goes beyond 
possible harms to individuals or even society.  The concern here is 
more that the use of the treatment offends human dignity rather than 
any harms that might result from it (House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 2005: 20). 
 
Previous reports concerning the maternal fetal divide, such as embryo and fetal 
research, have attributed some status to the human embryo and had something akin 
to ‘dignity’ in mind.  The Polkinghorne Committee Report 1989, which was set up to 
review and overhaul the code of practice governing fetuses and fetal tissue 
acknowledged a ‘special status’ of the fetus (Keown 1993).  They go on to say that 
the fetus is entitled to respect broadly comparable to that of a living person.  The 
Warnock Report (1984), also concluded that the embryo had special status because 
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of having some intrinsic moral importance; thus, must be treated with respect 
(Jackson 2006).  It should be noted that the eventual conclusion of the Warnock 
committee was essentially a compromise position in order to appease many diverse 
factions of society (Jackson 2006).  Although not specifically a reference to human 
dignity, the intrinsic nature of humanity is evident. 
 
Furthermore, the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) has stated that in order for 
respect of persons to be fulfilled, there has to be respect for the equal value, dignity 
and moral rights of individuals regarding personal information and genetics (Human 
Genetics Commission 2002).  The HGC report on reproductive choices and genetics 
reaffirmed the significance of dignity within autonomy (Human Genetics 
Commission 2006).  However, GTAC, which governs the ethical approval process of 
FGT, makes no specific reference to human dignity.  But GTAC is governed by the 
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, which implemented 
the European Clinical Trials Directive.
142
  The Directive established that the 
accepted basis for the conduct of clinical trials in humans is founded on the 
protection of human rights and the dignity of human beings, with regard to the 
application of biology and medicine.
143
  However, GTAC is a Research Ethics 
Committee (REC); therefore it’s priority is to safeguard the rights, safety, dignity 
and well-being of people participating in research (National Patient Safety Agency 
2009).  Therefore, dignity should be an integral part of scrutinising proposed FGT 
research. 
 
In addition, within the regulation of biotechnologies, vis-à-vis FGT, human dignity 
emerges as an ethical or moral principle that needs exploration.  However, as seen in 
chapter 3, the regulation of medicine within England and Wales is based upon the 
principle of autonomy (Jackson 2006).  Therefore, any construction of human 
dignity should include ‘autonomy’ within it.  The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) recognises that patients have the right to be treated with dignity; and, it was 
from the fundamental dignity and equality of all human beings that the notion of 
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patient rights was developed (World Health Organisation 2010).  Therefore, by 
exploring human dignity will inform the debate within FGT and the related concepts 
of patient autonomy.  Consequently, it is not exaggerating to characterize it as the 
overarching principle of international biolaw (Andorno 2009).  The international 
instruments appear to present three ideas about human dignity.  Firstly, there is 
something inherent or intrinsic about human dignity; secondly, it applies to everyone 
equally; and finally, because it is inherent in every human, it cannot legitimately be 
taken away (Andorno 2009).
144
  
  
The benefit of utilising human dignity is that it is not contingent upon current social 
thinking and can be used regardless of time or place.  Contemporary human rights 
and autonomy based theories too often forget this element of the debate, thus leading 
to incomplete debate and regulation (Dupré 2009).  By adding this dimension, issues 
related to the intergenerational aspect of FGT can also be critiqued and discussed.  
Despite all these references to human dignity, and as an important concept within the 
regulation of FGT one has to establish: what is human dignity? The next section 
explores this more fully. 
5.3 What is human dignity? 
It should be noted that the terms dignity and human dignity can indicate who can 
possess dignity.  For example, the term human dignity excludes all those outside of 
the homosapien species without debate, whereas dignity is inclusive of anything that 
can possess dignity.  Guidance about what human dignity is, is merged within the 
various sources of human dignity which Schulman (2005) identifies as: classical 
antiquity, biblical religion, moral philosophy (Kantian), and 20
th
 century 
constitutions and international declarations. The focus within this section will be 
upon classical antiquity, biblical religion, and moral philosophy as this will help 
inform the documentary analysis which does not include these sources. 
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Dignity within classical antiquity can be traced back to Roman times.  Dignity is 
akin to worthiness and associated with rank, honour and excellence (Schulman 
2005).  Such a concept of dignity has been viewed as empirical or external dignity 
(De Baets 2007, Gewirth 1998).  Therefore, dignity becomes contextualised 
depending on time, relative space, and social position.  Given the increased 
complexity that biotechnologies add to the debate on FGT, it should be clear that 
associating dignity with rank and honour, turns dignity into a contingent property 
based upon social class and a form of excellence (Schulman 2008).  The failure of 
contingent propositions will be seen within 5.6.  More importantly, however, is 
whether such a position contradicts human dignity (Andorno 2009, Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001).  Deciding who has dignity based on social position, makes 
dignity exclusively concerned with the dignified conduct of a social group, not of 
humanity.  Therefore, as a source for defining human dignity it will not be used. 
 
Guidance for defining dignity can also be found from biblical sources (Schulman 
2008).  However, although biblical guidance is noteworthy, it remains bound to a 
notion of ‘god’, and does not provide any further grounding of human dignity, which 
could be useful for debate.  Therefore, biblical sources will not inform the derivation 
of human dignity within the thesis.  The search to construct human dignity should 
therefore take place within the moral philosophy part of Schulman’s identified 
sources. 
 
‘Human dignity’ consistently emerges as an abstract concept which needs to be 
defined or grounded.  Human dignity has been associated with genetic uniqueness.  
Therefore, dignity is genetic uniqueness and has been seen within the cloning debate 
as a way in which dignity can be violated.  However, if genetic uniqueness grounded 
human dignity then monozygotic twins would violate human dignity by their mere 
existence.  More importantly, our genes do not, on their own, bind our future life to a 
particular course (Caulfield 2003).  Therefore, the concept of human dignity must be 
grounded within a theory that is dependent on something other than genetics.  Kass 
(2008) identifies that within moral philosophy there is still tension about what 
human dignity is. 
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There are differences of opinion about exactly what it means and 
what it rests on, a difficulty painfully evident when appeals to 
“human dignity” are invoked on opposite sides of an ethical debate, 
for example, about whether permitting assisted suicide for patients 
suffering from degrading illnesses would serve or violate their human 
dignity.  There are also disagreements about the extent to, which 
considerations of human dignity should count in determining public 
policy (Kass 2008: 297). 
 
These types of questions appear to further complicate what is entailed in human 
dignity but as Schulman (2008) identifies, there are several possible answers to the 
problems that Kass observes: 
One possible answer discussed in our report is that it is morally 
permissible (and perhaps even admirable) for such a patient, who 
finds the prospect of years of dementia humiliating or repellent and 
who is reluctant to become a burden to his family, to forgo 
medication and allow heart disease to carry him off in a more 
dignified and humane way.  Another possible answer is that it is 
morally impermissible, because deliberately hastening the end of 
one’s life, even by an act of omission, is incompatible with the equal 
dignity and respect owed to all human life.  A third answer is that 
respect for the dignity and autonomy of all persons requires us to 
defer to the personal choice of a competent individual in such 
intimate matters, regardless of how he or she might decide (Schulman 
2008: 4). 
 
 It is important to identifying a common thread for human dignity from these 
answers that can guide regulators, practitioners and individuals in the maternal fetal 
divide.  Within moral philosophy according to Ashcroft (2004) there are four distinct 
groups within which a person can be situated in when talking about dignity: 
1. Those who consider dignity talk as incoherent and unhelpful 
2. Those who find dignity as illuminating, but still reducible to 
autonomy such as Beyleveld and Brownsword do utilising Gewirthian 
theory. 
3. Persons who consider dignity as being part of a family of concepts 
4. Those who see human dignity as a metaphysical property, which 
grounds human rights (Ashscroft 2004: 679). 
 
Those within Ashcroft’s first group argue that, despite human dignity being 
identified as being embedded in the modern debate surrounding genetics and medical 
ethics, it can appear as an ungrounded or a circular concept that is based upon 
humanity, although it is unclear what it is about our humanity that gives people 
dignity (Feinberg 1980).  Because of this lack of clarity Helga Kuhse forwards: 
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[H]uman dignity plays a very dubious role in contemporary bioethics 
discourse.  It is a slippery and inherently speciesist notion, it has a 
tendency to stifle argument and debate and encourages the drawing of 
moral boundaries in the wrong places.  Even if the notion could have 
some use as a short-hand version to express the principles such as 
‘respect for persons,’ or ‘respect for autonomy.’ It might, given its 
history and undoubtedly long-lasting connotations accompanying it, 
be better if it were for once and all purged from bioethics discourse 
(Kuhse 2000). 
 
Ruth Macklin would agree with Kuhse, as she argues that the concept of dignity is a 
useless tool and is the equivalent to respecting autonomy (Macklin 2003).  However, 
dignity only becomes useless if it is not entrenched in a theory that goes beyond the 
intrinsic and abstract nature of dignity.  English lawyers may fit into this first group 
of people, but one has to accept that dignity is an important part of regulation and 
practice (Brownsword 2003).  Therefore, as Van Der Graaf and Van Delden identify, 
it is the job of ethicists to clarify the position of dignity within the social, legal and 
ethical debate (Van Der Graaf and Van Delden 2009).  Given that the second, third 
and fourth groups identified by Ashcroft are not mutually exclusive a tension 
between autonomy, rights and duties emerges.  Therefore, an ethical theory that 
transcends these groups would be preferable.  Key theorists and academics that 
utilise human dignity to inform their theories
145
 include Immanuel Kant, Jürgen 
Habermas, Leon Kass, Charles Foster and Alan Gewirth.  These will be examined in 
turn below. 
5.4 Moral theorists and human dignity 
Within early moral philosophy, Immanuel Kant utilised human dignity as the very 
basis for his theory Categorical Imperative: 
[T]hat, which constitutes the condition under which alone something 
can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value, that is, a price, 
but an inner value, that is, dignity [...]Morality, and humanity insofar 
as it is capable of morality, is that, which alone has dignity (Kant, 
Gregor et al. 1998: 42). 
 
From dignity Kant goes on to construct his Categorical Imperative.  Without 
engaging with the complete work of Kant the Universal rules within the Categorical 
Imperative has two formulas: The Formula of Universal Law; and The Formula of 
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the End in Itself.  The Formula of Universal Law indicates that one should act only 
on a maxim that at the same time one would want it to become a universal law (Kant, 
Gregor et al. 1998: xviii); and The Formula of End in Itself (Kant’s most recognised 
principle) means that persons should act in a way, to others and themselves, never 
just as a means, but at the same time an end (Kant, Gregor et al. 1998: 43-44).  Both 
these rules are moral absolutes (Pullman 2002).  However, Schulman (2005) argues 
that because of the narrow and constricted account of Kant’s principle, it cannot cope 
with modern day biotechnological advancements because it is difficult to apply, and 
is too rigidly focused within the deontological and consequentialism debate.  These 
arguments against employing a Kantian model appear as toothless accusations.  
Bioethicists have claimed to use Kantian theory successfully as a method of analysis 
of modern biotechnology (President's Council on Bioethics 2008).  Also, regardless 
of ethical theory, one will be placed within deontological or consequentialist 
reasoning..  
 
Kant attributed inherent dignity to being rational and autonomous, but saw beings as 
things in themselves, not subject to natural phenomena (Kant, Gregor et al. 1998).  
Therefore, Kantian theory does not allow persons to decide right and wrong from 
any empirical reference, but purely from rational thought which presents difficulties, 
because persons are subject to both phenomena and noumena (Gewirth 1983).  More 
importantly, Kant’s Categorical Imperative derives it acceptance from the logical 
implication of acceptance of morality.  Starting from the acceptance of morality 
makes Kant’s theory contingent; therefore, those such as moral error theorists146 and 
moral subjectivists
147
 can easily disregard the Categorical Imperative by dismissing 
that morals exist (Joyce 2007).
148
  This fatal flaw makes the Categorical Imperative 
unusable as a foundational theory within the thesis, because a more defensible theory 
should be used. 
 
                                                 
146
Someone who thinks that although our moral judgments aim at the truth, they systematically fail to 
secure it.  The moral error theorist stands to morality as the atheist stands to religion (Joyce 2007). 
147
Someone who believes that moral facts exist but holds that they are, in some manner to be 
specified, constituted by our mental activity.  The slogan version comes from Hamlet: “there is 
nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so” (Joyce 2007). 
148
 Further discussion about the weakness of contingent arguments is conducted within 5.6. 
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Habermas (2003), on the other hand, recognizes that as genomic technologies 
increasingly become available, the choices of those technologies bears on the future 
of human nature.  Biotechnologies such as genetic engineering pose ethical issues 
across the human species.  Such issues concern not merely our self-understanding as 
members of a particular culture or tradition, but how to understand our basic human 
dignity (Habermas 2003).  The core of human dignity, and thus the basis for a 
human-species ethics, lies in the capacity of human beings for autonomous self-
determination.  The foundation to Habermas’s theory is his species ethics, which 
seeks to answer questions relating to the contemporary debate by addressing what it 
is to be human.  Central to Habermas’s species ethics (2003) is the need to 
understand what it is to be human and how being human is affected by new 
contemporary biotechnologies which seek to make life an artefact rather than the 
product of some form of natural process.  Such technologies are an affront to his 
species ethics and thus dignity.  However, the species ethics Habermas utilises is: 
[T]he most speculative idea in a book that is characterized by an 
innovative élan and a significant number of promissory notes.  For it 
is entirely unclear, to begin with, how this species-ethics is supposed 
to generate the individual obligations demanded by the gravity of 
genetic interventions or how we are supposed to imagine this process 
of reflection and self-clarification occurring on a global scale 
(Anderson 2005: 821). 
 
More importantly, the species ethics relies on one considering the genome as a 
programme rather than as an intricate thing that interacts with more than just 
genetics, but with the environment and ultimately the public.  His argument also fails 
to distinguish why assumed consent, with regards to enhancements, is any different 
to that of measures seeking to treat or correct an individual’s gene back to within 
‘normal functioning’.  It may rule out certain practices, but it blurs the boundaries 
between methods that seek to enhance and those considered therapeutic (Rorty 
2003).  Considering these problems Habermas’ species ethics will not be utilised to 
ground human dignity.  However, Habermas does raise a serious and fundamentally 
important thought process about how modern day technologies are impacting upon 
our perception of theoretical notions such as dignity.  He questions whether we 
ought to change the genome of future generations.  This thesis engages with such 
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issues; therefore, such a reflective stance to instigate dialogue is important because it 
can help provide resolutions to many of the issues identified later in the thesis.
149
  
 
A contemporary academic who considers that human dignity is a key component 
within modern advances in genetics is Leon Kass.  Kass sees modern advances in 
biology and medicine as invoking an inhuman basis (Kass 2002, 2008).  Kass, as 
does Habermas, sees modern biotechnology as dehumanising, which other 
bioethicists are blind to.  In order not to make the same mistake Kass (2002) argues 
that human dignity should be rooted in a proper anthropology that goes beyond the 
said dignity of ‘persons,’ to reflect and embrace the worthiness of embodied human 
life (Kass 2002: 18).  The dignity he seeks uses our awareness of need, limitation, 
and mortality in such a way that people naturally formed a way of life that  has 
engagement, depth, beauty, virtue and meaning, not despite our embodiment, but 
because of it (Kass 2002: 18).  However, despite Kass’s movement to a more 
natural, biological and anthropological vision of biotechnologies, he never actually 
defines what human dignity is, thus leaving the concept without useful meaning.  
Despite defending this allegation in later writings, by claiming everyone can in fact 
readily recognize dignity, both when it is shining and when it is extinguished (Kass 
2008); such a defence lacks any substance beyond one’s own interpretation of their 
own ‘human dignity.’  By Kass’s own admission: 
The dignity of being human is rooted in the dignity of life itself and 
flourishing in a manner seemingly issuing only in human pride, 
completes itself and stands tallest when we bow our heads and lift our 
hearts in recognition of powers greater than our own.  The fullest 
dignity of the god-like animal is realized in its acknowledgement and 
celebration of the divine (Kass 2008: 329). 
 
Such a statement makes human dignity nothing more than a reworded religious 
theory.  Considering the inherent problems with such a theological approach (see 
above), the interpretation of human dignity forwarded by Kass will not be followed. 
 
A relatively new approach to human dignity is that of Charles Foster.  He claims, 
quite simply, that human dignity is the bioethical theory of everything and that 
                                                 
149
 See 7.4 and 8.4. 
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human dignity can provide the answers to medical and bioethical questions that other 
theories cannot (Foster 2011: 1).  He considers human dignity to be connected to 
human flourishing (Foster 2011: 4).  It is not another name for the authoritarian 
imposition of some powerful group's vision of human flourishing, all in the 
legitimating name of human dignity (Brownsword 2012).  Human dignity, according 
to Foster, is a neo-Aristotelian concept based virtue. 
 
However, although he criticizes autonomy based approaches such as those taken by 
Beyleveld and Brownsword due to their alleged limitations, the paradigm that Foster 
suggests does not seek to provide answers.  In fact, he warns the reader against 
searching for answers within the book (See Foster 2011: 11).  Therefore, the notion 
of human dignity expressed by Foster appears to be a set of well thought out 
questions without any answers.  Also, the neo-Aristotelian ‘virtue’ ethic fails in the 
same way as the use of dignity within Roman times.  To the end that the thesis is 
seeking to establish answers (although it may pose more questions as well!) this 
approach will not be used. 
 
Another contemporary theorist associated with human dignity is Alan Gewirth.  On 
first appearance Gewirth is seemingly more concerned with human rights theory than 
human dignity.  However, contemporary theorists have connected dignity to Gewirth 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 1998, Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001) and have seen 
dignity as the basis of his theory (Steigledger 1998).  Gewirth does not object to 
human dignity being the foundation of rights; but for different reasons than the 
above theorists.  Gewirth sees reason and voluntariness or free will as generic 
features of the basis of human dignity (Gewirth 1998: 168).  According to Gewirth, 
if ‘X having dignity’ is equivalent to ‘X having human rights’, then it does not add 
substantially to the attribution of rights (Gewirth 1983).  However, human dignity 
derived from an logically necessary form of moral theory can help identify what 
human rights social and legal institutions ought to recognise or facilitate (Gewirth 
1979); therefore, providing a helpful critique of the FGT debate.   
 
Gewirth goes further to identify that human dignity within international declarations 
are only implicit (Gewirth 1996).  However, an explicit reference to human dignity 
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can be derived from the explicit dialectically necessary mode of derivation of the 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) (Gewirth 1996: 66).
150
  The argument is 
dialectic (as opposed to assertoric) when it begins from statements presented as 
being made or accepted by an agent and examines what they logically should do, 
rather than statements made by the writer themselves (Gewirth 1996: 16).  This adds 
theoretical and analytical strength to human dignity because, unlike a contingent 
basis, a dialectically necessary foundation cannot be dismissed by not accepting the 
basis it stands upon (See Kant above).  The link between human dignity and the PGC 
is that violating the PGC is to violate human dignity.  Dignity serves as the 
grounding or antecedent to human rights (Gewirth 1992: 14).  As Gewirth states: 
[T]he idea of human dignity can serve as the justificatory basis for 
regarding the needs of human agency as sufficiently important or 
compelling that they can provide, in turn, an adequate justificatory 
basis for human rights (Gewirth 1998: 174). 
 
There has been widespread criticism of Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency, 
with the majority being defended by Beyleveld, and Gewirth (as will be shown 
below) offers the most robust theory that is associated with human dignity. 
 
Therefore, in identifying that the PGC can be utilised to identify whether actions or 
practices violate human dignity; the PGC can be taken to govern the making of all 
such judgements surrounding FGT and how FGT practitioners, patients and 
regulators should approach the subject.  It can govern all relevant persons and the 
relationship between them because the PGC governs the rules of moral agency and 
moral patients, or those to whom one has a moral obligation (Pullman 2002); thus, 
making the PGC most suitable to address the issue of human dignity. 
5.5 Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) 
Before the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) can be explained some opening 
remarks and clarifications should be made.  These issues include the dialectic 
necessary method that Gewirth utilises how Gewirth defines morality; what ‘rights’ 
are under the PGC, and; the constitution of the Generic features of Agency.  It 
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 Here dialectic refers to statements made from an agent’s point of view. See 5.5.1 for further 
explanation. 
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should be noted at the outset that where a person has ‘lost their dignity’ 
behaviourally they are not someone who can be treated as without dignity (Rolston 
2008).  Having dignity and being treated with dignity are two closely linked debates, 
but the thesis will focus on the construction of dignity in general, because this 
reflects the documents and literature of the thesis. 
5.5.1 Starting premise under the PGC 
Firstly, the PGC is not foundationalist in the sense that it begins from self evident 
moral or evaluative statements.  The PGC is grounded in statements of action, which 
are prudential (Gewirth 1983: 14).  A prudential claim, or right, is a justified claim, 
or entitlement, whose justificatory basis or criterion is the self-interests or purposes 
of the rights holder or claimant themselves (Gewirth 1985: 302).  Despite starting 
from prudential statements, the PGC is a moral theory through prudential reasoning, 
due to the second stage of the PGC.  The move from prudential reasoning to moral 
reasoning is not motivational but logical (Gewirth 1978: 146).  The movement is 
logically necessary if there is a sufficient condition that justifies an agent having 
generic rights,
151
 then logically those rights are held by all others satisfying that 
condition (Gewirth 1978: 146).
152
  However, the movement from a prudential right 
to a correlative ought judgement (or instrumental duty), does not indicate a 
movement from a prudential to a moral theory (Gewirth 1978: 145).  Therefore, a 
key and fundamentally important question is: How can the PGC be a moral principle 
if it is derived from claims or judgements that are themselves not moral? The key to 
this transition is the principle of universalisability, which is considered later in the 
chapter.  However, to summarise: 
[The] generic rights referred to in the antecedent are prudential; but 
the generic rights referred to in the consequent are moral.  The 
antecedent's rights are prudential in that the agent claims them with a 
view to serving or upholding his own interests or purposes.  But the 
consequent's rights are moral in that, in setting them forth, the agent 
has now to uphold or take favourable account of the interests or 
purposes of other persons -namely, of all prospective purposive 
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 See Stage II and the principle of universalisability combined with the Argument for Sufficient 
Agency. 
152
 Being based on logic makes the reasoning a necessary independent valid condition that is not 
contingent. 
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agents, whose generic rights, and hence whose possession of freedom 
and well-being, he is now logically committed to endorsing.  Thus the 
logically necessitated generalization of the agent's prudential right 
claim yields a moral rights judgment because the latter, generalized 
judgment upholds the interests of persons other than or in addition to 
the original agent […] (Gewirth 1985: 304). 
 
In order to progress through the stages of the PGC, Gewirth uses the dialectically 
necessary method (Gewirth 1978: 42-47), which is taken from the internal viewpoint 
of a prospective purposive agent (or agent for short).  The method is derived from 
self agreement based on pure thought, rather than debate about which way to act.  
The dialectically necessary method is different to a dialectic contingent argument.  
The dialectic contingent method begins from a singular or general statement or 
judgement that reflects the beliefs or ideas of a person or group (Gewirth 1978: 42).  
That belief can be rejected purely on principle where an agent chooses not to adhere 
to it or believe it.  Therefore, the conclusion of a dialectic contingent argument can 
be coherently rejected.  An argument becomes dialectically necessary when: 
[...] the statements it presents reflect judgements all agents necessarily 
make on the basis of what is necessarily involved in their actions [...].  
The statements the method attributes to the agent are set forth as 
necessary ones in that they reflect what is conceptually necessary to 
being an agent who voluntarily or freely acts for purposes he wants to 
attain (Gewirth 1978: 44). 
 
Despite a dialectically contingent argument having less force than a dialectically 
necessary argument, it can provide additional weight to the PGC.  Therefore, where 
regulation is based upon a contingent proposition such as human rights, then the 
PGC can be taken into account.
153
  However, before the PGC can be expanded 
further terminology and the foundations of the PGC will be discussed. 
5.5.2 Morals, rights, duties and voluntariness under the PGC 
Gewirth opens his book Reason and Morality (1978) by defining morality as: 
A set of categorically obligatory requirements for action that are 
addressed at least in part to every actual or prospective agent, and that 
are concerned with furthering the interests, especially the most 
important interests, of persons or recipients other than or in addition 
to the agent or the speaker.  The requirements are categorically 
obligatory in that compliance with them is mandatory for the conduct 
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 See 5.6. 
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of every person to whom they are addressed regardless of whether he 
wants to accept them or their results, and regardless also of the 
requirements of any other institutions such as the law or etiquette, 
whose obligatoriness may itself be doubtful or variable.  Thus, 
although one moral requirement may be overridden by another, it may 
not be overridden by any non-moral requirement, nor can its 
normative bindingness be escaped by shifting one’s inclinations, 
opinions, or ideals (Gewirth 1978: 1). 
 
Therefore, what is moral covers a wide range of situations and importantly covers 
FGT.  What is ‘moral’ for Gewirth, goes beyond the above definition of morality, 
and requires moral philosophy to go the next step.  Gewirth explains that the 
intention of moral philosophy is to answer three central questions, with their own 
sub questions: 
First, there is the authoritative question: why should one be moral, in 
the sense of accepting as supremely authoritative or obligatory for 
one’s actions the requirement of furthering or favourably considering 
the important interests of other persons, especially when these conflict 
with one’s own interests?  Second, there is the distributive question: 
whose interests other than one’s own should the agent favourably 
consider in action? To, which persons should the goods [or benefits] 
accruing from such consideration be distributed in actions and 
institutions?  Third, there is the substantive question: of which 
interests should favourable account be taken? Which interests are 
good ones or constitute the most important goods (Gewirth 1978: 3)? 
 
All the above questions appear relevant for the regulation and practice of FGT and 
human dignity because they require us to answer questions such as: should a mother 
make moral decisions? If she should, whose interests should be taken into account?  
The fetus.?  The father’s?  And finally, if they are important, regardless of what 
those interests are, should those rights be placed above that of the decision maker 
themselves, in reaching a decision of whether to have FGT?  In answering these 
questions, one can see what the rights and duties of patients should be and how 
regulators should act in order to facilitate the right balance of interests and goods 
within FGT.  Also, it can be ascertained what rights and duties a fetus, parent, 
mother or third party may have. 
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Important elements of the PGC are the Generic Features of Agency (GFA).  It is the 
unjustified violation of the generic features that would constitute a violation of 
human dignity.
154
  Gewirth refers to the GFA in terms of ‘action’ comprising of: 
[...] in the strict sense that is relevant to moral and other practical 
precepts, [having] two interrelated generic features: voluntariness or 
freedom and purposiveness or intentionality (Gewirth 1978: 27). 
 
Therefore, the concepts of voluntariness and purposiveness (Gewirth 1978: 31-37) 
need defining, as they both can appear abstract and vague.  However, within the 
PGC Gewirth refers to voluntariness as: 
[...] behaviours or movements to be actions in the strict sense and 
hence voluntary or free, certain causal conditions must be fulfilled.  
Negatively, the behaviours must not occur from one or more of the 
following kinds of cause: (a) direct compulsion, physical or 
psychological, by someone or something external to the person; (b) 
causes internal to the person, such as reflexes, ignorance, or disease, 
that decisively contribute, in ways beyond their control, to the 
occurrence of the behaviour; (c) indirect compulsion whereby the 
person’s choice to emit the behaviour by their own unforced and 
informed choice.  Positively, the person must control their behaviour 
by their own unforced and informed choice.  This does not mean that 
whenever they choose to do something they do it, for they may be 
unable to do it.  It means rather that when their behaviour is free and 
voluntary, their unforced and informed choice is the necessary 
condition of the behaviour [...] person or agent to whom choices 
belong may be viewed as an organised system of disposition in, 
which such informed reasons are coherently interrelated with other 
desires and choices.  [...] it is the person who controls his behaviour 
by their unforced choice, so that is voluntary (Gewirth 1978: 31). 
 
Therefore, voluntariness involves both positive and negative behaviours, and 
consequently the PGC involves both positive and negative rights, which accords 
with the distinction in medicine between refusing life saving treatment and a right to 
treatment.  However, can pregnancy fit Gewirth’s freely chosen and voluntariness 
actions, where examples that indicate the difference between non voluntary choices, 
are such as being held at gun point, and voluntarily choosing to be fired (See 
Gewirth 1978: 31-37)?   
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 The reason that an ‘unjustified’ violation of the PGC is against human dignity is that where there is 
a conflict between the rights of two agents, it may be justified to violate the PGC in order to maintain 
dignity overall. 
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It could be contended that pregnancy falls into the involuntary category.  However, 
Gewirth indicates that causes internal to the person, such as reflexes, ignorance, or 
disease that decisively contribute, in ways beyond their control, to the occurrence of 
the behaviour are not voluntary (Gewirth 1978).  However, pregnancy is not a 
disease and in the majority of cases entered into voluntarily.  One has to consider 
that a pregnancy may be unwanted/unplanned or forced upon a woman through rape.  
Such cases are clearly in the first place not voluntary.  It could be argued that 
situations that fit the above circumstances cannot fall within the remit of the PGC.  
However, in general, pregnancy is a freely chosen pursuit by many.  When it is not, 
there is a choice about continuing a pregnancy or not.  Regardless of the person's 
view on the ethical side of pregnancy, given the current state of technology there is a 
choice about continuing the pregnancy.  Although controversial, such a statement is 
amoral in that it merely states that an agent has a choice once they are aware that 
they are pregnant.  One might consider such actions as a mixed action under 
Aristotle’s construction of voluntary and involuntary actions (Aristotle, Rowe et al. 
2002).  However, actions within such a circumstance are still voluntarily chosen 
despite taken under pressure and the outcome is controlled by an analysis of 
mitigating circumstances (Rees 2000).  Therefore, pregnancies and the resultant 
choices that fall within FGT would be considered voluntary.   
 
Connected to voluntariness is purposiveness.  Gewirth goes on to state that 
purposiveness consists of: 
The behaviours that are the possible objects of these and other moral 
precepts are hence not aimless but rather goal-directed, at least in the 
sense that they envisage more or less clearly a certain content to be 
effected or achieved, even if at one level this content consists only in 
a certain mode of acting or in observance of certain rules or formal 
requirements.  The persons who engage in this behaviour are regarded 
not merely as loci of movements, but as controlling their movements 
for reason they can make their own, because they want to engage in 
that behaviour either for its own sake or for some result to be 
achieved (Gewirth 1978: 37). 
 
Therefore, purposiveness indicates an active thought to do something, and is 
prudential.  For example, if I want to go fishing, merely wanting to go fishing does 
not cast any moral judgement about fishing.  In wanting to go fishing, I actively 
engage in the pursuit of fishing, hence I have a purpose to my action.  Having 
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identified the principle behind an agent, Gewirth introduces freedom, wellbeing and 
the GFA, which are fundamental principles of the PGC.  Therefore, these concepts 
also need defining.  ‘Freedom’ is frequently used by Gewirth within the PGC and 
refers to the ability of an agent to control: 
[...] each of their particular behaviours by their unforced choice and 
[...] his longer-range ability to exercise such control [...].  The loss of 
disposition or long range freedom, such as by imprisonment or 
enslavement makes all or most purposive action impossible, while to 
lose some occurent or particular freedom debars one from some 
particular action but not from all actions.  Nevertheless, the loss of 
freedom in a particular case deprives one of the possibility of action 
in that case (Gewirth 1978: 52). 
 
Therefore, facilitating autonomy appears as a key concept in relation to parts of the 
PGC.  Furthermore, there are three levels to an agent’s wellbeing within the GFA: 
basic, non-subtractive and additive goods.  The foundations of the GFA are the basic 
goods, which include: 
[...] the proximate necessary preconditions of his performance of any 
and all of his actions [...].  [Therefore,] certain physical and 
psychological dispositions ranging from life and physical integrity 
(including such of their means as food, clothing and shelter) to mental 
equilibrium and a feeling of confidence as to the general possibility of 
attaining one’s goals (Gewirth 1978: 53-54). 
 
The basic goods are fundamental for an agent to act (the principle of action).  These 
include life itself, capacities involved to make choices and the mental equilibrium 
sufficient to translate one’s preference into active pursuit of one’s purpose 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  For an agent to have the possibility of 
successful action non-subtractive and additive goods emerge as sub categories.  Non 
subtractive goods are those goods needed to be able to act successfully, without 
thereby being needed for the possibility of acting.  For example, the possession of 
accurate information in order to make informed decisions (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001: 71).  Therefore, non-subtractive goods consist of goods that an 
agent needs to retain what it already considers as ‘good’ apart from basic goods 
(Gewirth 1978).  Additive goods consist of whatever an agent needs to increase its 
existing level of capacity of purpose-fulfilment, and whatever it wishes to have, apart 
from basic and non subtractive goods (Beyleveld 1991: 17).  Such additive goods 
depend on the individual and can range from the latest mobile phone to having the 
newspaper every Sunday morning. 
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Within the PGC, the generic features of freedom and well being are prudential.  The 
PGC maintains that an agent must consider that they have ‘strong’ or ‘claim’ rights 
(Gewirth 1978: 65-67).  Claim rights are correlative to duties on the part of others 
not to interfere with the doing or possession of that to which the rights-holder has the 
right (Beyleveld 1996).  Under certain conditions an agent must concede positive 
rights, but also must consider that they have negative rights as well.  The concepts of 
negative and positive claim rights are equivalent to those suggested within 1.2.  
Claim rights should be distinguished from mere liberties (weak rights), which 
indicate that it is merely permissible to do something, but it can be restricted in 
certain circumstances. 
 
Where rights are not restricted, an agent can waiver their rights or not exercise them 
at all.  However, the wavering of a duty towards another agent is not permissible.  In 
conjunction with the GFA are the duties of aid and non interference.  The duties of 
aid and non interference are conditional and are subject to the provisos of 'own 
unaided effort' and 'comparable costs.'  Therefore, an agent may have a duty to aid 
another agent  to secure its generic features only where it is unable to do so itself, but 
only when doing it does not deprive me of the same or more important generic 
capacities, as measured by the degree of needfulness for action (See Gewirth 1978: 
217-230). 
 
The thesis will not refer to the generic features as being divided between substantive 
(well being) and procedural (freedom), because the division appears to add 
contingency to the PGC.  More importantly, it allows for a simpler presentation of 
the PGC.  The PGC will be presented in three stages and follows the principle of 
Reductio ad Absurdum.
155
  In order for the PGC to succeed, it must be shown that it 
is contradictory for an agent to hold that it is permissible for it to do anything that 
violates the PGC and consequently human dignity.  However, an agent can forward a 
logically incompatible view with the PGC, but it is logically impermissible to do so.  
In forwarding an incompatible subjective viewpoint an agent contradicts that it is an 
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 Reducing a proposition to the absurd and thus showing the contradictory nature of the argument. 
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agent due to the dialectically necessary element of the PGC.
156
  In fact, the PGC 
allows for agent fallibility, and thus may not condemn an agent for acting immorally 
if their good faith intention had been to act morally in the terms of the PGC (Holm 
and Coggon 2009: 305).  Therefore, an agent must act in a practically reasonable or 
rational way in accordance with the PGC.  The PGC is set out in three stages, 
moving between each stage through logical deductive and dialectically necessary 
reasoning. 
5.5.3 Stage 1 
In claiming that I am a prospective purposive agent (agent):
157
 i.e. those who act 
voluntarily for purposes that they have freely chosen (purposive agents), as well as 
those who intend to do so, which they have the capacity to do so, which they have 
some disposition to exercise (Beyleveld 1991: xxxvi), I claim: 
1. I do (or intend to do) X voluntarily for a purpose E I have chosen. 
 
Because E is my freely chosen purpose, I attach some positive value to E (which is 
prudential and not definitive), and because my purposes have a motivating power 
sufficient to move me to act for E (G 49), I must also claim: 
2. E is good, 
 
Meaning only that I attach sufficient value to E to motivate me to pursue E (i.e. I 
value E proactively).  To signify this claim and not contradict I am an agent, this 
must be expressed as (2).  If I do not accept (2), then I deny that I am an agent, 
which is to say that it is dialectically necessary for me to accept (2). 
3. There are generic features (needs) of agency.158 
 
In order to be an agent a minimal rational capacity must be possessed, including the 
ability to recognise that to achieve an end I must possess or obtain necessary needs 
to these end (Beyleveld 1996: 20).  Therefore, I must accept:
159
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 There is an exception to this rule as purposes that are chosen under any circumstance whatsoever 
are excluded (See Beyleveld 1991: 47-56). 
157
 Gewirth uses the acronym PPA for prospective purposive agent PPA, but for simplicity the term 
‘agent’ will be used to signify a prospective purposive agent. 
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 Gewirth separates the GFA into conditions necessary for action and conditions necessary for 
successful action, regardless of what those conditions are. 
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 By the principle ‘whoever pursues an end must be prepared to pursue the means necessary to 
achieve the end’. If I do not accept this principle, I deny that I am an agent (because agents, by 
definition, do things as perceived means to their chosen ends). 
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4. My having the generic needs is good for my achieving E whatever E 
might be ≡ My having the generic needs is categorically 
instrumentally good; therefore, my having the generic features is a 
necessary good. 
5.5.4 Stage 2 
Because  
5. I value my purposes proactively, this is equivalent to me having to 
accept I categorically instrumentally ought to pursue/defend my 
having the generic needs. 
 
As it follows from (4) that I must be motivated to pursue my generic features for my 
purpose and because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, if others interfered with my having 
generic features, I would not be free to pursue or defend (5).  Therefore, because my 
having the generic needs is necessary for me to pursue having the generic needs, I 
must hold: 
6. Other agents categorically ought not to interfere with my having the 
generic features against my will, and ought to aid me to secure them 
when I cannot do so by my own unaided efforts if I wish so, 
 
Due to the other-referring categorical ‘oughts’ correlate with claim rights, I must 
hold: 
7. I have both negative and positive claim rights to have the generic 
needs. 
5.5.5 Stage 3 
8. It follows (purely logically) that if I am an agent, by not considering 
that I have a right to the generic features, I deny that I am an agent if I 
do not consider that my being an agent is sufficient reason for my 
having a right to have the generic features.  I have a right to have 
generic features → (I am an agent → I have a right to have the 
generic features). 
 
However, (8) cannot be logically followed unless it is secured by the ‘Argument for 
Sufficient Agency’ (ASA) (Gewirth 1978 109-110).  The ASA is as follows: 
a) If it does not entail that I must hold (8) then I must be able to deny ‘I 
am an agent → I have the generic rights’ without denying that I have 
the generic rights. 
b) To deny I am an agent → I have a right to have the generic features, is 
to assert that my having some property D - a quality not necessarily 
possessed by all agents – is necessary for me to have the generic 
rights.  To deny ‘I am an agent → I have a right to have the generic 
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features’ is to assert ‘I have a right to have the generic features → I 
have D’. 
c) ‘I have a right to have the generic features→ I have D’ logically 
assents to ‘I am an agent without D → I do not have generic rights’.  
In other words, to be consistent with ‘I have the generic rights → I 
have D’, I must consider, even though I am an agent, that I do not 
have the generic rights if I do not have D. 
d) However, on the basis of my having to hold (8), I must, provided only 
that I am an agent, consider that I have a right to have the generic 
features–, which is to say that I must,  by virtue of being an agent, 
consider that I have a right to have the generic features, whether or 
not I have D. 
e) ‘I must consider, even though I am an agent, that I do not have the 
generic rights if I do not have D’ contradicts ‘I must, by virtue of 
being an agent consider that I have the generic rights, whether I have 
D or not’. 
f) Since ‘I am an agent → I have D’ is to contradict what my having to 
hold (8) entails, ‘I am an agent → I have D’ contradicts that I must 
hold (8). 
g) Since ‘I am an agent → I have D’ is equivalent to denying ‘I am an 
agent → I have a right to have the generic features’, to deny ‘I am an 
agent → I have the generic rights’ is to deny that I must hold (8). 
h) Thus, in order not to deny (8), I must reaffirm, I have a right to have 
generic features → (I am an agent → I have a right to have the 
generic features). 
 
Since, I deny I am an agent if I deny (8); consequently every agent also does so, thus 
making (8) dialectically necessary for every agent.  Having secured (8) through the 
ASA, in order to progress the PGC further, another principle must be introduced: the 
principle of universalisability.  The principle of universalisability, states: 
If some predicate P belongs to some subject S because S has the 
property Q (where the ‘because’ is that of sufficient reason or 
condition, then P must also belong to all other subjects S1, S2... Sn that 
have Q.  If one denies this implication in the case of some subject, 
such as S1, that has Q, then one contradicts oneself.  For in saying that 
P belongs to S because S has Q, one is saying that having Q is a 
sufficient condition of having P; but in denying this in the case of S1 
one is saying that having Q is not a sufficient condition of having P 
(Gewirth 1978: 105). 
 
For example, if I have a right to have my work marked because I am a student, then 
anyone else that is a student, I must also logically conclude, also has that right 
because they are students regardless of any other features I may like or dislike.  
Therefore, using the principle of universalisability it follows that: 
9. A possible agent is an agent → All other possible agents have the 
right to the generic features 
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10. All other possible agents have the right to the generic features 
11. I have a right to have the generic features and other possible agents 
have a right to have the generic features ≡ All agents have a right to 
have the generic features ≡ Principle of Generic Consistency. 
 
From these statements, it follows by once again using the principle of universalibilty:  
12. Principle of Generic Consistency applies to all agents. 
 
Although the PGC is forwarded as being dialectically necessary and introduced in 
regards to human dignity, as stated previously the principles of autonomy and human 
rights are seen as contemporary concepts that must be addressed within FGT.
160
  
Given that autonomy stems from the concept of human rights, a contingent argument 
in relation to human rights for the acceptance of the PGC as a critique can also be 
forwarded.  In doing so, those who maintain that there are such concepts as 
autonomy and human rights, but do not agree with the dialectically necessary 
argument of the PGC, will still be bound by it through their own contingent 
acceptance of autonomy and human rights. 
5.6 Contingent argument for the PGC 
Beyleveld (1996, 2012) forwards a contingent argument dependent upon the 
acceptance of human rights, which would also make the GFA applicable.  The 
argument is contingent as it relies on the agent to recognise (1) I have human rights.  
An agent can deny the assertion of (1) and all that follows from (1).  However, 
international institutions and countries, such as the UK and the USA, recognise 
human rights.  Therefore, within the context of FGT any agent denying the existence 
of human rights can be shown those instruments.  For those still denying that human 
rights exist, but still asserting that autonomy exists, refer to a right that is derived 
from human rights theory so must still accept the PGC or contradict themselves 
(Gewirth 1978).  Therefore, having a contingent argument based on human rights 
adds to the strength of the PGC as an underlying principle to guide regulation, 
practice and individual decisions. 
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 See chapters 6-9. 
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Starting from the statement that (1) I have human rights, it follows that (la) I am 
human → I have R-rights.  Having already stated the principle of universalisability 
above, it requires one to concur that (2) X is human → X has R-rights.  Therefore, 
(2a) All human beings have R (rights).  Having established (2a) it follows (3) A has 
a right to y → A has a right to the necessary means to exercise y.  From (4) there are 
generic feature (GF) (which are necessary means to the exercise of y, whatever y 
might be), as a result of (4) one must agree that (5) whatever A has a right to; A has 
a right to have the GF.  Having stated in (2a) that all human beings have R-rights, I 
must assent to (6) all human beings have a right to have the GF, whatever R are.  
Leading to (7) all humans have a human right to have the GF.  (8) Any being granted 
a claim-right must be capable of exercising it because in order to be able to exercise 
a right a being must be an agent.  It follows that I must assent to (9) All agents have 
a (claim) right to have the GF (which is the PGC) (Beyleveld 1996). 
 
Therefore, the contingent argument for the PGC from human rights demonstrates 
that anyone who claims to have a human right to anything would contradict that 
claim if they did not accept that all agents have a right to have the GFA.  Therefore, 
anyone that accepts human rights must accept and act in accordance with the 
prescriptive requirements of the PGC (Beyleveld 1996, 2012).  Consequently, human 
dignity is intrinsic within human rights instruments as well as those regulations 
governing the practice of FGT.  Having secured the PGC as the principle that an 
agent must follow on pain of contradicting that they are an agent, it logically follows 
to ask: who is an agent?   
5.7 Clarifying: who is an agent? 
5.7.1 Principle of proportionality 
It could be contended that despite the PGC being dialectically necessary, it has no 
practical significance as it cannot be demonstrated with the same degree of 
stringency that there are other agents (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000).  Identifying an 
agent is not as intuitive as it may initially appear and these beings are called 
ostensible agents.  There are a number of marginal groups that may be afforded 
protection under the PGC, because of their status as ostensible agents.  In order to 
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assess if an agent is an agent, Gewirth proposes that the principle of proportionality 
should be utilised by agents.  The principle of proportionality is: 
When some quality Q justifies having certain rights R, and the 
possession of Q varies in degree in the respect that is relevant to Q's 
justification the having of R, the degree in, which R is had is 
proportional to or varies with the degree to, which Q is had.  Thus, if 
x units of Q justify that one have x units of R, then y units of Q justify 
that one have y unit of R (Gewirth 1978: 121). 
 
However, there is an inherent problem with Gewirth’s principle of proportionality.  
Gewirth claims that the principle shows the degree to which partial or marginal 
agents have generic rights.  In attributing quasi generic rights to partial agents it does 
not give generic rights to a lesser extent, but it gives a different quality of protection 
granted by generic rights (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 119).  In order to rectify 
the problem presented by the principle of proportionality, precautionary reasoning 
can be utilised.   
5.7.2 Precautionary reasoning 
The PGC shows that agents are categorically required to treat other agents as having 
the GFA, and should avoid treating an agent as though it did not have the GFA.  
Therefore, where X shows behaviours of agency (see 5.8), X is an ostensible agent.  
The possibility that X may not be an agent is wholly discounted, and X’s status as an 
ostensible agent can be taken as being sufficient that X has the capacities to be an 
agent (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 121).  Accompanied with an adaption of 
Pascal’s Wagers' reasoning about the existence of God,161 Beyleveld and 
Brownsword introduce the precautionary principle, which states: 
If there is no way of knowing whether or not X has property P, then 
in so far as it is possible to do so, X must be assumed to have property 
P if the consequences of erring in presuming that X does not have P 
are worse than those erring to the side that X has P (and X must be 
assumed not to have P if the consequences of erring in presuming that 
X has P are worse than those of assuming that X does not have P) 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 122). 
 
                                                 
161
 Pascal (1966) considers that logic can neither determine nor deny the existence of god; therefore, 
in weighing up equally possible outcomes, with one of those outcomes being disastrous, one must 
choose the choice that avoids that disaster, and one must wager god exists. Despite the argument 
having logical roots, it does not provide for acting in a way that there is a god or proves that there is a 
God, as it may be equally disastrous or beneficial that god or any other being exists. 
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Precautionary reasoning moves the argument away from proportionality and towards 
owing protection to all beings that have uncertainty surrounding their agency in 
relation to the proportionate degree that they have necessary capacities and 
characteristics of agency (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 125).  It does not make 
the principle of proportionality redundant, as the duty to which an agent owes an 
ostensible agent is subject to the principle of proportionality (Beyleveld and 
Pattinson 1998).   
 
In order to help assess whether there is a possible agent, four categories of empirical 
evidence are suggested to aid an agent in ascertaining the relative agency of an 
organism, these are: 
1. Patterned organismic behaviour (displayed by living organisms). 
2. Behaviour that evidences itself as purposive (as being motivated by 
feeling and desire). 
3. Behaviour that evidences itself as intelligent (as being susceptible to 
learning by experience). 
4. Behaviour that evidences itself as rational (value-guided, and 
characteristics of an agent)(Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998: 18-19). 
 
Where X shows all of the above characteristics and behaviour, one (any agent) must 
treat that being as an agent (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000).  If a conflict arises, as is 
apparent within FGT where an operation is purely for the benefit of the fetus, but has 
to go via the mother, all things being equal: 
If my doing y to Z is more likely to cause harm h to Z than my doing 
y to X (and I cannot avoid doing y to one of Z or X) then I ought to 
do y to X rather than to Z. 
Where y = failing to observe a particular duty of protection; and h = 
mistakenly denying a being the status of an agent, we can infer by this 
criterion that: 
If my failing to observe a particular duty of protection to Z is more 
likely to mistakenly deny Z the status of an agent than is my failing to 
observe this duty 
of protection to X (and I cannot avoid failing to observe this duty to 
one of Z or X) then I ought to fail to observe my duty to X rather than 
to Z (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 123). 
 
In short, the rights of an agent who displays more agency relevant features, takes 
precedence over those who show less agency relevant features.
162
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 Further elaboration on the application of these principles is situated within 10.3 and 10.4. 
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The precautionary reasoning forwarded here has its critics.  It is argued that 
precautionary reasoning is not inherently flawed on an intellectual level, but it does 
not provide a useful tool for guiding the action of agents (Holm and Coggon 2009).  
It is claimed that precautionary reasoning pays insufficient attention to the conditions 
under which it is appropriate; and in practice the rights of a non ostensible agent 
must yield to those of an ostensible agent (Holm and Coggon 2009: 295).  For a full 
defence of precautionary theory Beyleveld and Pattinson (2010) offer a reply to such 
claims.  More relevant to the debate within FGT is Holm and Coggan's claim that the 
rights of a non ostensible agent must yield to those of an ostensible agent.  However, 
Holm and Coggan fail to consider that in utilising precautionary theory duties can be 
imposed on agents towards ostensible agents.  Therefore, precautionary theory offers 
more than just ‘rights’, but duties towards an ostensible agent without contradicting 
the PGC, which can provide guidance.   
 
By utilising such precautionary reasoning it can be applied to the so called marginal 
groups, whose agency status are in question and provide guidance on how to regulate 
agent conduct.  The marginal groups consist of those who are unconscious, the 
mentally handicapped, children, fetuses, embryos and gametes.  The thesis will focus 
upon children, fetuses, embryos and gametes. 
5.8 Marginal groups under the PGC 
5.8.1 Children 
The marginal groups that are important in relation to FGT are fetuses and embryos.  
Identifying the position of the PGC in relation to children, one can see how fetuses 
would be in the future if they develop to term.  In assessing rights and duties several 
groups of agency arise: the potential agent; and the future agent.  A potential agent is 
a being that has the potential to become an agent (Pattinson 2002: 21).  A potential 
agent is different from a prospective agent,
163
 as the latter already has the proximate 
abilities of the generic features of action, even if he is not actually acting (Beyleveld 
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 A prospective agent has the capacity and disposition to agent; therefore, is not differentiated within 
the thesis from an agent. 
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and Pattinson 1998: 31).  A future agent is a being that will in the future poses 
intrinsic moral status.  The distinction between ‘potential’ and ’future’ agents means 
that each type of agent will derive protection from two different sources.
164
  
However, the PGC is applicable to both and therefore the terms may appear 
interchangeable, but it is the application of the PGC that is important.  The first 
ostensible agents to be considered within the marginal groups are children.  
According to Gewirth: 
Children are potential agents in that, with normal maturation, they 
will attain the characteristics of control, choice, knowledge, and 
reflective intention that enter into the generic features of control.  A 
potential agent is not the same as a prospective agent, for the latter 
already has the proximate abilities of the generic features of action 
even if he is not currently acting.  Insofar as children are not such 
prospective agents, they are not among the recipients whose rights to 
freedom the PGC requires agents to respect fully.  But insofar as 
children are potential agents, they have rights that are preparatory for 
their taking on the generic rights pertaining to full-fledged agency 
(Gewirth 1978: 141). 
 
Therefore, children and new born babies are not full agents but have the right to have 
their potential protected. As they mature they should increasingly participate in 
decisions affecting themselves (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 130).  However, 
Gewirth’s position on children (and the mentally deficient) appears to be only 
utilised in relation to children, and not to fetuses or embryos (See Gewirth 1978: 
141-142).   
5.8.2 Fetuses, embryos and gametes 
As stated above, the position in relation to the fetus and embryo are the focus of the 
thesis.  There are circumstances where the rights and interests of agents have 
precedence over the status of an embryo or fetus (Steigledger 1998).  Nonetheless, 
precautionary reasoning imposes a duty upon agents to allow relevant potential 
agency to develop and where possible assist with that development.  For Gewirth, 
the fetus has generic rights, but embryos and fetuses lack purposivity altogether 
under the Principle of Proportionality. According to Gewirth: 
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 Developed further within chapter 10. 
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If there were no conflict between fetus and the rights of the mother, 
the principle of proportionality and the PGC require that the fetus [...] 
have such a right to well-being as is required for developing 
potentialities for growth toward purpose-fulfilment. 
When there is a conflict, however, the mother’s generic rights 
should take priority.  [...] [T]he fetus lacks abilities, except in 
remotely potential forms [...].  Hence its [the fetus] generic rights, by 
comparison with the rights of its mother, are minimal (Gewirth 1978: 
142). 
 
As the fetus develops it gains more protection.  Therefore, a six month fetus will 
have more right to protection than a three month old fetus (Gewirth 1978: 143). 
 
Gewirth’s position on a fetus lacking purposiveness is outdated and contradicts his 
reasoning in relation to children.  It is widely accepted that at some point during 
pregnancy, a fetus shows the ability to display a response to pain (See Derbyshire 
2006).  One could consider reacting to pain as evidence of behaviour of agency.  
Ultimately Gewirth appears to be saying that the principle of proportionality and the 
PGC justify that the fetus has a right to realise its potential to develop into an agent, 
from which it may be inferred that the fetus has a right to life and the other 
conditions necessary to realise its potential to develop into an agent (Beyleveld and 
Pattinson 2000: 49).  However, under precautionary reasoning where X is a fetus or 
embryo it means that if there is: 
1. Evidence that X is a potential ostensible agent, by itself, requires 
agents to grant X moral status (in proportion to the strength of the 
evidence); and 
2. Evidence that X is a potential ostensible agent adds to the moral status 
secured for X by the degree to which X exhibits the capacity and 
disposition to do something voluntarily for a purpose that it has 
chosen (GCA) behaviour (bf).  Thus, if Y is apparently only a partial 
agent with y moral status (by virtue of Y's degree of GCAbf) but not 
apparently a potential ostensible agent, and X is apparently a partial 
agent with y moral status and also apparently a potential ostensible 
agent, then agents must take more seriously the possibility that X is 
an agent than that Y is an agent, by virtue of, which their duties of 
protection to X are greater than their similar duties to Y.  (And, of 
course, the degree to, which evidence of potential to become an agent 
adds to X's moral status will be proportional to the strength of this 
evidence) (Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998: 27). 
 
Therefore, a developing fetus should be afforded more protection as it develops, but 
an embryo should not be afforded any significant protection. 
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Gametes are afforded no protection.  Although genetically part of the human species, 
protection under the PGC is governed by the ability to express the abilities of 
agency.  Empirically, gametes only show patterned organismic behaviour, which if 
one was to afford all patterned organisms the protection of the PGC, then it would be 
ethically and morally impermissible to clean ones home with bleach or to wash 
oneself, which inevitably kills cells.  Therefore, the choice of agents supersedes that 
of any gamete as they have no protection under the PGC.  Gametes only posses 
passive potential rather than active potential; therefore, it is misleading to say that an 
unfertilized ovum is potentially a person (Reichlin 1997: 4).
165
  Even if this 
argument is flawed, gametes are fundamentally the agent’s own 'property'.  
Therefore, the choice over the use of gametes fundamentally lies with the agent and 
as does all associated parental rights that stem from a gamete if they produce a child. 
 
Even if partial agents are not directly protected, they can be indirectly protected 
through physical proximity to agents and the development of virtues by agents that 
are needed for compliance with the PGC.  Pattinson (2002) outlines five possibilities 
for the protection of beings with indirect moral status.  They consist of: physical 
proximity; the development of virtues; protection of the sensitivities of others; 
contractual collective waiver of the freedom to mistreat certain beings; and property 
(Pattinson 2002: 30).  With regards to fetal surgery the most interesting is that of the 
physical proximity argument and the protection of the sensitivities of others, due to 
the nature and intergenerational aspect of fetal gene surgery.  Therefore, within the 
debate of FGT it will be interesting to see how the PGC aligns with the practice of 
practitioners. 
5.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the frequent references to dignity within international instruments, 
domestic regulation and consultation documents indicate that human dignity is not a 
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 Property is not used in the conventional sense as here it refers to ‘under the control of the agent’. 
Whether the body is 'property' is a vast question and for further reading see articles such as: Harris, J. 
'Who Owns My Body' (1996) 16 OJLS and Skene, L. 'Arguments Against People “Owning” Their 
Bodies, Body Parts and Tissue' (2002) 2 MacQuarie LJ 165. 
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concept that can be ignored.  Despite there being various sources of dignity, the 
abstract concept of dignity was shown to be rooted in moral philosophy.  After 
considering Kant, Foster, Habermas, Kass and Gewirth, it emerged that Gewirth’s 
PGC appeared as the most appropriate ethical theory to use in this thesis.  It was 
found that in utilising a dialectic necessary approach, the PGC is an appropriate 
ethical theory which can be used to assess the current and potential future progress of 
FGT.  Where human dignity is used as a foundation for regulation, the PGC can be 
used to ascertain whether a violation of human dignity has occurred.  The theory 
imposes duties as well as elaborating rights, which may consequently be taken into 
account in the examination of intergenerational issues, and must be analysed.  In 
using the PGC as an analytical tool for FGT, it can guide regulation where it is 
scientifically plausible but uncertain that harm will result then, that action or inaction 
shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm (World Commission on the Ethics of 
Scientific Knowledge and Technology 2005).
166
  Such harms include: 
 threatening to human life or health 
 serious and effectively irreversible 
 inequitable to present or future generations 
 imposed without adequate consideration of the human rights of those affected 
(World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology 
2005: 14). 
 
Such issues are clearly relevant to FGT as identified in chapter 2.  It can guide 
regulation in these areas (akin to the precautionary issues with 2.62) because where 
uncertainty and harm are relevant to choice and impact upon marginal groups as well 
as wider concerns can be taken into account.  It does not fall foul of the zero 
tolerance arguments as the precautionary reasoning seeks to reduce harm under the 
PGC to the minimum.  Therefore, the PGC can be used in making ethical 
assessments of the choices science and technology present, or in this case the 
direction of FGT.  By making those ethical assessments the concerns raised in 2.6, 
such as regaining control of autonomous technology through precautionary 
reasoning (in terms of harm and rights) can start to be addressed. 
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 The judgement of plausibility should be grounded in scientific analysis. Analysis should be 
ongoing so that chosen actions are subject to review.  Uncertainty may apply to, but need not be 
limited to, causality or the bounds of the possible harm (World Commission on the Ethics of 
Scientific Knowledge and Technology 2005: 14). 
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It may become evident that ‘harm’ between that of the mother and that of the fetus 
within the context of FGT is an important issue.  Harm is of relevance due to the 
proximity of intervention for both mother and fetus, but also relevant to possible 
future generations.  Harm within the PGC refers to violations of an agent’s generic 
features, aka human dignity.  However, as has been shown above, duties can be 
inferred upon an agent in relation to a fetus because of their relevant empirical 
evidence.  Under the potential agent definition in PGC the fetus/future generation is 
not protected, but under the future agent definition there may be an issue within the 
debate concerning the prohibition of germ line interventions and harm to a future 
agent.  Under the precautionary principle where a marginal group is in need of 
protection of their generic features it would mean that certain potential practices in 
FGT may be banned or should not be pursued.  How such a distinction affects 
intergenerational regulation will be interesting.  What is clear is that the PGC should 
be used to critique the debate surrounding FGT due to the PGCs connection to 
human dignity, and this will be done in chapter 10.  Finally, therefore, having seen 
that the analysis of the issues raised by FGT should be grounded in ethics (in this 
case the PGC), the data must be collected by documentary analysis and semi 
structured interviewing as identified within chapter 3. 
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6 Documentary Data: Human Dignity 
6.1 Introduction 
Having seen that the data primarily points towards identifying a maternal fetal divide 
within current regulatory and medical practice as well as revealing a potential 
overarching principle of human dignity, it has been indicated that the PGC will be a 
useful analytical tool to assess the maternal fetal divide and the future impact of FGT 
progress.  In order to assess the impact of progress as identified explicitly in 2.6.2, 
and implicitly throughout the thesis, the regulation and FGT practitioner’s views of 
future FGT needed to be explored.  Chapters 6 and 7 are a result of the analysis of 
institutional regulation from legislators to the EMA.  These chapters are important to 
the thesis because they identify and analyse the regulation under which FGT will be 
conducted when it progresses to clinical trials.  It is these regulations that are 
charged with controlling FGT and any potential scientific progress that might occur. 
 
During the documentary analysis two main themes emerged: human dignity and 
scientific progress (or issues relating to the research process).  Chapter 6 analyses 
human dignity and chapter 7 analyses scientific progress.  Some of the themes, such 
as intergenerational issues, cover both themes and therefore there is not a definitive 
separation of the issues.  It should be noted that the documentary analysis was 
conducted before the interviews took place in order to inform the interviews. 
 
This chapter will identify the following underlying themes: human dignity, the 
themes underpinning human dignity such as the empowerment of the individual and 
finally future generational interests. In each of the following sections, except 6.2, the 
findings or principles identified are then related to the maternal fetal divide and the 
consequences for FGT practice.  Firstly, section 6.2 identifies the sample and the 
initial document findings.  Section 6.3 will then move from identifying the abstract 
principle of human dignity to identifying principles that facilitate human dignity 
within FGT.  By moving from human dignity as an explicit guiding principle, human 
dignity is empowered through implicit terms such as autonomy in section 6.4.  It 
appears that autonomy raises the individual within a clinical situation above 
scientific progress and the wishes of society concerning FGT. It is also seen that 
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human dignity can constrain action even where choice is available and therefore 
autonomy can be constrained.  Section 6.5 then looks at intergenerational issues, and 
shows that when possible next and future generations are taken into account, the 
present individual is raised above their interests because a fetus is not considered an 
individual.  Section 6.6, however, shows that there is some protection afforded to 
future generations in the regulation and practice of FGT, which is dependent upon 
maternal choice.  The chapter will then conclude that human dignity is implicitly 
applied through principles such as autonomy.  Through autonomy the individual 
within a clinical setting is raised above all others.  However, this principle may 
potentially be eroded by the research process and by the fetal interests, which will be 
developed later in chapter 7.  
6.2 Initial document findings 
In total 127 documents were analysed.
167
  The documents were divided into the 
following categories: primary and secondary legislation governing England and 
Wales; EU regulation; case law from England and Wales; case law from the ECtHR; 
governing body policy and consultation documents; and international declarations 
and conventions.  They were selected due to their relevance to issues such as: the 
maternal fetal divide; the regulation of gene therapy, thus FGT; regulation of 
genetically modified organisms and clinical trials.  An initial word count provided a 
useful tool to highlight possible emergent themes.  Considering the vast amount of 
documents and words a more useful tool was to use Nvivo’s ‘tag cloud’.  The tag 
cloud generated a list of the top 100 words in alphabetical order with the most 
prominent being the largest and boldest.  One letter words and single numbers were 
eliminated to give a better picture of the possible themes that might emerge.  The 
results of that tag cloud are visible in Diagram 4. 
. 
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 For full list of documents and reason for selection see Appendix F - List of Analysed Documents. 
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Diagram 4.  Top 100 tag cloud 
 
Words such as risk, information, consent and human appear as frequently used words 
being in the top 100 words.  However, it is evident that ‘dignity’ is nowhere to be 
seen.  In terms of scientific progress words such as treatment, clinical, research and 
products appear to be frequently used indicating that the documents are relevant to 
the thesis.  Personal words such as ‘he’ and ‘she’ appear within the tag cloud, 
therefore some form of personal ownership may arise from the data.  The same can 
be said for positive words that facilitate action.  However, the interpretation of these 
words must be contextualised as they may infer duties, rather than negative rights for 
parties.  They also place possible restrictions upon researchers or individuals with 
words such as ‘must’, ‘condition’ and ‘regulation’ appearing. Words such as 
‘section’ and ‘article’ appear on the tag cloud, which is unsurprising given that the 
documents in questions divide their relevant parts into articles and sections.  
However, looking at the frequency of words can be misleading, because within the 
tag cloud important words such as rights and dignity do not appear.  In fact, the term 
dignity is only used 167 times.   
 
However, relying on the word count for what themes are important misrepresents the 
documents.  Nvivo 8 utilises every word individually within the word count.  
Therefore, within the tag cloud plurals of the same word are counted as two separate 
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words unless an apostrophe is used.  Therefore, the prominence of words such as risk 
should be greater as risks and risk’ appear later on with their own count of 708 and 
17 respectively.  As a result the word count for ‘risk’ is 2817 instead of Nvivo’s 
2092 count.  . 
 
It is important to consider the institutional structure (See Appendix C – Institutional 
Structure), within England and Wales.  Each statute implicitly includes all other 
relevant statutes unless it states that it is contrary to or outside the remit of an act.  
The same applies to European regulation.  Therefore, the top down approach of 
documents can be seen by the regulatory references with those at the bottom 
providing the filler which the reality painted by the document above appears to have 
missed. 
 
The institutional structure indicates that cross referencing of documents is high 
between all the documents.  Therefore, institutional structure is important.  However, 
it is evident that, because of the hierarchy between the documents, the referencing of 
other institutional documents becomes more prominent.  For example, using a matrix 
query (See Appendix H – Sampled Matrix Query) it is evident that certain types of 
documents are referred to by only certain institutions and that, by looking at the 
amount of referencing, each institution appears to have a certain remit.  For example, 
references to articles and books are solely the domain of judicial cases and policy 
documents, but institutions reference from a wide range of sources either above or 
below them in the institutional hierarchy.  European institutional documents, on the 
other hand, only tend to reference their own institutional documents and documents 
from institutions above them.  For example, intergovernmental documents reference 
themselves; whereas, policy documents, consultations and case law have the 
broadest range of cross regulatory referencing as they also have the duty to interpret 
an issue or case in light of all relevant documents. 
 
In order to help guide readers, legislation will often start with procedure formalities, 
such as those stated above, followed directly by a section titled ‘interpretation’ or 
‘definitions’.  The purpose of such formalities is to inform the reader about a 
document’s remit.  Often within case law and policy documents definitions appear at 
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the back of the document, but are there none the less as a guide for the reader.  The 
abundance of definitions and facts within a document helps shape and clarify the 
agenda and stance upon a specific point.  The issue of ‘remit’ becomes important in 
the context of interests and decisions made upon the rights of others.  Through the 
thematic approach, certain themes arise as guiding principles within that remit.  One 
such theme is that of human dignity.  Human dignity can be seen as an explicit and 
implicit principle.  The chapter will now elaborate upon human dignity and how 
autonomy and intergenerational issues show the implicit nature of human dignity, 
with the effect of these principles upon the maternal fetal divide. 
6.3 Human dignity as an explicit and implicit guiding principle 
Within international declarations and conventions human dignity is a key principle.  
It is inviolable and appears as an intrinsic foundation to declarations.  Within the 
international and intergovernmental institutions human dignity appears as an explicit 
theme within the documents.  It applies to every human being and is a source of 
empowerment because: 
[…] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
168
  
 
The above quote illustrates that human dignity is not an isolated concept.  It is an 
explicit concept that is connected to other principles such as liberty and equality.  It 
is considered a necessity that protects the identity and dignity of all human beings.  
The mere connotation of human dignity with ‘democratic’ adds political weight 
behind it.  By associating human dignity with more than just science it also becomes 
about human action and interaction based on a multitude of preferences, thus making 
human dignity a complex principle (Häyry and Takala 2005).  Human dignity 
appears as a value that cannot be removed by anyone.  Intertwined with the explicit 
notion of human dignity is biology and/or humanity.  When human dignity is used in 
the explicit sense it appears to encompass the whole of humanity, thus prescribing 
dignity in human genes (Häyry 2004).  Importantly, for the maternal fetal divide, 
chronologically, there is little to indicate when one becomes a member of humanity; 
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therefore, becoming entitled to equal treatment.  The only indication is within United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 whereby ‘birth’ is considered 
a factor in the assessment and attainment of human dignity:  
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.
169
  
 
However, within the Council of Europe a different point of origin for human dignity 
emerges as: 
It was acknowledged that it was a generally accepted principle that 
human dignity and the identity of the human being had to be 
respected as soon as life began (Council of Europe 1997: [19]). 
 
Other documents confirm the intrinsic link to humanity.
170
  Therefore, at an 
international level there is a lack of clarification regarding the attainment and 
interpretation of human dignity.  Given the political structure in place international 
conventions are hugely influential in the creation of European Regulations and 
Directives.
171
  These ultimately help construct the regulation of FGT within England 
and Wales.  However, because the highest political institutions only have persuasive 
force, the legislator has to indicate what founding principles are important.  The top 
of the binding legislative structure is the EU.  The preamble of a European document 
serves as notice to readers about the influences and considerations within the drafting 
process.  Within the preambles the influential nature of the intergovernmental 
documents is evident; thus, including human dignity is an explicit concept for the 
institution: 
The accepted basis for the conduct of clinical trials in humans is 
founded in the protection of human rights and the dignity of the 
human being with regard to the application of biology and medicine, 
as for instance reflected in the 1996 version of the Helsinki 
Declaration.
172
  
 
Therefore, human dignity and human rights are connected within the application of 
biology.  The principle of human dignity is confirmed within other Directives; 
however, the explicit nature of human dignity is now less prominent.  Instead the 
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recurrent theme of cross regulatory referring (or referral to another relevant 
institution) makes human dignity implicit at the level of the EU: 
This Directive is based on international experience drawn upon 
through an extensive consultation, the Council of Europe’s Guide to 
safety and quality assurance for organs, tissues and cells, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of Europe’s 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo, 
4.IV.1997), with its additional protocols, and recommendations from 
the World Health Organisation.
173
   
 
The high level of cross regulatory referencing implies that human dignity is an 
important concept as the documents that are referenced explicitly utilise human 
dignity.  As will be shown in chapter 7, scientific evidence appears as a key theme, 
which can cause problems when combined with human dignity.  However, at an 
international level, human dignity is explicitly and implicitly used as a founding 
principle for regulation.  Therefore, it is paramount and forces it way into the 
thinking of those who practice genomic medicine.  It is explicitly connected to the 
themes of rights, liberty and the biology of humanity. 
 
Within England and Wales, human dignity as an explicit regulatory concept for FGT 
disappears.  Only implicit references to human dignity within legislation emerge.  It 
is the inclusion of other documents through cross regulatory referencing, as Directive 
2006/17/EC signifies, that human dignity becomes a relevant influence and factor 
within FGT with sections within the regulation of FGT stating: 
Clinical trials shall be conducted in accordance with the principles of 
the Declaration of Helsinki.
174
  
 
Because human dignity is such an important principle within the Declaration of 
Helsinki, it is implicitly one of the important factors for FGT within England and 
Wales.  One could argue the difference between ‘must’ and ‘shall’ varies the 
obligations of a physician, but the implicit inclusion of human dignity within clinical 
trials means that human dignity is within the regulation of FGT.  Themes emerge 
that help conceptualise what human dignity is and how human dignity can relate to 
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the regulation and practice of FGT.  These themes help translate human dignity 
implicitly into England and Wales, which is important for the maternal fetal divide 
as international documents are only persuasive unless specifically enacted through 
ratification or specific reference within legislation.  Thus, despite the documents not 
being binding, because of their influencing power human dignity has the potential to 
be an enforceable norm within the practice of FGT (Andorno 2009). 
6.3.1 First impressions for the maternal fetal divide 
On first instance, human dignity has the qualities identified within section 5.2 as 
being a guiding principle not only for biotechnology and human rights, but 
specifically for FGT.  Human dignity is the rock upon which rights are founded and 
is firmly tied to a preambular of ideas such as equality and inherent dignity 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  It is not contingent upon social rank, thus 
moving away from the idea that human dignity is empirical or external (Gewirth 
1998).  Therefore, human dignity has the qualities of various conceptual models.  No 
reference to God appears, therefore, human dignity appears to have the qualities of 
reason, capacity, genetics and sentience (Häyry 2004).  What is clear is that, rightly 
or wrongly, human dignity is inherently speciest within these documents (Kuhse 
2000).  That is not to say that animals could not have ‘dignity’ (Singer 1989, 1993), 
but within the documents considered here it is purely focused upon the inherent 
dignity of humans.  Nevertheless, further exploration is needed because the differing 
attributes of several different conceptions of dignity would have different 
implications for the maternal fetal divide.  For example the commencement of ‘life’ 
varies between the different conceptions.  Humanity at the biological level starts at 
conception, but sentience could be evaluated as engaging at different points of 
biological development.  Without identifying the most prominent conceptualisation 
of human dignity such issues and vagueness cannot be reconciled. 
 
The lack of definition is unsurprising as every definition in law is omnis definitio in 
iure periculosa est or perilous in today’s language.  Thus, the generalised 
formulation of the principles can ultimately be justified by the need to find a balance 
between the universalism of some bioethical norms and the respect for cultural 
diversity (Andorno 2007).  Nonetheless, the first principle that emerges is that every 
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human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human.  The second is 
that this intrinsic worth should be recognized and respected by others, and some 
forms of treatment by others are inconsistent with, or required by, respect for this 
intrinsic worth (McCrudden 2008).  Therefore, the interpretation of human dignity is 
important for the maternal fetal divide because it creates boundaries, which can then 
be used to assess whether the current frameworks are implementing the maternal 
fetal divide uniformly.   
6.4 Conceptualising human dignity within regulatory institutions: 
the individual is paramount 
Human dignity appears as a hollow concept within the documents, because on initial 
reading the term human dignity is not explicitly defined.  However, principles 
emerge, which indicate what human dignity might be and how it is adhered to in the 
maternal fetal divide, research and the rights of others within the FGT context.  
Within the sample a strong emphasis emerges surrounding how individuals, society 
and science or medicine should and must be prioritised.  It is repeated in several 
sources regardless of where those documents fit within the institutional structure of 
regulation. 
The rights, safety and well-being of the trial subjects shall prevail 
over the interests of science and society.
175
  
 
The above extract pronounces the importance of the individual over society despite 
both being related to dignity.  However, an interest being superseded by the rights of 
the individual says little about the rights of society.  It will be shown there is a stark 
difference between interests and rights within the context of FGT, which can amount 
to an inherent contradiction.  The European institutions use such statements to 
reinforce the principles that were indicated within the higher political institutions, as 
is evident from the extracts. 
 
Human dignity being bound to the individual is repeated identically three times 
within the Clinical Trials Regulation 2004 as well as being repeated identically in 
other documents.  It is confirmed that within the practice of FGT human dignity is 
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the paramount consideration.  Therefore, individual rights should prevail within the 
practice of FGT practitioners rather than the dignity of society.  Elevating the 
individual as being the most important principle appears to create a tension between 
other related themes.  On the first interpretation rights, ergo dignity, appears as the 
key claim against even the economic interests of a country.  The result is that there is 
no tension between human dignity and other factors due to the carte blanche 
superiority of the individual.  The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
1997 Explanatory Report emphasises how powerful the ‘individual’ can be: 
It did not appear desirable, in the context of this Convention, to make 
the exercise of fundamental rights chiefly concerned with the 
protection of a person's rights in the health sphere subject to the 
economic well-being of the country, to public order, to morals or to 
national security (Council of Europe 1997: [156]). 
 
Once again the individual is of paramount concern and human dignity appears 
intrinsically linked to individual rights.  More importantly specific documents 
elaborate on what rights are, such as the ECHR.  As a result, the structure and 
hierarchy of the documents becomes important as the implication is that such pieces 
of legislation could, in fact, be more significant than other pieces of equal legislation.  
The HRA 1998 s.4 is a clear indication of the effect of human rights ergo human 
dignity within institutions. 
 
Despite the apparent carte blanche nature of human dignity to control research and 
progress within FGT, any conflict between human dignity and scientific progress 
would still potentially need resolving.  Documents across institutional sources deal 
with the conflict between research, the individual and society, thus highlighting the 
competing nature of the interests’ of others and the complications this can cause.  
Once again, the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedical Research 
1997 explanatory report elaborates further: 
The first is that of the individual, who had to be shielded from any 
threat resulting from the improper use of scientific developments.  
Several articles of the Convention illustrate the wish to make it clear 
that pride of place ought to be given to the individual: protection 
against unlawful interference with the human body, prohibition of the 
use of all or part of the body for financial gain, restriction of the use 
of genetic testing, [...] (Council of Europe 1997: [14]). 
 
The above extracts highlight the competing nature of the principles that emerge from 
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human dignity and point out situations in which human dignity must be properly 
considered.  Human dignity is protected if consent and information procedures are 
adhered to once scientific practice has conducted its own measurement of what is 
best for the individual.  Therefore, the individual is paramount, but an individual’s 
choice is mitigated by principles that they may or may not have control over. It will 
be shown below how such a position ultimately causes an inherent contradiction 
within FGT. However, even if the individual is paramount within human dignity 
who can decide upon what is best? 
6.4.1 Who can decide? 
It appears that the only person to decide is the individual, which is facilitated by 
other principles such as informed consent and autonomy.  It is the interplay between 
these principles and scientific progress and risk evaluation, which emphasises the 
primacy of the individual.  An example relevant to children shows how they 
amalgamate: 
Persons who are incapable of giving legal consent to clinical trials 
should be given special protection.  [...].  Such persons may not be 
included in clinical trials if the same results can be obtained using 
persons capable of giving consent.  Normally these persons should be 
included in clinical trials only when there are grounds for expecting 
that the administering of the medicinal product would be of direct 
benefit to the patient, thereby outweighing the risks.  [...].  Children 
represent a vulnerable population with developmental, physiological 
and psychological differences from adults, which make age and 
development related research important for their benefit.  [...].  The 
clinical trials required for this purpose should be carried out under 
conditions affording the best possible protection for the subjects.  
Criteria for the protection of children in clinical trials therefore need 
to be laid down.
176
  
 
There are many different complex competing themes in the extract above; but, it 
offers an insight into what criteria need to be fulfilled in order to uphold human 
dignity.  The extract highlights the interplay and tension between consent, protection, 
risk and ‘best interests’, which is evident throughout the regulation of FGT.  
However, the individual is sometimes not deemed to be the top of this theoretical 
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model.  Autonomy can be restricted depending upon the issue at stake and the point 
of development in the technology.  The extract clearly indicates that certain elements 
of the risk evaluation are not done by the individual or proxy consenter.  Therefore, 
there is an inherent conflict between pursuing human dignity through autonomy and 
scientific progress.  The documents place derogation from the model of individual 
over society and science outside of scientific progress or research and social 
acceptability.  Therefore, the individual is the priority within the context of research: 
Traditionally, reproductive autonomy meant simply the freedom 
(assuming it was a real freedom) to decide whether to try and 
reproduce, with whom, when and where.  [...] Whilst we would strive 
to encourage autonomous decision making, we recognise that there 
may be problems with unfettered and unregulated choices.  These 
problems can include decisions, which may adversely affect broader 
society and thus be in tension with genetic solidarity and social 
responsibility.  [...].  Perhaps the best formulation is that whilst 
autonomous decision making should be supported and encouraged, it 
is legitimate to limit this autonomy where its exercise unreasonably 
impacts on the autonomy of others, or threatens others with 
significant harm (Human Genetics Commission 2006: [1.5]). 
 
Therefore, the tension between the individual and society is not just a result of the 
balancing of primary rights holders, but also results from genetic solidarity and a 
rights holders own responsibility.  The tension can be mediated, but also influenced, 
by scientific knowledge and social acceptability, which may restrict or promote 
certain autonomous actions.  Therefore, there is a distinction between being 
constrained to choose and being forced or fraudulently made to act, which is 
consistent throughout the documents.  In identifying the difference between 
constrained choice and enforcement, if the interests and rights of the individual were 
always paramount then one should be entitled to choose any procedure regardless of 
procedural affects.  In turn, scientists would be allowed to conduct clinical trials on 
any condition with any method on anybody.  However, the above extract clearly 
shows that this is not the case as autonomy is a two edged sword which can be 
constrained and influenced by society.  However, the influence for such a decision 
comes from regulators rather than just from science.  Within the research 
environment once a choice is available the emphasis falls back upon individual 
autonomy through risk management/assessment and the communication of 
information to the individual.  Such empowerment and negative liberty clearly 
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emanates from the concept of consent. 
6.4.2 Consent facilitating human dignity  
Consent emerges as the undercurrent within the documents reinforcing the 
prioritisation of the individual over science and society.  ‘Consent’ ultimately means 
patient empowerment and control over their bodies.  For example, valid consent 
means the same as legal consent, which emanates as a strong concept and is repeated 
constantly within all levels of the institutional framework.  Consent is referenced 
over 2200 times within the sample and appears in virtually every document.  The 
repetition of consent throughout the sample emphasises the importance of consent 
for the individual.  Consent is interwoven with risk calculation and other issues as 
seen above.  Nevertheless, in order to operationalise autonomy, communication of 
information related to issues of risk and treatment management are needed: 
If one considers the scope of the doctor's duty by beginning with the 
right of the patient to make his own decision whether he will or will 
not undergo the treatment proposed, the right to be informed of 
significant risk and the doctor's corresponding duty are easy to 
understand: for the proper implementation of the right requires that 
the doctor be under a duty to inform his patient of the material risks 
inherent in the treatment.  and it is plainly right that a doctor may 
avoid liability for failure to warn of a material risk if he can show that 
he reasonably believed that communication to the patient of the 
existence of the risk would be detrimental to the health (including, of 
course, the mental health) of his patient.
177
 
 
Once again the priority is the patient which accordingly creates a correlating duty 
upon the physician in order to facilitate that priority.  It also places a duty upon the 
physician to have current knowledge of treatment practices.  The consequence of 
such duties and indication of best interests is recognised and thus can affect the 
relationship of the individual with the physician.  However, the sample recognises 
such a situation and the influential Helsinki Declaration states: 
The refusal of a patient to participate in a study must never interfere 
with the patient-physician relationship.
178
  
 
Such statements do little to illuminate how to resolve competing or conflicting 
interests which may occur when a treatment option is forwarded.  However, the 
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consequential duty of information communication places patient autonomy in the 
hands of the physician, thus initially outside of the realm of autonomy.  Therefore, 
what is in the best interests of an individual emerges.  It is the duty of the physician 
to consider what is in the best interest of the patient.  The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
lists the important factors, which include both medical and social interests, to 
consider for incompetent patients and serves as a guide.  Best interests is usually 
connected with incapacity when the individual is concerned; but, because of the 
information and clinical research,  it is apparent within FGT that best interests or the 
interests of others becomes a relevant factor due to the maternal fetal divide and the 
involvement of more than one entity. 
 
It does not, however, appear that by placing the individual as the central focus of the 
maternal fetal divide one can adequately answer the question of conflict.  If fetal life 
is protected under human dignity, then the autonomous choice of FGT practitioners 
and mothers can be constrained and possibly lead to enforced practices within 
maternal fetal conflict (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  Therefore, human dignity 
is about empowerment and constraint (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  By 
creating a hierarchy with the individual taking precedence over society, one is 
creating the necessary conditions for human dignity to flourish as well as respecting 
the individual’s own dignity (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  Therefore, choices 
within the maternal fetal divide should empower the individual by placing autonomy 
at the focus of the maternal fetal divide (Van Bogaert and Dhai 2008).  Duties are 
imposed upon institutions to correlate information from all the available sources, not 
only to protect human dignity but to facilitate autonomous choice.  Doctors are 
aware of such duties, which are fundamental practices within medicine and good 
practice (General Medical Council 2009b). 
6.4.3 Dignity as constraint and the maternal fetal divide 
Dignity can constrain action in general, in contrast to our rights, which are specific to 
furthering our personal goals (Dwyer 2003).  Therefore, by choosing to recognize 
these values and to treat the world accordingly, individuals should accept some 
constraints on their actions (Bostrom 2008).  Therefore, choice is constrained by a 
seemingly paternalistic bubble whereby those other than the person in question are 
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making judgements about what is acceptable.  The documents appear to recognise 
such constraints by introducing themes such as risk and the interplay between the 
individual and the FGT practitioner.  However, differences arise between 
technological and societal constraints, which are external constraints; and self 
imposed or internal constraints.  If the individual was truly paramount within 
regulation the only external constraint upon their dignity would be technological and 
financial.  If finances were not an issue, then a subjective construction of dignity 
would be created, which would be conditional upon time and place in relation to 
technology and therefore unworkable within institutions (McCrudden 2008).  
Nonetheless, decisions that engage the maternal fetal divide are constrained by more 
than just risk and genetic manipulation.  Removing scientifically orientated 
constraints such as risk and safety, society emerges as a constraint, which is 
intertwined with the regulation of science. 
 
By including society as a constraint upon regulation, human dignity recognises the 
impact of choice beyond the individual.  Thus, human dignity examines the 
implications of this technology within existing and potential patterns of oppression.  
It requires the examination of specific circumstances, to take into account actual 
experiences and concerns and to assess the significance of genetic interventions upon 
personal and social relationships (D’Agincourt-Canning 2001: 236-237).  Therefore, 
human dignity situates individuals in their place within society.  Here, thinking in 
terms of human dignity can, arguably, contribute to understanding people as existing 
at the heart of complex webs of interrelationships, rather than considering them as 
isolated persons from the single perspective of their rather abstract individual 
autonomy (Dupré 2009).  However, as the debate surrounding the prohibition upon 
sex selection has indicated, a ban on social sex selection because of the majority 
must be recognised for what it is, an attempt to formalise the tyranny of the majority 
and to institutionalise contempt for the principles of liberal democracy (Harris 
2005b).  Therefore, calls to constrain choice because of society can be dangerous and 
must be fully evaluated beyond the barometer questionnaire that is often used.   
 
Constraint does not include ‘enforcement of treatment’ (apropos abortion see Scott 
2002) and in the case of the maternal fetal divide it encompasses far more than a 
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mere refusal of treatment because there are two entities involved with their own 
separate rights.  Treatment without consent depends on factors such as capacity and 
informed consent.  More importantly for FGT is how the individual is defined.  If the 
individual includes a fetus then a set of competing rights between the mother and 
fetus arises, which would need resolving.
179
  How the individual is defined is 
important because if the fetus is deemed an individual, a mother’s beneficence based 
obligations to the fetus through practices such as FGT could justifiably constrain (in 
the broader inclusive sense) her autonomy (Fleischman, Chervenak et al. 1998).  
Therefore, conflict between the rights of the fetus and the mother cannot be resolved 
until the relationship between mother and fetus is considered.   
6.5 Prioritising the individual over the next unborn generation 
Despite the individual emerging as the priority within research and medicine, the 
problem arises of how the individual is placed in relation to other possible 
individuals, such as a fetus.  With human dignity seemingly flowing ambiguously, it 
could be seen that outside of the biological connection to the human species a fetus 
is not ‘life’.  Therefore, until birth a fetus can be treated without dignity unless that 
treatment would result in a problem for society or the mother.  Within the sample it 
is the characterisation of a legal individual post birth that creates rights and thus 
gives one human dignity. 
Except under statute an embryo or foetus in utero cannot be the victim 
of a crime of violence.  In particular, violence to the foetus, which 
causes its death in utero is not a murder.  The foundation authority is 
the definition by Sir Edward Coke of murder by reference to the 
killing of "a reasonable creature, in rerum natura:" Co.Inst., Pt.  III, 
ch.  7, p.  50.  The proposition was developed by the same writer into 
examples of prenatal injuries as follows:  
"If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or 
otherwise killeth it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, 
whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is 
delivered of a dead childe; this is a great misprision, 
and no murder [...].
180
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Therefore, the human dignity of the next generation is not violated despite the 
recognition of the maternal fetal divide, because there is no individual upon whom 
their human dignity can be violated.  However, as was seen in the literature review, 
the relationship between a mother and a fetus, thus the nexus point of the next 
generation, becomes a regulatory issue.  It is case law and policy which illuminates 
the relationship between generations when pregnancy arises.  Legislation does not 
elaborate upon the nature of the maternal fetal relationship.  For example, within the 
Abortion Act 1967 the rights and interests of the pregnant individual are weighed up 
against those of the fetus: 
1 Medical termination of pregnancy 
[…] (a)that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week 
and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater 
than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her 
family; or 
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury 
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or 
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the 
life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated; or 
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would 
suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
handicapped. 
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would 
involve such risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) 
or (b) of subsection (1) of this section, account may be taken of the 
pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.181  
 
Despite abortion being capped at 24 weeks, ultimately it can be done up until birth.  
It confirms the position that the mother is the most important aspect within 
pregnancy.  Risk, foreseeability and the duty of the physician are important factors, 
which indicate that the individual needs help to exercise their rights.  The statute is 
silent about fetal interests and rights.  However, that does not equate to the fetus 
having no rights or interests.  For example, the limit on abortion to 24 weeks 
recognises the interests of the fetus in being born after this point.  Therefore, to 
assess whether the fetus has any interests or rights the nature of pregnancy emerged 
as a theme that could reveal whether, within the climate of scientific progress which 
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challenges such principles, the next generation could be an exception to the rule.  It 
is evident within the instructional structure that the judicial institution and policy 
documents emerge as being relevant, rather than the legislative institutions. 
6.5.1 The relationship between fetus and mother within pregnancy 
Legally, pregnancy is an extension of the mother, thus explaining the 
intergenerational relation between mother and fetus.  Therefore, one can ascertain 
how the rights and interest of the next generation are weighed up against the rights of 
the current pregnant mother.  Such autonomous rights are closely connected to her 
right to a private life: 
The commission finds that not every regulation of the termination of 
unwanted pregnancies constitutes an interference with the right to 
respect for the private life of the mother. Art 8(1) cannot be 
interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination are, as a 
principle, solely a matter of the private life of the mother.
182
 
 
Restricting the scope of pregnancy is particularly important in assessing the 
competing interests/rights between a mother and those of the next and future 
generations.  However, there is a distinction between the rights of others and the 
interests of others within the sample.  It is clear that the next generation have no 
exercisable rights until they are born.  However, the competing interests within 
pregnancy results in the prioritisation of the current generation over possible future 
generations.  Speaking specifically about fetal interest: 
Since an unborn child has, ex hypothesi, no existence independent of 
its mother, the only purpose of extending the jurisdiction to include a 
foetus is to enable the mother's actions to be controlled.  Indeed, [...] 
in practice:   
"It would mean, for example, that the mother would be unable to 
leave the jurisdiction without the court's consent.  The court being 
charged to protect the foetus's welfare would surely have to order the 
mother to stop smoking, imbibing alcohol and indeed any activity, 
which might be hazardous to the child.  Taking it to the extreme were 
the court to be faced with saving the baby's life or the mother's it 
would surely have to protect the baby's."   
Another possibility is that the court might be asked to order that the 
baby be delivered by Caesarean section.  [...] it would be intolerable 
to place a judge in the position of having to make such a decision 
without any guidance as to the principles upon, which his decision 
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should be based.
183
 
 
The above extract summarises the competing issues at stake and how institutions 
should deal with the maternal fetal divide when autonomy, risk and danger are taken 
into account.  Although the maternal fetal divide is recognised by the judiciary it is 
conceptualised upon the notion of interests.  Nonetheless, the interests of another 
entity, that of the fetus, are not compelling enough to create a right, which can 
overcome the individual’s.  Not only is it considered unfair on the individual to 
enforce such a proposition; but, placing such a burden upon the judiciary without 
guidance from the legislator is untenable.  The emergence of derogation
184
 and 
deference
185
 in answering such questions emerge as relevant themes.  Because of the 
institutional structure, when questions of unlegislated moral circumstance with 
regards to the fetus arise, institutions use ‘remit’ or the separation of powers to avoid 
the deeply moral questions.
186
  Therefore, within the recognition of the maternal fetal 
divide the default institutional position is that the individual is paramount, unless 
otherwise directed. 
 
Prioritising the individual is not surprising considering the institutional emphasis on 
the individual is based upon autonomy.  However, implied from the sample is that 
the fetus has recognised interests, which themselves are bound up with the interest of 
the human species and can create correlating duties.  Case law provides the 
interpretation of legislation; thus, can provide information regarding the interface 
between the individual and the next generation.  The only interest the next generation 
is owed is not to be injured: 
If, as is conceded, any duty is owed to an unborn child, the authority's 
hospital laboratory and the doctor looking after the mother during her 
pregnancy undoubtedly owed the child a duty not to injure it, and if 
she had been injured as a result of lack of reasonable care and skill on 
their part after birth, she could have sued them, as she is suing the 
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doctor, for damages to compensate her for the injury they had caused 
her in the womb.  [...].  But this child has not been injured by either 
defendant, but by the rubella, which has infected the mother without 
fault on anybody's part.  Her right not to be injured before birth by the 
carelessness of others has not been infringed by either defendant, any 
more than it would have been if she had been disabled by disease 
after birth.  [...].  The only right on, which she can rely as having been 
infringed is a right not to be born deformed or disabled, […].  
[However,] the only duty, which either defendant can owe to the 
unborn child infected with disabling rubella is a duty to abort or kill 
her or deprive her of that opportunity.
187
 
 
Emphasis within the sample is on the interest of the next generation not to be harmed 
or injured.  Defective genes or physical impairments are considered ‘normal’, 
therefore no harm results.  In arriving at the current position, there is an increase in 
international regulatory referencing, as well as influences from scholars.  The 
influence mainly arises from, in no particular order, Canada, the USA and Australia, 
as well as Europe.  However, once that fetus is born the interest of that generation is 
then taken into account and the rights of others become relevant.  Once proximity 
between mother and child has been broken, then a fictitious act occurs giving that 
generation rights of action, which in some cases did not exist seconds before.  
Therefore, with regards to FGT one needs to know what actions lie in respect to the 
duty of others in relation to the interests that the fetus may have: 
The real question posed for our decision is not whether an action lies in 
respect of pre-natal injuries but whether a plaintiff born with injuries 
caused by the pre-natal neglect of the defendant has a cause of action in 
negligence against him in respect of such injuries.  [...].  For the purpose 
of these proceedings it is to be assumed that the plaintiff's injuries as 
subsisting at the time of her birth were caused by the act or omission of 
the defendant in the driving of his car.  What creates the difficulty is that 
such act or omission preceded and was, therefore, separated in point of 
time from the birth of the plaintiff in her injured condition.
188
 
 
The above example displays the fictitious legal practice that gives a neonate’s 
prenatal interests legal standing.  Essentially, interests are only as good as the right 
that you have, which in the case of the next generations is connected to the nexus 
point of birth.  Ergo, ‘life’ and therefore the ‘individual’ are not created until birth 
within the realm of the institutional reality of FGT.  The rights of the next generation 
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are generated against others, but not the individual pregnant women.  As the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 s.1 states: 
(1) If a child is born disabled as the result of such an occurrence 
before its birth as is mentioned in subsection (2) below, and a person 
(other than the child’s own mother) is under this section answerable 
to the child in respect of the occurrence, the child’s disabilities are to 
be regarded as damage resulting from the wrongful act of that person 
and actionable accordingly at the suit of the child. 
 
Therefore, the rights of the next generation are selective and created against FGT 
practitioners and the mother.  Those rights emerge from interests that crystallise into 
rights upon birth, which is confirmed by the other documents within the legislative 
and judicial institutions.  However, the individual is closely connected with the 
theme of life; therefore, if the fetus is considered to be a ‘life’ it may gain more than 
just interests.  Within, Vo v France,
189
 the theme of life and what is an individual 
combined to result in a fetus only having interest: 
[The] Court is convinced that it is neither desirable, nor even possible 
as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the 
unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of the 
Convention.  As to the instant case, it considers it unnecessary to 
examine whether the abrupt end to the applicant’s pregnancy falls 
within the scope of Article 2, seeing that, even assuming that that 
provision was applicable, there was no failure on the part of the 
respondent State to comply with the requirements relating to the 
preservation of life in the public-health sphere.  With regard to that 
issue, the Court has considered whether the legal protection afforded 
the applicant by France in respect of the loss of the unborn child she 
was carrying satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 
2 […].190 
 
Derogation and deference surrounding the remit of ‘life’ results in an institutional 
reluctance to answer the deeply ethical and moral questions.  The issue is continually 
deferred back to the member states that are ultimately silent upon the issue unless an 
instance arises whereby a question specifically needs the issue of a fetus and if it is a 
‘life’ to be resolved.  Until that specific circumstance occurs in case law then such 
uncertainty will continue.  The lack of a clear statement of the interplay of human 
dignity to the viable fetus has left the question for another day, ensuring continuing 
confusion for future cases (Goldman 2005). 
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6.5.2 Consequence for the maternal fetal divide 
Despite the fetus being framed as a distinct and separate being from the mother’s 
body in which it resides (Casper 1998), regulation is clearly based upon dependant 
moral status (Harris 2000).  Clearly, the biological unborn patient that Liley (1972) 
proposed cannot exist in such a framework.  Liley’s biologically determined fetal 
patient being in control of pregnancy cannot be sustained as the mother is in legal 
control of pregnancy (Liley 1972).  Even the fetus as a patient concept proposed by 
Harrison et al (1984) as well as Chervenak and McCullough (1994) would fail to 
find full recognition within the institutional framework, because it is accepted that 
the fetus is not a separate patient, but closely connected to the mother (Chervenak 
and McCullough 2007).  Decisions are viewed as exclusive with regards to the 
maternal to fetus, but inclusive from the fetus to mother (Harris 2000).  Therefore, 
the maternal fetal divide is strictly one about ostensible individuals.  It is the rights 
of ‘actual’ persons rather than possible persons that are applicable regardless of the 
consequences for the next or future generation (Heyd 1994).   
 
Given that informed consent is an integral part of the autonomous decision making 
process hindsight bias of the ‘I’ve changed my mind’ scenario when a mother 
becomes distressed by a pregnancy is a consequence that mother, child, family, FGT 
practitioners (to name a few) have to deal with (Brooks and Sullivan 2002).  
Hindsight bias may become more relevant within FGT because of the vast range of 
possible certain and uncertain outcomes.  Such hindsight bias could result in 
challenges to established social and legal criteria
191
 which medical decisions are 
judged (Dickenson 2003).  Therefore, cases of wrongful birth may become evident 
especially if FGT and abortion options are not aligned properly. 
 
Nonetheless, hindsight bias is information dependent, which in turn creates social 
responsibility and accountability within the maternal fetal divide for all practitioners 
involved.  The creation of such responsibility is no different from any other medical 
or genomic activity; however, the consequences can be profound and thus lead to 
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elements not being addressed (see 7.6).  Uncertainty within medicine can lead to 
problems within the doctor patient relationship because the time has passed when it 
was an absolute belief that knowledge of the mechanisms of disease was sufficient to 
establish correct diagnoses; provide accurate prognoses; and, through application of 
medical research, produce cures (Giraud 1992). 
 
More importantly, any conflict between the mother and fetus is not relevant for the 
maternal fetal divide within the framework other than that it exists.  The fetus has no 
‘rights’ therefore, there is no conflict between rights holders other than those which 
are socially constructed.  For example, in fetal treatment meetings at one institution, 
fetuses are routinely referred to as ‘the kid,’ and ‘the baby,’ which are all quite 
human-and gendered-identities (Casper 1994).  Nevertheless, in the majority of 
cases, maternal and fetal interests align and the mother will want to do what is best, 
no matter what is involved, despite there being no legal or strict ethical obligations 
(Chervenak and McCullough 2007).  However, such beneficence is constrained by 
human dignity.  Therefore, acts which a mother is willing to do, such as sacrificing 
her own body for the benefit of the fetus, could fall into the dwarf throwing category, 
whereby using one’s own body in the way one sees fit is limited by dignity.192  Such 
restrictions upon human dignity are enforced through the regulation of practice and 
research.  Therefore, high risk procedures that would ultimately lead to maternal 
death, but fetal survival and correction are filtered out by the research process.  
Therefore, autonomous choice and human dignity within the context of FGT is 
mitigated by regulators.
193
 
 
Tension emerges between the recognition and appreciation of interests for those who 
are not ‘individuals’.  If the interests of the fetus or the public are not capable of 
overriding the individual then surely the Abortion Act 1967 would be different?  
Therefore, even if the fetus has no rights and will not be considered life for 
protection within the regulation of FGT, certain obligations may still be owed that 
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entail constraints upon dignity, such as prenatal interventions (Savulescu 2007).  
However, there does appear to be a ray of light within regulation that takes into 
account intergenerational interests. 
6.6 A ray of light? 
Despite the mother being paramount, future generations are taken into consideration 
and positive action can be taken.  Regulation and subsequent case law dictates that 
they should be taken into account by FGT practitioners, with the interests of the next 
and future generations being able to influence the decisions of practitioners: 
Article 16 – Protecting future generations 
The impact of life sciences on future generations, including on their 
genetic constitution, should be given due regard.
194
  
 
Therefore, the interests of the next and future generation are important and should 
become part of the autonomous rational reasoning of the individual.  This position is 
reflected within stem cell research where the dignity of the embryo must be 
respected.
195
  The decision making of the individual should be mitigated not by the 
interest of others but by the fetus.  Within case law from England and Wales several 
examples emerge, with the below extract being a typical example:  
In my judgment a reasonable medical man or woman carrying out the 
procedure would take account of the risk of causing injury to the 
embryo in the womb and the consequent risk of the child being born 
injured and with abnormalities.
196
 
 
Therefore, the interests of the next and future generations are relevant factors in the 
practice of FGT practitioners, which regulators would like practitioners to take into 
consideration.  The consultations documents highlight the intrinsic nature of the 
fetus and how it should be treated with respect and dignity.  Nevertheless, 
intergenerational interests are not the only consideration which limits and guides the 
practice of FGT practitioners.  An example of this is from the highly influential 
Council of Europe protocol where it states: 
1. Research on a pregnant woman, which does not have the potential 
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to produce results of direct benefit to her health, or to that of her 
embryo, foetus or child after birth, may only be undertaken if the 
following additional conditions are met: 
i.  the research has the aim of contributing to the ultimate attainment 
of results capable of conferring benefit to other women in relation to 
reproduction or to other embryos, foetuses or children; 
ii. research of comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out on 
women who are not pregnant; 
iii. the research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden.
197
  
 
However, the above needs elaboration because it could easily be construed that the 
fetus within this protocol is disposable.  Also, the reasons behind the protocol are 
unclear.  The explanatory report goes on to explain: 
[R]esearch [must] be aimed at benefiting other women in relation to 
reproduction, or other embryos, foetuses or children.  The wording 
“in relation to reproduction” should be understood broadly; for 
example it would include research relevant to the health of women 
following pregnancy, or research relevant to women’s choice on 
whether or not to become pregnant.  Indent ii requires that research of 
comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out on women who are 
not pregnant.  Recourse to research on pregnant women, embryos or 
foetuses must be, scientifically, the sole possibility if it does not 
produce a significant direct benefit for the participant or her embryo, 
foetus or child.  This provision should not be considered 
discrimination against the pregnant woman, but protection of her 
health and that of her embryo, foetus or child (Council of Europe 
2005: [103]). 
 
It is evident from the explanatory report that the treatment of future generation will 
not be discriminatory if based on objective reasoning.  It should be noted that the 
language used is future’ rather than ‘next’ generation.  Future generations encompass 
a far wider remit than next generations because future generations include any results 
that affect the germ line.  Despite the above quote explicitly mentioning embryos and 
fetuses; it is the relevant provision in terms of reference to the benefit of other 
fetuses, embryos and children that encompass the next generation, and implicitly 
future generations.  Despite terms such as ‘future’ being used, the above quotes 
typify that in practice, when legislating, the next generation has a relevant interest in 
conjunction with the individual.  Therefore, the tension and conflict appears to 
emerge from how others, such as third parties, view how a mother should exercise 
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her autonomy, but also how that autonomy is balanced against the next generation 
(Scott 2002).  So what does that mean for the maternal fetal divide within FGT? 
6.6.1 Consequence for the maternal fetal divide 
By implying that fetal interests have the ability to constrain certain practices, human 
dignity as a constraint must also be considered in areas such as enforcement of 
treatment.  Fetal interests appear to be recognised, even within regulatory institutions 
where the fetus is not a legal ‘life’.  However, due to fetal interests crystallising 
postnatally one does not need to engage with questions of personhood or agency 
because the focus can be on the next generation’s wish not to suffer harm 
(Buchanan, Brock et al. 2000).  Therefore, as long as children are being forced to 
receive treatment against their own or parental wishes,
198
 the enforced treatment of 
pregnant women is possibly tenable (Purdy 1990).  Because of the institutional 
recognition of the maternal fetal divide and ‘the nature of pregnancy’, the next 
generation can be considered, due to the ‘best interests’ of the current individual.  
FGT technology will be targeted at conditions whereby ‘life’ is highly likely not to 
occur or where ‘life’ will occur, but with severe disabilities and where there is no 
postnatal cure (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 1998).  Therefore, in assessing 
responsibilities towards a fetus, an alternative perspective is needed to understand 
the relationship between the mother and the next generation (Groves 2006).  The 
introduction of fetal interests creates a responsibility for rights holders to consider 
the interests of others.  Consequently, one has to separate life saving and therapeutic 
treatment from life enhancing therapy.  Surely the state has a legitimate interest in 
protecting the health of the next and possible future generations from conditions that 
lead to neonatal death?   
 
Empirically, reproductive choices that affect future generations affect ‘actual’ 
persons because they can restrict choice (Heyd 1994).  The inclusion of future 
interests within the regulation of FGT appears to signify this because of the emphasis 
on safety (see chapter 7).  Furthermore, it would appear that the function of FGT 
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within its narrow remit of applicable conditions should be preferential on a 
regulatory level than the alternatives of abortion or no action at all.  Ultimately, 
however, independent physical persons are more important than the future ‘actual’ 
persons within regulation once implantation occurs.  By focusing upon actual 
persons, the maternal fetal divide does not take into account the difference between 
life saving and life enhancing treatment (Savulescu 2007).  The sample does not 
appear to engage with the possibility that these conditions can only be treated in 
utero.  As a result, harm to the next generation within the maternal fetal divide can 
only be mitigated by the choice of the mother.  As it will be shown in chapter 7, 
these issues are compounded further.  Therefore, despite the benefit to society in 
preventing disease propagation the state cannot act to secure the protection of future 
generations within the clinical context.  
6.7 Conclusion 
Human dignity appears as an explicit overarching principle for the future use of 
FGT.  However, human dignity is facilitated by autonomy which ultimately raises 
the individual above all else within the clinic since without individual consent 
science cannot legitimately proceed.  There is a ray of light for the protection of 
future generations within the regulation of future FGT because the dignity of the 
embryo is to be respected in stem cell research, and the status of the fetus must be 
taken into account in the decision making process.  However, a fetus is not 
considered an individual, therefore maternal choice within the clinic trumps fetal 
interests.  In addition there are precedents in restricting choice within the clinic due 
to society and governmental will.  Nevertheless, autonomy within the clinic appears 
unrestricted because of the narrowness of present choices.  
 
In adopting a consistent approach to autonomy, society avoids problems such as 
deterring women from seeking medical care; burdening women and often minority 
groups disproportionately with these interventions; and highlighting the uncertainty 
of medical predictions of harm (Annas 1986, Purdy 1990).  Importantly, by 
liberalising the rules on pregnancy such rules are considered as not casting a social 
function upon pregnant women to be merely fetal containers.  However, the fetus as 
a patient concept is shaped and formed by the relationship between the mother and 
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the clinician (Casper 1998).  Yet that social relationship does not have any weight 
within regulation, despite having consequences for engaging further social 
relationships between the mother, child and third parties.  Such a position shows a 
flagrant disregard for the harm that could be suffered as the relationship between 
mother and fetus matures and crystallises postnatally.  It focuses upon fetal harm, 
rather than upon the future child (Buchanan, Brock et al. 2000); thereby guaranteeing 
postnatal harm because only palliative postnatal treatment would be available.  This 
would be an injustice contrary to the prevention of harm to future individuals 
(Savulescu 2007).   
 
The law crystallises rights upon birth, which within the confines of FGT creates a 
legal tension.  Two elements arise that settle the regulatory and practical implications 
of such crystallising rights, namely: a mother cannot be held liable for negligent acts 
towards her own fetus (Jackson 2009);
199
 and, such action would be an omission 
which does not increase the harm suffered by the fetus and is not within the remit of 
sanctionable omissions in tort (Markesinis, Deakin et al. 2003).  However, such 
general principles appear to mask over the need to evaluate the moral implications of 
such unique practices and the possible moral, societal and political implications. 
 
Despite recognition of the impact of biotechnologies, it is possible to discriminate 
against the interest of the fetus if it is deemed objective with a legitimate aim.  Thus 
the interest of the next generation can still be overridden ultimately by the individual.  
Therefore, despite the ray of light offered in 6.6 for the protection of the interests of 
the next and future generations, ultimately, where autonomous choice is allowed, 
future generations are at the mercy of the current individual.  Nevertheless, the 
importance of future generations’ interests in conjunction with the interests of others 
within FGT means that the scientific progress of research must be examined more 
intently to discover the ways in which FGT progress impacts upon current thinking.   
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7 Documentary Data: Scientific Progress  
7.1 Introduction 
Having seen that human dignity has played an implicit role in the clinic before 
choice can be exercised within the clinic certain research protocols have to be 
followed.  Given the purported importance of human dignity seen within the first 
half of the documentary analysis in chapter 6, this chapter will analyse the regulation 
of the FGT and the way in which it impacts not only upon the progress of FGT but 
also on the maternal fetal divide.  This chapter will show how the progress of FGT is 
controlled through creating a set of research parameters prescribing limits within 
which a FGT practitioner can operate.  The limits emerge from risk and safety 
assessments which have elements of fear within them.  The consequence is that 
scientific progress has many hoops to jump through which impacts upon choice 
within the clinic and creates a paternalistic bubble within which FGT proceeds.  The 
creation of this bubble protects future generations and, therefore, intergenerational 
interests but effectively regulates the scientific progress of FGT and restricts 
maternal choice. 
 
In section 7.2 the remit of FGT will be outlined in order to identify whether ‘choice’ 
is restricted and if there is any effect upon the maternal fetal divide.  Section 7.3 
explores the research procedures to see if there was any influence of rights and 
dignity within the process or whether dignity is just a feature found within the clinic.  
It emerges that through safety and risk assessments dignity and protection of future 
generations are being taken into consideration.  However, within section 7.4 these 
principles appear to stifle the progress of FGT because human dignity appears to be 
one of the driving principles behind the research restrictions.  In section 7.5 it 
emerges that this leads to limitations such as the prohibition on germ line 
interventions.  Therefore, human dignity within the research process ultimately 
restricts the areas FGT practitioners can pursue and hence what patients will be able 
to choose.  Finally, in section 7.6 missing issues are identified from the documentary 
analysis in order to provide some contrast and guidance for analysis of the interview 
data in chapter 9.  
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7.2 Remit of fetal gene therapy: disease selection 
It is often argued that scientists have freedom to research whatever they like.  
Within humans this is not the case because the interaction of that freedom to 
research and the rights of others often intersect:  
[…] “scientific research in the field of biology and medicine shall be 
carried out freely, subject to the provisions of this Convention and the 
other legal provisions ensuring the protection of the human being.” 
As mentioned in the Explanatory Report in relation to the latter, if 
“freedom of scientific research is justified not only by humanity’s 
right to knowledge, but also by the considerable progress its results 
may bring in terms of health and well being of patients”, it is “not 
absolute.  It is limited by the fundamental rights of individuals, which 
protect the human being”(Working Party on the Protection of the 
Human Embryo and Fetus 2003: 22). 
 
Therefore, a FGT practitioner does not have complete freedom in research as their 
choices are not only restricted by regulation, but also by fundamental rights.  
Therefore, as highlighted in chapter 6, these rights include the right to life, the right 
to private life, autonomy and human dignity.  These rights tell us little about what 
diseases FGT practitioners can investigate and develop treatments for.  However, it 
is clear that only specific diseases can be researched: 
The disorder or disease treated would need to be life threatening, or 
associated with severe disability, and for, which no suitable treatment 
is available after birth, in order to justify intervention in utero (Gene 
Therapy Advisory Committee 1998: [27(c)]). 
 
Therefore, harm must occur before birth and be irreversible, assuming the phrase ‘no 
suitable treatment’ means ‘a treatment that is unsuccessful in curing or alleviating a 
condition’ as the report implies.  Essentially, conditions that violate the right to life 
and autonomy of the next generation include conditions such as cystic fibrous and 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy,
200
 but what about future generations? 
  
It is clear from the documents that future generations are protected from further harm 
through the prohibition of certain practices.  It is only somatic treatments that are 
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permissible because germ line interventions are prohibited.  The practice is 
prohibited such that a clinic trial licence cannot even be applied for: 
The licensing authority shall not authorise a clinical trial involving 
products for gene therapy if the use of those products in that trial 
would result in modifications to any subject's germ line genetic 
identity.
201
   
 
Therefore, a divide is created between somatic and germ line genetics.  A child born 
as a result of successful treatment will have two different genetic constitutions.  
Furthermore, the issue of germ line transmission and treatment within FGT has lead 
to a narrowing of the point of permissible intervention once pregnancy has occurred. 
In utero gene therapy heightens concerns about the risk of germline 
transmission.  Until compartmentalisation of the primordial germ 
cells in the gonads, which is completed in humans by the 7th week of 
gestation, cells are unprotected and mitotically active, allowing viral 
vector infection.  This must be taken into account, and in utero gene 
therapy should preferentially be conducted after this time-point in 
order to minimise the risk of germline transmission.  In addition, this 
risk should be considered also for other types of gene therapy in 
fertile women (European Medicines Agency 2006: 5). 
 
The consequence of the explicit prohibition on any germ line interference is that 
regulation reflects this position through reinforcing safety procedures.  Therefore, 
precaution must be taken in research that could inadvertently affect the fetal or 
maternal germ line: 
Reproductive and developmental toxicity: Studies on the effects on 
fertility and general reproductive function shall be provided.  
Embryo-foetal and perinatal toxicity studies and germline 
transmission studies shall be provided, unless otherwise duly justified 
in the application on the basis of the type of product concerned.
202
  
 
Therefore, a separation is made between in vitro embryo genome alterations and 
fetal alterations.  It is here that FGT must tread with caution, because treatment 
would be in danger of no longer being fetal treatment but embryo treatment and 
therefore prohibited.
203
  Yet, it is the distinction between fetal and embryo research 
that has an effect upon the maternal fetal divide.  
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7.2.1 Effect for maternal fetal divide 
It is evident that the management of a condition is being driven by two ethical 
considerations.  The avoidance of treatment in utero where possible; and secondly, 
the risk of germ line transmissions.  Consequently, the maternal choice identified 
within chapter 6 is restricted in favour of human dignity and choice is made within 
the confines of the paternalistic bubble.  The restrictive and precautionary range of 
diseases that can be researched once again affects reproductive choice (Heyd 1994).  
Nevertheless, where prospective parents have knowledge of their genome they can 
still choose to exercise limited choice over which embryo, sperm or oocyte are used.  
Therefore, through negative selection of specific genetic constitutions, prospective 
parents are exercising intergenerational choices (Buchanan, Brock et al. 2000).  
However, these intergenerational choices are not exercised through alteration, but 
selection.  The consequence is that the maternal fetal divide will become relevant 
only for those who do not have genetic information before conception or 
implantation and those cases where mutation occurs.  Therefore, the restriction upon 
the development of in utero treatments will make certain conditions principally about 
termination or birth, rather than termination, birth or treatment.  Where a condition 
falls into the former category, then emphasis will be placed upon pre-implantation 
reproductive choice; therefore moving the debate away from the maternal fetal 
divide.  For those conditions, choice does not have to be weighed up against actual 
future persons, merely future potential persons (Savulescu 2007); therefore, there is 
no maternal fetal or maternal embryo conflict.   
 
However, it is clear that even where a condition is treatable one has to consider the 
duties of parents towards their children.  Due to only somatic interventions being 
pursued, any future offspring of the treated child would have a chance of inheriting 
the treated child’s genetic condition, because the treated child’s germ line will not 
have been altered.  As a result, future interests remain relevant within the disease 
selection model, because of the possible effect upon treated child’s reproductive 
future.  However, the debate surrounding the informing of offspring and the 
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offspring’s reproductive choices moves the debate away from the maternal fetal 
divide.  Yet, once conditions have been identified for which treatments can be 
developed, it is clear that certain research procedures must be followed.   
7.3 Research procedure 
Legislation, accompanied by codes of practice, are the principle documents for 
governing research procedure.  There was little, if any, mention of research 
procedure within the cases analysed because the ‘procedure’ was not the substantive 
issue in question.  However, within the regulatory documents the themes of 
procedure and good practice are evidently paramount to scientific research.  Within 
those documents the procedural requirements of FGT includes: specific information 
needed for a research application; having an emergency protocol to reduce adverse 
reactions; what laboratory procedures should be followed as well as outlining good 
clinical practice and practical procedures.  Good clinical practice is a set of 
internationally recognised ethical and scientific quality requirements which must be 
observed in designing, conducting, recording and reporting clinical trials that involve 
the participation of human subjects.
204
  These principles include obtaining informed 
consent, conducting risk-benefit calculations and trials that are scientifically 
sound.
205
  Within good clinical practice ‘clarified guidance’ emerges as a key theme.  
Within the theme, protection, due process and uniformity/standardisation appear as 
strong themes from the documents that govern the current regulation of gene 
therapy.  It would appear that FGT practitioners must adhere to these in order to 
merely operate: 
Standard procedure 
1.  […] a competent authority or the Commission may ask for further 
information, make comments or present reasoned objections to the 
placing on the market of the GMO(s) in question within a period of 
60 days from the date of circulation of the assessment report. 
[...] 
The competent authorities and the Commission may discuss any 
outstanding issues with the aim of arriving at an agreement within 
105 days from the date of circulation of the assessment report. 
Any periods of time during, which further information from the 
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notifier is awaited shall not be taken into account for the purpose of 
calculating the final 45 day period for arriving at an agreement.  
Reasons shall be stated in any request for further information.
206
  
 
This quote typifies the due process nature of an application and the clarification 
needed to guide FGT practitioners.  It also makes scientific progress based on a 
uniform process so that ideas can be disseminated across not only the UK, but across 
the European Economic Area.  Specifically to UK, FGT practitioners, an example of 
a structured process can be seen within Appendix E.  It should be noted that by 
utilising a clarified application process with due process embedded within it, the 
research procedure outlines duties and rights that research should follow.  Within 
these duties, obligations arise for FGT practitioners to obtain informed consent from 
individuals before they can conduct research.  Therefore, the individual becomes a 
prominent and important part of research.  The ‘individual’ theme will be returned to 
below, as the main thrust of the research procedure from the institutional documents 
is to guide FGT practitioners through the process and attain good clinical practice.  It 
is clear from the titles of regulatory documents that good practice is key.
207
  In 
attaining good clinical practice certain technocratic criteria emerge: 
 5.2. Specific requirements for gene therapy medicinal 
products 
 
 1. Human pharmacokinetic studies  
 Human pharmacokinetic studies shall include the following 
aspects:  
  (a) shedding  studies  to  address  the  excretion  of  the  
gene  therapy  medicinal  products;  
 (b)biodistribution studies;  
  (c) pharmacokinetic studies of the medicinal product and 
the gene expression moieties (e.g.  expressed proteins or 
genomic signatures).  
 2. Human pharmacodynamic studies  
Human pharmacodynamic studies shall address the expression and 
function of the nucleic acid sequence following administration of the 
gene therapy medicinal product.  
 3. Safety studies  
 Safety studies shall address the following aspects:  
 (d) emergence of replication competent vector;  
 (e) emergence of new strains;  
 (f)  reassortment of existing genomic sequences;  
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 (g) neoplastic proliferation due to insertional 
mutagenicity.
208
  
 
This is just one example of the clarification and remit of FGT that emanate as typical 
themes in relation to guiding research within the area.  Information is communicated 
in technocratic language unlike the documents that generally outline principles.  The 
voluntary code of practice, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), is heavily loaded 
with technocratic language thus making the document opaque to all readers other 
than trained expert readers.  However, the technocratic style informs the researcher 
of important criteria they must cover and in some cases how to do it.  For example, it 
goes as far as to prescribe how to label samples and products for manufacture to 
ensure uniformity between FGT practitioners.
209
  The techno-scientific script, in 
relation to clinical trial applications through to emergency procedures, crystallises 
multiples trajectories of medical practice through protocols and regulation 
(Timmermans and Berg 1997).  Therefore, the standardisation of procedure traverses 
all practice of gene therapy.  In standardising the practice of FGT in accordance with 
the rest of Europe, data becomes more reliable and transparent, thus increasing the 
objectivity and understanding of results within the european scientific community.  
As a result of this standardisation ‘biomedicalisation’210 of science within the UK 
emerges due to inclusion of conceptual and clinical expansions through the 
commoditisation of health, the elaboration of risk and surveillance, and innovative 
clinical applications of drugs, diagnostic tests, and treatment procedures (Clarke, 
Shim et al. 2003).  Therefore, through technocratic language, risk is quantifiable and 
provides assurance about the safety of FGT.   
7.3.1 Safety first through risk assessments 
Safety emerges as a key concept that FGT practitioners must observe.  The standards 
they are expected to attain are communicated in a technocratic way.  Procedural 
duties are in line with the conformity of research and the practice of good clinical 
practice.  Procedural safety and informed consent also fall within the good clinical 
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practice of FGT practitioners and are present throughout the work.  Where the 
themes of safety and procedure are raised it is evident that they are based upon 
scientific practice.  Therefore, as will be shown below, scientific evidence and 
progress are helping to inform both the individual persons and the safety protocols 
that are made.  In order to conduct risk assessments and facilitate the action of FGT 
practitioners, procedural requirements emerge based around risk avoidance: 
2.4 Bacterial vaccines and gene delivery systems  
Overview        53 
Risk assessment for human health     54 
Hazards associated with the recipient strain    54  
Examples of bacterial gene delivery systems    55  
Hazards associated with genetic inserts     60 
Alteration of phenotype      61 
Genetic stability and sequence mobilisation    62 
Risk assessment for the environment     63 
Survivability and stability      63 
Hazards posed by the genetic insert     64 
Alteration of phenotypic and pathogenic traits   64 
Procedures and control measures     65  
Operational considerations      65  
 (Health and Safety Executive 2007: 2) 
 
The risk assessment is for the benefit of the research subject, as well as for the 
environment and society in general.  From the contents pages of the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) voluntary code of practice this is a visible consideration.  In 
fact, the guidance from the HSE is principally about risk assessment within clinical 
trials.  Risk assessment and informed consent are all part of the general theme of 
good practice.  The Medical Research Council (MRC) good practice guidance 
indicates the same reliance upon risk for good management in their construction of 
what amounts to good practice in the below extract: 
Conducting the research  
4.1 Information and organisation 
4.2 Use, calibration, and maintenance of equipment 
4.3 Risks of research misuse 
4.4 Hazardous processes and materials 
4.5 Standard operating procedures  
(Medical Research Council 2005: 1) 
 
Risk assessment is not only communicated in a technocratic manner, but in order to 
facilitate good clinical practice through principles such as informed consent, further 
procedural tick lists are obligatory.  Communication of those risks that must be made 
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clear to the patient appear to be simplified into layman’s terms.  For example, 
Directive 2006/17/EC highlights that patients: 
[M]ust be selected on the basis of their age, health and medical 
history, provided on a questionnaire and through a personal interview 
performed by a qualified and trained healthcare professional.  This 
assessment must include relevant factors that may assist in identifying 
and screening out persons whose donation could present a health risk 
to others, such as the possibility of transmitting diseases (such as 
sexually transmitted infections), or health risks to themselves (e.g.  
superovulation, sedation or the risks associated with the egg 
collection procedure or the psychological consequences of being a 
donor).
211
   
 
Because information has to be communicated to the patient whom may not have the 
expertise or experience in the field (based on scientific qualifications), the language 
appears simplified.  It is noteworthy that post 2005 there is a marked shift in 
amending directives, which clarify and extend the risk calculation of tissue and 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) that are within the ambit of Directive 
2004/23/EC.  No doubt the increase in risk assessment is connected to the French X-
SCID gene therapy trial upon children where, in 2005, it could be considered that the 
previous risk calculations were not adequate to take into account the risks within 
human patients.  The introduction of Regulation 1394/2007/EC is a clear indication 
of the practice of FGT adjusting what is included within the risk assessment.  
Therefore, risk is an important factor within research, with risk predictability 
emerging as a key component regardless of whether its effect is environmental or 
medical: 
The use of tissues and cells for human application carries a risk of 
disease transmission and other potential adverse effects in recipients.  
In order to monitor and reduce these effects, specific requirements for 
traceability and a Community procedure for notifying serious adverse 
reactions and events should be set out.
212
 
 
Therefore, risk calculation indicates monitoring is also an important process and 
includes the monitoring of premises so that they comply with enforceable standards.  
There is the specific requirement for long term monitoring of the engraftment of a 
biomolecule, thus the prospective nature of gene therapy is a consideration.  
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However, within the documents it appears vague as to how long ‘long term 
monitoring’ is, as indicated in Regulation 1394/2007/EC.  EMA guidance indicates 
that it could be days, months or years, but does not explicitly reference looking at the 
next generation (Committee for Medical Products for Human Use 2009).  The next 
generation may implicitly be included, but it is not clear that this is the case.  To 
facilitate the monitoring of research it has to be traceable.  Therefore, further duties 
are imposed upon FGT practitioners to create research trials not only for their own 
science, but also for safety protocols which can be followed in cases of emergency.  
Therefore, with monitoring comes compliance, which is monitored by regulators.  
Whether procedural guidance is considered red tape is another issue, but it is a 
uniform process that appears to be constrained by fear and safety concerns.  
 
It is clear that the focus of regulation is to: deal with scientific uncertainty (risk) and; 
apply ethical principles for the protection of present and future generations; offer 
special guarantees that secure the legitimacy of genetic governance through public 
participation and transparency in a globalized world; and finally employ a variety of 
different instruments for the regulation of extremely diverse applications of 
biotechnology, all of which function in the shadow of biotech patents (Somsen 
2005).  The main focus is upon the first and last points.  The final point is clearly 
demonstrated through the operational focus of bodies such as the HSE, GTAC, 
MHRA and DOH.  Risk being prevalent within the regulation of FGT is not ground 
breaking. Due to the uncertain elements of novel technologies the state through 
regulation should guide the size and direction of biotechnologies (Somsen 2005).  
The preoccupation follows the increasing focus of proactive risk regulation of 
biotechnologies because of the uncertainties inherent in their release (Tait and 
Levidow 1992).  However, the documents appears to understate the inherent 
uncertainty of gene therapy with rigorous good practice, risk assessments and long 
term follow-up providing adequate measures that ensure certainty and thus do not 
violate human dignity. 
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7.3.2 Consequence of risk assessment on scientific progress and the 
maternal fetal divide 
Risk within the sample is based upon expert scientific models of risk rather than lay 
perceptions of risk (Somsen 2005).  The risk is balanced relatively to risk-benefit 
criteria (Van Ness 2001).  Therefore, risk is framed by technocratic calculations of 
‘risk-benefit’ and communicated by technocratic language.  In doing so, the apparent 
objectivity of scientific discourse can be shown often to be presenting ‘highly 
contentious’ statements as ‘uncontentious’, indeed, as fact (McKenna and Graham 
2000).  The lack of animal models for evaluating the effects of biological products 
are much less well developed than their counterparts in traditional toxicology 
because of a lack of prenatal research in general (Office of Recombinant DNA 
Activities 1999).  Therefore, the above mentioned safety models may not be 
appropriate or adequate to foresee dangers despite the certainty that such models 
should maintain safety within FGT.  The technocratic language appears to the lay 
person to provide certainty within an area which is ‘experimental’ and thus always 
containing uncertainty within it.  The uncertainty of such practice is evident within 
the evolution of medical practice, none more so than within gene therapy (Henry 
2006).  Given the relationship between the patient and physician, communication of 
risk and uncertainty must occur in order to achieve informed consent and maintain 
human dignity within the maternal fetal divide.  By communicating this risk it also 
seeks to identify uncertain future harms to future generations that may not have been 
already considered within the maternal decision making process. 
 
Yet even the most successful trials of gene transfer have engendered questions about 
its prospects, which was evident in the haemophilia B trial raising concerns about 
germ line modifications (Marshall 2001).  The results of the X linked, severe, 
combined immunodeficiency trial were offset by unexpected, vector induced 
leukaemia in two participants (Kimmelman 2005).  Therefore, ‘risk’ is based on 
perceived as well as known risks from previous scientific knowledge (Williams 
2001).  Further examples of such uncertainty surrounding in utero damage are the 
thalidomide and Epilim cases.  These two examples highlight two different issues 
relating to the culpability of FGT practitioners and drug companies involved in novel 
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drugs.  Importantly, both highlight the intense and emotional effect of damage to the 
next generation, and how unforeseeable certain acts can occur within the framework 
of certainty and risk management (BBC 2002, Hirsch 2011).  Such examples 
highlight the difficult nature or regulation within FGT. 
 
Despite the certainty presented by risk management, precautionary reasoning is 
evident within regulatory bodies.  As was the case with thalidomide, Epilim and 
other known drugs, uncertainty, although statistically low due to the proactive 
approach, was still a possibility, as within any clinical trial.  Therefore, precautionary 
reasoning through monitoring and strict risk management is the best that can done 
and addresses some of the ethical concerns regarding the next and future generation 
(Somsen 2005).  Yet, a focus on risk management can lead to stifled scientific 
progress (Rostein, Irving et al. 2006), or at least significantly hindered scientific 
progress.  However, that restriction on progress may be legitimate where the reasons 
are justified.  Those reasons appear to be because of fear and safety concerns, which 
appear to stem from the application of human dignity.  The resulting effect upon the 
maternal fetal divide is that, rather than allowing mothers to assess risk themselves, 
the choice is once again restricted by paternalism, by society and by humankind in 
general. 
7.4 Scientific progress stifled by fear and safety concerns 
In considering future generations it appears that in terms of germ line technology the 
current regulatory system is contradictory because of the stifling fear and safety 
concerns.  On the one hand regulation is pro scientific progress.  On a policy 
document level pride emanates about the achievements of genomics and scientific 
progress. 
Here in Britain we start with a great advantage.  We have in this 
country some of the best scientists, academics and universities.  A 
great deal of the research and innovation into genetics is happening 
here – in both our pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries as 
well as in the public sector.  Our NHS genetic services are admired 
throughout the world.  We are well placed to lead the world in the 
discovery and realisation of the maximum benefits of genetics in 
healthcare (Department of Health 2003: [1.4]). 
 
Scientific progress within the UK is seen as something to be proud of.  Scientific 
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progress is important not only for science itself but for the public good.  It emerges 
that good clinical practice as identified in section 7.3 (such as scientifically sound 
trials and informed consent) is built upon the previously mentioned procedural 
requirements.  It is from these procedural requirements that science is reinforced 
by its own findings in order to progress.  At the European level, it is clear to see: 
The principles of good clinical practice and detailed guidelines in line 
with those principles shall be adopted and, if necessary, revised to 
take account of technical and scientific progress […].213  
 
It continues by stating: 
Adaptation to scientific and technical progress 
 This Directive shall be adapted to take account of scientific 
and technical progress in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 21(2).
214
  
 
In fact, regulation is actively striving to maintain a grip upon research, which can be 
seen in the extract below.  Research informs the regulators, who in turn inform the 
legislators, who then govern the practice of science, which then develops further 
within those confines thus needing further regulation: 
Due to scientific and technical progress in the field of advanced 
therapies, as reflected in Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on 
advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 
2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, it is appropriate to 
adapt Annex I.  The definitions and detailed scientific and 
technical requirements for gene therapy medicinal products and 
somatic cell therapy medicinal products should be updated.  
Moreover, detailed scientific and technical requirements should be 
established for tissue engineered products, as well as for advanced 
therapy medicinal product containing devices and combined 
advanced therapy medicinal products.
215
  
 
The influencing nature of scientific progress within areas such as FGT, which seeks 
to challenge our understanding of not just humanity but language, is an important, 
visible concept.  However, in relying upon science to guide and direct regulation, 
one must look at the consequences and possible restrictions upon the progress of 
FGT.  In terms of intergenerational issues, in order not to violate human dignity 
research within pregnancy is severely restricted.  With images of Frankenstein 
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monsters and deformed thalidomide babies fresh in the minds of those who conduct 
research, and the fear of reoccurrence, restrictions upon FGT can be seen: 
An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be 
undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and 
only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of 
any descendants.
216
  
 
Therefore, a reiteration of the disease model above is seen.  However, with scientific 
progress reinforcing itself with continuing research it ends in a contradictory 
position.  It is clearly stated within Directive 2001/20/EC, which is transposed 
directly into the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004: 
The licensing authority shall not authorise a clinical trial involving 
products for gene therapy if the use of those products in that trial 
would result in modifications to any subject's germ line genetic 
identity.
217
  
 
The position of a complete ban on germ line interventions is reiterated within the 
policy documents analysed.  The regulation goes further to explain why germ line 
interventions are prohibited: 
The UK Clinical Trials Regulations 2004 prohibit gene therapy on 
reproductive (germ line) cells; it can only be carried out on non-
reproductive (somatic) cells.  Germ line gene therapy can potentially 
cause changes in a patient, including harmful effects that could be 
passed on to future generations.  It is therefore currently considered 
unacceptable for both ethical and safety reasons (Parliamentary Office 
of Science and Technology 2005: 1). 
 
Therefore, biological intergenerational aspects are an explicit consideration.  The 
interests of future generations are enough to prohibit the research freedom and 
practices of FGT practitioners on human beings.  However, how can one overcome 
safety fears when all clinical trials that would seek to alter the genome on humans 
are prohibited?  If one assumes that within the normal model of clinical trials in 
other sections of experimental medicine, once animal models have been properly 
conducted then safety concerns should only be fixed to current contemporary 
knowledge.  Therefore, another reason must emerge as to why certain practices are 
prohibited, if regulation wishes to be progressive rather than reactionary. 
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7.5 Fear stemming from human dignity? 
With the individual embedded as a paramount consideration within good clinical 
practice of research, human dignity arises as an element which can be used to hinder 
scientific research.  Therefore, within FGT carte blanche prohibitions emerge 
because of human dignity: 
The International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO should 
contribute to the dissemination of the principles set out [...] and give 
advice concerning the follow-up of this Declaration, in particular 
regarding the identification of practices that could be contrary to 
human dignity, such as germ-line interventions.
218
  
 
It emerges that germ line alterations could be contrary to human dignity.  Although 
the contingency of ‘could’ is used within the above quote, it is clear from reading 
other international explanatory reports that it is the fear of the effect of germ line 
alterations producing individuals or entire groups endowed with particular 
characteristics and required qualities (Council of Europe 1997), which would 
intuitively violate human dignity.  Such intuitive violations of the abstract notion of 
human dignity should never be allowed, because to do so would devalue and 
disrespect humanity.  However, further investigation into the prohibition reveals that: 
Because little is known about the possible consequences and hazards, 
and any harm to future generations would take a long time to discover 
and deal with, this application of gene therapy needs to be considered 
quite separately from somatic cell gene therapy (Clothier 1993: 
[2.26]). 
 
However, carte blanche statements such as safety are time limited; whereas calls to 
human dignity are indeterminate in length.  By prohibiting germ line technology, 
even for therapeutic and preventive purposes, regulation does not recognize an 
interest in inheriting a genetic patrimony made better through the eradication of 
genes causing diseases (Mori and Neri 2001).  A distinction between the next 
generation and future subsequent generations is emphasised by a prohibition on germ 
line technologies.  Restriction due to human dignity being violated could be 
considered valid on safety reasons because of the underlying themes that guide 
research.  The foreseeability of scientific research emerges as a possible reason why 
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human dignity is violated by not just the intervention on the genome, but by safety 
concerns.  The best example of the importance of foreseeable consequences is from 
GMO regulation.  When emergencies occur FGT practitioners must be prepared for 
foreseeable incidents with, once again, procedural process being key: 
(1) Where an assessment carried out pursuant to regulation 6(1) 
shows that, as a result of any reasonably foreseeable accident –  
(a) the health or safety of persons outside the premises in, 
which an activity involving genetic modification is carried on 
is liable to be seriously affected; or  
(b) there is a risk of serious damage to the environment, [...]. 
(2) Where an assessment carried out pursuant to regulation 7(1) 
shows that, as a result of any reasonably foreseeable accident, the 
health or safety of persons outside the premises in, which an activity 
involving genetic modification is undertaken is liable to be seriously 
affected, the person undertaking that activity shall ensure that, before 
the activity to, which the assessment relates begins, a suitable plan is 
prepared with a view to securing the health and safety of those 
persons.
219
 
   
Evident within the uniformly structured risk calculation, is that the foreseeability of 
risk is important.  Foreseeability within risk assessment links back to the circular 
reinforcement of scientific progress by scientific practice dependent upon regulation.  
In doing so, reasonably foreseeable accidents become part of the mechanism of 
safety.  The intended primary benefit of a clinical trial is the attainment of 
generalizable knowledge, because clinical trials are directed towards attaining 
medical and clinical knowledge (Van Ness 2011).  Furthermore, that knowledge will 
empower the effective treatment of the population of patients that the experimental 
subjects statistically represent (Van Ness 2001).  However, with indefinite changes 
to a genome, the foreseeability of germ line interventions becomes unforeseeable.  
Such unforeseeability is no different from other forms of clinical practice, such as 
inadvertent germ line transmission by chemotherapy (Laurema, Heikkila et al. 2003).  
However, in general, the outcomes of scientific knowledge are rarely amenable to 
previous knowledge, therefore, science has an inverse relationship with the capacity 
to know scientific consequences (Adam and Groves 2006).  Since the effect of 
altering a genome can never be fully known, one can understand where safety 
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concerns about violations of human dignity related to future generations and 
humanity arise.   
7.5.1 Foreseeable fetal gene therapy? 
The foreseeability of future research is stifled by the inherent contradiction within 
the institutional reality of in utero germ line therapy.  Regulation is kept up to date 
and altered by further scientific knowledge.  Well designed clinical studies are the 
best available means of addressing uncertain gene therapy risks in human patients 
whether that be for somatic or germ line interventions (Deakin, Alexander et al. 
2009).  These technologies require investigation into the ‘risk’, which poses 
challenges for both the informed consent process and the conduct of clinical research 
more generally (Deakin, Alexander et al. 2009).  Therefore, an inherent contradiction 
emerges that stifles the progress of germ line interventions and consequently 
overrides the interests of future generations in not having debilitating genetic 
conditions eradicated, without the need of further intervention, such as PGD.  
Therefore, the current prohibition upon germ line therapy is based upon risk to 
human dignity, due to causing more harm than cure (Pattinson 2002).  Nevertheless, 
if those factors are important enough to stop germ line research, given the lack of 
knowledge about somatic interventions, should they also be prohibited?  Clearly the 
extent of the lack of scientific knowledge is key in the distinction, but it could lead to 
the stifling of technological innovation if all procedures are banned where the risk of 
a therapy was not 100% known (Van Ness 2001). 
 
One has to assume that it is the resulting safety concerns of direct physical gene 
manipulation that violates human dignity, rather than the notion of gene pool 
altering, because germ line choices already occur within embryo selection in assisted 
reproductive technologies (Nielsen 1997).  However, in the distant future (and not as 
we understand FGT today) gene editing (See Disterer, Simons et al. 2009, Ledord 
2011)
220
 could be conducted in utero, thus making in utero germ line editing akin to 
negative selection, yet contrary to human dignity.  Nevertheless, the possible positive 
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effects do not violate human dignity because somatic gene therapy is permitted and 
this practice is akin to somatic gene therapy (See Suziki and Knudtson 1989).  One 
has to assume that the choice itself does not violate human dignity, but rather the 
unknown consequences through future generations that distinguish germ line and 
somatic alterations.  The ability not to be able to contain and control medical 
problems to the current and/or the next generation is what appears to give rise to the 
violation of human dignity.  Yet, current treatments such as chemotherapy and 
radiation therapies possess significant risks to ovaries and germ line cells (Laurema, 
Heikkila et al. 2003).  However, these treatments are not considered to violate human 
dignity.  Therefore, despite regulation not distinguishing between deliberate or 
inadvertent germ line alterations, it could be assumed that somatic FGT would still 
be acceptable but whether it would continue to be licensed is another issue.  No 
doubt those such as Habermas would identify that imposing a genetic preference 
upon a potential person does not treat that potential person as an autonomous 
individual because a positive response to therapy cannot be guaranteed (Habermas 
2003).  However, it is still unclear how dignity is violated by gene therapy within the 
sample other than by invoking the notion of ‘playing God’.  This is currently 
occurring within assisted reproductive technologies but in a less intrusive manner 
because PGD is seen as an acceptable form of intervention despite the implicit 
picture it paints of society. 
7.6 Missing key issues surrounding fetal gene therapy 
In terms of framing the intergenerational issues that affect FGT there appears to be a 
big gap within the documents analysed.  The regulatory documents frame the 
intergenerational aspect of their work in terms of inheritance or germ line issues.  
However, there are exceptions which include information about the effect of somatic 
gene therapy in general.  The issue is recognised and taken into account; but the 
absence of recognition that somatic gene therapy indicates a change to the next 
generation merely shifts connected issues to future generations.  The lack of 
recognition creates a difference between biological intergenerational issues (germ 
line) and intergenerational issues per se (future reproductive choice, the environment 
etc).  There is scientific recognition of the difference between germ line and somatic 
technology which appears to drive the distinction between issues which are 
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intergenerational and those which are not.  In a sense the documents appear to 
consider future generations connected to direct germ line interferences, thus in an 
inheritance or biological way, rather than viewing intergenerational issues.  It is the 
silence within the documents relating intergenerational issues to somatic gene 
therapy that leads to this conclusion.  Without explicitly stating this is not the case, 
and with such an explicit divide between germ line and somatic regulation, one has 
to come to this conclusion.  However, the wider intergenerational aspects of somatic 
gene therapy are recognised. 
There is a duty to identify and assess promptly any adverse 
consequence of gene therapy for the patient, both in the aftermath of 
treatment and in the long term.  This duty does not end with the death 
of the patient.  To verify that therapy has not inadvertently affected 
offspring and successive generations monitoring should extend at 
least into the next generation.  Indeed, insofar as it is possible, 
monitoring should continue over several generations.  Therefore, 
those conducting such research have a duty not only to maintain 
adequate records but also to ensure that an effective monitoring 
system is in place.  It will require that a register be setup, and 
carefully maintained, with safeguards to protect confidentiality  
(Clothier 1993: [4.9]). 
 
In highlighting that the possible effect of somatic gene therapy is perceivably 
unknown; the Clothier Committee rightly acknowledges that intergenerational issues 
are relevant.  However, another inherent contradiction within the perceived practice 
of FGT emerges.  If the carte blanche ban on germ line practices is because of the 
themes of unknown risk and ethical issues, then, as the Clothier Committee 
highlights, potentially somatic gene therapy engages the same issues.  In terms of 
somatic FGT it should be just as important because of the stage of development.  
Within the Clothier report the theme of confidentiality emerges and is linked to 
issues relating to the right to know, thus engaging the patients and their human rights 
such as the ECHR Article 8.  However, it is evident that long term studies should be 
done, possibly over many generations, if evidence of germ line transmission occurs.  
If that is to be done then confidentiality, the right not to know and informed consent 
cannot be fully attained.  The choice must therefore be between safety/human dignity 
and these concepts.  If safety is a paramount consideration then enforcement of 
follow-up on patients and future children must occur to fulfil this criterion regardless 
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of other criteria.  Clearly, it is the current generation that is more important when 
practicing human dignity. 
7.6.1 Consequence of rights crystallising after birth for practice 
It is evident that interests within pregnancy can  accrue into rights upon birth 
(Jackson 2009).  The sample indicates that the ‘life’ of a fetus is intimately 
connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant 
woman.
221
  Therefore, it could be submitted that any genetic intervention is an 
intervention on both mother and fetus.  That does not mean a fetus has a right to that 
intervention, but it does presuppose that the intervention creates an interest which the 
fetus is party to, just as children have an interest in familial genetic information 
(Clothier 1993).  Therefore, it could be submitted that regardless of whether the 
intervention is deemed to be legally solely on the mother, that the fetus maintains an 
interest, as a child would, in this information which crystallises upon birth.
222
  
Therefore, the issues no longer concerns confidentiality between fetal therapist and 
mother, but it includes whether it would be in the best interest or welfare of the 
child
223
 to know the information about their genetic constitution against parental 
wishes, given that there would be a disparity between their somatic and germ line 
genetic constitution.  
 
Such a dilemma highlights the difference between knowing about your genetic 
heritage and it being medically recorded.  The difference between the two has lead to 
the introduction of ghost records as patients within the USA wish to avoid such 
issues for themselves by choosing not to have genetic information placed upon their 
medical records (Klitzman 2010).  Therefore, further issues surround FGT such as do 
insurers have a case for requesting genetic information for prenatal therapy if the 
child does not know about that genetic information (Ashscroft 2007)?  Who is in 
control and legally entitled to prenatal gene therapy information?  What effect would 
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this have on antenatal care? 
224
  Does privacy need to be rethought and reconstructed 
relevant to generations for all genomic information (Chadwick 2010)?  For all the 
positives in mitigating the differences between biological and social 
intergenerational issues, it does not offer a conclusive account of intergenerational 
issues.  It may be a question of remit, which is an important concept for the 
institutional documents, but the guidance and code of practices do not appear to fully 
address the issue.   
 
Given the silence within the sample about liability other than a reference to ‘good 
clinical practice’, if the unknown ‘unknown’ occurs claimants would have to seek 
restitution by claiming under the Consumer Protection Act 1987.  However, a 
successful action under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 might be made difficult 
by the controversial ‘development risks defence.’225  Under that defence producers 
will not be liable if they show that, at the relevant time, the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge was not such that they could be expected to discover the defect 
(Corrigan, Liddell et al. 2006).
226
  However, it is unclear how to compensate parents 
where the child in question would die within a short period of time, or would have 
debilitating condition regardless of the genetic intervention.  Without insurance 
payouts or preordained out of court settlements via contract, financially supporting a 
case would be astronomic.  The Epilim case classically illustrates several key ethical 
considerations, which are intertwined with political decisions which ultimately 
decide if justice is done, but is most notably on the side of Goliath (Hirsch 2011).  
Given the unique nature of FGT such an omission for redress to cover the unknown 
‘unknowns’ through insurance is potentially contrary to human dignity.   
 
It is also clear that the regulations paint an ideal model which has not taken into 
consideration, for example, the financial implications on issues such as long term 
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follow-up.  It is clear that the documents analysed in this chapter are not giving a 
true reflection of practice, and therefore the barriers to the progress of FGT must be 
explored within the interview data.  Issues regarding the usefulness of human dignity 
within practice, and implications for future generations must be more fully explored 
within the interview data. 
7.7 Conclusion  
In conclusion, with the rapid evolution of biomedical techniques new threats to 
human dignity may arise, which regulators are under a duty to prevent through clear 
and precise regulation.
227
  The guiding principle for FGT practitioners is human 
dignity, which initially appears vague and lacking in substance.  However, through 
the examination of the documents human dignity has been fleshed out into principles 
that are commonly seen from the basis that the individual is paramount.  From the 
concept of human dignity the emphasis is placed on the individual as being 
paramount within research.  Autonomy is the key concept.  From autonomy, the 
individual is empowered to make their own decisions on their own terms.  Individual 
rights make the rights of others, such as the right of the father or fetus, mere 
considerations with no overriding authority.  However, for the next and future 
generations there is a stark difference between rights and interests.  It is the 
difference between rights and interest that appears to give future generations a voice.  
The next generations’ interests are taken into account, but their interests appear to be 
overruled by the individual within the clinic.  Interests manifest themselves into 
rights only after birth.  The interest of future generations also appears within the 
regulation of scientific progress.  However, those interests are not always a 
straightforward balancing exercise.  Protection of future generation interests are 
afforded through risk and assessment procedures that have to be strictly adhered to in 
any research carried out in FGT.  However it has been shown that the notion of 
human dignity that underpins the research protocols ultimately restricts the areas of 
permissible research.  Fear of outcomes, for example germ-line transmissions, and 
inherent uncertain consequences for future generations emerge as hindrances to 
scientific progress, seen in the current prohibition on germ-line research and 
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intervention.  The same fear acts as a procedural restriction upon the research 
autonomy of FGT practitioners.  It appears that the intergenerational aspects of FGT 
are framed around germ line interventions, ergo permanent interventions to the 
human heritage rather than looking at intergenerational issues that encompass more 
than just germ line interventions.  As stated above, it may be a question of remit 
rather than a failure to be explicit within the sample, but it is clear that the issue of 
confidentiality and of the right to know after birth is not adequately represented 
within the immediate regulation of FGT. 
 
However, there are inherent contradictions within the sample documents.  For 
example, the institutional principle of the individual being paramount is not based on 
the individual’s own thought or choice.  The individual is only paramount within a 
framework of what the institutions allow and consider ethical, safe or appropriate for 
society at large.  The current generations’ rights prevail over the interests of the next 
generation but for FGT practitioners the interests of future generations override their 
work in the name of dignity.  Yet the same interest is not enough to override the 
autonomy of the individual once a choice is made available.  Therefore, a 
paternalistic bubble in which choice can be made is in operation.  There are still 
further issues relating to the remit of the sample, and the deference about questions 
concerning viability of fetus’ and treatments which are purely of fetal benefit.  In 
addition how such technologies are accessed has to be taken into account since they 
may simply resolve individual problems whilst leaving social problems intact 
(Rothman 1985).  However, the analysis presented in this chapter may not have 
given a true representation of the guiding principles within FGT or the potential 
impact of scientific progress upon future interests and FGT practitioners.  There 
could be other more important issues that the documentary data cannot reveal.  
Chapters 8 and 9 set out to explore further the impacts of scientific progress through 
the interview data. 
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8 Interview Data: Human Dignity in Practice 
8.1 Introduction 
Having conducted the literature review and documentary analysis the next step was 
to conduct interviews with those who would be at the forefront of FGT within the 
UK.  The prospective interviewees were identified through purposive sampling and 
led to a total of 13 interviews being conducted between November 2010 and May 
2011.  These interviews supplement as well as challenge the conclusions found 
within chapters 6 and 7, such as: human dignity is not a useful concept within the 
clinic; autonomy is paramount; and, intergenerational interests are taken into account 
within the research process.  In order to do this, the interviews were conducted in a 
semi structured way following the outline in Appendix B - Interview Question 
Schedule.  Therefore, the interview data acts as the glue which binds the thesis 
together, and ultimately helps answer the research questions, because FGT is now 
progressing into the clinic. Therefore any concerns regarding regulation as well as 
missing issues not highlighted within the documentary analysis can be revealed.  The 
revelations from the interview data presented within chapter 8 and 9 include: human 
dignity is not explicitly used by FGT practitioners; maternal rights trump 
intergenerational ones only within the clinic; there is a potential conflict between 
FGT, abortion and ethics; and, collaboration as well as being a convincing argument 
in itself can mediate the uncertainty of scientific progress. 
 
As mentioned within the methodology chapter, the interview chapters will mirror the 
documentary chapters in order to make comparison easier.  This chapter will focus 
upon the theme of human dignity and therefore correlates with chapter 6.  Section 
8.2 starts by identifying that human dignity is not a concept readily used by FGT 
practitioners, and the logical conclusion from the deconstruction of the concept leads 
to the idea that certain practices are not contrary to human dignity (see section 8.2.1). 
It will then show that human dignity is implicitly upheld by FGT practitioners by 
autonomy and informed consent.  As with the documentary data, some themes were 
identified initially, such as human dignity and autonomy, and eventually other 
concepts, such as ‘do no harm’, were identified as being connected to human dignity. 
The analysis in section 8.3 then followed the concept of autonomy within the clinic 
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and shows how autonomy leads to the mother being paramount.  However, the effect 
on the next generation was still a pertinent theme connected to autonomy within the 
clinic and subsequently examined.  Ultimately, in the view of FGT practitioners, the 
autonomy of the mother trumps all others, including the fetus.  Therefore, despite ‘a 
step further’ being identified in section 8.3.3 which potentially could see fetal 
interest within the clinic mediating maternal autonomy, this was a minority view 
which defaulted back to maternal autonomy in section 8.4.  The chapter will then 
conclude in section 8.5.  Each section will be contrasted with the documentary 
analysis and will also indicate the effect upon the maternal fetal divide.  The chapter 
will then conclude whether or not human dignity is relevant within FGT. 
 
Because of the subsequent deconstruction of human dignity it was evident to the 
interviewees that germ line therapy should be currently banned but not because of 
human dignity.  Rather it should be banned because of safety concerns and the lack 
of scientific knowledge upon gene therapy in general.  Although prohibition of germ 
line technologies was discussed within the research procedure of the documentary 
analysis; within the interview data it appeared in the general discussion about human 
dignity.  Therefore, the prohibition will be explained in relation to the context in 
which it arose. 
8.2 Human dignity: what do you mean? 
In the view of FGT practitioners it was evident that raising the idea of human dignity 
as a central concept leads to definitional issues and was not a concept readily used by 
FGT practitioners.   
 RC [O]ne of the things that comes in the literature is this concept 
of human dignity, which being situated in the UK is not necessarily 
something you’ve come across.  It has been argued that there is role 
for human dignity within the work that you do from an international 
documents especially given the international nature of what you do.  
Is it something that you’ve ever considered? 
 IE11 What do you mean by human dignity? 
 
Another interviewee responded: 
 The phrase human dignity is not one I’ve encountered or come across 
before to be honest.  IE12 
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The above extracts demonstrate how the term ‘human dignity’ is not readily used.  
The frequent response to the concept of human dignity was one of seeking 
clarification about it [IE1-3,5,7-9,11-13].  Seeking clarification was more prevalent 
within the basic scientists than the clinicians.  A minority appeared to formulate 
human dignity in an abstract way, which went beyond autonomy [IE1, 4, 6, 10] (see 
8.3.3).  In general, these were the interviewees with 20 years of experience within 
genetics.  However, the explicit notion of human dignity is not one that is prevalent 
within the practice of FGT practitioners.  Where the response was not initially one 
that asked for clarification about human dignity, the result was still one dismissing 
the explicit utilisation of human dignity: 
[Do I use human dignity?] Not explicitly.  I think parents and medical 
professions would consider it under their list of essential ingredients 
for a healthy life.  So, parents trying to decide if to have a termination 
or not; or me trying to decide if it would be appropriate to do a 
termination at 32 weeks would undoubtedly take human dignity into 
the equation.  So yes it would be a concept that you would be familiar 
with in trying to quantify or decamp what it decreases from a 
dignified existence.  But I don’t think I’ve heard it discussed more 
explicitly than that.  IE6 
 
Therefore, human dignity may not be an explicit concept utilised within the 
laboratory or clinic, where they are guided by other principles.  There was a 
recognition of the term ‘dignity’ as one might associate it with dignity in dying 
[IE10] rather than human dignity in the immediate Kantian sense (See Tadd 2006).  
Only a minority of the interviewees recognised that they used human dignity 
explicitly within their work [IE1,4,9].  Given their own unique professional, 
academic and cultural upbringing it could be expected that they would fall outside 
what one might expect from medical practitioners within England and Wales.  
However, due to confidentiality these unique features cannot be revealed, since it 
would lead to the interviewees being identified.  What is intriguing is that their 
unique circumstances (which differ between the three interviewees) would lead to 
the idea that human dignity would be a concept that they are aware of and fully use.  
Therefore, human dignity within the practice of FGT was introduced through the 
ideas that the document analysis revealed.   
I think that the principle of human dignity in medical therapy 
encompasses an obligation to respect the individual’s autonomy and a 
duty to ensure safety and predictability of the intervention.  The issue 
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is that there is often a conflict between the interests of the parents and 
those of the fetus.  IE9 
 
The interviewees all recognised concepts that have been attributed to human dignity 
such as autonomy, informed consent and respect for decisions (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001).  In identifying the implicit nature of human dignity, professional 
standards shape practice and, as seen within the documentary analysis, implicitly 
carry human dignity into practice: 
In medicine, you are always guided by the principle ‘do no harm’; 
and that is particularly important in pregnancy where you have a 
mother and fetus and interventions that affect the mother can affect 
the fetus, and we are very often guided by we know that treating the 
mother that it would do harm to the fetus, but the overriding principle 
is that the mother take priority, especially in the UK.  I think it 
becomes more of a problem in other countries where there isn’t such a 
cut and dry basis to stand on.  So yeah I think human dignity does 
shape what we do as do no harm basically means that, preserving the 
human state or trying to improve it by not making it worse.  But I’ve 
not really come across it.  IE2 
 
The very essence of treating illness is human dignity in action.  Yet, the documents 
and ethical sources that were identified by the interviewees were not documents that 
explicitly use the term human dignity.  The Hippocratic Oath was referred through 
the principle of ‘do no harm’ by the clinically trained interviewees [IE2,4-6,8,10], 
which does not contain explicitly human dignity, but focuses upon the patient (See 
Mason, McCall Smith et al. 2006).  Therefore, unlike the document analysis which 
explicitly states human dignity as the principle that is utilised, it is the resulting 
concepts such as autonomy and ‘do no harm’, which guide the practice of FGT 
practitioners.  It is clear that these concepts implicitly put human dignity into action.  
However, concepts such as ‘do no harm’ are not reliant upon human dignity being 
explicitly mentioned or referred to, in order to be actionable.  The interviewees’ 
references to governing body protocols such as the professional codes of practice 
(for example GTAC), which do not explicitly mention human dignity, appears to 
have more prevalence within the ethical tools of FGT practitioners.  Therefore, 
within the practice of FGT the explicit term human dignity appears a useless concept 
that does not add anything to the debate or the practice of FGT and can add 
inconsistency (Gewirth 1983, Macklin 2003, Melo-Martin 2011, Salvi 2001).    This 
inconsistency of its application is elaborated upon by the interviewees’ view upon 
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the prohibition of germ line technologies, which should be prohibited but not for the 
reason stated by the documents. 
8.2.1 Germ line alterations are not inherently contrary to human 
dignity 
It followed that because human dignity is a vague concept, where it had been cited as 
a reason why certain scientific practices are banned, the interviewees questioned 
whether germ line technologies infringed human dignity: 
I’m not against germ line gene therapy provided it’s safe and it’s in 
the interest of human dignity and not to do with weird things, which 
is more science fiction and popular press speculation, but that’s why 
we have GTAC and other bodies.  But in principle the reason not to 
do germ line therapy is that we know so little about these things that 
it’s not acceptable.  And the other hand there are only very few exotic 
cases where it would be beneficial.  Most things that you can do that 
you would like to apply it for you can do it other ways, like abortion 
and embryo selection things like that, so it’s not really necessary.  It 
may get to a time where altering the genome of people would be of 
general benefit like if you could reduce the occurrence of cancer, we 
don’t know.  I wouldn’t close the door on research in that area but I 
don’t think it’s anything that we should aim for by clinical 
application.  IE1  
 
Therefore, human dignity per se is not the direct reason why one should not pursue 
germ line alterations for the benefit of future generations (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001).  It is the current state of scientific knowledge and safety 
concerns that is the reason why germ line alterations should not currently be carried 
out.  This appeared to be the prevailing opinion with the exemption of one 
interviewee who appeared to advocate a carte blanche ban on germ line technologies, 
because ‘it still maybe unethical even if safe’ [IE7].  However, the interviewees all 
agreed with the current ban on germ line technologies.  Despite this the question still 
remains about germ line interventions because gene therapy is progressing at a 
remarkable pace: 
[T]he thing is, the question is now gene therapy is looking at gene 
editing, and there is a paper out in the American Society of 
Haematology, which came out a couple of months ago where they 
have shown efficient gene editing for haemophilia in a mouse model, 
which means you’re not putting a gene in, but you’re correcting a 
mutation.  So the thing is, well, what would be bad about germ line 
mutation with that? Surely you’d want that?  Then you’re not getting 
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into the fetus and you’re correcting a severe genetic disorder and their 
kids would be cured.  Well you could argue that gene therapy is 
unethical because you’re curing people who would then go on to 
reproduce and have a greater chance of having kids together who are 
carrying the mutation.  Disease propagation for the next generation, 
so surely you’d want to stop that? So there’s a heck of a lot of stuff 
that you can discuss.  IE3 
 
Therefore, ultimately germ line therapies should not be ruled out in the future for a 
few specific conditions.  The example of gene editing highlights that technology is 
progressing at such a pace that current prohibitions are constantly being challenged.  
Despite the pace of scientific progress, the violation of human dignity appears to 
come from the purpose behind the intervention. 
I think it depends it comes down to issues of regulation.  I don’t think 
anyone would think that arranging some sort of DNA to prevent a 
child having cystic fibrosis or its offspring could be considered to be 
against human dignity.  Whereas I suppose if we need loads of tough 
people to Shot Putt in the Olympics, or something so we wanted to 
put in genes that made your muscles big because we as a nation 
decided that was important, then that would be tinkering with human 
dignity because our interest would be socially driven rather than in 
their interest of the individual.  IE2 
 
Therefore, where the documents express a carte blanche ban on germ line 
technologies the interview data suggests that using ‘human dignity’ as the reason for 
prohibition is misleading, unless the prohibition is connected to the safety concerns 
of current scientific knowledge.  Therefore, human dignity is being supported 
indirectly through the application of scientific safety.  However, the current scientific 
criterion for safety has uncertainty rooted within it.  Therefore, how much 
uncertainty someone is willing to accept will be a key area of debate if/when germ 
line technologies occur in the future.  Several interviewees highlighted that germ line 
alterations are currently occurring within medical practices such as radiotherapy 
[IE1-3,5,6,10-12] (Schneider and Coutelle 1999).  Several went further to postulate 
what if current somatic intervention inadvertently caused a germ line intervention 
that benefited the patient, would that then be a violation of human dignity 
[IE1,3,10]? 
 
As highlighted above, human dignity could, in theory, be abandoned within the 
regulation of germ line technologies if they were safe [1-6,9-13].  However, the 
183 
 
indirect violation of human dignity differs from the direct prohibition of germ line 
therapy within the documents, which is key if scientific progress and ethics are to be 
balanced.  The fundamental difference is that the interviewees reasoning behind a 
current prohibition is based upon the contingency of current scientific knowledge.  
Once the contingency of sufficient knowledge is surpassed then germ line therapies 
will not be contrary to human dignity in the minds of therapists.  Therefore, the 
prohibition forwarded by the interviewees is time and place dependant whereas the 
prohibition within the documents transcends time and place because of the intrinsic 
notion of human dignity.  Therefore, as science progresses, the ban formulated by the 
interviews must be constantly reviewed to ascertain if the ban is still justified.  It 
may become a question of efficacy of treatment between somatic or germ line 
treatment, and whether a condition mutates, to ascertain whether human dignity is 
maintained (Pattinson 2002).  The proviso of safety still applies, but that is markedly 
different from a definitive ban, which the documents advocate (Pattinson 2002).  
Yet, if the documentary analysis is correct in indicating that the germ line ban is a 
timeless ban, a debate surrounding the prohibition would not occur, because once a 
technology is considered contrary to human dignity, then it will always be so.  The 
difference between the two approaches is a reminder of the tension between therapy 
and those who practice science. 
8.2.2 Consequence for the maternal fetal divide 
Human dignity may appear as the overreaching principle of biolaw (Andorno 2009) 
and human rights,
228
 but it is certainly not explicitly the overreaching principle of 
FGT practitioners.  Implicitly, through other principles such as autonomy and safety 
it is up held but the term ‘human dignity’ does not substantially add to the practice of 
FGT practitioners.  It is the intrinsic worth of people that is implicitly recognized and 
respected by others; thus, requiring some forms of treatment by others are 
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inconsistent with, or required by, respect for this intrinsic worth (McCrudden 2008).  
Therefore, one has to question the use of the term within regulation at the 
international level (Kuhse 2000, Macklin 2003, Melo-Martin 2011).  If a principle 
merely collapses into other principles which are utilised by practitioners, then why 
even use the term ‘human dignity’ where it could be substituted for ‘medical ethics’ 
and reach the same conclusion?  The referral to ‘do no harm’ and the lack of 
consistent abstract definition by the FGT practitioners suggests that the concept of 
human dignity per se is not important and is certainly not explicitly the foundation 
for the work of FGT practitioner.  Therefore, the interview data indicates that, 
despite the documents professing that ‘human dignity’ is a fundamental principle 
within genetic technology, it explicitly is not for FGT practitioners.  Therefore, the 
deciding factors on the outcome of the maternal fetal divide rests with other 
principles such as autonomy and informed consent. 
 
The FGT practitioners also indicated that the prohibition upon germ line 
technologies is because of principles such as safety and scientific knowledge rather 
than human dignity per se.  It is this current clinical risk that would have to be 
overcome (Elias and Annas 1992).  The risk-benefit ratio may still be too high to 
warrant germ line interventions but it is the scientific consideration that appears 
prevalent (Anderson 1990, Elias and Annas 1992).  The moral distinction between 
the purposes behind germ line intervention is a permissible line to draw because 
inserting a gene to restore normal function is different to enhancing ‘normal’ 
functioning genes (Anderson 1989, Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, Buchanan, 
Brock et al. 2000).  However, the documentary analysis does not make the above 
distinctions.  It rests solely upon human dignity and appears to rest upon crossing a 
symbolic barrier that biotechnologies should not cross (Elias and Annas 1992). 
 
The interviews confirm the documentary analysis by indicating that human dignity 
needs unpacking from the data.  Therefore, it is the utilisation and implementation of 
other principles that are paramount for the working of practitioners and regulators 
within England and Wales.  Autonomy emerges as a key principle in the unpacking 
of human dignity.  Importantly, it is the mother’s autonomy that is considered the 
paramount concept within the clinic.  Therefore, the next section will expand on this 
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and it will be seen that it follows from autonomy that informed consent is important, 
and that other parties such as the father and other medical professionals should also 
be considered.   
8.3 Mother’s autonomy paramount 
Within the interview sample the mother’s autonomy within the period of pregnancy 
appears paramount, thus supporting the documentary analysis.   
It is the mother that has to undergo the surgery, so we would need to 
explain to her what we would be doing to her, but it’s for the benefit 
of the fetus.  […] I personally think it’s the patient’s choice, whether 
she is willing to undergo, whether she will give her consent or if she’s 
happy to undergo this procedure or not rather than the doctors in the 
clinic. IE7 
 
The introduction of FGT as another treatment option does not fundamentally alter 
the position of autonomy.  It is the patient’s choice whether to use the technology. 
I think it’s important that they’re not forced even if it does show that 
having this therapy is better than having no therapy at all.  You can’t 
force someone to take chemotherapy if they’re dying of cancer.  It’s 
completely their responsibility unless they’re mentally impaired and 
not able to make a decision.  But the same should apply for any kind 
of fetal therapy.  IE8 
 
Autonomy appears as the main principle to apply despite the direct beneficiary of 
treatment not being the mother.  Given that within England and Wales autonomy is 
the foundation for the patient’s right to choose, in both a legal and medical 
context,
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 it is unsurprising that autonomy emanates throughout the sample.  
Therefore, the default position is an individually focussed approach regardless of the 
interviewee’s position or experience.  The position of autonomy being paramount 
confirms the documentary analysis. 
In the end the mother, and in the broader sense the family, should 
have the say as you can’t ask the fetus.  IE1 
I think that you should take everything into consideration in a family 
environment and it should be a family decision except in the situation 
where there is disagreement and of course it’s the mother’s body that 
suffers, so she takes priority.  IE5 
 
Therefore, the wider social decision of the mother is not to be ignored, but ultimately 
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it is the mother’s decision, because she is the site of intervention and not just an 
innocent bystander.  To facilitate maternal autonomy, informed consent was highly 
relevant for both clinicians and basic scientists.  By utilising informed consent it 
provides the conditions necessary for autonomy.  However, the FGT practitioners 
highlighted several difficulties surrounding the assessment of what information may 
be important, how much information should be given to patients and issues relating 
to a patient’s retention, understanding and use of that information: 
I think one of the most difficult things to do is to make sure that what 
you’ve said gets through and it’s absolutely clear they’ve understood.  
I think that it’s a very very important thing, but also a very difficult 
thing because you have very different levels of basic knowledge and 
understanding.  Some people you give them a percentage they don’t 
know what you’re talking about.  So making sure that the message 
that you are conveying is received and can be reproduced in a 
discussion, that they tell you what and why a certain therapy is 
proposed is a very important part of the consent process.  IE1 
 
Therefore, the complexity of the information to be understood is important, but also 
how it is communicated: 
If the patient needs more information or would benefit from 
counselling from not just the obstetrician but the fetal medicine expert 
about what the risks are, the procedure, to talk to the geneticist about 
accuracy of the diagnosis, to talk to the paediatrician about the 
alternative outcomes, what are the chances of the child having a 
normal life if nothing is done?  What are the chances of the child 
surviving the intervention? […] That hasn’t even touched on 
explaining the uncertainties involved because there are lots of 
uncertainties from the point of intervention to what happens after the 
child is born.  […] So we have to explain to her in a frank and open 
way as possible what the uncertainties are, that she would have to be 
monitored as well despite she would not be getting the intervention 
per se, that this is going to go on for a long time […] and we’d have 
to stress the importance of a long term follow-up for her as well as the 
child.  So there are lots of issues to discuss.  IE13 
 
Therefore, being open, honest and frank about the information involved should help 
facilitate the informed consent process.  However, several interviewees 
[IE1,2,5,6,8,10] highlighted the importance of having sufficient time to consider 
what is being proposed because of the amount of information that needed to be 
digested.  The basic scientists implicitly identified time to consider the options in 
front of them, but the clinical interviewees were more explicit about the issue, 
drawing upon past clinical experience as examples. 
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It’s very easy to only take in half the information or a tenth of the 
information a clinician is telling you so it’s not something that is 
rushed into quickly.  I find, in my experience, that often in pregnancy 
that everything is meant to be normal.  People are often very shocked 
or horrified when something deviates.  And what you find is that lots 
of women that have had miscarriages, ectopic pregnancies, fetal 
abnormalities want to make a decision right there and then and I think 
in the clinical setting that wouldn’t be an appropriate thing.  So it 
wouldn’t be appropriate to discuss it initially.  It would be important 
to give more information and let people fully absorb everything 
before making a decision.  IE5 
 
Therefore, it is important for a mother not a have an impulsive reaction when 
receiving information, even if her decision has been preconceived through her past 
experience.  Interestingly, despite the mother’s decision being paramount, it was 
contextualised around other important parties and considerations.  Therefore, 
informed consent also included consultation with the father and broader family unit 
as well as other medical professionals.  Therefore, despite maternal autonomy being 
paramount, reference was made to ‘the parents’ and making the decision in the 
context of the immediate family.  It included considering the possible consequences 
upon those family members.   
Well you know if a couple came in and the mother came in and said 
she wanted therapy but the father said no.  I think you’d have to say 
them you’ve got to go and decide.  But that’s for whatever kind of 
therapy you do, I mean we hit that all the time with caesarean 
sections.  We have husbands saying that their wife isn’t going to have 
caesarean section and you have to put them out the room and say 
they’ve got nothing to do with it.  IE2 
 
In other words, the interviewees referred to differing parties which the mother should 
consult before making her decision, and the importance of their role in the decision 
making process.  These parties included the future father, clinical staff members such 
as genetic counsellors and the broader family.  Therefore, the mother’s decision is 
not an isolated medical decision but a social decision as well and part of an 
autonomous decision making unit (Rapp 2000).  In other words, a mother’s decision 
is where multiple interests of other parties intersect before a decision is reached.  
However, as demonstrated above, the interviewees stressed the importance of it 
being the mother’s choice even if it is contrary to the wishes of the ‘family unit’.  
Therefore, maternal rights to informed consent and the right to refuse were strong 
themes throughout the interview data when clinical choices were made. 
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8.3.1 Consequence for the maternal fetal divide 
Regardless of interviewee attributes, the interviewees confirmed the position 
identified within the document analysis that autonomy is realised through informed 
consent.  Given the huge amounts of guidance and focus upon consent within 
medicine (See General Medical Council 2009b) as a general rule informed consent is 
not a new or exciting find.  Nonetheless, there are already ethical issues surrounding 
informed consent for gene therapy (Kahn 2008), gene therapy for young children 
(Lowenstein 2008) and general prenatal decisions (Rapp 2000).  In fact, the adverse 
reactions that have occurred within gene therapy have called into question the 
informed consent process (Caplan 2007, Kahn 2008).  Questions were raised by 
several interviewees, in particular relating to the uncertainty of knowing what a 
mother would want to know in the informed consent process [IE1-4,6,10-12].  As 
stated above open, honest and frank conversations with the patients about the options 
and the consequences of their action or inaction were important factors in ensuring 
that the informed consent process is adhered to fully.  In doing so, FGT practitioners 
are ensuring that the safety of patients is protected, while also enabling research to 
develop better treatments for patients (Deakin, Alexander et al. 2009).   
 
Time is an important concept for the fulfilment of informed consent, thus human 
dignity.  For some patients that amount of time maybe more than adequate in 
deciding between nature, intervention or termination; but, for others it may not be so 
as they could be suffering from post traumatic stress (European Critical Care 
Foundation 2010).  Some may find themselves with insufficient time to decide due 
to difficulties in arranging meetings with genetic counsellors or because of the 
enormity of the decision at hand.  They will have to weigh up the decrease in 
likelihood of successful treatment by a delay in their decision making, but still come 
to their right decision.  Therefore, as alluded to within the documentary analysis, 
hindsight bias becomes even more a issue (Brooks and Sullivan 2002).  However, a 
mother must be allowed the time to come to the decision that she feels is right. 
 
Therefore, on initial inspection the general rule is that autonomy is paramount.  The 
FGT practitioners are focused upon individual choice within the clinic.  Yet, the 
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admission that other parties should be consulted allows a mother to consider the 
implications of the genetic intervention and recognises that medical decisions have 
wider implications.  However, outside of the mother and the clinician these ‘other 
parties’, which include the fetus, father, and society at large are ultimately only 
considerations.  Therefore, despite fathers being increasingly included within 
pregnancy, the medical technology of FGT is further transforming choice at an 
individual level for the mother (Rapp 2000).
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However, what differentiates these interviewees from the rest of the medical 
profession is that they work specifically with the fetus.  Therefore, the fetus as a 
patient may implicitly emerge within data.  If it does emerge then it may have 
implications about the explicit stance initially forwarded by the interviewees.  Within 
the next section the next generation is recognised through identifying that the fetus 
has some form of status.  Therefore, ethical questions are raised not only about what 
is ethical but about the status of the fetus.   
8.3.2 Next generation interests 
Despite the autonomy of the mother being paramount, the fetus appeared as an 
important party within FGT.  It emerged that the fetus is important because of the 
debate it sparks and whether it should be treated as a patient. 
[…] because we do a lot of stuff that is, I wouldn’t say ethically 
challenging as that would make it sound too dramatic, but because it 
involves the fetus, is the fetus its own person? Is it separate to the 
mum? Who is more important in terms of anything you treat a fetus 
with the mother is going to get affected. Does that mother then have 
the right to choose not to have that therapy even though she knows 
that her unborn baby is sick?  IE11 
 
The above quote symbolises the tensions within FGT because the fetus is sole 
beneficiary of treatment.  The recognition of site of intervention or benefit means 
that the fetus cannot be ignored.  But does being a beneficiary make you a patient? If 
so what are the consequences of having patient status? 
The first thing is about rights of the fetus I suppose and whether you 
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consider the fetus a patient or not.  It’s something that is central to 
fetal medicine and hence why it’s a fairly new concept is that up until 
recent decades the fetus was not considered a major priority.  And of 
course there is the legal side of things that the fetus does not have any 
legal rights until it’s born as you know.  And so I think it’s variable 
how much autonomy or moral status people bestow upon the fetus 
and it’s very patient dependant.  Doctors also have varying feelings 
about it; I suppose it’s gestation dependant.  And so the very concept 
of performing a procedure on a fetus that can’t consent is slightly 
controversial.  But, I suppose with the principle of medical ethics of 
preventing harm and do the best for your patient and as an 
obstetrician you are considering both, you want the best outcome for 
the fetus specifically but taking into account the mother’s wishes.  
And so you would in most circumstances you would try and act in the 
fetuses interests as potentially it’s a born child and that born child will 
have rights at that stage.  IE5 
 
It emerges within the data that the fetus has to be a consideration even if “the fetus as 
a patient does not exist […] [because a fetus] is more than a series of organs” [IE10].  
It has to be of consideration because the modus operandi is to treat the next 
generation, which is the fetus.  The recognition that the fetus is more than a series of 
organs means it is in the thoughts of FGT practitioners. The question emerged: How 
much weight should be given to the fetus purely as an individual? 
I would like to think about the fetus as a patient, as a being that needs 
protection.  What applies to an infant should theoretically apply to the 
fetus.  But, reproduction is an inefficient process and reproductive 
loss is a way to ensure that only those fetuses that are fit enough will 
be born and survive.  Are we intervening where we should not? This 
is a possibility.  IE9 
 
Therefore, by giving the fetus a status that overrides biology and the mother’s 
autonomy, FGT could raise further questions about what should be done to the 
‘patient.’  The focus upon not just fetal benefit, but the corresponding effect upon the 
future child makes the next generation the patient that needs consideration.  
However, due to the movement of FGT to indirect FGT,
231
 understanding who is the 
patient is a blurred concept 
 We injecting […] into the mother […], which in turn increase the 
supply of substrates and oxygen to the fetus.  So the gene therapy is 
not a fetal issue but a maternal issue.  […] The patient is the mother 
but the beneficiary is the fetus.IE7 
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Because of the blurred patient status further questions are raised regarding whether 
the fetus can be prioritised over the mother by the mother’s autonomous decision. 
[I]f gene therapy improves XXXX people are still concerned that for 
the sake of the fetus are you going to inject a large dose of viruses 
into the mother can you prioritise the benefit of the fetus over the 
mother? What if the vector does some benefit for the fetus but in turn 
harms the mother.  Can you actually do that? IE7 
 
Therefore, fetal interests appear within the work within the duties of the FGT 
practitioners.  They actively think about the fetus and understand that their work is 
about benefiting the fetus.  The area is connected to the research procedure and will 
be elaborated upon within chapter 9.  Yet, forwarding fetal beneficial treatment in 
the clinic highlights the fetus as an independent being that needs help.  Its 
independence is not drawn from its status within pregnancy but from its status as a 
future child. 
 
The interviewees that raised the ‘fetus as a patient’ concept knew that it depended on 
the viability of the fetus and the acknowledgement of the mother to continue a viable 
fetus to term, thus implicitly forming the same criteria as Chervenak et al (2007).  
The concept appears more pertinent within the clinically educated interviewees.  The 
basic science interviewees had more autonomy focused answers, but there were still 
elements of the fetal benefit within their accounts.  All the clinically based 
interviewees had a version of the fetus as a patient within their account, which 
confirmed fetal patient status within the UK is dependent upon maternal autonomy.  
Interestingly, the more experienced the FGT practitioner the more intrinsic and in 
depth the exploration of the concept was.  The result of a more in depth analysis was 
to pose more hypothetical questions.  As one interviewee put it “[some] have more 
time to ponder in depth than those still currently working in the field” [IE9].  The 
fellow clinical interviewees were just as insightful about the ethical dilemma that 
such a concept could produce.  Given the dilemmas that could evolve from fetal 
therapy there was an avoidance of prioritising the fetus over the mother.  That 
included the prioritisation of those acting on behalf of the fetus.  In doing so, the 
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majority confirmed the case law concerning fetal medicine.
232
  Therefore, the 
emphasis is firmly upon the mother and her rights within the clinic.  However, 
preclinical decisions directly affect the choices that can occur as well as choice in 
general (see chapter 6).  The question that flows from indentifying the fetus as a 
being that needs help is whether that can override the autonomy framework that is 
engrained within the practice of medicine? 
8.3.3 A step further? 
The majority of the interviewees closely followed the autonomy framework currently 
in action with England and Wales.  However, there was recognition of a possible 
step further for the practice of FGT.  The recognition took two forms.  For the 
majority there was recognition of deviating from the current autonomy framework 
because of the site of intervention, but it was no more than that.  The problems 
caused by such action in the USA caused the majority to reaffirm the autonomous 
decision making of the mother [IE1,3-6,10,11,13].
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  Then there was the recognition 
by two interviewees [IE4,9] that because of the site of intervention one should ask 
further questions about the status of the fetus, which should lead one to the 
conclusion that it may be permissible to act against the interest of the mother in 
favour of the fetus: 
I think human dignity is caused by human beings ability to have 
abstract thought.  [...].  I think there is a human soul and that gives 
human dignity.  Now monkeys have 99.9999% DNA the same as us.  
I think the DNA is irrelevant; it comes from activity and the ability to 
take two ideas put them together, come out with a third, which is 
unlike the previous two, like music and poetry.  The second concept 
is, is that applicable to all human beings?  So a child with Down’s 
syndrome is that a human being?  The vegetative human after a car 
crash, is that a human being? Going back to Aristotle I don’t know, 
but it’s more important not to deny human dignity to those who 
should have it than to give it to those who might not be human.  
                                                 
232
 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.3(1)(a)-(d). Section 3(1)(a)-(c) codified the test of capacity that is used 
within the common law and was established within Re C [1994] 1WLR 290. These provisions do not 
apply to those under the age of 16 under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.2(5). 
233
 Although not specifically mentioned by name cases such as Whitner v South Carolina 492 S.E. 2d 
777 (S.C. 1997) where a pregnant woman who was prosecuted for placing her in utero child in danger 
due to the use of illegal drugs during pregnancy; and Utah v. Rowland, No. 041901649 (Utah Dist. 
Ct.-3d Apr. 7, 2004) where Melissa Rowand was charged by the State of Utah with murder of a still 
born fetus due to refusing a caesarean section which lead to the death of one of her twins. The charge 
was later dropped to child endangerment (Habiba 2005). 
193 
 
Therefore, I treat the unconscious patient as a human and therefore 
I’m saying is the fetus by the same principle a human?  If we have 
any doubt that we should give human dignity to the fetus.  IE4 
  
Another interviewee asks: 
If the fetus were to decide as an autonomous individual, would she or 
he decide to live or not? I think this depends on the outcome.  An 
individual with a partially treated genetic disease may lead an 
agonizing life whereas a non-treated individual would have 
succumbed early in life.  On the other hand, genetic treatment, which 
leads to a significant improvement in quality of life would be 
desirable.  The option of in utero testing for therapeutic success 
should be available in my opinion when prenatal therapy for genetic 
diseases is offered. IE9 
 
Therefore, both advocate decisions in favour of the fetus, with the latter utilising an 
indirect fetal benefit option.  Despite using different methods the outcome was about 
trying to identify what the fetus would want or that ‘we should listen to the child 
whispering what it wants’ [IE4].  It was recognised by both the clinical and the basic 
scientist that even if the fetus could choose no one has a way of knowing what it 
would choose [IE1-6,9-13].  Therefore, the best person to decide would be the 
mother.  A more fruitful development was along the developmental lines, which 
could support the above two interviewees’ views, although the interviewee did not 
advocate the fetus taking priority over the mother. 
If I’m presenting a case to a colleague I present a picture of the family 
unit because at the end of the day, and it maybe because of my fetal 
medicine interest but I think about the fetus, and the continuity into 
paediatrics and the father is critical to that, so it’s a prenatal approach. 
IE5 
 
Interestingly one interviewee did not directly endorse either of these views but 
implicitly made their actions dependant on the developmental location of the fetus, 
thus indicating an intermediary position.  However, several interviewees strongly 
indicated that location did not change their stance [IE2,6,10].  Ultimately, the 
precautionary principle indicates that the fetus should be treated at certain points 
overriding the mother’s autonomy, if needed.  Despite the two individuals not 
utilising the same language, they both did not push the issue further.  Such a stance 
clearly contradicts the normal autonomy approach to FGT that appears strongly 
within the sample.  Several reasons could explain why the two individuals have a 
tangential view about fetal rights.  These include personal attributes such as religion, 
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cultural up bringing or one’s perception of when ‘life begins; but the most pertinent 
would be the unique careers of each of the individuals, which would suggest the 
possibility of having stances contrary to norm.  Due to confidentiality these issues 
cannot be explored further.  Implicitly, it questions whether an individually 
orientated ethical framework sufficiently considers and grants weight to the ethical 
demands of the group.  The group in this circumstance is humanity in general, which 
a fetus biologically is a part of.  Framing choices concerning the fetus within the 
group of humanity means that the interests of the fetus and society cannot be ignored 
(Widdows 2011).  Therefore, fetal interests could be served by human dignity even if 
the fetus as a patient concept can only influence FGT practitioner at the research 
conception phase.  
8.4 The effect on the maternal fetal divide: maternal autonomy is 
still paramount 
Despite the mother’s autonomy appearing as the paramount consideration in FGT, it 
is evident within the data that all FGT practitioners, independent of experience, 
recognised that because the fetus is the prime beneficiary of treatment, they are 
challenging the maternal body through pregnancy and the way that fetal growth is 
seen within medicine (Casper 1998).  The emergence of developmental-biological 
orientated technologies change the focus from women to the uterine system and the 
fetus (Samerski 2009).  The challenge was not mitigated where the FGT was not 
directed at the fetus because it was still the prime beneficiary.  In challenging bodily 
integrity, further issues arise, such as fetal rights, fetal duties and the fetus as a 
patient. 
 
Several key points arise out of the possibility of fetal rights or the fetus being a 
patient within the work of FGT practitioners.  Firstly, the technological revolution 
that has occurred over the last three or four decades within obstetrics has pushed the 
fetus to the forefront of clinicians minds (Casper and Morrison 2010).  Therefore, 
one cannot ignore the fetus within FGT because it is the site of intervention and the 
intended beneficiary.  Even if the social context of these decisions does not lead to a 
position whereby the risks and burdens that are synonymous with pregnancy 
correlate to pregnant women having a duty towards the fetus (Scott 2002), the fetus 
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is protected by the actions of FGT practitioners before maternal decisions are 
needed.  Consideration of the possible postnatal effect on the fetus indicates 
beneficence based obligations towards the fetus (Chervenak and McCullough 2009).  
By focusing upon obligations, which are necessary within the research protocol of 
FGT, it is in the postnatal implications of treatment that the fetus as a patient initially 
appears to situate itself.  Striking a balance between maternal risk and fetal benefit is 
the implementation of fetal interests within research. 
 
Therefore, despite the site of intervention importing issues surrounding the best 
interest of the next generation the mother’s autonomy to decide is still paramount.  
By placing autonomy as the paramount consideration within the clinic the interview 
data confirms the documentary analysis.  Fetal benefit is still contingent on maternal 
health, safety and choice.  Consequently, issues about the maternal fetal conflict are 
currently irrelevant in terms of the final decision made, despite FGT further 
contributing to ethical constructions of the fetus (Casper 1998).  Maternal fetal 
conflict is therefore about maternal physician conflict or maternal third party 
conflict, because it is these third parties who represent the voice of the fetus.  In 
order to mitigate the mothers autonomy it has been proposed that preventive ethics 
should be employed, which can include four clinical guides:  
1. Informed consent as an ongoing dialogue between the pregnant 
woman and her physician,  
2. Negotiation as a clinical strategy,  
3. Respectful persuasion as a clinical strategy, and  
4. The proper use of ethics committees (Chervenak and McCullough 
1990, 2010).   
 
With the exemption of the two unique interviewees, there was consistently a strong 
prioritisation of the mother’s autonomy over the fetus, which confirms the document 
analysis.  Despite the glimpse of hope for those who advocate fetal rights, these are 
overridden by the ability of women to control their own choices within pregnancy.  
However, the ‘fetus as a patient’ is not a completely useless concept as the fetus is 
taken into consideration when FGT practitioners are considering risks and what 
treatments to pursue in the research conception phase.  Therefore, certain obligations 
must be fulfilled to protect the fetus from unnecessary harm, thus bestowing a form 
of dignity upon the fetus (See Savulescu 2007) and creating a paternalistic bubble 
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within which pregnant women can exercise their choice (see 6.4.3).  Nonetheless, the 
fetus as a patient concept relies upon the mother confirming that position upon the 
fetus; therefore, ultimately she can remove that status.  The fetus is not the 
controlling subject within pregnancy, contrary to idea that medical technology has 
shifted the fetus from the controlled to the controlling subject (Squier 1996).  The 
mother is not the antagonist but the controller of the maternal fetal divide. 
 
Safety considerations included the mother, who takes precedence over the fetus as a 
patient concept.  Therefore, a 100% efficacious fetal treatment would be disregarded 
if the safety of the mother was too heavily compromised.  That predicament raises 
issues surrounding autonomous decision making and, once again, highlights that 
autonomous decision making is made within a paternalistic framework; thus, 
confirming the document analysis.  Importantly, the fetus as a patient concept within 
the clinic confirms the prioritisation of the mother.  Therefore, despite the fetus 
being framed as distinct, separable and separate from the pregnant woman’s body in 
which it resides (Casper 1998, Squier 1996), which can be the sole beneficiary of 
treatment, clinical application is clearly based upon its dependant moral status 
(Harris 2000).  There was an awareness of the complications that patients with 
capacity could cause in the future in both a legal and moral sense because of the 
implications of the full autonomous decisions of mothers where other options were 
available. 
 RC  That’s a good place to stop there.  I was going to ask about if 
they didn’t have capacity to consent but that’s a question for a 
different day 
 IE13 It’s a good question though because the fetus does not have 
the capacity to consent or define themselves.  We’ve had cases of kids 
growing up and trying to sue their parents for not terminating them 
and allowing them to grow up with these conditions.  It’s something 
that we’ll have to address at some point. 
 
Given the complexity of issues surrounding treatment without consent and what 
constitutes the ‘best interest’,234 the treatment of incapacitated patients was not 
explored.  Such questions are important because the result of these issues potentially 
could imperil the production of future generations (Habermas 2003).  Nonetheless, 
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the Court of Protection may be asked to intervene in the future, which could have far 
reaching and profound implications for the treatment of incapacitated patients, as 
well as the way in which FGT is viewed. 
8.5 Conclusion 
By representing the interview data in a similar manner to the documentary data, the 
analysis of the interviews can be seen to move from identifying human dignity 
within the data to exploring if fetal interests can impose restrictions upon FGT.  In 
doing so, the FGT practitioners confirmed the view that human dignity is not a 
concept used by FGT practitioners, with concepts such as ‘do no harm’ being more 
important.  Human dignity is a concept that appears better suited to academic 
scrutiny of practice rather than an abstract concept which is explicitly used.  For 
example, the data also confirmed that autonomy of the mother is a key principle that 
guides treatment with informed consent, and time being important in facilitating 
autonomy.  Therefore, autonomy implicitly ensures human dignity is being served 
through principles such as informed consent.  Therefore, the interview data appears 
to confirm that human dignity does not add to the debate and is not used explicitly as 
the document analysis implies.  However, the implicit assertion of human dignity is 
through analysis rather than FGT practitioners’ explicitly utilising human dignity.   
 
Having identified this implicit assertion then it follows that individual choice is the 
key.  However, in identifying the individual, in the view of the FGT practitioners the 
fetus is not an individual that can choose, because there is no way of knowing what it 
would choose.  Therefore, the interview data confirms the documentary data through 
the implicit recognition of human dignity.  Despite the fetus not being an individual, 
the fetus has interests, for example through being represented in the family as a 
future child or having an interest in having a condition cured.  Therefore, 
intergenerational issues are evident within the working of FGT practitioners, with 
another ray of light shining through.  Nonetheless, as seen within the documentary 
data, maternal autonomy within the clinic trumps that of intergenerational interests, 
because fetal interests are still contingent upon maternal health and maternal 
autonomy 
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In relation to the research questions the material points to initial conclusions for the 
first two research questions.  Are the intergenerational issues of FGT taken into 
account?  Clearly human dignity through autonomy means that intergenerational 
issues are taken into account.  This in turn means the answer to the second research 
question as it stands, the views of the FGT practitioners and the documents align.  
This means that despite issues such as protecting fetal interests, intergenerational 
issues cannot override the reproductive rights of the mother, her rights trump the 
rights and interests of everyone else even if treatment could be 100% efficacious. 
This is one of the challenges that FGT poses to conventional thinking. 
 
The next step is to see whether the interview data further reflects the documentary 
data or whether scientific progress within the clinic and laboratory is portrayed 
differently to that within the documentary data.  This is important as the initial 
conclusions to the first two research question could change due to the impact of 
potential progress.  In trying to answer the final research question, chapter 9 
investigates the application and manifestation of FGT as a clinical practice.  The 
views of FGT practitioners on scientific progress could point to further areas where 
FGT may have an impact that was not evident from the documentary data.  
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9 Interview Data: Scientific Progress  
9.1 Introduction 
Having seen that human dignity is not an explicitly used concept within FGT and 
that autonomy is the key concept within the clinic, further issues must be discussed 
in relation to the progress and future utilisation of FGT.  Importantly for the thesis 
this chapter outlines how autonomy and choice before the clinic can be restricted by 
a number of factors in the research process such as: treatment options affecting FGT 
for example abortion; by inherent uncertainty; by funding and the formulation and 
regulation of resulting treatments.  The data within this chapter directly relates to the 
aims of the thesis which is to ascertain whether there are intergenerational aspects in 
FGT and whether scientific progress implicitly protects intergenerational interests.  
The chapter will focus upon the research procedure aspect of the data.  The theme of 
the research procedure focuses upon FGT as a future treatment option for genetic 
conditions.  The themes discussed within the chapter are not exhaustive and other 
themes were raised within the data such as globalisation, specific technocratic 
barriers such as engraftment and vectorology, and public engagement.  However, 
these areas are not considered here due to space and the focus of the thesis.  
 
This chapter will focus on the following sub themes of research procedure, factors 
affecting FGT as a treatment option and mediating uncertainty.  Section 9.2 will 
outline how FGT is presented as a future treatment option.  In presenting FGT as a 
treatment option the factors that influence the progress of FGT from an experimental 
model will be revealed in section 9.3.  These factors include the influence of 
funding, the inherent uncertainty within the FGT and other available treatment 
options. The theme of other treatments provides a clear example of the convergence 
of autonomy of the patient, choice within medical decisions and the research 
procedure.  Because of the identified convergence of the principles that are key 
within the thesis an in-depth discussion will occur (9.3.4) to exemplify how 
autonomy, choice, intergenerational issues and medical research can cause ethical 
and legal dilemmas.  Following the discussion of ‘other treatment options’ section 
9.4 will focus upon ways in which FGT practitioners can overcome or mediate these 
barriers.  These factors include conducting safety tests through risk assessments, 
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providing a convincing argument and producing ethical work through collaboration.  
The chapter will then conclude by summarizing the detailed analysis and the 
implications that the interview data has revealed. 
9.2 Research procedure: framing the practice of fetal gene therapy 
as another treatment option 
From the outset of the theme of research procedure it is evident that the research 
process is to design a treatment option for severe genetic conditions.  Importantly, 
this frames how FGT will be delivered within the clinic and, ultimately, the impact 
upon the previous theme of human dignity through autonomy.  Thus this sub section 
provides the foundation upon which the factors within the clinic are based.  That 
base is the delivery of FGT as another treatment option. 
RC […] so you see it [fetal gene therapy] as another treatment 
option?  
IE3 Yeah, it’s another treatment option, but the problem is it’s a 
gene.  But the gene is like when we give vaccinations of viral genes 
into little children and little babies to prevent smallpox’s and polio 
militias.  That has been immensely successful.  So I see it as an 
extension of that.   
 
Therefore, FGT is another treatment option for serious genetic conditions within 
pregnancy.  It is compared to other treatments that occur within pregnancy and 
neonatal development and that helps establish FGT as a credible option.  The 
comparison to other tested prenatal treatments which have overcome their own 
difficulties is where FGT as a treatment option should be aimed. 
It’s a bit like fetal blood sampling and saying that your fetus is 
anaemic and we’re going to give it a small blood transfusion by 
injecting blood into the placenta.  It’s a perfectly acceptable 
treatment, why would the mother say ‘actually no I’m going to have 
an abortion now and I’m going to abort this pregnancy?’  It just seems 
strange because there is a perfectly viable option to treat that child.  
That’s the kind of end point I’d like to see it coming to.  If you get 
diagnosed with this horrible disease, you can terminate, but there is 
also the option to treat the child, a free option to do that.  No pressure 
or anything.  But I’d like it to be at a stage where you get to point of 
fetal blood sampling so why wouldn’t you do it?  It’s a routine 
procedure that is available all over the world.  That would be the ideal 
situation to be in one day, all over the world.  IE12  
 
By comparing FGT to other current medical interventions helps provide ethical 
guidance as well as forming a basis for the acceptance of FGT.  In other words: if X 
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(a current medical practice) is acceptable and Y (an experimental medicine) 
significantly resembles X then Y should also be acceptable.  Those current practices 
have (at least to some extent) overcome the major scientific and ethical hurdles that 
would additionally stand in the way of the progress of FGT.  Therefore, the 
interviewees expressed the desire to make FGT a normal prenatal treatment option.  
However, FGT is not yet a routine treatment and so the experimental and pioneering 
elements were stressed. 
Ok so the major obstacles will be firstly we have to establish that fetal 
gene therapy is very much in experimental mode.  So there hasn’t 
been any group that has taken it into the clinic.  IE13 
 
Because FGT is an experimental treatment it still needs to overcome various 
practical and scientific barriers that will be discussed below.  However, the goal is to 
make it a credible treatment option.  By identifying FGT as another treatment option 
within pregnancy for serious genetic condition there is an issue about how to propose 
the treatment.  The resemblance to other treatments (highlighted in the examples 
above) means that the process of offering therapy is not seen as a barrier to the 
progress of FGT. 
[W]e’re very used to talking to women in diagnosing fetal 
abnormalities and introducing the idea that they can have a 
termination if that is their chosen option.  So we would provide it as 
one of a range of management option.  We would never prioritise 
them, that is up to the parents.  So yeah in that context we would add 
gene therapy as another option.  But we wouldn’t use termination of 
pregnancy as a lever to say you can have a termination of pregnancy 
or our gene therapy.  IE6 
 
The above extract demonstrates how FGT would be approached in the clinic and 
once again how comparison to other current practices is an important part of making 
FGT feasible and credible.  The introduction of FGT to patients will increase 
choice.
235
  Previously, those in receipt of their own genetic information before 
pregnancy occurred had the following preventive options: (i) have no children, (ii) 
take the risk and hope that their child will be unaffected, (iii) adopt a child, (iv) the 
use of assisted reproductive technologies such as prenatal diagnosis with selective 
abortion, or sperm donation, or the use of pre-implantation diagnosis after in vitro 
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 Issues regarding ‘choice’ will be discussed in relation to abortion below to highlight the tension 
within practice. 
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fertilisation of intracytoplasmic sperm injection (Fletcher and Richter 1996, Pembrey 
1995).  Ultimately, there is the choice of having a child with the condition and opting 
for palliative treatment if no corrective treatment is available.  Where a genetic or 
congenital abnormality is identified during pregnancy the treatment options are: do 
nothing and have a child with a severe genetic condition or choose to terminate the 
pregnancy (Chervenak and McCullough 2009, 2010, Coutelle 2008).  However, the 
interviewees presented FGT as another treatment option regardless of prior genetic 
knowledge (David and Peebles 2008).  Women will freely be able to choose between 
pregnancy, termination and therapy.   
 
It is proposed that FGT would be offered as another treatment option from which the 
patient has to choose.
236
  There would be no extra weighting towards any of the 
options, and the interviewees stressed being open, honest and frank in conversations 
with the patients.  In doing so, FGT would not be pushed as a cure, but as an 
experimental treatment option for mothers to consider in the management of their 
genetic or congenitally affected fetus and just like any other treatment option (David 
and Peebles 2008).
237
  Therefore, despite the claims of FGT treatment increasing 
fetal patienthood (Casper 1998) the option is framed within a reproductive 
framework with other options.  Despite an awareness of the influence of the other 
factors within a pluralist society that would affect the uptake of FGT (see below); 
there was an overall confidence that when FGT is efficacious, safe and has obtained 
ethical approval that it would establish itself initially as an experimental treatment 
option that would be used.  The experimental aspect of the treatment was constantly 
referred to in order to emphasize the uncertain elements involved and confirmed the 
literature of Chervenak and McCullough (2010) [IE1-13].   
 
Once FGT is approved there appear two main themes that could potentially hinder 
FGT progressing. These are factors affecting the utilisation of FGT as a treatment 
option (9.3) and mediating the uncertainty of a clinical trial in FGT (9.4).  These two 
themes will be dealt with separately in the following sections. 
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 See chapter 2. 
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 Thus, following EMA and GTAC guidelines upon the difference between therapy and 
experimental treatment. 
203 
 
9.3 Factors affecting the utilisation of fetal gene therapy as a 
treatment option 
Presenting FGT as another treatment option raises questions such as: what may 
hinder FGT becoming a treatment option?  The factors that appeared as barriers to 
the transition of FGT from an experimental treatment to an acceptable treatment 
option include: it being scientifically possible, regulation, funding, uncertainty, and 
other treatment options.  Ultimately, FGT has to be scientifically possible but the 
next sections focus on these other factors and will highlight intergenerational aspects 
as well as the handling of scientific development of FGT in the clinic.  However, 
there are many barriers to FGT because it is a developing science. 
I think it’s a difficult situation as there are two separate ideas.  So 
there is what is actually happening and how science is progressing, 
and what is physically possible and what is safe and what is being 
published.  And then there is the public perception of what that is and 
that may not necessarily be the same thing.  IE11 
 
The above extract indicates just a few of the factors that are seen as barriers to FGT.  
The interviewees expressed many other factors that would appear as barriers to the 
translation of therapy to the clinic as well as the acceptance of FGT as a treatment 
option.  These mitigating factors can be divided into preclinical, intra clinical and 
trans-experimental barriers.  Preclinical barriers to the progress of the FGT were 
expressed in terms of vector efficacy, toxicology and patient safety, highlighting the 
importance of safety studies before scientific work translates into the clinic.   
 
The majority of the documents analysed were connected to the regulation of FGT.  
Given the vast array of regulations an important factor to consider was whether 
regulation was a hurdle to the progress of FGT.  As will be seen in the next section it 
appeared that despite the importance of regulation it was not a major hurdle to the 
progress of FGT. 
9.3.1 Regulation is important but not a major concern 
FGT is a highly regulated area but the current regulatory model, despite playing an 
important function, was not seen as a major barrier to the overall progress of FGT.  
In the view of the FGT practitioners within the UK, regulation is another hurdle that 
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is currently well focused and adopts the right approach even when the 
intergenerational aspects are taken into consideration.  One interviewee remarked. 
 I think that we’ll just get over them as another scientific hurdle.  The 
more experiments and changing variance in different ways to be 
better and insertions, they are just problems to solve really.  Yes, 
they’re immediate hurdles, not bigger picture hurdles.  They’re just 
the next thing on the ladder but they’re not going to stop you from 
making the medicine better.  IE11 
 
Therefore, regulation is just one of the hurdles that FGT must overcome.  Other 
scientific hurdles may cause bigger obstructions to the progress of FGT but that is 
not to undermine the role of regulation within the research process as it has an 
important function within the research process.  In fact, the interviewees commented 
about how well they are regulated as ‘they are there to keep us safe’ [IE11] and 
within the UK the regulators are seen in a positive light. 
[R]egulation will play a very important role in reaching general 
consensus in the population because it will be a sensitive issue.  But I 
think that good science is good science, is good science you know.  
So if it’s good science eventually it will win the argument like stem 
cells and other things.  If it’s not good science, if it’s not strict enough 
it shouldn’t go ahead and it’s fairly simple.  I think that regulators are 
there not only to be negative but to be positive and at least in Britain I 
think that’s the role that GTAC is playing.  In other countries and on 
the continent I’m not always convinced by about that.  But I think in 
Britain that’s the way things are going.  IE1 
 
Therefore although regulation is still an important factor it is not currently a major 
hurdle to scientific progress.  Within the sample there is an expected division, 
because of a hierarchical structure, between the PhD students and senior 
interviewees who are dealing directly with regulation.  The PhD students were fully 
aware of, and observe the regulations but it is the research group leaders who deal 
with regulators and regulation in detail. 
 RC You’ve mentioned about safety but actual regulation you 
don’t necessarily see as a problem as long as you do your safety 
studies, animal models correctly, follow the guidelines, so you don’t 
really see that as a hurdle?  
 IE7 Well no, as long as we stick to the regulations I think it should 
be fine.  Yeah things should be fine, from my own perspective I’ve 
not handled the regulations as much as XXXX or what therapeutically 
what to do, I don’t have to work on that, or answer questions on that.  
It’s basically the boss’s job.   
 
However, despite the undercurrent of regulation being an important part of the 
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research process, it is not seen as a hindrance because the scientific approach to FGT 
and regulatory guidance upon the area are currently aligned.  An example of this can 
be seen when the interviewees talk about the most beneficial point of intervention 
and, which diseases to target. 
You’re trying to get in there before organ damage has occurred and 
when you might have easier access to the tissue.  For example, cystic 
fibrous before you‘ve formed a layer of mucus over the epithelial 
cells, which you want transvect.  So you’d be going in earlier because 
you can; and because you want to provide people with an option to 
termination of pregnancy; and you’re going to get a better result 
doing it at that stage than later on.  IE6 
 
Therefore, the point of damage makes the focus of treatment upon the next 
generation an important factor and confirms the GTAC guidelines upon what 
diseases an in utero approach should be used (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 
1998).
238
  Therefore, regulation confirms the science behind a fetal approach with 
many of the interviewees confirming that this is the right approach [IE1-6,9-13].  In 
fact, having regulation that confirms this approach is beneficial for the next 
generation by preventing damage. 
So taking the example of cystic fibrous much of the damage to the 
lungs happens prenatal.  Once the baby is born most of the damage 
has already occurred and there is very little that can be done to 
reverse that damage.  Whereas if you administer a therapy prenatally 
then you can stop most of that damage from happening.  [...].  It has 
been shown that a fetus is more tolerant than an adult to gene therapy 
because their immune system has not completely developed.  So a 
vector can have a greater benefit, a beneficial effect a greater 
therapeutic effect on a fetus that on an adult.  So before this immune 
competence occurs it is important to administer the vector at that time 
to achieve maximum therapeutic efficacy.  IE7 
 
Therefore, the point of intervention is considered in relation to the teratogenic
239
 
timescale of the fetus as a human being.  Control over the point of intervention is 
predetermined by the biological nature of the disease and when damage occurs.  It is 
important to stop the irreversible damage that is created in utero, thus why an in 
utero approach coupled with teratogenic concerns is needed.  However, for any fetal 
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 Gene therapy Advisory Committee 1998 s.27(c) states that the disorder or disease treated would 
need to be life threatening, or associated with severe disability, and for which no suitable treatment is 
available after birth, in order to justify intervention in utero. 
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 Relating to, or causing developmental malformations (National Institute of Health 2011). 
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treatment, the FGT practitioner’s treatment options are limited by birth.  Therefore, 
despite the shared understanding of pregnancy and birth being a critical 
developmental stage for a separate human to be established, it is not these boundaries 
that concern FGT practitioner.  Therefore, the established boundaries for biomedical 
treatment are challenged (Williams, Wainwright et al. 2008).  The practical 
implication is that the interviewees did not limit their work to prenatal work.  Their 
practice goes beyond the imposed time frame which pregnancy enforces upon both 
mother and fetus (Adam 1995).  The practice is connected to the linear development 
of a child from conception through to childhood.  That developmental connection is 
highlighted by the teratogenic concerns that FGT practitioner have.  If they were 
solely concerned within the boundary of pregnancy then future teratogenic concerns 
would not be of paramount importance to FGT, which regulation currently reinforces 
through its guidelines upon fetal intervention.  However, within the interview sample 
there was an underlying recognition that a serious adverse or perceived unethical 
incident could result in regulators shutting FGT down. 
I think it’s regulation as you need to pass phase one, two, three, four 
and I think that gene therapy is really it’s a big issue.  Back to 1999 
where one case ended up with leukaemia.  So in the States they 
banned this stuff.  So I think gene therapy needs a very nice 
regulation and you need to care about safety of course.  IE8 
 
Another interviewee focused upon why FGT has this problem.  It appears to stem 
from the general fear surrounding gene therapy.  With FGT being a sub speciality of 
gene therapy, that fear transcends into FGT as well. 
I think the problem is that gene therapy is highly scrutinized.  
Certainly for us that work in the gene therapy field and not personally 
even though we’re quite close to the clinic, it seems if there is a single 
adverse event people are running around screaming.  Yet thousands of 
people die each year from paracetamol.  Penicillin would never have 
been passed by the FDA.  So you got drugs that you can buy off the 
shelf or prescribe, which are pretty dangerous and people will accept 
those risks.  And yet gene therapy a single bad thing and people are 
horrified and I think that it’s just because it’s a gene.  IE3 
 
Interestingly, the sample group did not see regulators or regulation as hindering their 
progress which appears contrary to the general view of clinical research regulation 
(Department of Health 2010, Paul, Anna et al. 2008).  Generally, the interviewees 
praised the work of regulators as well as the current rules within which they work 
especially given the good reasons and the current experimental status of treatment.  
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Therefore, once the regulatory boxes were ticked clinical trial approval would be 
difficult but not impossible.  Such comments were based on those who had had 
previous dealings with regulators in general, thus principally an area of comment for 
the post PhD members of the interview group.  The current PhD students were aware 
of the process but expressed their own caveats to their opinions such as a lack of 
regulatory experience.  Due to no clinical trial having been proposed to GTAC the 
only guidance that the senior practitioners used were conversations that had begun 
and experience with Ethics Committees and the phase 0 clinical trial proposal in the 
USA (Office of Recombinant DNA Activities 1999).  Importantly, the biggest caveat 
raised by those dealt with structural abnormalities that blurred the boundary between 
therapy for the mother and therapy for fetal benefit.  The blurred boundary meant 
that it would not be easy to ascertain the stance of GTAC about their treatment 
proposal, hence the reason why early conversations before a clinical trial application 
was submitted have been started.  However, regulators were not seen as a 
particularly difficult obstacle to FGT progress.   
9.3.2 Funding as a hindrance to fetal gene therapy progress 
The FGT practitioners appeared to suggest that even if FGT was scientifically 
possible and fulfilled ethical criteria a huge obstacle to overcome is how to acquire 
funding.  The economic environment is not directly amenable to funding FGT 
because of the inherent perception of it as being ‘risky’.  Therefore, the lack of 
venture capital could lead to FGT progressing slower than expected, which was seen 
as one of the major obstacles for FGT 
I think the main obstacle will be getting the money to do it because 
XXXX doesn’t have the money to do it, I don’t have that much 
money, we have to raise it from investors who would want to produce 
this product.  Capitalism does not like taking risks.  And that will be 
very difficult.  The psychological barrier of saying a treatment for 
pregnancy - wow!  Treatment for small children – wow!  Let’s invest 
in Brill cream or invest in bananas.  So finding people who want to 
invest in this.  And we might have to get the money from grant giving 
bodies like the XXXX who have already funded us to do the XXXX 
experiments and so to take it into man might need the health service 
funding the research.  IE4 
 
The lack of private investment and reliance on state funding makes the funding of 
fetal research subject to the political debate of what research bodies ought to be 
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funding.  The documentary data is silent on this point, but ties into broader research 
funding issues.  Research is subject to the political changes, especially within a 
recession whereby certain research areas go unfunded. 
XXXX and I had an idea with a social scientist that we wanted to 
explore patients/healthcare workers views on fetal gene therapy and 
other issues like informed consent process.  We couldn’t find any way 
to get it funded.  We looked at various bodies and they wanted to fund 
people doing ethical research, but not an ethical project.  So it’s a bit 
of a problem really.  The Wellcome Trust used to fund all sorts of 
ethical research but don’t any more.  IE2 
 
Although all of the interviewees were in receipt of some form of funding they 
highlighted that it has fallen onto governments and institutions to fund such 
endeavours.
240
  The combination of the other possible choices before FGT and the 
historical problems that have occurred in gene therapy and experimental medicine in 
pregnancy (Thalidomide and Epilim) creates a vacuum of funding for FGT outside 
of research councils and institutions.  Within the interview data the effects of such 
huge, one-off catastrophes were recognised as having wide ranging impacts beyond 
funding and upon the progress of FGT in general.  Such an issue becomes a problem 
within FGT because the cost of the amount of follow-up data required by a post 
clinical trial may financially outweigh the initial clinical trial.  A related concern was 
the length of necessary follow-up [IE1-3,5,8,10-13]. 
[T]here are a lot issues surrounding delayed or long term adverse 
effects.  So we put a vector into a fetus and is that vector going to 
cause a mutation at any point in time into the host genome?  Is the 
vector going to make its way into the germ cells of the fetal recipient 
and then in 20 or 30 years time when the surviving time the child 
wants to start their own family, is this vector, which in most cases 
based on a virus going to be transmitted to the next generation?  So 
you’re talking about a really long  follow-up.  A long follow-up in the 
monkey and an even longer one in human patient.  So that will add to 
the cost of translation.  IE13 
 
Connected with the necessary length of follow-up several interviewees [IE1,3,10,12] 
highlighted the timescale of the FGT practitioner. 
[...] in fetal gene therapy particularly you have a narrow time limit to 
do things.  I see another time scale, that’s the time scale of the 
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 For example, Ark therapeutics has been able to fund such endeavours into fetal growth restriction 
with aid from an EU Framework Programme 7 Grant of almost €6 million (Genetic Engineering & 
Biotechnology News 2012). 
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researcher, the observer like you and the patient.  We feel that we’ve 
made terrific progress in a short time but if you have the disease it’s 
not quick enough.  Yes we’d like to do things quicker but you have to 
do things properly and you shouldn’t rush yourself into things that 
aren’t ready.  IE1 
 
Therefore, intergenerational issues involve the FGT practitioner as well as the 
intended recipient of treatment.  The documentary analysis did not highlight such 
issues, but merely pointed to ‘long term follow-up.’241  The sample indicates that the 
length of the follow-up should equate to the length of time that the fetal generation 
survives [IE1-3,5,8,10-13].  The length of necessary follow-up identified by the 
sample poses several questions to consider relevant to investment, insurance, patient 
fatigue or loss and viral epidemiology.  The follow-up may even include the 
corrected fetus’s own offspring, as well as maternal follow-up, in order to ensure 
safe somatic therapy has occurred (Abi-Nader, Rodeck et al. 2009).  Therefore, there 
is a direct conflict between market efficiency and social efficiency because of the 
short time frame within which private investors operate, as opposed to the long time 
frame that is needed for the practice to be conducted safely (Welsh 2006).  
Therefore, the cumulative cost of a FGT clinical trial in the introductory phase will 
significantly outweigh the cost of palliative postnatal therapy.  The decision to fund 
further endeavours may rest with countries which have a crippling genetic problem 
(such as within the thalassemia belt)
242
 and the social economic climate may indicate 
pursuing a genetic, rather than a protein, therapy regime prenatally if it is more 
economically viable.   
 
It is clear that intergenerational issues surrounding patient follow-up include the 
FGT practitioner, which ultimately affects funding.  Such intergenerational aspects 
are not referenced to dignity;  they are contingent and lack the timeless element that 
human dignity has (Dupré 2009).  Therefore, the combination of these separate 
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 Long term follow-up under Regulation (EC) 1394/2007 Art 14 and  Directive 2001/83/EC Annex 
1which is expanded upon through the European Medicines Agency (2009) document 60436/2007 
Guideline on Follow-up of Patients Administered with Gene Therapy Medicinal Products which 
states: The clinical follow-up period is dependent on considerations such as the characteristics of gene 
therapy medicinal products, the anticipated time for the occurrence of delayed adverse reactions, the 
clinical indication and expected life expectancy of the treated patients. 
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 The thalassemia belt extends from the Mediterranean East through the Middle East and India to 
South East Asia and South through Africa (Rodak et al 2007). 
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issues relating to follow-up illustrate that time has multiple timeframes (Adam 1995, 
Adam and Groves 2006, 2007, McKenzie and Davies 2002).  In recognising the 
multiple time lines that are operating within the clinic and overall practice of FGT, 
future generations have to be important in the decision making of all actors involved 
(Adam and Groves 2007).  It is through the knowledge of what action can be 
achieved in the future that, as protagonists of that future, it follows that responsibility 
rests with us towards our own future and the future of others.  The creation of social 
and legal rules regarding the incorporation of future generations appears to fulfil 
such a responsibility.  The issues relating to the different time lines must create a 
responsibility for research funders, patients and FGT practitioners themselves, which 
must be reinforced.  However, within a society that is pro autonomy how can these 
duties be enforced?  Through legislation?  A contract for treatment?   
 
Clearly a fetus cannot be a party to a contract and without knowing what a fetus 
thinks one cannot establish whether the contract is entered into willingly by either 
fetus or mother (due to social and goal orientated pressures), thus breaching 
fundamental contract principles (See Chitty and Beale 2008).
243
  The consequences 
of breach of a contract for those deemed eligible to be a party to it could have huge 
social, legal and ethical consequences.  Such consequences would need a full 
investigation as would any proposed regulation.  Furthermore, long term follow-up 
would need to include the possibility of autopsy of the mother, future child and 
possibly third generation persons (Office of Recombinant DNA Activities 1999), 
which could create questions relating to the current regulation of autopsy.  Under the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 would that mean that all deaths of those in receipt of 
FGT (both mother and fetus) should be treated as an ‘unknown death’244 for safety 
reasons?  Such a change could be seen as controversial, but the salient point is that 
long term follow-up for FGT and the different time frames in operation could cause 
significant legal and social problems, which funders would want to avoid.  These 
long term problems create further uncertainties within research, which the interview 
sample highlighted as a major concern within the progress of FGT. 
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 Also see the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and unreasonable contract terms. 
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 Corners and Justice Act 2009 s.2(b). 
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9.3.3 The uncertainty of treatment 
In the view of FGT practitioners the inherent uncertainty of FGT could lead to FGT 
not being utilised.  Uncertainty can be characterised in four ways: risk (quantifiable 
risk), uncertainty (quantitative significance is unknown), ignorance (lack of 
knowledge) and indeterminacy (recognising the open ended and conditional nature 
of knowledge) (Wynne 1992).  The FGT practitioners appear to engage and address 
all four of these under the term uncertainty in conjunction with 9.4.  The uncertainty 
was not only related to the immediate risk of treatment but also to long term follow-
up and the potentially bigger concerns related to society.  These will be dealt with in 
that order.  Uncertainty relates to potential restriction any upon maternal choice, but 
also highlights the potential of FGT to impact beyond the clinic, which is highlighted 
by the third research questions.  Firstly, there are general concerns about the 
uncertainty of treatment. 
 Depending on the virus it may not have any long term effect but the 
point is that we don’t know so we can’t say that there definitely not 
going to be any effect or there’s no major concern.  We can’t say that 
as we don’t have that information at the moment.  So this is one of the 
blackholes in clinical trials and we have to tell the patient that we 
don’t know but we have some confidence that the future offspring are 
going to be problem free.  IE13 
 
Possibly the most influential factor in the utilisation of FGT and a possible barrier to 
such treatments reaching clinical trials or being chosen by patients is the inherent 
uncertainty about the therapy within humans.  Some of the uncertainties included: 
the unknown long term effect of introducing viral vectors into the genome even if the 
half life of the vector is short; whether the animal data would translate into the 
human model; and if the treatment would be 100% efficacious.  Regardless of the 
amount of data accumulated within animal models, clinical trials of any 
investigations in human subjects are intended to:  
[D]iscover or verify the clinical, pharmacological and/or other 
pharmacodynamic effects of one or more investigational medicinal 
product(s), and/or to identify any adverse reactions to one or more 
investigational medicinal product(s) and/or to study absorption, 
distribution, metabolism and excretion of one or more investigational 
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medicinal product(s) with the object of ascertaining its (their) safety 
and/or efficacy.
245
  
 
Therefore, discovery of the unknown implicitly implies uncertainty about the 
procedure that will occur.  In the extract below one can see how the site of 
intervention changes the dynamics of uncertainty. 
RC So scientific uncertainty seems to be the main thread and what 
you can control.  But how is that different from any other clinical 
trial?  There is always uncertainty in clinical trials. 
IE Yes there is but with many interventions there has already 
been a lot of preparation and background work to show that it is 
efficacious and safe for most drug trials.  The obvious parallel there 
would be thalidomide and that was in the days when drugs were not 
tested in humans and rarely in animals never mind pregnant animals.  
So we learnt a lesson from that.  So I think that on the other hand with 
a number of drugs that appear on the market, they are used widely, 
their drawbacks are not so dramatic and they come apparent some 
years later.  So there are similar parallels there as well but with gene 
therapy, especially in utero, there is a range of uncertainties at the 
moment still.  Surgical procedures are in some respect simpler, for 
example the surgical procedures tried out for the fetus, but then the 
risk to the mother are potentially greater as well as the fetus.  The 
other thing about the fetus, in a similar extent but not quite the same 
as in the child, is that you have such a long period ahead for follow-
up and development where you don’t quite know what might happen.  
So there is a bigger question mark really.  IE10 
 
It is clear that uncertainty and risks within FGT are larger than the inherent 
individual risks involved with other clinical trials.  The risks associated with FGT 
transcend current generations and extend to possible future ones.  The focus is upon 
the individual (see chapter 6), which can serve as a hindrance to problems relating to 
collectives such as humanity in general (Prior, Glasner et al. 2004).  However, there 
is an awareness of larger social implications. 
I think if that impacts on the whole of society or on just those four 
with the disease, that’s still a positive thing.  I think you do have to 
think about what impact that would have on the greater society […].  
But I think that whatever you do could have bigger implications but 
then the likely hood of some horror thing happening is so tiny given 
all the regulations and all the small steps that need to happen before 
anything even gets near a human, never mind a big clinical trial is 
extremely low.  IE11 
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The documents connect risk to the ‘environment’ and the individual but not to the 
larger social risk posed to society and the human species in general from the effect 
of, for example, a generation of babies with birth defects.  It provides further 
evidence that most medical applications consider individual risk rather that collective 
risk (Welsh and Evans 1999).  Nevertheless, those collective and societal concerns 
are incorporated into FGT through teratogenic concerns for the individual as well 
concerns relating to vectorology.  For example, the interviewees were aware of these 
risks, which included the effect of a transgene upon fetal and neonatal development.  
These developmental concerns, known as teratogenic concerns, are highly prevalent 
within the decision making of clinicians relating to pregnancy (Lyerly, Mitchell et al. 
2007).  The concerns included the effect upon the future parents if those 
uncertainties manifested themselves, as well as the increased incidence rate of future 
disabled children, who would otherwise not have been born.  Therefore, the 
interviewees’ concerns transcend into the next generation because of the concerns 
relating to the future child.  By implicitly ascertaining whether to offer a pregnant 
woman treatment, the FGT practitioners make ethical judgements about what is an 
acceptable outcome for the future quality of life of the fetus.  Therefore, 
intergenerational criteria are relevant within FGT because of the risk to the future 
child, as well as the effect those decisions have upon society at large. 
 
Unlike the documentary data, which declares a discipline that can answer any 
question of risk or uncertainty through further scientific models; the interviewees 
explicitly state there are questions that science cannot answer until clinical trials are 
conducted [IE 1-13].  However, new forms of uncertainty create new forms of 
uncertain risk (Nowotny, Scott et al. 2001), which creates a tension between what 
GTAC professes as ethical research, because according to 27(b) research is ethical 
when the risks are known (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 1998).  Underlying 
the uncertainty of FGT was the interviewees’ apprehension concerning previous drug 
trials, such as the thalidomide incident, and the adverse reactions that affected gene 
therapy in general, such as the Jesse Gelsinger and Jolee Mohr deaths (Deakin, 
Alexander et al. 2009).  The apprehension is related to the effect of these adverse 
events and the result upon their work.  As a consequence the work to mediate the 
uncertainty of research and the informed consent procedure becomes even more 
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important.  However, having framed FGT as a treatment option it is the alternative 
treatment options that appear to create doubt over whether FGT would be utilised. 
9.3.4 Other treatment options: In particular abortion 
In particular the option of abortion was highly prevalent within the data.  This is 
important because abortion is distinctly a right of the current generation over the 
next generation.  If the regulation of abortion was to be changed then the rights and 
interests of the next generation could be seen to restrict present maternal autonomy, 
and thus provide a clue for answering the research questions.  For this reason the 
discussion surrounding abortion will be longer than in the previous sections in this 
chapter.  However, it is clear that in the view of FGT practitioners they would not 
restrict the right of abortion, even to pro abortion patients, despite abortion playing a 
major role in how FGT will progress.  
All the way through fetal medicine there is this interesting 
undercurrent really.  Is the treatment that you’re providing to the fetus 
compatible with what the neonatologist would do if that baby was 
delivered?  And that is sort of important in a way because if you were 
going to do something that in a way no neonatologist would do or 
would dream of doing after birth, then you should ask yourself: what 
is it that is so different about a fetus in utero, which makes that 
allowable?  So the most gross example of that is termination of 
pregnancy.  IE6 
 
It is evident within the views of the FGT practitioners that abortion is a recurrent 
procedure that has implications for FGT.  Abortion is prevalent within the theoretical 
conception of FGT when treatment options are proposed, and post therapy because 
the option is legally available due to Abortion Act 1967.  Most prominent within all 
the interviewees’ narratives was the effect that abortion has upon FGT as a treatment 
option: 
 Of course at the moment if you can diagnose the disease prenatally 
then abortion rules in this country means women have fairly readily 
available access to termination of pregnancy as a management option.  
So if you’re going to introduce a gene therapy that may or may not 
cure a fetus that would be very unattractive to somebody whom 
would have certainly would have considered termination.  IE6 
 
The above extract shows how abortion looms within the minds of FGT practitioners 
in England and Wales.  The extract below also highlights that, despite FGT being a 
treatment with global application, ‘abortion’ looms over FGT even in the theoretical 
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stage within countries where abortion and PND are available. 
Yeah.  I gave a talk on this brain stuff and some guy in the audience 
said ‘what’s the point of this?’ So I was like hmm and he carried on ‘a 
mother who has had prenatal diagnosis and diagnosed with this 
particular disease would just terminate.  There is no argument.  She 
wouldn’t risk this when she could terminate having a child.’ So I said 
‘yeah that’s a fair point and she may well choose to terminate if she 
wants to, I’m not going to argue that point.  She has a right to 
terminate and she may well choose to terminate.  But there are certain 
situations where the mother may not choose to terminate whether that 
be social, or ethical, or religious reasons or geographical reasons 
because it’s illegal to do so in that country.  So suddenly our proposal 
becomes very relevant.  IE12 
 
Therefore, the availability of abortion could severely hinder the progress of FGT 
unless patients choose not to terminate.  Unlike other areas of decision making 
within pregnancy, which appear to compare the risk of intervening against the 
exclusion of not intervening (Berer 2005), FGT is compared to other treatment 
options in terms of the efficacy of the treatment.  Abortion can have a 100% efficacy 
in achieving its purpose.
246
  Yet, due to the uncertainty of FGT, the normalisation of 
abortion within developed countries (Berer 2005), the efficacy of abortion, and the 
certainty of doing nothing at all, FGT appears to be the third and final option.  
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for parents to choose not to abort in these 
circumstances (Coutelle 2008).  
 
Research suggests that although moral values are important the choice to seek 
termination of pregnancy is a pragmatic one that reflects the impact of pregnancy 
and childbearing on personal and household circumstances (Lie, Robson et al. 2008).  
Comparing the abortion rate under the Abortion Act 1967 s.1(1)(d) to other certified 
abortions may provide light upon this area.  Where an abortion is performed because 
of risk of the child being handicapped, 2290 abortions were carried out in 2010 
(Department of Health 2011).
247
  However, in 2008 there were 4254 children born 
who had reported congenital abnormalities (Office for National Statistics 2009).  The 
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continuing birth of those with congenital abnormalities clearly confirms this 
pragmatism (Office for National Statistics 2009).  Therefore, FGT could be used 
within the abortion debate as a tool to justify an anti-abortion campaign for 
conditions that potentially could be cured by treatment.  Technology is always 
changing and reframing the abortion debate as well as the public’s acceptance of 
abortion laws (Callahan 1986).  As illustrated above, framing FGT as a treatment 
option must surely call into question the use of abortions by pro-life advocates just 
as the introduction of IVF promoted debate surrounding therapeutic abortion 
(Michael and Buckle 1990).  Nonetheless, the statistics upon the use of abortion may 
indicate that there are still those who choose not to abort when they legally could do. 
 
With the ability to perform elective abortions late into gestation
248
 there was a sense 
of exclusion of those who had a preference for abortion as a treatment option.  The 
exclusion was both practitioner and patient imposed exclusion.  Practitioner imposed 
exclusion is exclusion from the trial because the practitioner has removed a patient 
from the trial because of their possible affinity to abortion.  Patient imposed 
exclusion is where patients remove themselves from the option of being included in 
the trial because they have chosen abortion as their therapeutic treatment or have 
utilised Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) to exclude the genetic problem.  
Practitioner imposed exclusion is also where by a candidate for the treatment is 
excluded because they do not attain the standard set by the practitioner.   
 
Patient imposed exclusion appeared to raise ethical problems surrounding the 
diversity of the intended recipients of the treatment, which concerned the 
interviewees.  Given that the risk of non chromosomal abnormalities increases with 
socio economic deprivation (Vrijheid, Dolk et al. 2000), families from higher 
socioeconomic status are more likely to utilise ARTs (Carrell 2010: 721).  Therefore, 
issues surrounding the initial sample population exist before the option of abortion is 
applied.  In addition, those with atheistic backgrounds or backgrounds where their 
religion does not prohibit them from utilising abortion would also reduce the 
diversity of the sample group. 
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Practitioner imposed exclusion is not uncommon within clinical trials regularly 
utilising certain candidates (Tunis, Stryer et al. 2003).  It has been proposed for fetal 
surgery that in order to avoid ethically unacceptable study design there should be no 
exclusion of participants because of their preference for elective abortion, and should 
include adversely affected infants and elective abortions as outcomes (Chervenak 
and McCullough 2009).  To do so would include ‘take a chance’ patients, which in 
turn raises further ethical questions about offering FGT to patients with this attitude.  
The literature and interview data suggest that candidates should be offered the choice 
because not to do so would violate the mother’s autonomy in deciding if a pre-viable 
fetus is a patient of not (Chervenak and McCullough 2009, Coutelle and Rodeck 
2002). 
 
However, serious ethical questions arise from those ‘take a chance’ patients.  It 
should be noted that the ‘take a chance’ patients who would accept and care for an 
affected child regardless of success or failure of the treatment, are not the most 
pressing ethical consideration (Coutelle, Themis et al. 2005).  It is those who have a 
preference for abortion that cause ethical uncertainty.  In taking a chance and 
choosing then to terminate a fetus if the desired outcome has not been reached, what 
does that say about FGT as a mode of fetal research?  The fetal patienthood is 
confirmed by the mother and thus FGT cannot negate a mother’s option to terminate 
(Chervenak and McCullough 2009, Coutelle and Rodeck 2002, Fletcher and Richter 
1996).  As a result the role of abortion as an option that can lead to unethical 
research must be considered, because it is clear that having an autonomy led system 
could lead to perceived ‘unethical’ research. For most women when amniocentesis 
was introduced, having the option of abortion was a key consideration before 
utilising amniocentesis (Rothman 1994).  To remove abortion as an option could be 
detrimental to FGT and could reduce patient numbers to a minimal amount.  It would 
be a stark example of the removal of choice from patients and an increase in the 
paternalistic bubble that was seen within the documentary analysis. 
 
However, what would stop maverick practitioners from trying to recruit those who 
are pro abortion and utilising that stance for further medical knowledge?  Could 
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autonomy within this specific case legitimately be restricted to stop the unethical 
manipulation of a fetus?  These questions highlight the balancing act that needs to be 
addressed between ethics, scientific progress and the rights of others.  If the balance 
is in favour of autonomy then ‘unethical’ research could be carried out.  It could be 
unethical in terms of fetal rights or societal views about the function of medical 
research.  Dr French Anderson’s preclinical proposal for gene therapy is a clear 
example whereby it was suggested that those who would abort could receive 
treatment and still continue to abort (Office of Recombinant DNA Activities 1999).  
As Dr Michael Wilks, chairman of the ethics committee of the British Medical 
Association in 1998 expressed: ‘I find it very difficult to accept that it is ethical to 
perform this kind of research on a woman who has made up her mind to have a 
termination, particularly as it is not of any benefit to the patient’ (BBC News 1998).  
Issues over fully cured then aborted fetuses could be outside the legal limit as section 
1(1)(d)
249
 would no longer apply, therefore would then a mother be forced to have a 
child they would originally have aborted? Given that the HFEA has continually 
stressed the importance of research being limited to 14 days of embryonic 
development or before the primitive streak appears,
250
 such issues need to be 
addressed.  However, if the balance goes too far towards ‘ethical’ research it could 
lead to the issues highlighted in the previous paragraph.  All the above questions are 
important because the important themes of the thesis (ethics, rights, law and 
scientific progress) are all competing to be dominant and which one of these 
concepts is deemed paramount will ultimately shape the practice and legislation of 
FGT. 
 
Within the context of those principal concerns the question of choice within the 
clinic is raised.  If autonomy is the primary principle to be adhered to then mothers 
should be able freely to choose regardless of social or medical repercussions.  Within 
the thesis there is the underlying assumption that choice within the clinic is freely 
exercised but it is evident within genetic services that choice is restricted by service 
provisions and possible professional measures of success (Chadwick 1993, Clarke 
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1990).  These services and measures of success could lead to subtle coercion to make 
it appear as if choice is available whereas in fact it is not.  Current cost cutting 
measures such as reducing ‘unnecessary tests’ within the NHS indicates that certain 
patients who previously had a choice would no longer be offered certain tests or 
procedures (Telegraph 2010).  Therefore, choice is heavily politicised.  There is also 
an issue surrounding the exercising of choice.  Choice within the clinic is dependent 
on the doctor patient relationship because, the doctor is there to give the patient all 
the information needed in order to make an informed decision, and the doctor should 
then implement that decision once the patient has made it (Williams 1988).  
However, as interviewee four indicates: 
In my experience as a doctor a lot of it depends on the relationship 
between the patient and doctor.  The majority of my patients say 
‘doctor you decide’ and I practice paternalistic medicine.  I think 
that’s what most of my patients want when they’re seriously ill.  They 
don’t want to have to decide whether they should have an operation or 
tablets or this or that.  They say doctor decide.  Now that’s not 
politically correct.  IE4 
 
Bryan et al (2006) indicated that choice within drug treatment of coronary patients 
has frequently been overridden by clinicians and Britten et al (2003) found that only 
a minority of all prescriptions were “wanted, necessary and appropriate”.  An article 
in the Lancet goes further to suggest that patient choice is a poisoned chalice and 
patients themselves do not want choice (Calne, Calne et al. 2008).  Therefore, an 
awareness of the exercising of choice by patients must be monitored.  If choice vis--
vie autonomy are key values then patients must feel they have exercised their own 
choice and not that of the medical profession.  The documents clearly indicate that 
paternalism should no longer exist in medical law;
251
 it must be the patient’s 
decision, which has not been unduly influenced;
252
 and removing choice, which 
would deprive an individual of a choice between two methods, is a breach of duty by 
a physician.
253
  However, the ’why wouldn’t you?’ argument leads to an opt out 
rather than an opt in discussion, which makes choice a negative not a positive action.  
The ‘why wouldn’t you?’ argument fails to appreciate the resulting harm of a 
negative result because the likelihood of a negative result is small.  It also fails to 
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consider those who would proactively choose to have disabled children.  The 
manifestation of case law indicates that the principles of choice and autonomy are 
not always adhered to within medical settings.
254
  Therefore, choice and autonomy 
must be seen to be exercised in every circumstance without prejudice.  The result is 
that the ‘why wouldn’t you?’ position cannot be adopted within the clinic. 
 
Despite the issues surrounding the above barriers to the progress of FGT the 
interview data provided areas in which these barriers could be mediated.  These 
included undertaking safety studies through risk assessments, producing a 
convincing or solid argument and by producing ethical research through 
collaboration.  Each of these will be discussed below. 
9.4 Mediating uncertainty and barriers to progress 
The three ways of mediating uncertainty are risk assessments, a convincing argument 
and producing ethical research.  Each of these factors plays an important role in the 
progress of FGT but they are not decisive on their own. For example a convincing 
FGT practitioner can be undermined by unsafe yet ethical research.  The three 
examples are useful tools for FGT practitioners and show that intergenerational 
aspects are taken into consideration, yet, once again, they do not determine the 
outcome because through mediating these barriers it is maternal choice and 
autonomy that is paramount.  However, in producing this convincing argument it is 
for fetal benefit and therefore fetal interests are being upheld. 
9.4.1 Safety first through risk assessments 
Within the sample the main aim is to provide a treatment that is efficacious.  
However, that aim of an efficacious treatment is not a carte blanche tool to conduct 
any type of FGT.  As indicated within the documents (chapter 7), research safety is a 
paramount concern linking the two concepts of risk-benefit ratio, and the safety of 
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treatment, which can reduce uncertainty to an acceptable level.  Therefore, creating a 
convincing argument should help to mediate the uncertainty of practice for proposed 
patients, thus allowing FGT to progress.  Within the interview data safety and risk 
assessment emerged as key concepts, thus confirming the documentary analysis.  
However, unlike regulation, they emphasize that the most important issue is safety, 
which has a knock on effect on whether FGT would be utilised: 
I think the most important factor that is, that we are constantly asked 
about whenever we present our data and is one of the things we 
clearly want to know is: are viral vectors safe to administer in a 
pregnant woman.  So safety is the most important issue.  And again if 
even if the vector can benefit the fetus, if gene therapy improves fetal 
growth people are still concerned that for the sake of the fetus are you 
going to inject are large dose of viruses into the mother can you 
prioritise the benefit of the fetus over the mother.  What if the vector 
does some benefit for the fetus but in turn harms the mother.  Can you 
actually do that? So these are some of the things that we are 
constantly being asked about and XXXX are investing a lot into, 
doing a lot of toxicology studies.  IE7 
 
In order to build a convincing argument the animal models that are conducted must 
provide data that strongly suggests that the treatment is safe.  Safety is a widely 
defined concept within the interview sample and is connected, for example, with the 
concept of harm and risk assessment.  One interviewee highlighted the 
accompanying definitional issue of safety within FGT.  The interviewees 
differentiate between molecular and practical safety studies and how that 
differentiation affects the judgment of what is ‘safe’.  
 If you do all the biochemistry and you do all the clinical tests that 
they do in hospitals then these mothers were deemed completely 
normal, completely fine.  If you do PCR on the blood, so if you do 
really, really ultra sensitive microbiological tests on the blood, then 
yeah you do occasionally see signs of the virus in the mother.  But it’s 
one of these things, clinically it’s fine.  It’s a normal mother, there’s 
nothing wrong with her and she’ absolutely fine.  But if you start 
digging deeper and deeper and deeper, when you end up at the 
molecular scale you’re going to find something.  Is that safe or isn’t 
that safe?  Is that a clear cut study or not?  Would that support fetal 
gene therapy or does it reject it? Again you got to weigh it up.  IE12 
 
Therefore, the remit of safety is not only one of scientific certainty, but also of risk 
perception.  In conducting safety and risk assessments there are concerns for both 
mother and fetus, but also teratogenic concerns that arise out of the uncertainty of 
genetic interventions, thus engaging with the intergenerational aspect of their work.  
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By utilising animal models that closely resemble the human model the uncertainty of 
the treatment can be reduced, but never entirely eliminated.  Therefore, one might 
not be able to achieve 100% risk free treatment, but will achieve a risk to benefit 
ratio that would make FGT acceptable.  By utilising animal models to define as close 
as possible risk-benefit ratio not only for the individual patient, but also on a broader 
level of public health, as with gene therapy in general, FGT is permissible (Fletcher 
and Richter 1996).    
9.4.2 Producing a ‘convincing argument’ 
Once the risk-benefit ratio has been scientifically achieved, then consideration of the 
use of a convincing argument appeared throughout the sample range.  The use of a 
convincing argument appeared to help FGT practitioners to get permission for a FGT 
trial as well as engaging with the problems raised by progressing technologies such 
as uncertainty, risk, ignorance and indeterminacy.  In the production of a convincing 
argument there is an implicit acceptance that merely citing scientific fact is not 
enough (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2002).  However, it could 
potentially call into question how certain the uncertainties are, as highlighted in 
9.3.3.  Despite this, the credibility of FGT practitioners would (in their view) 
hopefully be enough to ensure that patients choose FGT.  As one practitioner stated: 
I think it’s going to be our ability to convince both the patient and the 
clinicians that this option of intervention and possible therapy has a 
high probability of success in order to legitimise getting the funding 
to do this, getting the patients to do this, putting the patients through 
this procedure without actually being able to guarantee 100% efficacy 
for successful survival of the affected fetus.  […] It’s going to be a 
gamble in the initial phase stages of it.  So somehow we will have to 
have such a convincing argument and such good data from the none 
human primate before we go into the clinic because there is so much 
more at stake than with adult and to some extent child 
experimentation.  IE13 
 
The convincing argument is the same as establishing a solid argument since solid 
arguments are also about legitimising the therapy. 
 At the moment it’s all about making the argument and providing 
proof of concept.  And if we can do that and say we’ve done X,Y and 
Z and this is perfectly applicable to the clinic then it’ll make our lives 
easier to push it forward and getting money for your work.  So it’s all 
about building a solid argument that people will accept, believe 
whatever you want to call it, […].  IE12 
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The convincing argument is infused with safety and risk-benefit ratios, which will 
decide if FGT will be accepted by regulatory authorities.   
So for genetic conditions where we see factor 9 deficiency where it’s 
all or nothing, but with growth restriction or perhaps preterm labour, 
if someone previously delivered at 24 weeks and you prevented them 
from going into labour, then fantastic.  But if the delivery is predicted 
at 30 weeks, do you give them the therapy or not? It’s going to be a 
balance of risk of what you know from how good it is to the risk of 
giving the therapy.  IE2 
 
Another interviewee remarks: 
[…] it’s all about that risk-benefit ratio, which will alter across time 
depending on what data we generate and how many patients it’s been 
tried on.  So that’s constantly going to be in flux and could as easily 
go back the other way and completely cease to be as development has 
become wide spread.  Only time will tell.  IE5 
 
Therefore, constructing a convincing argument will depend on the facts of each case 
and is based upon the safety and risk-benefit ratios.  The convincing or solid 
argument is utilised not just for convincing regulators to permit clinical trials, but 
ultimately for patients.  The ‘convincing argument’ is about having strong scientific 
data that suggests that within a human model the treatment is efficacious and safe.  
However, mere fact is not enough because underlying the conveyance of that 
information is honesty and being a credible source of information.  Honesty about 
the difference between human and animal models; honesty about the uncertainties of 
treatment, despite the measures to mediate them appearing as conclusive; honesty 
about the massive “gamble”, as one interviewee put it, about taking the treatment, 
were all areas of consideration.  This honesty makes their advice credible. Credibility 
is central to the convincing argument, which is no different from other discplines and 
is dependent on trust as well as credibility (Wynne 2002), especially in areas where 
risk communication is needed (Renn and Levine 1991). 
 
One has to be clear that the sample refers to being up front and honest with patients, 
which differs from coercion.  For example, guidance from the USA indicates a 
clinician should recommend the treatment above all others if it is efficacious 
(American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics 1999).  The honesty of 
the FGT practitioner enhances the autonomy of the patient and facilitates choice as 
well as reinforcing the credibility of the FGT practitioners.  Therefore, implicitly 
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within the interview data the informed consent of the patient was a paramount 
consideration. It is a patient’s right whether or not to accept that uncertainty exists, 
and informed consent is the proposed method for resolution of the existing 
uncertainties (Djulbegovic 2001, Djulbegovic and Clarke 2001). 
 
Perhaps uncertainty should be viewed as a friend rather than an enemy of science 
(Djulbegovic 2001, Djulbegovic and Clarke 2001), because when it is recognised 
and acknowledged more effective resolutions can be devised (Djulbegovic 2004).  
Uncertainty cannot be eliminated from medical decisions (Martinez 2012, 
McCullough 2012). Therefore, one has to ask: 
Against the background of this growing unawareness and non-
knowledge in the wake of the modernization of knowledge, the 
question of deciding in a context of uncertainty arises in a radical 
way.  If we cannot know the effects of industrial research, action and 
production––as is already generally the case in the fields of genetic 
engineering and human genetics––if neither the optimism of the 
protagonists nor the pessimism of their critics is based on certain 
knowledge, then is there a green or red light for techno-industrial 
development and mass utilization (Beck 2000: 217)? 
 
This is where the FGT practitioners can address the issue of uncertainty.  The 
documents appear to ignore this issue by presenting linear value neutral balance 
between risk and benefit, which ignores the impact of risk if it occurs and how the 
severity of a ‘risk’ is perceived by the patient and or public (Slovic 1987).  Risk 
within the data and documents is reduced to statistical models focused within the 
clinic trial and laboratory setting (Beck 1992b, Prior, Glasner et al. 2004).  However, 
the convincing argument goes one step further and is about responsibly managing 
epistemic uncertainty within the clinic (Martinez 2012, McCullough 2012).   
 
In order to produce a convincing argument the ‘risk’ conveyed to patients will have 
to be understood and should include the perceived risks within society.  All these 
factors help manage uncertainty within FGT due to FGT practitioners having 
comprehensively thought through all the issues of uncertainty relevant to FGT 
(McCullough 2012).
255
  However, not evident within the document analysis is how 
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the uncompromising models for testing toxicology forces novel experimental 
medicine to conform to pre-existing models.  Therefore, the FGT practitioners are 
developing models to satisfy the current criteria for gene therapy toxicity studies, 
rather than developing toxicity models that best suit the FGT in order to resolve 
issues of uncertainty and safety.  Developing these models has slowed down 
progress, but not halted it.  The interviewees were aware that public acceptance and 
risk perception were important sub topics to mediating uncertainty, therefore, 
without in addition addressing how the patients would respond to risk, their strong 
argument would fail (Slovic 1987).  The acceptance of the role of abortion is a direct 
result of anticipation how patients may respond to the uncertainties of the treatment.  
However, that is different from the public’s perception, which includes the 
perception of FGT by non FGT practitioners.  In understanding the possible 
responses that patients potentially have to the risks of FGT, FGT practitioners are 
able to create ethically acceptable methods through collaboration. 
9.4.3 Producing ethical research through collaboration  
Beyond the ethical guidance from governing documents for clinical practice and 
scientific progress already identified, or the document analysis, ethical guidance is 
ingrained into research through collaboration and comparison of research.  
Collaboration works in several ways.  There is collaboration between the basic 
scientists and the clinically based scientists; collaboration between FGT practitioners 
in general; and collaboration between junior and senior FGT practitioners in general.  
The first type of collaboration appears as the most significant form of collaboration 
within the sample.  
Yeah, we’re totally plugged in with the clinicians as my boss is 
XXXX is a clinician.  The guys down XXXX are all clinicians, but 
we tend to take a more basic approach.  I’m not saying they don’t do 
basic science, but we just do basic science.  And we can be guided by 
the scepticism and enthusiasm, so for the XXXX stuff XXXX kept on 
saying that you’d never get an obstetrician putting a needle into a fetal 
XXXX, but a neurosurgeon will do this into an adult or child, but not 
an obstetrician because you’re poking a needle randomly.  So now 
we’re using vectors that can target the XXXX from an intravenous 
injection, which again obstetricians do put needles into the circulation 
and that’s an existing technology.  So yeah we are guided a lot by 
what they think and say.  IE3 
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The conversations that occur are important to produce work that has a higher 
probability of getting approval by external ethical bodies such as GTAC. 
IE2 So XXXX gene therapy, we did some ultrasound guided gene 
therapy into XXXX at the equivalent of 12 weeks pregnancy and it 
was jolly difficult.  We injected it but it was very difficult.  We didn’t 
have any losses but I can’t hand on heart say to mother that I am 
going to stick a needle under ultrasound guidance into your babies 
XXXX and it will be fine because I very much doubt that it will be 
fine.  
 RC Doubt you’d get GTAC approval for it. 
 IE2 Exactly, so what’s the point even going down that way.   
 
If communication of possible ethical dilemmas did not occur to basic scientists then 
the credibility of research could be negatively impacted.  This is a two way process 
between clinician and scientist. 
 RC So having that bridge between your blue sky thinkers and 
practitioners that see mothers day in day out with severe genetic 
conditions is important? 
 IE2 Sometimes I say to them “we can do so and so” and they’re 
like “o we didn’t know that you could do that in a human” and I’m 
like “Yeah!” or sometimes we have to say to them “why don’t we try 
it this way because we can go into circulation at 12 weeks” and 
they’re thinking ‘can we do that? ‘And I’m like “Yes you might have 
a miscarriage but hey, you warn them of that about the risk of 
miscarriage, we have to do that every day of the week when we do an 
amino” it’s a terrible thing to happen but they know what the risk is.   
 
Therefore, the reciprocal process is useful for both clinicians and basic scientists.  
The pooling of clinical and basic science produces research which avoids perceived 
ethical and practical barriers within the clinic.  There is recognition within the 
sample of the different factors within the treatment process and the consequence 
upon what is ethically acceptable practice.  These factors include: what is 
scientifically possible, what would be accepted by clinicians as a possible treatment 
option; what would be accepted by patients as a possible treatment option; and what 
would be accepted by ethics committees as an ethically acceptable practice.  Given 
that research is becoming more translational, from the laboratory to the clinic 
(Soderquest and Lord 2010), the communication of ethical dilemmas before 
translation occurs is important.  Because the fetus will hopefully become a child that 
collaboration occurs with neonatologists and scientists as mentioned above 
[IE3,6,11,12] and between disciplines to resolve scientific hurdles and guide practice 
[IE2,4,6]. 
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In identifying communication of perceived ethical dilemmas as an issue, autonomy is 
framed within choices already made by FGT practitioners.  The example used in the 
quote above [IE2] is referred to by many of the interviewees as an example of good 
collaboration between scientists and clinicians.  It also explicitly demonstrates the 
implicit bubble in which autonomy is framed within the documents.  The risk to the 
mother is held to be the paramount consideration, but in a truly autonomous system 
those risks should be weighed up by the pregnant woman.  However, because there 
are a vast number of stakeholders in clinical research, each with their own different 
perceptions of risk, there is a deep question of “whose risk is it anyway?” FGT 
practitioners, regulators, and the public legitimately have deep concerns about risk in 
clinical research, yet, these concerns should not excessively restrict research or 
eclipse the interests of patients (Deakin, Alexander et al. 2009).  As mentioned 
within the documentary analysis, autonomy appears within a paternalistic bubble 
because of risk concerns (See 6.4.3, 7.2.1 and 7.3).  Patients are increasingly trying 
to claim ownership of risk and to have a voice in decisions about the risk levels they 
are exposed to, thus bursting the paternalistic bubble (Epstein 1996).  Within the 
present circumstances the decision is not to research highly invasive fetal treatments 
whereby fetal interests do override the future autonomous choice of a pregnant 
woman.  It could even be said that the fetus has a right not to be manipulated because 
it would potentially become a full holder of human dignity.  Because of the future 
rights that the fetus would hold, agents have to act in a way that respects that future 
dignity (Knopoff 1991).  Therefore, it is within the ethical collaboration of scientists 
that the fetus as a patient concept and fetal rights emerge as significant restrictions 
upon the autonomy of mothers and FGT practitioners.   
9.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the interview data in relation to the research procedure frames FGT as 
another treatment option which is aiming to make the transition from an 
experimental treatment option to a normalised treatment option.  The FGT 
practitioners compare the experimental practice to other current normalised 
practices, thus giving them a target to achieve that would present FGT as a less 
radical practice.  However, by framing FGT as a treatment option several hurdles 
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arise besides the specific scientific hurdles, such as vectorology and engraftment 
rates, that could hinder the progress of FGT.  These factors include regulation, 
funding, the uncertainty of practice and other treatment options, in particular 
abortion.   
 
Regulation is not a major hindrance to the progress of FGT, because currently 
regulation and therapists are on a common path.  However, that homeostasis can be 
torn apart by one ‘unethical’ incident such as was the case for gene therapy.  Funding 
could emerge as another hurdle to the progress of FGT because historically in utero 
research is not an area privately funded due to liability for an unsuccessful outcome.  
The length of necessary follow-up coupled with the need for research to be 
continued beyond the time of the initial head FGT practitioner also cast doubts over 
where the necessary funding could be obtained.  The uncertainty of the treatment is a 
major concern to the sample because of the consequent effects of patients choosing 
abortion over FGT, where some risks cannot be known until the first clinical trials 
have been conducted.  Other treatment options pose significant questions about how 
to balance autonomy, ethics and scientific progress while also maintaining a practice 
that is socially acceptable.  It also raises questions about the underlying assumption 
of choice with regards to genetics, which cannot be ignored and needs monitoring. 
 
These hurdles can be mitigated by the safety studies that are currently being 
conducted, because from these safety studies the therapists can construct a 
convincing argument as to why the research should be allowed and why patients 
should choose to have the treatment.  There is an inherent understanding that certain 
practices would be tolerated by patients if they received ethical approval.  Here, 
communication and collaboration between the basic scientist and clinician is key to 
creating ethically acceptable work.  A convincing argument could be construed for 
practices that are just on the edge of social or ethical acceptability, thus 
strengthening the argument for therapy. 
 
However, concerns regarding the interplay between autonomy, scientific progress 
and the rights of others are apparent within the data.  These factors appear important 
in connection to the research questions.  The example of abortion indicates that when 
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autonomy, ethics and scientific progress collide there is no easy solution to fully 
reconcile all three.  The example of ethically acceptable research being created 
through collaboration is another area whereby the paternalistic bubble is created 
before patient choice, as was evident within the documentary analysis.  Therefore, 
autonomy is being restricted, which indicates that intergenerational aspects are 
restricting autonomy.  However these examples lead to questions about whether the 
resolution of this conflict is legitimate.  The application of the PGC is now important 
to find answers to these types of questions.  It is clear that human dignity as an 
abstract concept is not going to resolve these issues.  Therefore, in order to provide 
resolution to the potential issues chapter 10 will identify and select five of the most 
relevant issues from the data and will then ethically analyse the issues in order to 
help fulfil the target of the thesis. 
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Resolving Issues with the Principle of Generic Consistency 
10 Identifying Key Issues and Relationship Within the Data 
10.1 Introduction 
Having collected and analysed the data there are several issues that stand out in the 
data that need resolving.  Within the interview data it was evident that a practical 
hurdle to the progress of FGT was the option of other treatment options that 
definitively worked.
256
  Those options were either choosing to abort or choosing to 
do nothing.  It was clear within the data that there is a balancing act between the 
autonomy of the mother, ethical research, legal research and ethical regulation.  The 
balancing act was relevant to many issues including whose interest can override 
those of another within FGT, the problem of current regulatory restrictions, and the 
problem of uncertainty within FGT.  In order to resolve these issues the Principle of 
Generic Consistency (PGC) was identified in chapter 5 as the most appropriate 
ethical principle to do so.  It should be noted that although there are many issues that 
arise from the data this chapter will focus on the five selected issues outlined below.  
Before the PGC is used to identify, elaborate and attempt to resolve these issues, 
some definitional and procedural issues regarding rights will be attended to. 
 
Section 10.2 will outline the five main issues that arose out of the data sources and 
which all relate to the research questions. Section 10.3 examines the status of agency 
of the key individuals in FGT.  In sections 10.4 and 10.5 the chapter will return to 
the PGC by outlining the interaction between the agents and potential agents in order 
to connect the relationships to the issues highlighted in section 10.2.  Section 
10.6seeks to resolve the five issues since it is seen to be evident that there is a 
tension between autonomy and the rights of others as FGT progresses to the clinic. 
Section 10.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
 The issues fell into the five themes: human dignity, maternal choice, maternal 
autonomy, constraints upon clinical/research progress and uncertainty within the 
clinic.  All these highlight issues related to the three research questions and help to 
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narrow the application of the PGC in the thesis.  In order to apply the PGC to the 
outlined issues each ‘agent’ within the practice of FGT must be identified.  Those 
‘agents’ will be the mother, FGT practitioner, and the fetus.  Although it may appear 
purely agent focused, agents take into account their duties to others and, therefore, 
wider issues are taken into account, such as whether scientific progress should be 
continued (see 10.6).  Given that the roles of the mother and FGT practitioner differ 
within FGT, the mother will deal with issues surrounding the remit of rights; 
whereas the FGT practitioner analysis will focus upon the remit of duties within 
FGT.  By identifying those possible agents discussion can take place surrounding the 
relationship between the mother and FGT practitioner; the mother and fetus; and 
finally the FGT practitioner and fetus.  By discussing the relationship between 
parties under the PGC resolution to the issues identified at the beginning of the 
chapter can be found.  The PGC is also useful because it can identify the procedure 
that can resolve conflict, which might result in a set of specific or general rules, or in 
the need for adjudication by a third party in certain circumstances (where a case by 
case basis is needed outside of the rules) (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2006).   
10.2 Outlining issues 
The five issues that this chapter will focus on result from the findings in chapters 6 
to 9 and are as follows: 
1. Human dignity is not a useful concept within the practice of fetal gene 
therapy despite appearing to be so within regulation. 
2. Is the paternalistic bubble that maternal choice is situated within, 
ethically correct according to the PGC? 
3. Can a mother’s autonomy be overridden by fetal interests given that 
the point of intervention is the only viable point of correction? 
4. Are the current regulatory restrictions upon FGT practitioners 
justified?  
5. Does the inherent uncertainty within fetal gene therapy meet the 
criteria for informed consent or render it ineffectual given that the 
nature of that uncertainty will affect future generations and their 
future autonomy?  
 
Each of these issues needs elaboration in order to provide guidance upon the 
substantive point within each issue, and to understand how they relate to the aim of 
the thesis.  It will be apparent that the issues have overlapping themes.  Therefore, in 
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order to reduce repetition each theme will first be dealt with substantively and then 
referred back to where applicable. 
10.2.1 Issue1: Human dignity 
Here the underlying assumption that human dignity is a useful and prevalent concept 
within FGT and bioethics in general is questioned.  Section 6.3 presents human 
dignity as an explicit and implicit guide.  However, section 8.2 questions the 
usefulness of human dignity, concluding that human dignity was not prevalent in 
shaping the ethical practice of FGT practitioners.  Other concepts emerged within the 
interviews, such as the usefulness of collaboration between the differing disciplines 
to create more ‘ethical’ practice.  The identification of human dignity being the 
foundational tool of analysis within the thesis could lead to the conclusion that the 
utilisation of the PGC as an analytical tool is not applicable as it has been contended 
that human dignity is not a useful concept.  Two points rebuff that argument.  Firstly, 
the PGC is dialectically necessary;
257
 therefore, it does not rely upon abstract 
concepts for validation.  Secondly, as shown within chapter 5 even if the explicit 
concept of human dignity is rejected, then given the contingent human right 
argument of the PGC,
258
 the PGC can still be utilised as the ethical theory of 
analysis.  In fact, the term human dignity does not appear in Gewirth’s early work.  
However, the consequence of the PGC still being applicable is that the implicit 
nature of human dignity as identified within both data sets is relevant.  To assess the 
usefulness of the implicit nature of human dignity within the practice of FGT issues 
two to five must be assessed.   
10.2.2 Issue 2: Maternal autonomy 
Issue two relates to the tension between the autonomy of the mother and the rights 
and interests of the fetus. Sections 6.4, 8.3 and 8.4 indicate maternal autonomy is 
paramount, however what is critical here is whether the fetus has any moral status.  
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If it has then the rays of light identified in sections 6.6 and 8.3.3 become relevant.  It 
is important to state that ‘overriding’ refers to an active intervention to override a 
mother’s expressed wish.  An ‘override’ includes what a mother should morally do 
under the PGC to restrain their own autonomy in favour of her duties towards her 
fetus.  It should be noted that fetal status is also important within issue three.  If the 
fetus has moral status then situations may arise whereby restrictions to other agents 
may be justified.  Issue three also draws upon the dilemma of comparing the refusal 
of treatment postnatally to that in utero.
259
  Nevertheless, it is clear from the 
interview and documentary data that the mother’s autonomy is paramount and 
cannot be overridden.  Only fetal interests, not fetal rights, are taken into account in 
the research phases through safety and risk assessments.  However, is this enough?  
It is clear that the intergenerational aspect of FGT is highlighted because the answer 
to such an issue has to consider the possible effect on the next and future 
generations.  Central to answering this question is the weight given to those 
generations.  Therefore, the weight given to possible and future agents under the 
PGC is important because it will help ascertain which goods of each agent can 
override one another. 
10.2.3 Issue 3: Maternal choice 
As seen above sections 6.4, 8.3 and 8.4 indicate that the individual, i.e. the mother 
within FGT has paramount choice within the clinic. Identifying maternal choice 
makes one question whether maternal choice is absolute or not because sections 6.6 
and 8.3.3 indicate possible erosion of this principle.  More importantly, sections 7.3 
and 9.4 clearly show that, just as in regulating scientific progress, the result is a 
reduction in choice.  However, if autonomy is absolute then agents should be 
allowed to choose any treatment they deem appropriate.  If that is the case then 
regulation should reflect that position and not impose any paternalism.  Importantly, 
the issue is not about an individual’s ability to choose but about the restriction of 
choice before they even set foot into the clinic.  Therefore, issue three deals with 
regulation of FGT practitioners and what limits can be imposed upon them, as well 
                                                 
259
 If the parents of a child refused to consent to treatment then a doctor could apply for a court 
declaration to decide if treatment is in the child’s best interest. See Mental Capacity Act 2005 s1(5), 
15 and Children Act 1989 s1(1). 
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as the consequent effects further down the research trail such as long term follow-up.  
Therefore, issue three is linked to issue four because if the regulatory restrictions are 
justified, the consequent effect is that choice within the clinic will be restricted.  
Several questions arise about the specific point of choice within the clinic and human 
dignity.  Would any restriction of autonomy violate human dignity?  If choice was 
unrestricted, would a refusal of treatment violate human dignity if it did not respect 
species integrity?  Therefore, these types of question must be considered. 
10.2.4 Issue 4: Constraints of clinical practice and scientific progress 
Despite regulation not being viewed as a major concern in 9.3.1, it is clear from the 
data that some regulatory restrictions, such as germ line therapies and the high safety 
thresholds, constrain clinical practice and progress.  Therefore, issue four is linked to 
issue three.  The relationship between agents within the issue is important because if 
duties are owed between agents then, regardless of an ethical system that promotes 
pure autonomy, autonomy will be restricted by the duties held between agents.  The 
consequence is that these duties can be enshrined within regulation thus leading to a 
justified paternalistic bubble.  With regards to germ line prohibitions within FGT 
section 8.2.1 highlights that utilising human dignity as the foundation for a 
prohibition appears contradictory.  Surely eradicating conditions that make the 
simplest form of agency nearly impossible upholds human dignity?  Through the 
PGC it will be shown that the current prohibition is valid but the logic behind it 
needs to be corrected.  Regulation should focus upon the safety, risk and the state of 
current scientific knowledge as reasons for prohibiting germ line therapies within 
FGT (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, Deakin, Alexander et al. 2009, Editorial 
1999, Pattinson 2002).  The consequent effect for future generations is that by their 
interests not having agency, debilitating conditions would continue to plague future 
generations.  By focusing upon safety and current scientific knowledge it would also 
uphold the next generation’s interest in not being caused further harm to their agency 
abilities.  
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10.2.5 Issue 5: Uncertainty and clinical progress 
Finally, the interplay of informed consent and uncertainty appears as relevant to 
clinical progress.  Despite the scientific certainty within sections 7.3, 9.3.3 and 9.4 
indicate how the inherent uncertainty of scientific progress can impact upon future 
clinical trials by making FGT practitioners produce convincing arguments as well as 
ethical research through collaboration.  Importantly, the issue is not just about 
whether uncertainty renders informed consent impossible, but it also questions if the 
inherent uncertainty of FGT and the possible negative effect upon a future agent 
justifies prohibiting therapy completely.  To further complicate issues the rules 
governing the targeting of specific diseases indicates that therapy would be the only 
realistic chance to cure conditions with high morbidity and or mortality (Gene 
Therapy Advisory Committee 1998).  Therefore, the risk of an uncertain outcome 
has to be balanced against such regulation.  The issue also has to take into account 
how the inherent uncertainty has to be balanced against the future agent’s rights 
because ‘uncertainty’ may impose restrictions upon that future agent’s liberty, which 
may contravene the PGC. 
 
Within all these issues there is the underlying theme about how the individual is 
situated within the wider context of society and the human species.  For example, the 
paternalistic bubble could be formed by scientific endeavour through collaboration 
and perceived ethical approval or it could be created by society, for example the ban 
on social reproductive sex selection (Harris 2005a, b).  The interplay of other 
treatment options such as abortion in sections 9.3.3 and 9.3.4 highlight that these 
issues should be viewed within the wider social context and includes questions of 
moral inclusion.  
 
In order to resolve these issues the PGC will be used because, as outlined in chapter 
5, the PGC is deemed within the thesis as the most robust theory associated with 
human dignity.  Some of the issues above can be resolved by identifying the status of 
the fetus, because if the fetus has no moral status issues regarding choice will rest 
firmly with the mother and thus will not violate human dignity.  As a consequence if 
the fetus has no status questions over ethical practice become about public 
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acceptance rather than ethical practice.  It will also confirm that regulation within the 
area is ethically correct in relation to the PGC and therefore human dignity.  
However, before the PGC is used, procedural and definitional issues must be 
addressed.  These issues include the definition and remit of rights and duties, the 
difference between competing and conflicting rights, and clarification of future and 
potential agents. 
10.3 Issue over future and potential agents 
Within this chapter the terms future and potential agent are often referred to.  These 
terms must be clarified as they have differing meanings and protection under the 
PGC.  Future agents should not be confused with potential agents.  A future agent is 
a being that will in the future possess the intrinsic moral status of an agent rather 
than being a potential possessor.  Therefore, a future agent can be a being in the next 
or any future generation.  Yet a potential agent can only refer to a being whose 
agency status is unknown.  Pluhar (1995) advocates the use of the differentiation 
between future and potential agents.  The differentiation offers protection to those 
potential agents as future agents because potential agents have no moral intrinsic 
value.  To afford protection to those outside of these criteria (to essentially a future 
agent that has no moral intrinsic value under the PGC) stretches the credibility of 
duties under the PGC.  However, where an agent acts in such a way that the intention 
is to bring into being an agent, future agency becomes important (Beyleveld, 
Quarrell et al. 1998).  For example, where a mother chooses not to abort a fetus with 
the intention that she wishes the pregnancy to come to term and produce a child, the 
future health of that child becomes a relevant consideration.  Therefore, such future 
agency arguments are important where abortion is not an option due to the focus 
within the thesis upon intergenerational issues.  It should also be noted that any 
potential or future agent that possesses any form of behaviour synonymous with 
agency will be afforded protection through the ASA and precautionary principle.  
Therefore, a fetus at best is a potential agent if future agency is not considered. 
 
It is worthwhile noting that within this chapter, and throughout the thesis, the agency 
relevant issues are related to treatment of debilitating characteristics rather than those 
which seek to genetically enhance an agent’s capacity.  Therefore, intervention is to 
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rectify the agent to within ‘normal functioning parameters’ in the scientific sense of 
the word.  Also, the argument deployed under the PGC is valid for both somatic and 
germ line interventions (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 155).  The effect is that if 
it is permissible to have somatic interventions that would uphold the dignity of a 
fetus then the same is true of a germ line intervention.   
 
In order to identify resolutions to the issues, the PGC will be used to identify the 
status of the mother, FGT practitioner and fetus.  Because of the clinical situation in 
which the mother is found the analysis will be conducted relatively to her rights and 
the FGT practitioners will be analysed in terms of their duties to other agents.  
However, both analyses are relevant to both types of agent. 
 
By identifying the ethical position of the potential agent issues arise surrounding the 
tensions between autonomy and which way those conflicts could be resolved under 
the PGC.  As stated within chapter 5, the resolution of the same conflict could result 
in two different answers under the PGC, both of which are permissible under the 
PGC.  Therefore, an issue can arise where agents cannot agree about which 
permissible route to take under the PGC (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2006).  
Ultimately, the PGC must call time upon disagreements and where there are many 
plausible outcomes the agents involved must settle their difference either by consent 
or because the PGC requires a determination (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2006).   
 
Before the status of each being involved is assessed it is important to address the role 
of third parties such as fathers, society and the state.  These parties may have 
legitimate status within certain decisions of FGT.  Where appropriate their role and 
possible rights and interests will be assessed and highlighted.  It should be noted that  
Gewirth contends the PGC is a community of rights because society must enforce 
each other’s rights, but also because agents have to recognise and accept obligations 
to society such as social contribution (Gewirth 1996).
260
  Therefore, society is, in 
effect, being taken into consideration in the analysis and exercising of individual 
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rights.  So what are these rights and interests of a mother, FGT practitioner or fetus?  
Each will be analysed individually before moving on to the relationships between 
these parties. 
10.4 Status of beings 
10.4.1 Mother 
The PGC was outlined in 5.5 but in short the PGC can be summed up as: I have a 
right to have the generic features and other possible agents have a right to have the 
generic features ≡ All agents have a right to have the generic features ≡ Principle of 
Generic Consistency.  (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, Gewirth 1978).
261
   
 
Therefore, an individual, in this case a mother, with full capacity has full moral 
status under the PGC.  Therefore, she is entitled to the basic goods, which includes 
life itself, capacities involved to make choices and the mental equilibrium sufficient 
to translate one’s preference into active pursuit of one’s purpose (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001).  They are also entitled to the non subtractive goods and 
additional goods that all agents under the PGC are entitled. 
 
There is no controversy about the status of a pregnant woman as an agent under the 
PGC.  She has the right to choose what medical treatment she can refuse or consent 
to.  That position is confirmed and reinforced within the documentary analysis and 
within the interview sample.
262
  However, case law in relation to autonomy clearly 
indicates that there is a limit to what a person can consent to.
263
  Also, there is a 
qualitative difference between the right to consent and the right to refuse.  The case 
law centres upon a positive right rather than the negative right of non interference.  
Therefore, human dignity emerges as a merely constraining, apparently self afflicting 
conduct.  The case law clearly indicates that there is an objective value attached to 
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human dignity.
264
  However, under the PGC an agent has the ability to waiver their 
own generic rights, unless doing so leads to, or involves, the violation of a duty to 
another agent.  A prime example is suicide, whereby under the PGC an agent can 
end their own life because, in a way similar to the abstract concept of human dignity, 
the rights under the PGC are categorical instrumental ones, not intrinsic ones 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  However, Gewirth maintains that there are 
certain duties to oneself.  If Gewirth is correct then the paternalistic bubble created 
by regulation and evident within the documentary and interview data will be justified 
because regulators would be justified in creating legislation that sought to prevent 
actions that violated those objective standards. 
 
Gewirth raises three specific points in relation to duties to oneself.  They consist of  
distinguishing between an agent’s present and longer range (future) perspective; 
differentiating between different aspects of the psyche and maintaining an 
equilibrium; and thirdly treating various aspects of one’s agency as agents that have 
rights, thus evoking the duties that one would hold against another agent (another 
form of equilibrium) (Gewirth 1978: 336). 
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001: 106-108) offer a concise and focused analysis of 
the three propositions, which focus upon three simple responses.  Firstly, the PGC is 
not a duty under the PGC, but a rational requirement; it is dialectically necessary, 
therefore deriving duties from others does not derive from duties to oneself; and 
finally, the balancing of different parts of agency are only components of agency not 
separate singular pieces of agency.  Ultimately, the PGC is based upon a will 
conception of rights.  Therefore, one can waive their own rights, hence eliminating 
or rejecting any duty owed to oneself.  Therefore, regardless of the arguments 
utilised by Gewirth, if committing suicide is acceptable (Gewirth 1978) then 
regardless of the hierarchy or equilibrium that Gewirth proposes, the right to waiver 
rights to oneself will ultimately prevail.  The consequence of such an ethical theory 
means that a mother can waiver her rights in relationship to herself, which could lead 
to her own death if she wishes. 
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On first inspection regulation should allow any self afflicting treatment chosen by 
the individual regardless of the risk.  The consequence would be that FGT 
practitioners could invest in treatments that had a high risk to benefit ratio and leave 
that decision up to the patient.  A stark example of this is chemotherapy patients who 
have little or no chance of surviving treatment.  Therefore, futile treatment at any 
cost could be developed, because the choice of risk lies with the agent.  
 
However, within pregnancy there are two aspects to medical treatment that result in 
treatment not being a purely self afflicting piece of conduct.  Firstly, within any 
medical treatment a physician or team of scientists, nurses, radiologists and so on 
would be needed; and secondly, within pregnancy there is the embryo or fetus to 
consider.  Because the status of the embryo is in question, utilising precautionary 
theory identifies that treatment within pregnancy involves another possible agent.  
With all things being equal that possible agent would develop into a child which 
would possess the abilities and cognitive functions which that impairment dictates.  
Therefore, the status of other beings such as the FGT practitioner and fetus also need 
identifying as they may identify a conflict of rights or the imposition of duties, which 
can constrain the rights of an agent. 
10.4.2 FGT practitioners 
FGT practitioners are agents who have the same rights and duties as any agent under 
the PGC.  Therefore, the focus within this section will be upon their duties towards 
other agents.   These duties will be relevant for the mother as well because these 
duties apply to all agents.  It could be argued that they also have a duty (the strength 
of which is dependent on who that third party is) to third parties such as society in 
general and the environment because of the possible consequences of their work. 
 
Within FGT there is the need for additional help from a whole team including 
scientists.  The same rights and duties apply to those team members.  Therefore, they 
are also under duty to prevent possible direct or indirect harm to rights holders.  It is 
important to note that such duties mean that FGT practitioners are also under a duty 
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to provide accurate information throughout the research process and must not falsify 
information.  
 
In order to comply with the PGC, a FGT practitioner should not place an agent under 
risk of generic harm, which includes killing another agent or performing unnecessary 
procedures.  Under the PGC it is also impermissible to put possible agents at risk of 
generic harm where this is not likely to prevent greater generic harm to a possible 
agent (Pattinson 2002: 133).  Such statements impose duties between agents which 
result in certain restrictions being imposed because of the duties imposed upon an 
agent to another agent.  For example, the uses of risk-benefit ratios within new 
treatments which would establish the levels of possible harm.  Another is the 
creation of clinical equipoise, which means a doctor cannot waiver the duty to 
provide the best treatment or act in their patient’s best interest (Freedman 1987).265  
Therefore, risk minimisation is a key principle (Council of International 
Organisations on Medical Science 2002, World Health Organisation 2002, World 
Medical Association 1947).  However, risk minimisation requires the reduction of 
risk to another agent but not the maximisation of benefits (Sachs 2011).  Risk 
minimisation is best characterised by risk-benefit calculations within the data (Health 
and Safety Executive 2007).
266
  
 
Within the interview sample it is evident that a self imposed style of regulation 
would be in place even if an ‘at any cost’ mantra to research was prevalent, because 
of the reaction of both society and the media to gene therapy.  The Jesse Gelsinger 
and Jolee Mohr are stark examples of the public and media reaction.  The maverick 
paternalist would be greeted with the same reaction, which is possibly best seen 
within the Alder Hey inquiry whereby acts that were illegal and immoral were not 
mediated by the beneficial effect that occurred (House of Commons 2001). 
 
Rights are not absolute and duties are no different.  Duties may be imposed through 
legislation or a moral framework.  Nonetheless, where those duties conflict with the 
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agents own rights then a limit can be placed upon the duties imposed by a rights 
holder.  For example, a rights holder has a right to an abortion, but only in so far as 
the clinician in question is not a conscientious objector.
267
  The conflict of rights here 
amounts to the imposition of a duty to refer to another clinician who does not object 
(General Medical Council 2011).  
 
It is worthwhile noting that under the PGC an agent is under a duty not to treat 
another agent merely as a means (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, Gewirth 1978).  
Such instances include treating another agent as if they cannot express their own will 
or refuse consent.  Therefore, a FGT practitioner must accept the refusal to treatment 
of another regardless of how they arrived at that conclusion.
268
 They are also under a 
duty not to utilise patients purely as research tools, which would instrumentalise the 
patient and be contrary to the PGC. 
 
However, there is a limit to the amount of paternalism or restriction of choice that 
can be exercised.  For example, if something is merely difficult then regulation 
should not restrict FGT practitioners from doing such practices without justification 
to do so.  Restrictions can be imposed where rights between agents are competing or 
are in conflict.  Within pregnancy identifying the status of the fetus is paramount in 
considering whether there is any conflict or competitive rights at stake.  If the fetus 
does have protection as an agent then further restrictions or duties can be imposed 
upon an agent because some agents need protecting due to their inability to protect 
themselves. 
10.4.3 Fetus 
Under the PGC the fetus is considered as a potential or future agent.  Both future and 
potential agents can have their own interests taken into account and in some 
circumstances have its interests protected.  It is here where the status of the fetus is 
assessed.  However, it should not be considered that the fetus is a patient, but rather 
as a being where its agency status is unknown. 
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 The only caveat is for those who lack capacity to consent, which is not within the remit of this 
thesis.  
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The document analysis clearly indicates that the fetus has no legal status.
269
  
Although apparently obvious, under the PGC a potential agent does not have any 
duties imposed upon it; however, what protection a potential agent receives is 
problematic (Beyleveld, Quarrell et al. 1998).  In order to ascertain whether or not 
one is confronted with a potential agent the two evidential rules are used as identified  
in 5.8 (See Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998: 27).  To aid our evaluation of a being’s 
agency status there are four categories of empirical evidence (Beyleveld and 
Pattinson 1998) which can be used under precautionary theory when there is conflict 
between the fetus and mother, or the fetus and third party.  Therefore, if there is 
evidence of a possible agent showing patterned organismic behaviour (displayed by 
living organisms); purposive behaviour (as being motivated by feeling and desire); 
intelligent behaviour (as being susceptible to learning by experience); or rational 
behaviour (value-guided, and characteristics of an agent) (Beyleveld and Pattinson 
1998) an agent must accept the possibility that the being may be an agent itself.  In 
terms of rights and duties these vary as potential agency increases during pregnancy.  
Yet, a potential agent has an interest in receiving treatment, which would increase 
the agent’s ability to carry out functions if the risk to increasing the harm already 
sustained was outweighed by the benefit that the fetus would receive (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2006, Pattinson 2002). 
 
As it has been stated, an agent only acquires human dignity through agency.  
However, those who can display proportionate features of agency will be afforded 
that same proportion of protection under the PGC (Beyleveld and Brownsword 
2001).  A practical example is abortion.  The example of abortion is useful within the 
context of FGT because within the data abortion was highlighted as an area of ethical 
concern.  Whether abortion is contrary to the PGC is dependent on whether 
terminating a fetus involves less of a violation of the PGC than is involved in 
causing generic harm to the fetus and/or mother (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2006).  
Therefore, destroying an embryo or fetus is not a violation of human dignity per se 
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(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  Where it can be said there is a sound rights 
based argument then abortion will not be contrary to the PGC.   
 
The rights based argument must take into consideration that an embryo or fetus will 
never have a greater moral status than the mother and an embryo has a lower moral 
status than a fetus.  Therefore, where a pregnancy places the mother’s life in 
immediate danger an abortion will not be contrary to human dignity.  However, this 
restriction must be made on a sound rights based argument.  This is comparable to 
the justification that parental autonomy can be restricted in a child's best interest.
270
 
Whether the current ‘abortion on demand’ limit of 24 weeks is justifiable is 
questionable under the PGC.  Before week 12, the embryo is simply a collection of 
cells that show no purposiveness.  Yet, post twelve weeks of gestation a fetus can 
start to exhibit purposiveness.  Once sensory nerves have reached the skin, which 
occurs at about 10 weeks, mechanical stimulation of the body can produce reflex 
movements (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2010).  Also, at 
about 18 weeks a fetus will withdraw from a needle and launch a stress response 
following needle puncture (Gitau, Fish et al. 2004).  However, it has been argued 
that a fetus cannot feel pain until week 24 of gestation because the cortex is not 
intact, which is perceived as fundamental in the perception of pain (Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2010).  Pain is merely just one piece of evaluative 
data for the purpose of agency but post 24 weeks agency relevant features appear to 
be more prominent.  However, the biological development of a fetus suggests that a 
fetus has agency relevant features before 24 weeks.  From week 13 rapid body 
development occurs while the fetus takes on more human features and beyond 16 
weeks starts to move (Tortora and Grabowski 2001).   
 
Therefore, between 12 and 24 weeks the fetus should be attributed some protection 
under the PGC with precautionary theory because the biological development of the 
fetus indicates that some protection should be imposed.  Therefore, if FGT occurs 
before 12 weeks then issues over ethical research and the balancing of rights and 
duties between mother and fetus are irrelevant.  After 24 weeks where there is a 
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conflict or competition of rights then the threshold for a mother’s right to triumph 
over the fetus’ right to life will be significantly higher.  Between weeks 12 and 24 
precaution must be taken. 
 
The abortion analysis can be translated into the FGT debate.  As has been seen in 
chapter 2, ideally FGT should occur before the immunological response of the fetus 
has developed, which has been recognised as early as the 13
th
 week of gestation 
(Coutelle, Themis et al. 2005).  Currently interventions have been targeted post week 
7 when the primordial germ cells have been compartmentalised due to the possibility 
of inadvertent germ line transmission (Coutelle and Rodeck 2002, David and Peebles 
2008) with week 14 being the point of intervention in the in utero stem cell 
transplantation for X linked SCID trials (Westgren, Ringdén et al. 2002).  The point 
of intervention will be condition dependant, but one cannot ignore the possibility of 
embryo gene therapy because the fetal stage occurs after the 56
th
 day of gestation 
(Tortora and Grabowski 2001).  If that is so, then there should also be an analysis of 
the ethics of in utero therapy in general rather than just specifically FGT. 
 
There are practical implications that would suggest that FGT would occur within the 
fetal development period because, unless pre implantation genetic diagnosis is 
conducted or the parents genetic history is known, then the relevant information 
would be acquired at 10 weeks from the first ultrasound scan, or 12 weeks from a 
CVS, or 14 weeks from amniocentesis or 20 weeks from the second ultrasound scan 
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2005).  Therefore the majority 
of FGT will fall within a grey area whereby substantive analysis is needed to ensure 
ethical research and ethical regulation occurs, as the X linked SCID trials indicated 
by being conducted at 14 weeks of gestation (Westgren, Ringdén et al. 2002). 
 
Having mentioned future agents, it is worthwhile identifying what protection, rights 
and duties future agents have.  Future agency is engaged when an agent acts in such 
a way that a potential agent will manifest itself as an agent in the future.  Under the 
PGC agents owe duties to future agents as agents equal to those that they owe to 
present agents (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, Pattinson 2002).  Future agents 
only acquire protection if they are treated in a way that allows them to develop 
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(Pluhar 1995).  However, a future agent has protection as a potential agent because 
of the characteristics that it possesses at the current time.  The importance of future 
agency is simple and is demonstrated in a situation where a mother acts in such a 
way that she is willing to give birth to a child and can take into account the interests 
of that future agent visa vie the child.  In other words, the long term prospect of that 
potential agent can be considered as well as the potential agent’s current interests.  
Therefore, if FGT occurred before the 12
th
 week of gestation only a future agent 
would have any interest worth taking into consideration as it is clear from the 
abortion debate that pre week 12 a mother’s rights will always trump the embryo’s 
interests. 
 
Under the PGC agents are required to take into account the generic rights that a 
potential agent will possess in the future.  As a result, problems emerge in relation to 
fetuses that have genetic conditions meaning that they will never fully posses all the 
basic goods required for agency.  It is clear that in the majority of cases the reason 
that FGT will be needed is because those future agents will not possess the generic 
features needed to function.  Therefore, depending on when FGT occurs one could 
legitimately argue that the fetus has nothing to lose, thus reengaging earlier risk-
benefit arguments.  However, if it is known that the fetus will never gain GFA then 
what duty do other agents have towards it?  Quite simply an agent with no generic 
features is dead and, therefore, not relevant.  A condition such as Gaucher’s disease, 
which severely compromises the ability of an agent to use their GFA does not 
indicate that they have no protection under the PGC because of precautionary theory.  
Therefore, those potential agents still have limited protection under the PGC. 
 
Having identified the status of the three main beings within fetal gene therapy, the 
relationship between those agents must be examined in order to help identify the 
solutions to the issues outlined at the beginning of the chapter. 
10.5 Relationship between beings 
10.5.1 Mother and FGT practitioner 
Both mother and FGT practitioner are agents with full generic features under the 
PGC.  Therefore, the relationship between the two rests upon rights and correlating 
247 
 
duties.  There is little in the way of controversy to say that when a mother presents 
herself to a FGT practitioner she has a right, at least to some extent, to medical 
treatment (Jackson 2009).  FGT practitioners within that relationship have a duty to 
treat a patient subject to their clinical judgement, the consent of the patient and the 
possibility of being a conscientious objector.  
 
In order to provide consent mothers need all the available information so that they 
can come to an informed decision.  Therefore, consent procedures provide a set of 
correlating duties for the FGT practitioner to fulfil.  Under the non subtractive duties 
of the PGC, FGT practitioners have a duty to provide accurate information in order 
to facilitate consent.  The documents and interview data strongly support that stance 
(See 6.4.2 and 8.3).  However, the inherent uncertainty within FGT makes the notion 
of one hundred per cent accurate information unattainable.  The caveat of ‘something 
might occur that we are not sure of’ within gene therapy cannot truly be said to be a 
low risk until human studies are done.  Therefore, the distinction between research 
and therapy is central.  Research refers to ‘an activity designed to test a hypothesis 
and contribute to generalizable knowledge’ and that ‘the practice of accepted 
therapy’ are ‘interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of an 
individual patient and that have a reasonable expectation of success’ (Office for 
Protection of Risks 1979).  Therefore, a FGT practitioner is under a duty to explain 
the difference between therapy and research, but also to explain the experimental 
nature of research.  They are under a duty to explain all the possible treatment 
options and what each treatment option involves, as well as the relative risks and 
chances of success (Pattinson 2002). 
 
Following the informed consent process a mother has the right to accept or decline 
treatment and the FGT practitioner has a duty to accept the decision.  Regulation 
consistently reflects that position (General Medical Council 2009b).
271
  Yet, as stated 
in Section 5.5 whether choice is being truly exercised is another issue.  Undue 
influence or coercion is not acceptable as under the voluntariness of the PGC choice 
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is exercised as an unforced choice.  Consent due to coercion is no different from 
forced choice as there are compulsory undesirable outcomes which the agent must 
choose, with a realistic threat of another worse choice if the option is not consented 
to (Gewirth 1978: 252).  Within the context of FGT such coercion would include 
manipulating information or applying pressure to take a course of action that was not 
freely entered into. 
 
Important for this relationship is the balance between the duty of the FGT 
practitioner to reduce the risk of treatment and the mother’s autonomy to choose 
what risks she is willing to take.  It has been suggested that where a treatment option 
is unethical because the risk is too high, that is paternalism in action (Pattullo 1982).  
Paternalism was evident within the documentary analysis whereby autonomous 
choice was only actionable within a paternalistic bubble.
272
  Therefore, if a mother 
presents herself willing to consent to any procedure and there is a team of FGT 
practitioners willing to do the procedure, where is the ethical dilemma?  
 
Although this is an apparent pragmatic and logical question, the answer is there is no 
dilemma.  FGT practitioners within this relationship still have the duty not to put the 
patient under unnecessary risks, which is trumped by a mother’s right to choose.  For 
example, when a treatment course is dangerous for a mother she can choose to take 
that course regardless of the risk to her own life.  However, a FGT practitioner is still 
under a duty not to damage agency relevant features of another agent.  The most of 
extreme of which would be to kill another agent.  Therefore, any ‘treatment’ that is 
actively seeking a result that would lead to the death of the mother would not be 
justified under the PGC.  Therefore, the duties upon FGT practitioners imposes a 
restriction upon the type of treatments, which justifies the paternalism within 
research and clinical ethics (Jansen and Wall 2009)   
 
Here ‘actively’ refers to any treatment whereby the main accepted result is death and 
includes any result that is achieved recklessly or negligently.  Therefore, the issue of 
double effect is a relevant consideration.  The legality of double effect is not up for 
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debate within this thesis, but it is clear within the FGT scenario that it may be 
irresistible not to infer criminal liability due to a strong causal link which is distinct 
from the palliative care situation whereby death is inevitable (Jackson 2006).  
Therefore, double effect is not an important consideration here.  One has to 
remember that the status of the fetus will be important within FGT, because the 
possible implications could affect the relationship between the mother and the FGT 
practitioner.  Therefore, the relationship between mother and fetus should be 
explored. 
10.5.2 Mother and fetus 
The relationship between the mother and fetus is one that in the majority of 
circumstances does not need to be explored because pregnant women will most often 
do what is best for their fetus (Rothman 1994).  In those circumstances a discussion 
surrounding competing and conflicting rights is not relevant.  However, due to the 
symbiotic relationship, many treatments have different implications for each being, 
which can mean that each being’s interests do not align (Dickens and Cook 2003). 
 
Because the relationship between the mother and fetus is constantly changing the 
amount of weight given to the potential agent grows as the fetus grows.  Yet, given 
the practical considerations explained above, the focus is on the relationship beyond 
the 12
th
 week of gestation.  That is not to say that the position is the same for FGT 
that could occur earlier than week 12 of gestations, but because of time and space the 
analysis will be focused upon the status of the fetus from 12 weeks onwards.  The 
only compromise to this position is when a mother confirms the status of future 
agency upon the embryo.  However, that consideration is dealt with by the general 
consideration of future agents. 
 
As stated earlier, agents owe duties to future agents as agents equal to those that they 
owe to present agents (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, Pattinson 2002).  
Nevertheless, where a mother is expressly stating that she will continue the 
pregnancy then one may take into account the future as well as current interests of 
the fetus.  However, the position is dependent on there being no countervailing or 
overriding rights of others that would be violated by employing a particular 
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technology (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001:155).  Therefore, it has been argued 
that these duties include the duty of easy rescue (Savulescu 2007), the duty to seek 
medical attention for her sick child (Knopoff 1991).  Here, unlike other special 
relationships that are forged between parents and children, the mother is in a unique 
position to help the fetus (Knopoff 1991).  Clearly a competing and overriding right 
is that of the mother’s autonomy to that of the fetus’ right to potentially having full 
agency relevant rights.  FGT involves having to obtain the consent of the mother 
because of the violation of her bodily integrity that has to occur in order to operate 
upon the fetus.  Therefore, any fetal rights must be balanced against the mother’s 
autonomy and the invasion of her bodily integrity.  Conversely a mother’s autonomy 
is enough to allow access to the fetus in order to operate. 
 
Here, it is the difference between a potential agent and a future agent that is pivotal 
to what interests can be considered.  A future agent with a debilitating condition 
would have an interest in gaining agency relevant characteristics.  Under the PGC an 
agent owes future agents equal rights and interests as those granted to present agents.  
Therefore, if there was no countervailing and overriding rights  it would be a 
violation of a future agent’s generic rights not to have FGT employed (Beyleveld 
and Brownsword 2001: 154-155).  However, there is no obligation upon the 
pregnant woman to confer the status of future agency on a fetus just because, at that 
point in time, there is fetal therapy which potentially could be used to cure or prevent 
her fetus’ condition (Chervenak, McCullough et al. 1994).  Her overriding rights are 
her own autonomy and right to bodily integrity.  However, where a mother acts in 
such a way as to refuse the option of abortion it could be contended that where the 
future health of that potential child is taken into consideration within the remit of 
conditions that can only be treated in utero, then the question turns to a balance 
between the autonomy of the mother and the condition in question to be treated. 
 
Although ‘enhancement’ is not distinctly within the remit of the thesis it is worth 
briefly considering whether in this relationship there is a moral obligation to create 
children with the best chance of life (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, Buchanan, 
Brock et al. 2000, Pattinson 2002, Savulescu and Kahane 2009).  As described 
earlier in the thesis the discussion of FGT is focused upon therapy rather than 
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enhancement.  But if there is a persuasive argument for enhancements then 
corrective therapies would automatically be included.  Yet, under the PGC it is clear 
that enhancements are not needed for an agent to be able to exercise their GFA.  
Therefore, an agent has no generic right to an enhancement (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001). 
 
Although outside the jurisdictional remit of this thesis it is worthwhile noting that 
some American states, such as South Carolina and Utah, prioritise duties within 
pregnancy over a mother’s autonomy.273  Therefore, establishing duties within FGT 
may have a more persuasive effect in certain jurisdictions.  However, a duty is not 
the same as a compulsory duty.  Under the PGC one may have duties to another and 
can act against those duties if they wish, but they will be acting in an immoral way.  
The severity of punishment that ensues depends upon the duty at stake.  The 
punishment will depend upon the relationship between the parties.  Therefore, 
another relationship to examine is that of the fetus and FGT practitioner as the FGT 
practitioner may have duties towards the fetus. 
10.5.3 FGT practitioner and fetus  
Unlike the relationship between a mother and FGT practitioner, which is the 
relationship between two separate autonomous beings with full agency; the 
relationship between fetus and FGT practitioner is complicated by the location and 
increasing agency status of the fetus.  There is, however, a direct relationship 
between FGT practitioner and fetus in two situations.  Firstly, where the mother has 
consented to a procedure that allows access to the fetus; and secondly, from their 
general duty within the PGC to take into account the rights and interests of potential 
and future agents. 
 
It is apparent from the first situation that the relationship between FGT practitioner 
and fetus is heavily dependent on the mother as a gate keeper.  In fact, it has been 
argued that it is here where conflict within the maternal fetal divide is created.  
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Therefore, the discussion should be centred upon maternal physician conflict (Van 
Bogaert and Dhai 2008).  Nonetheless, where the mother has consented, the rights 
and duties will never be more than that owed to the mother because the mother is an 
agent compared to the ‘potential agency’ status of the fetus. 
 
Under the PGC regulation should not restrict therapy that seeks to help those 
possible agents that would be non-viable or would have a low moral status that 
would significantly impair their ability to exercise functions under the PGC.  
Therefore, the safety and risk elements that need to be satisfied would be condition 
dependent.  For example, conditions such as Edwards syndrome
274
 or type two 
Gaucher’s disease275 would have a significantly lower risk threshold than a condition 
such as haemophilia, which can be treated postnatally. 
 
However, the approach above appears to have an ‘at any cost’ for those debilitating 
conditions such as Edwards syndrome whereby the risk threshold that needed to be 
crossed would essentially be that of imminent death to the fetus as agency function is 
severely limited because of the condition.  Without regulation, stopping the ‘at any 
cost’ mantra for a fetus could be utilised if the damage to the mother is limited.  In 
other words, where the risk to the mother is low, where is the harm in a high risk 
strategy for diseases which severely debilitate the functioning of agency?  
 
Excluding the relationship and correlating duties to the mother, it appears that under 
the PGC as long as further harm to a fetus does not occur as a result of the treatment 
then it should be pursued.  That includes conducting research where it is known not 
to produce a benefit.  These conditions must apply to both potential and future agents 
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because it is morally impermissible under the PGC to inflict further harm to the 
GFA. 
 
By applying the PGC to the different relationships evident in the five issues 
identified at the start of the chapter it is clear that these relationships need to be 
applied.  The relationship between mother and FGT practitioner appears contingent 
upon a mutual relationship between the two, with a duty upon the FGT practitioner 
to act within the confines of those duties.  However, once the relationship between 
mother and fetus as well as fetus and FGT practitioner are introduced the picture is 
not as straight forward.  Other duty based obligations are then in play, which may 
impact upon the application of the PGC upon the issues.  The FGT practitioner has 
an obligation towards the fetus (gestational dependant) as well as the mother having 
a duty to help her fetus develop into a child, once she has decided not to abort.  
Therefore, the balancing of these obligations and rights must be applied within the 
issues. 
10.6 Resolving issues 
For the sake of completeness all the issues outlined in section 10.2 will be dealt with 
in the order that they are outlined.  There is significant overlap between the issues 
and hence the resolutions.  Therefore, where the resolutions overlap the reader will 
be referred to the initial discussion of that theme.  Where relevant, the interests of 
third parties such as the state and father will be addressed.  However, it must be 
considered that the resolutions to these issues are yet to be situated within a social 
context.  Therefore, they are ideal philosophical resolutions that are yet to be 
mediated by society, even though under the PGC the following resolutions are what 
‘ought’ to happen.  Once the issues have been addressed the chapter will conclude. 
10.6.1 Issue 1: Human dignity is not a useful concept within the 
practice of fetal gene therapy despite appearing to be so within 
regulation 
The first issue relating to the usefulness of human dignity is answered without 
reference to specific agents but in reference to the PGC.  As has already been stated, 
the usefulness of the term ‘human dignity’ as an explicitly used concept is answered 
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by the FGT practitioner’s views.276  However, the PGC also shows that the intrinsic 
nature of human dignity as identified by the documentary analysis is problematic.   
 
To have a will conception of rights means that human dignity cannot be intrinsic in 
the same sense that the documentary analysis identifies.  Human dignity is dependent 
on the formulation of the PGC and the resulting rights and duties.  Therefore, for 
human dignity to be done acts must be in accordance with the PGC.  It is the implicit 
nature of human dignity that becomes important as suggested by the interview data 
and the further documentary analysis.  Therefore, to ascertain if human dignity is a 
useful concept, the answers to the issues below become important as they outline 
whether or not FGT is implicitly contrary to human dignity.  
 
Despite being able to prove that human dignity as an underlying concept is important 
through the PGC, it is strongly emerging as an intrinsic concept that adds nothing 
significant to the discussion (Gewirth 1983, Macklin 2003, Melo-Martin 2011, Salvi 
2001).  It is an uncompromising concept when it is raised in order to question the 
legitimacy of any other position (Somsen 2005).  Therefore, human dignity is an 
important analytical tool when associated with an ethical theory (in this case the 
PGC) as an implicit concept.  However, human dignity as an explicit stand-alone 
concept is not a useful or necessary practical tool for regulation or practice of FGT. 
 
Despite stating that human dignity as an explicit tool is not useful, it does appear as a 
concept that will continue be used for the foreseeable future.  The use of human 
dignity allows regulators to avoid the appearance that they are seeking to regulate 
morality and it has the political advantage of avoiding taking a particular religious 
perspective (Caulfield 2003).  In addition, the frequency and level of the documents 
in which human dignity is explicitly cited means that the explicit use ‘human 
dignity’ is here to stay. 
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10.6.2 Issue 2: Can a mother’s autonomy be overridden by fetal 
interests given that the point of intervention is the only viable 
point of correction? 
From the data it was seen that a mother’s autonomy within FGT is paramount.277  
However, this causes tension for regulators where autonomy is placed above 
everything else.  Issue two indicates that a carte blanche remit of autonomy is not 
possible within a theory or system that advocates rights and duties.  Therefore, 
autonomy is justifiably restricted in certain situations.  It is already evident that the 
paternalistic bubble can be increased to include fetal interests and this can affect 
maternal choice.  However issue three, below, looks to take that restriction further.  
It seeks to restrict autonomy after the paternalist bubble has been created.  It is here 
that the relationship between mother and fetus is crucial.  It is clear that the ultimate 
decision of life or death of a fetus under the PGC is justified until week 12 whereby 
the status of the fetus is unclear.  Therefore, it is the relationship after week 12 that 
must be examined, which will be applicable to future agents where abortion is not an 
option for a mother. 
 
It must be contended that where a mother is not willing to have an abortion, she is 
under a duty to consider the future agent’s interest.  Considering that the rules 
dictating when FGT treatments can be developed mean that there are no postnatal 
treatments, then it is in that future agent’s interest to undergo therapy (See Gene 
Therapy Advisory Committee 1998).  Therefore, a mother is under a duty to future 
agents to have therapy and it would be a violation of the PGC, and therefore human 
dignity, if a mother did not elect to choose therapy.  Within the context of England 
and Wales there is no duty within the regulations to compel a person with capacity to 
receive treatment.  To do so would be battery.
278
 
 
However, as indicated within the interview data, these decisions, particularly in 
relation to FGT and a mother’s right to abortion, cannot only be viewed within the 
confines of the maternal fetal divide.  The effect upon society’s view of such actions 
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must be considered as the effect upon ‘ethical’ research could lead to a mother’s 
choice being restricted.   
 
Within the PGC ‘ethical research’ is research that abides by the PGC.  It is clear that 
where a being or agent is instrumentalised then the research will not be ethical.  
Under the PGC the purpose behind any genetic intervention must be analysed 
because if the purpose of a genetic intervention seeks to instrumentalise the future 
agent then it will violate the PGC.  To instrumentalise an agent means that in order 
that the rights holder X is not treated as an end (a generic rights bearer) X must be 
capable of being a rights holder which, under the PGC, are only agents (Beyleveld 
and Brownsword 2001: 161).  
 
Clearly where a mother presents herself as being pro abortion then the 
instrumentalisation of the potential agent has to be considered.  However, there is a 
fundamental difference between being pro abortion and actively forwarding yourself 
for research because you have already taken the decision to abort.  As indicated in 
9.3.4 how do you regulate such an ethically and socially controversial area where the 
option to abort is a fundamental choice? 
 
Several solutions are viable under the PGC.  Treatment could be restricted to those 
who would not consider an abortion.  However, the practical outcome of such an 
option would be to drive patients towards abortion and potentially stifle the progress 
of FGT.  The potential effect upon the subject cohort could also raise significant 
ethical issues.  Another controversial option is not to offer treatment to those who 
present themselves as wanting an abortion regardless of outcome.  Ascertaining the 
potential patients’ views before the therapy is offered would be legitimate clinical 
trial criteria in the early stages of research.  Nonetheless, it is those who would abort 
regardless of the outcome that should be excluded, not those who might abort.  
Therefore, the potential agent is not instrumentalised through being used as just an 
end for research and ultimately a mother’s choice will not be restricted because they 
will still receive their abortion, although earlier than they would have wanted.  Once 
treatment has become efficient and distributed, then the restriction could be lifted as 
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research is no longer being conducted and the instrumentalisation of the fetus is not 
relevant.  
 
Another restrictive approach would be to remove the option of abortion if treatment 
is successful.  If the results of the intervention occurred post 24 weeks then 
essentially an abortion would be illegal and contrary to the PGC, except in the case 
of an emergency.
279
  One cannot view these suggestions in isolation as the removal 
of abortion as an option could heavily impact upon the uptake of FGT because 
abortion is an important option for mothers (Rothman 1994).  However, a successful 
treatment would engage the normal abortion laws.  If FGT was successful in 
ameliorating diseases and treating congenital malformations then this option is the 
most sensible and would conform to the PGC.  Conversely, where the treatment only 
partly ameliorates a condition, depending on the seriousness of the condition the 
option of abortion may still be available where that condition is incompatible with 
the GFA.  Therefore, choice is once again restricted but legitimately under the PGC, 
and would not need a substantial regulatory change. 
 
Therefore, fetal interests can override a mother’s autonomy in certain circumstances 
when abortion is being considered, but what about the fetal interest in receiving 
treatment where abortion is not an option?  As discussed earlier in relation to a 
mother and a fetus, a mother will be under a duty towards a future agent to have FGT 
and will act contrary to the PGC by not having therapy.  Where FGT becomes true 
therapy and future agency is confirmed, the State may have a legitimate interest if 
the State adopts a public health model that seeks to avoid harm to specific groups 
(Buchanan, Brock et al. 2000).  However, the State must still adhere to the PGC.  
Therefore, unless other countervailing duties arise the State would be legitimate in 
enforcing that duty even where the damage would occur by omission (by not acting 
to correct the defect) (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001).  The duties would be much 
like those currently in operation under the Children Act 1989 because future agents 
are afforded the same status as present agents.  However, pregnancy does have a 
special relationship whereby the overriding rights of the mother would trump such 
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regulation.  Therefore, where the risk to the mother’s health, both physical and 
psychological, was a greater risk than the risk to the fetus under the PGC it would be 
immoral to enforce a duty upon the mother.  Therefore, practically such a rule would 
be unenforceable because an expectant mother could legitimately argue that forcing 
therapy upon her fetus, which she does not want, would lead to her own 
psychological damage and resentment towards that child. 
10.6.3 Issue 3: Is the paternalistic bubble that maternal choice is 
situated within, ethically correct according to the PGC? 
Having outlined the relationships between beings under the PGC, it is clear that an 
element of paternalism from the regulators to society, and thus the individual, will be 
justified within the regulation of FGT.  As was seen in chapter 7, the paternalistic 
bubble relates to regulators imposing conditions upon FGT practitioners, which 
ultimately shapes the available choices within the clinic.  The duties imposed upon 
FGT practitioners towards other agents, such as the duty not to place another agent 
under the risk of generic harm, results in certain behaviours and activities having to 
be banned.  In banning certain behaviours then the regulation of risk is legitimised.  
The net effect is that choice within the clinic will be restricted because certain 
practices are not permissible regardless of consent.  Therefore, the paternalism seen 
within the data, such as the assessment of safety and risk of GMOs (Health and 
Safety Executive 2007),
280
 is justifiable under the PGC.
281
 
 
However, the above only provides guidance and does not identify what level of risk 
is acceptable or what outcomes other than death and impairment to the basic goods 
are acceptable.  It also fails to define the remit of ‘unnecessary risk’, because for 
some mothers anything that will save the life of the fetus and not kill themselves is a 
necessary risk to take.  Therefore, the same tipping point regarding what level of risk 
is acceptable is applicable.  Nevertheless, would a treatment be acceptable where the 
result is the need of blood transfusions for the rest of the mother’s life whereas the 
fetus is fully treated?  Under the PGC as long as a treatment does not place an agent 
                                                 
280
  Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000. 
281
 This point relates to uncertainty and will be discussed further in issue 4. 
259 
 
under risk of generic harm then the choice of taking on that risk will lie with the 
mother.  Therefore, regulation looking at safety could be more liberal in terms of the 
risks that the mother can consent to.  The bottom line is that where there is a 
significant risk of death and damage to the GFA, such as brain function, it will not 
be ethical under the PGC.  It should be stated that here the PGC is not being 
interpreted as implying risk-benefit calculations are wrong per se, but that they 
should be reconsidered. 
 
The remit of risks and benefits cannot be medically confined but must include social 
and environmental elements.  It is here that the PGC is considered a constraint by 
virtue of what society wants itself to be (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001: 11).  One 
also has to consider that the environment could be relevant under the basic goods of 
the PGC because where a GMO gets into the ecosystem it could affect an agent’s 
ability to obtain sustenance.  The regulations on genetically modified organisms do 
include environmental risk assessments and are legitimate pieces of regulation 
(Health and Safety Executive 2007).
282
 Through such pieces of regulation society’s 
interests as rights holders are taken into account, which must impose a certain level 
of paternalism.  However, beyond these limits it should be the patient that decides 
what risks they are willing to take (Djulbegovic 2001, Djulbegovic and Clarke 
2001). 
 
However, does that level of patient and societal protection, as well as the need for 
results, justify a strict long term follow-up because of safety concerns?  Clearly 
entering into a contract with provisions for follow-up is part of clinical research.  
The length of follow-up within FGT would be unparalleled due to intergenerational 
issues.  Follow-up would be needed on the mother, the fetus and possibly the fetus’ 
offspring (Coutelle, Themis et al. 2005).  Clearly freedom of contract can only apply 
to the mother in this instance and the fetus up until the point of Gillick 
competence.
283
  Beyond that point the child would have to decide whether to 
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continue with follow-up.  It would then be up to that future teenager to decide if they 
would want to carry on the follow-up.  However, are future agents under a duty to 
other agents to provide follow-up data so that safety measures can be constructed 
properly?  Such a duty appears weak at best, but any serious complications no doubt 
could, and should, be brought to the attention of FGT practitioners.  Therefore, a 
duty to inform FGT practitioners of any serious health conditions such as any 
malignancy could be imposed.  That duty would be applicable to both mother and 
fetus.  Therefore, long term follow-up of the current and next generation is possible.   
 
There is a note of caution about how free and voluntarily the contract entered into 
under FGT would be.  As noted in 5.5, voluntariness is assumed within the thesis.  
However, it is not beyond plausible thinking that such follow-up terms would be 
ignored for the potential of a healthy/healthier child.  Also, the regulation of germ 
line alterations goes beyond the individual and into the realm of the regulation of 
technologies with a potential impact upon the whole of humanity and future 
generations to come.  Therefore, the issue of germ line alterations will be dealt with 
in issue four.   
10.6.4 Issue 4: Are the current regulatory restrictions upon FGT 
practitioners justified? 
It is clear from the resolution of the previous three issues that imposing conditions, 
such as safety protocols, to acquire informed consent, are legitimate restrictions of a 
FGT practitioner’s freedom under the PGC.  One example within the regulation of 
FGT is the prohibition of germ line therapies.
284
  It has been seen that there is a 
difference between the practice of FGT and the picture that regulation paints with 
regards to human dignity.  As shown within the interview data this difference is seen 
none more so than in the prohibition of germ line technologies, which are prohibited 
because they violate human dignity. 
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The risk of deleterious mutation that may occur in the future is inherent within 
sexual reproduction as well (Salvi 2001: 533).  In addition, the prohibition because 
of safety concerns is time limited because of the fast pace and unpredictability of 
science (Bernier and Bregoire 2004).  As already stated, the risk of generic harm is 
the standard used to assess what would be a permissible risk.  Therefore, even with 
the uncertainty of FGT where viability issues arise,
285
  the future being has so much 
to gain by even partial amelioration.  However, the same rules imposed upon somatic 
interventions apply; therefore, if the germ line intervention is not likely to prevent 
greater generic harm to a possible agent it is morally impermissible (Pattinson 2002). 
 
The best example of instrumentalisation raised in issue two is the use of FGT to 
determine what a fetus will become and value.  The violation of the PGC and 
therefore dignity comes from the intention of not granting equal rights to the child of 
the future (Beyleveld, Quarrell et al. 1998).  Nonetheless, such points are moot 
within a therapy that seeks to restore the GFA to within a ‘normal range’. FGT is not 
about selecting traits, but is about restoring functionality of genes (Buckley, Rahim 
et al. 2011, Coutelle 2008, Coutelle, Themis et al. 2005, David and Peebles 2008). 
 
However, FGT can still engage objections from disabilities groups due to issues 
surrounding the right to inclusion, and the loss of support.  These arguments, 
however, are not necessarily prevalent when the PGC is applied.  For example, 
according to the loss of support argument, if genetic interventions are routinely used 
to reduce the likelihood that future children will be affected by disability, the 
community of people living with disability will shrink (Buchanan, Brock et al. 
2000).  Yet, there are serious evidential flaws with the loss of support argument (See 
Buchanan, Brock et al. 2000, Malek 2008) and the argument fails to consider the 
interest in not having a disability. More importantly, the fears of producing a genetic 
underclass under the PGC are countered by the duty to assist those who do not have 
full generic functions, whether this be through taxation or other measures (Beyleveld 
and Brownsword 2006). 
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Within regulation it is clear that any clinical trial that is known to result in germ line 
modifications is unacceptable and therefore un-licensable.
286
 It is clear under GTAC 
guidelines that where the outcome of research is not known it is unethical research 
(Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 1998).  However, given the uncertainties within 
FGT there will be in the words of Donald Rumsfeld ‘[…] [T]here are unknown 
unknowns’ (U.S. Department of Defence 2002).287  These unknowns are radicalized 
risks within industrial technical–scientific projects, which produce unintended risks, 
which are incalculable and beyond the control of modern day science (Beck 1992a, 
1999).   However, given the extent of animal models that will be undertaken that 
unknown risk will be reduced to its known minimum.  Therefore, as long as that 
information is communicated to those involved and the purpose is to avoid 
inadvertent manipulation of the germ line, then that mode of research is acceptable 
under the PGC thus confirming the current stance (Clothier 1993).
288
  Also, under 
the PGC, where somatic interventions are acceptable then so also will be the germ 
line equivalent because the relative harms are comparable.  Therefore, in principle, 
avoiding known inadvertent germ line interventions would be permissible, because 
of the current state of germ line research, rather than imposing a complete ban on 
germ line alterations per se.  It must be recognised that reconciling such underlying 
ambiguity is an ongoing problem for modern societies and risk assessments have 
arisen as the method  with which to confront and minimize them (Beck 2009).  
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10.6.5 Issue 5: Does the inherent uncertainty within fetal gene 
therapy meet the criteria for informed consent or render it 
ineffectual given that the nature of that uncertainty will affect 
future generations and their future autonomy? 
Firstly, it should be identified that issues surrounding informed consent are not 
restricted to FGT.  Informed consent within genomics and medicine in general is an 
area of hot debate.  For example, there are issues surrounding informed consent and 
bio banking when a child’s information is used (See Holm 2005).  However, the 
issue here is about whether the uncertainty of therapy renders the informed consent 
process ineffectual and therefore FGT should not be continued.  The underlying 
assumption of fetal consent to the medical intervention must be acknowledged but 
the answer to that question will never be known.  The attempted wrongful life 
actions symbolize that one can never be sure about this.  Nevertheless, under the 
PGC one can assume that an intervention that would restore GFA would be a 
positive thing.  Therefore, presumed consent such as in the case of emergency 
medicine would resolve such an issue (Allhoff 2005). 
 
Under the PGC uncertainty is not necessarily a problematic issue with regards to 
informed consent.  FGT practitioners must acquire accurate information and 
ascertain as best they can within the limits of their knowledge.  That does not mean 
that a FGT practitioner can go blindly into a project.  They must still work to reduce 
the risks involved, which would involve utilising the risk-benefit calculation as seen 
in issue three.  Therefore, as long as uncertainty is reduced to the level that current 
scientific knowledge can be expected to achieve and the information about 
uncertainty is communicated then the PGC will not be violated.  Examples of such 
steps can be seen within the guidance upon informed consent (General Medical 
Council 2009a).   
 
However, is this a carte blanche green light for technology to proceed (Beck 2000)?  
That is a possible outcome, but other options are available such as: wait until our 
knowledge and understanding of genetics in vitro increases and then reassess the 
risks; or stop research into anything where the consequence of uncertainty could 
possibly result in unknown harm; or accept the limitations of risk assessments with 
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staggered progress and constant reassessment through phased clinical trials.  
Currently, the last of these options is in place, which fulfils the PGC in the 
immediate instance, but consideration must go into the issue of uncertainty and long 
term damage. 
 
Given the nature of the uncertainty the level of follow-up is critical.  Therefore, can 
uncertainty within FGT demand patients to adhere to the follow-up procedure?  
Follow-up has to be adequate, but in making long term follow-up adequate it can 
significantly increase cost, which can lead to failure of a project.
289
  As stated within 
10.6.3, uncertainty of treatment cannot provide a strong enough duty to compel 
future agents against their wishes to continue with future follow-up.  However, long 
term follow-up procedures are a legitimate clause to impose within a contract as long 
as they are not deemed too restrictive upon an individual.  Therefore, a balance 
between the adequacy of follow-up and restrictive conditions is needed.  For 
example, follow-up testing that involved testing a mother’s blood every week at 1pm 
on a Monday, clearly is an excessive inroad into liberty, yet yearly tests would not 
be.  The balance has to be struck between the frequency of testing, the risk of future 
health problems and the risk associated with the vector and the GMO used 
(European Medicines Agency 2009).
290
  Legitimate clauses that include the 
permission to conduct post-mortems upon the mother and future child up until the 
point of Gillick competence could occur as part of the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009.  Such informed consent would have to have a provision for emergency recall 
and life time testing of patients.  It would need an amendment to the Corners and 
Justice Act 2009 to include future autopsy of the mother, future child and possibly 
third generation persons (Office of Recombinant DNA Activities 1999).   
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10.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the issues raised above had an undercurrent of the tension that 
autonomy can have within a system which needs to take into account the rights of 
others.  These other rights holders include FGT practitioners and future agents such 
as a fetus.  That tension manifests itself within the data as the paternalistic bubble 
that is evident within the regulation of FGT, which in turn restricts maternal choice 
in order to protect future generations.  The majority of the regulations cited are 
consistent with the interpretation of the PGC as they all reach the same conclusion 
despite following different modes of interpretation.  Third parties such as society are 
taken into consideration because of the correlating rights and duties that are enforced 
within the PGC. 
 
By utilising the PGC it is evident that the state of regulation on the whole is 
legitimate and within the interpretative confines of the PGC.  However, it is 
confirmed that the term human dignity does not add anything significant to the 
debate and, thus, the views of FGT practitioners are consistent with the PGC, which 
points towards the implicit nature of human dignity.  Yet, because of the implicit 
nature of human dignity through concepts such as autonomy or the GFA, the term 
human dignity is not needed within the debate of FGT.  Therefore, the removal of 
‘human dignity’ from regulative provisions would clarify why certain techniques are 
prohibited. 
 
The PGC has also helped to provide some resolutions to some of the ethical 
dilemmas identified within the issues.  There are acceptable ways forward, which 
balance the rights and duties evident within the FGT scenario.  The PGC is 
consistent with the data findings that it is only in very exceptional circumstances that 
maternal autonomy does not trump fetal interests/rights.  It is only when future 
agency is compelled upon the fetus that a duty arises for a mother to have surgery.  It 
could be considered legitimate for the State to impose a duty upon a mother to have 
therapy subject to the extent of her bodily invasion.  However, the mother’s 
psychological health must be taken into consideration and where damage to that 
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psychological health would be long term the mother’s autonomy would have to 
prevail. 
 
Further consistency between the interview data and the PGC is seen as both 
identifying significant knowledge deficits as the reason why there are research 
restrictions upon germ line therapies and why unspecified long term follow-ups are 
needed.  These restrictions result in the safety protocols and the paternalistic 
approach within FGT regulation. Such criteria result in FGT practitioners being 
placed under a duty not to damage their patients GFA. However, uncertainty does 
not render that duty impossible, merely that informed consent and a consequent long 
term follow-up must be communicated and agreed upon by the patient.  Conditional 
reportage of serious illness appears as a legitimate way to continue long term follow-
up.  Nevertheless, there is a need to consider the recourse that FGT practitioners 
would have if the correlating contract and/or duties are not adhered to.  It is the 
balancing of these rights and duties which ultimately need justifying as FGT 
progresses and as any kind of recourse is pursued.  By balancing such rights and 
duties future generations are taken into account and their prospective interests are 
taken into consideration.  Therefore, any attempt to cure a condition ‘at any 
cost/risk’ is not a prospect for FGT when interpreted through the PGC.  
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11 Conclusion 
11.1 Introduction 
Having established the field through the contemporary history of FGT, then 
introducing the maternal fetal divide, it became apparent that intergenerational 
interests was a central issue to be addressed.  Through establishing the foundation of 
human dignity within the regulation of FGT, the PGC was established to be an 
appropriate tool for analysis.  After months of collecting data from documentary 
sources as well as interviewing some of the world’s leading FGT practitioners, the 
data was analysed thematically.  The thematic approach highlighted areas such as the 
lack of explicit use of human dignity by FGT practitioners.  The practice of human 
dignity is manifested through other concepts such as autonomy at both a regulatory 
and a practice level.  The competing interests of generations were clearly evident 
because FGT is framed as another treatment option for future patients.  From the 
analysis and inductive comparison between the documentary and interview sources, 
five key issues were identified in 10.2, with the PGC used to try and provide 
adequate resolution to these issues, thus leading to the recommendations below. 
 
Firstly, section 11.2 the overall impression of the data will be discussed.  It will 
codify the comparisons and contrasts within the sources.  The overall impression will 
include reflections upon the importance of this multidisciplinary thesis as well as 
identifying the significance in using such a methodology within an area where ethics, 
law, social science and science are all involved.   Section 11.3 will then refer back to 
the original research questions and seek to answer them by drawing upon the data 
findings.  Following on from those answers, section 11.4 will propose some 
recommendations, because within an area such as FGT resolving potential issues 
before they happen will help increase its acceptance.  Section 11.5 presents some 
suggestions for further research and section 11.6 concludes the thesis.     
11.2 Overall impression 
Overall the documentary and interview data compared and contrasted each other.  
There were many similarities within the data sources, especially when referring to 
the implicit use of human dignity.   Autonomy and informed consent emerged as an 
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implicit recognition of human dignity.  Furthermore both sources strongly assert that 
the mother’s autonomy is paramount within the clinic.291  Future generational 
interests appear within the reasoning of the documentary and interview data and 
appear as rays of light for the protection of future generations’ interests.292 
 
One significant difference between the interview and documentary data is the use of 
the term ‘human dignity’.  It is clear that the picture the documents profess about 
human dignity is not actually found in the work of FGT practitioners who are 
situated in the UK.  The interviewees struggled to define and pinpoint exactly what 
human dignity entails.
293
  That does not mean that human dignity as an analytical 
tool is not useful, but in terms of practical application it does not add to either the 
debate or practice.   
 
Another similarity between the data sources is the emphasis upon safety.  The remit 
of safety goes beyond the mother and includes maintaining safety towards the fetus 
and future generations.
294
  Here the impact of intergenerational interests is most 
evident because if intergenerational interests are taken into account then choice 
further down the research trail is reduced.  It is at this point where maternal interests 
are also taken into account in addition to maternal choice.  In other words, risk-
benefit calculations take precedence over treatment choice, thus imposing a 
paternalistic bubble.  As a consequence, the research areas for FGT practitioners are 
restricted, thus resulting in reduced choice within the clinic.  Autonomy within the 
clinic is never one hundred per cent autonomy, but it is autonomy to choose a set of 
predetermined choices within a paternalistic bubble.  This would appear problematic 
when using the PGC to interpret the data, but precautionary steps must be taken 
which makes the restriction upon choice valid.  For example, where the status of a 
fetus is in question and the impact upon them would outweigh the benefit, 
practitioners/mothers must take steps to protect those potential agents.  Therefore, 
restriction upon research and ultimately choice, where the risk to the fetus outweighs 
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the benefit, are legitimate.  However, where research is high risk to the mother and 
not the fetus, autonomy should prevail. 
Both sources acknowledge the uncertainty within FGT.
295
  Yet what legislation does 
not appear to stress is the communication of that uncertainty, with uncertainty being 
extinguished through further scientific studies, such as toxicology.
296
  It is the 
production of a convincing argument that will calm fears regarding uncertainty.
297
  
This is not evident within regulation, because FGT practitioners have to deal with the 
implication of uncertainty through the consent process.  The communication of that 
uncertainty to patients does not invalidate the consent process when utilising the 
PGC as an analytic tool as seen within 10.6.5.   
It is evident from the scientific progress chapters that the work of the FGT 
practitioners looks beyond the regulatory confinements.  These issues include the 
interplay of abortion within the clinic, funding, and the explicit acknowledgement of 
the effect of uncertainty of treatment.  The FGT practitioners appear to confirm the 
author’s assessment that germ line technologies should be banned, but not 
indefinitely.  Within the interview data concerns regarding the interplay between 
autonomy, scientific progress and the rights of others are apparent.  The example of 
abortion indicates that when autonomy, ethics and scientific progress collide there is 
no easy solution to fully reconcile all three.  The PGC identifies that any possible 
resolution of these issues is not straight forward since the stage, type and condition 
in question will alter whether fetal interests override maternal wishes.   
11.2.1 Some reflections 
If humanity is to become the master of technology instead of its subject, then  
research in areas such as FGT must be more comprehensive and go beyond a six 
page report (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 1998) and must be continually 
revisited as regulation and science develop.  This thesis is part of that process and 
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has identified problems, such as abortion, long term follow-up, uncertainty and 
human dignity, as areas in which FGT is potentially ahead of regulation.  
 
Using such a methodology encourages those outside of science to write and explore 
the unknown.  As stated in 2.6.2, areas of emergent technology must adopt a 
prospective approach to reduce these uncertainties.  The exploration of FGT, despite 
not being completely unknown, has been a task which no doubt will help FGT 
practitioners, regulators and academics control as much uncertainty that inevitably 
surrounds new practices before clinical trials.  Given the ethical considerations 
surrounding FGT an inductive ethical model must be used to help guide practice.  
This is highly relevant, if not fundamental to establishing future practice that will 
control technology, yet still allow it to progress.  Therefore, despite lacking data 
fields such as patient ethnographies, in order to tackle these inherent difficulties a 
multidisciplinary approach within emerging technology fields with an ethical 
analytical tool produced rich data.  In addition this methodological approach is used 
by the National Institute of Health (1999) to investigate such emerging areas.   
 
Within emerging complex areas, such as FGT, multidisciplinary work combined 
with a mixed methodological approach is the best method to truly explore a 
multidisciplinary practice.  As stated in 9.4.3, the different areas can help improve 
and progress an area forward.  With the addition of an outsider’s perspective such a 
methodology becomes significantly important to the practice as a whole.  This is 
especially so when there has been little written about this method and therefore it can 
be used as a foundation or model for further specific work.  It can also provide FGT 
practitioners and regulators with an impression of the vision that they are portraying 
to others. 
 
The chapter will now return to the original research questions and discover what 
answers have been provided by this multidisciplinary and mixed methodological 
approach.   
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11.3 Research questions 
11.3.1 Are the intergenerational issues of fetal gene therapy taken 
into account by both direct and indirect stakeholders?   
Clearly, from the data intergenerational issues are taken into consideration.  From a 
regulatory stance, at face value, regulation applicable within the clinic appears to be 
focused upon the human dignity manifested as autonomy.
298
  Fetal interests are 
discussed but they are ultimately not relevant.  However, within the regulation of 
FGT fetal interests are protected.  For example, the rules governing the diseases for 
which FGT can be developed and the regulation governing safety do take into 
account future generations as well as the current ones.  Nonetheless, considering the 
progress of FGT towards resolving congenital abnormalities, as well as further 
possible progress that has occurred, GTAC should revisit the area.  The 
recommendations below, which are not evident within their report, should now also 
be taken into account (Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 1998).  
 
From a practitioner stance the care over the fetus as well as the mother directly takes 
into account both their interests.  In terms of third parties such as fathers, it was clear 
from both sources that their input was ultimately relevant.   It should be noted that 
within the interview data ‘parental decisions’ was referred to, but ultimately it was 
then deferred back to maternal autonomy.  Therefore, indirect stakeholders are 
relevant, but not taken directly into consideration.  Importantly, both data sources 
confirmed that birth was the point where those parties would have separate rights.
299
 
11.3.2 Can intergenerational issues override the reproductive rights 
of the mother?   
The answer is dependent upon the area in which the rights and interests of the 
mother and fetus are being considered.  When regulators are considering the areas 
within which FGT practitioners can operate, the interests of generations become a 
purposeful and relevant consideration that can ultimately restrict maternal choice 
within the clinic.  For example, any treatment that would place the life of the fetus at 
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risk with little chance of success would be prohibited from clinical practice.  
Therefore, choice is restricted by the paternalistic bubble, despite the potential gain.  
Another example is where treatment would impact upon future pregnancies despite 
the possible impact upon the fetus that currently needs treatment.  Here it is future 
offspring that are impacting upon maternal access to certain treatments within 
pregnancy.  It is also worth noting that it is at this point that maternal choice can be 
restricted due to patient safety.  Therefore, implicitly the fetus as a patient concept is 
taken into account, thus implementing the maternal fetal divide identified in chapter 
4. 
 
These restrictions appear to emanate from human dignity.  Yet, on closer inspection 
safety concerns and public policy considerations are better placed to provide an 
explanation.
300
  It also appeared in the interview data that what therapy options 
patients would choose was a factor taken into consideration.  Therefore public 
perception of FGT, and science in general, would appear important, as well as the 
communication of those feelings/opinions to FGT practitioners.  However within the 
clinic, it is a different story.  As stated in 6.4 and 8.4, it is clear that maternal 
autonomy is paramount.  The mother may choose to prioritise intergenerational 
rights and interests; but, ultimately that is her choice and they cannot override her.  
The data confirms the position where the fetus is seen as a patient, which is 
contingent upon maternal consent to operate.   
 
Within 10.6.2 it is clear that fetal interests can override a mother’s autonomy in a 
limited set of situations when abortion is being conducted.  Also where abortion is 
not an option a mother will be under a duty towards a future agent to have FGT and 
will act contrary to the PGC by not having therapy.  As mentioned within 10.6.3, 
certain areas within the paternalistic bubble are not valid.  The consequence of this is 
that the PGC would allow a wider remit for research than is currently available.  
However, in potential prospective research areas such as germ line technologies, 
regulation is correct, even if the reason behind it is not.  Nevertheless, under the PGC 
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in certain, limited circumstances intergenerational issues can override maternal 
rights.   
11.3.3 Have intergenerational issues impacted upon the areas that 
fetal gene therapy has, and will have an effect upon? 
The clearest area where intergenerational issues are demonstrated is within the 
divide between germ line and somatic interventions.  The interview data and 
documentary analysis also highlights that the regulation and practice of FGT is 
governed by a divide between mother and fetus.  Areas such as consent and long 
term follow-up are examples where the impact of such technology is seen firsthand.  
GTAC guidelines combined with the interviewees’ proposal of FGT as another 
treatment option
301
 indicate that for conditions to be amenable by FGT they must 
have an intergenerational aspect.  Clearly, abortion is an area within the interview 
data where FGT raises significant questions regarding not only intergenerational 
interest, but also how FGT is viewed as a practice.
302
  However, as seen within 
10.6.3, when using the PGC as an analytical tool certain paternalistic regulatory 
restrictions are not valid. 
 
However, within the regulation of FGT key areas of consideration regarding 
intergenerational aspects are missing.  The documents frame the intergenerational 
aspect of their work in terms of inheritance or germ line issues.  Consequently, a 
difference between biological intergenerational issues (germ line) and 
intergenerational issues per se (future reproductive choice, the environment etc) 
emerges.  This will impact upon issues regarding confidentiality, future reproductive 
choices, consent, contracts and long term follow-up procedures (i.e. post mortems) 
as seen within 9.3.3.  FGT practitioners cannot be expected to deal with areas such as 
contract and confidentiality.  However, they should have an input regarding those 
issues as they are at the coal face of progress. 
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Having considered the data and identified areas in which ethics can provide guidance 
or avenues of resolution in relation to the research question, it is now appropriate to 
suggest recommendations that appear valid from the data.  Although a wealth of 
recommendations could be proposed, the five most prominent have been identified 
and are discussed below. 
11.4 Recommendations 
It is clear from the data and the ethical analysis that changes in line with the PGC 
should be introduced.  These recommendations include:  
1. The removal of ‘human dignity’ from regulation, including its 
indirect application;  
2. Make the prohibition upon germ line technologies conditional, 
therefore allowing FGT practitioners to conduct germ line research 
within animals once knowledge deficits have been satisfied;  
3. Further investigate how abortion, informed consent, long term follow-
up and confidentiality can be maintained and regulated ethically. 
4. Reconsider how far bodily integrity can be respected where abortion 
is no longer an option and treatment is only available within 
pregnancy;  
5. Review of research funding in relation to long term studies of fetal 
gene therapy. 
 
Each of these will now be elaborated in turn in order to provide the justification for 
each recommendation.  Following from those recommendations, where further 
research has been proposed, those proposals are in addition to the recommendations. 
11.4.1 The removal of ‘human dignity’ from regulation including its 
indirect application. 
It is clear from the data findings and resolution under the PGC, that removing 
‘human dignity’ is a strong recommendation for FGT regulation within the UK.303  
Commentary by academics such as Macklin (2003), Melo-Martin (2011) and Salvi 
(2001) is clearly supported by the data findings.  Despite the use of the term ‘human 
dignity’ it only appears implicitly within the regulation of FGT within the UK, the 
recent intellectual property case of Brüstle v Greenpeace
304
 clearly indicates that 
where human dignity appears in the preamble of a directive, it will be taken into 
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account within ECJ interpretation of directives.  Therefore, it is important that 
regulators within England and Wales actively create regulations to fulfil their 
obligations under EU law, rather than just deferring their responsibilities by 
referencing the directive directly.  By removing ‘human dignity’ the debate will not 
be stifled and it will remove the ambiguity of the term in any regulation. 
 
11.4.2 Make the prohibition upon germ line technologies 
conditional, therefore allowing FGT practitioners to conduct 
germ line within humans once knowledge deficits have been 
satisfied  
In connection with the removal of human dignity from regulation, the regulation of 
certain techniques/technologies such as germ line interventions must be 
reconsidered.  Such a recommendation must start with the caveat that currently the 
ban on germ line technologies is reasonable.  However, by removing human dignity 
from regulation, it should be reaffirmed that safety and knowledge deficits need to be 
satisfied within animal models after successful somatic FGT.  Although contingent 
upon the future status of somatic interventions, imposing a long term de facto ban 
upon germ line technologies currently appears valid.  Such a step may be seen as 
substantially hindering the progress of germ line therapies.  The underlying tone of 
fear and safety accompanied by the interviewees’ recognition of the impact of 
negative stories connected to pregnancy and gene therapy implies precautionary 
small steps must be taken in this area.   
11.4.3 Reconsider how far bodily integrity can be respected where 
abortion is no longer an option and treatment is only available 
within pregnancy  
Before proceeding with this recommendation it is important to draw attention to 
three important assumptions.  It would appear valid to assume that the population 
involved in such a decision would be minimal, because in the majority of cases 
patients would do what is ‘best’ for their fetus.  Secondly, such recommendation is 
condition dependent. Therefore, it would be relevant to consider severe genetic or 
congenital defects (which are the criteria for FGT research).  Finally, this 
recommendation is contingent upon FGT becoming a working viable treatment and 
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the level of intervention needed. For example, open utero surgery compared to 
transplacental injection.  Therefore, this recommendation is not applicable while 
FGT is at the stage of clinical trials or before the treatment is perfected.   
 
Nonetheless, it is clear from the data that the rules currently governing autonomy, 
abortion and the point of intervention collide.  The answer to such a collision 
includes cost benefit analysis, but also how society views someone who actively 
refuses to provide their genetic offspring with treatment.  Postnatally the question of 
best interest arises,
305
 which must be considered when interpreting that data with the 
PGC if the point of intervention is post 12 weeks of gestation.  This consideration 
will have more weight the longer gestation occurs.  Yet, post 20 weeks of gestation, 
it is clear abortion is problematic under the PGC unless the fetus fulfils the criteria of 
exceptions under the Abortion Act 1967.
306
  It is here that best interest 
considerations, such as the fetus as a patient, should occur. 
 
If one considers that the children can survive premature birth of at least 22 weeks of 
gestation (See New Scientist and Reuters 2007) where best interests of that child can 
occur, then the issue of bodily integrity must be questioned under the PGC for 
interventions at this point.  However, scientifically intervention would need to occur 
at least post seven weeks when the gonads have been separated, but also when the 
organ that would need intervention has differentiated itself.  The point of 
intervention is therefore more than likely to occur post 12 weeks.  It would be here 
that the fetus as a patient concept proposed by Chervenak and McCullough would be 
applicable to assess the best course of action.  It would fulfil the PGC requirement to 
take into account those agents as if they were in existence, due to the nature of the 
treatment proposed. 
 
Couples are not allowed to actively implant embryos with known genetic defects,
307
 
then why allow a pregnancy to continue without treatment where abortion is not an 
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option?  Albeit the debate concerns in utero considerations not ex utero, which are 
the realm of the mother.
308
  Yet, under the PGC such a decision is not ethically valid.  
It could be contended that such a decision is qualitatively different where the 
question to be considered is not about life itself, but the future quality of life.  In 
other words, such a situation gives rise to a violation of bodily integrity for the best 
interest of the future child akin to if that child was already born.  The question of 
abortion would not be removed as given the criteria for FGT; the option of abortion 
would always be applicable.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the decision to do nothing 
or abort is significantly changed by the introduction of a treatment option, which 
would help improve the quality of life of the future child. 
 
Although this thesis is concerned with patients who have capacity, one cannot ignore 
the fact that if the mother was considered to lack capacity, treatment of the fetus 
would clearly be in the mother’s best interests.309  Best interests include interests 
beyond medical interests, but are the considered benefit to the person.
310
  Clearly 
having a healthy/less severely handicapped child is more in the parent’s interest than 
having a child that would be born with more severe conditions. 
 
Connected to such a question is how to deal with those who receive FGT and are 
only partially ameliorated.  Clinical judgement will have to be consistent in 
determining what quality of life that future child would have.  However, under the 
PGC, it would appear valid where that information is not known by the mother to 
continue to allow the option of abortion in those circumstances.  As a result, it would 
reduce the uncertainty of treatment.  Where the treatment is perceived to have 
worked, abortion would not be an issue since then the abortion rules relevant to 
‘normal’ fetuses apply. 
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11.4.4 Further investigate how abortion, informed consent, long 
term follow-up and confidentiality can be maintained and 
regulated ethically. 
Although in general the current regulation does a sufficient job in coping with the 
majority of issues there are some areas which must be addressed.  The debate must 
also be widened to include what a mother can and cannot consent to.  The effect of 
this debate can shape what research can be conducted.  The conclusion may be that 
the current restrictions are valid in order to protect those who are vulnerable.  
However, that position would have to be contrasted with the position where a 
mother’s decision to refuse treatment is presumed to be valid and voluntary, even in 
the most extreme of circumstances that could lead to their own death.
311
  Therefore, 
the question has to be: How and why are these circumstances any different for FGT?  
Clearly, the difference lies between the right to consent and the right to refuse.  The 
law is clear upon consent to treatment being distinguishable from consent to 
grievously bodily harm (GBH).
312
  Yet, given that FGT would be considered 
treatment regardless of who the patient is, it is the distinction of treatment from 
GBH, which indicates that line of reasoning, is invalid.
313
  These distinctions are 
irrelevant for those agents with capacity, because the issue is about the prevention of 
harm to another being.  It would also be irrelevant, because one can consent to 
activities which merely carry the risk of injury or harm, never mind omitting to 
prevent harm.
314
  Therefore, given the conditions present for FGT the interplay 
between abortion and FGT must be investigated further, as well as the ethical 
consequences that may have an impact on the perception of FGT as a practice.
315
 
 
Contractually, long term follow-up is problematic in several ways, including making 
an unborn child party to a contract to merely maintain adequate contact with patients 
after treatment.  However, it would be appropriate to include an amendment to the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, as well as to the Human Tissue Act 2004 in order to 
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facilitate post mortems upon those who have undergone FGT.
316
  Nonetheless, 
identifying who such patients are raises questions about centralised medical records.  
There are numerous options that could be investigated to resolve this issue.  One 
such way could be through a central database that could be accessed (akin to a 
Google search) by the medical practitioner who pronounced the death if the family is 
unaware of the death.  Another method may include giving these patients a different 
medical record to standard patients, one which flags up an issue regarding their 
medical status.  Connected to this are confidentiality and the right not to know 
issues.  Therefore, confidentiality issues must also be investigated, due to the 
complexity of the issues initially raised and identified in relation to gene therapy by 
the Polkinghorne committee (1989).   
11.4.5 Review of research funding in relation to long term studies of 
fetal gene therapy  
From a practical stance, it is clear that the work being conducted by FGT 
practitioners is subject to funding.  However, given the unique safety concerns and 
the recommendations made above, funding is difficult to obtain.  As IE4 poignantly 
expressed: 
Capitalism does not like taking risks.  And that will be very difficult.  
The psychological barrier of saying a treatment for pregnancy - wow!  
Treatment for small children – wow!  Let’s invest in Brill cream or 
invest in bananas! 
In order to resolve issues surrounding long term follow-up outside of animal studies, 
funding must have a contingency for appropriate long term studies to be conducted.  
Given the impact of technologies such as FGT, government funding should be in 
place for FGT practitioners in order to cover these long term follow-up studies.  
Such contingency may include an obligation upon the FGT practitioner or institution 
to conduct the future research depending on the status of the initial FGT practitioner.  
In conjunction with a review, practical implications, such as compelling future 
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generations over the age of majority
317
 to be submitted to clinics for testing, would 
need to be resolved. 
11.5 Further Research 
From the data it is logical to conclude that not all possible data analyses were 
conducted.  Given the embryonic nature of FGT there will be many avenues to 
explore for further research.  Further interviewing could be conducted to ascertain 
what future plans regulators such as relevant members of Parliamentary committees, 
GTAC and EMA have regarding FGT.  In addition, patient groups, which would 
seek to benefit (or be disadvantaged, depending on your stance on the impact of 
genetic treatments) should be contacted regarding the progress of FGT.  Further 
research into the areas indicated within recommendation three is a priority as it is 
apparent that FGT will be entering the clinic in the very near future. 
 
In conjunction with the further interviewing, as within other areas of biotechnology, 
a survey of the public’s attitude towards some of the dilemmas highlighted within 
the thesis should occur.  However, a note of caution must be given since a public 
survey should not be taken as the major reason to prohibit a practice, such as social 
sex selection (Harris 2005a, 2005b).  To avoid any such allegations the survey 
should form part of a comprehensive investigation. 
 
As mentioned within the thesis, it has been assumed that the mother in question has 
capacity.  The divide is somewhat artificial, because when FGT becomes a publicly 
accessible procedure, issues regarding incapacitated patients will be just as relevant.  
The artificial divide can be seen within the thesis where it has indicated that there 
may be questions regarding the capacity of patients to decide.  Therefore, further 
research should be done to ascertain when it would be in the best interest of those 
patients who are incapacitated.  Furthermore, this would help provide practical 
guidance to FGT practitioners.  It would also serve as an area in which research 
could investigate how to improve FGT to all those involved. 
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11.6 Conclusion 
FGT is constantly developing as a possible treatment option.  However, its 
development raises questions that this thesis has tried to highlight and provide 
recommendations to resolve these issues under the guidance of the PGC.  Human 
dignity emerged within the literature as an underlying concept with the current 
regulation that underpins FGT, together with the maternal fetal divide as identified in 
chapter 4.  By utilising semi structured interviews and documentary analysis the 
thesis has investigated the emerging technology of FGT.  The thesis does not try to 
provide every answer to every problem indicated within the data, but it has addressed 
what it considers the most important aspects of FGT.  It highlighted the underlying 
concept of human dignity within regulation and how ‘human dignity’ is not 
explicitly used within practice, and it foregrounded the interplay between abortion 
and FGT.  Utilising the PGC it has helped resolve some of the substantive issues 
within the thesis.   However, given that the areas for recommendation range from the 
removal of human dignity from regulation to a review of funding for FGT 
practitioners, it is clear that the thesis has only touched the tip of the iceberg.  
However, with a number of areas to investigate further, work by those other than 
FGT practitioners is also not over.  As the number of professionals, treatable 
conditions and availability of treatment increases FGT should, in the words of Dr 
Harrison a pioneer of fetal surgery: 
Proceed with Caution....and Enthusiasm (Jancelewicz and Harrison 2009: 235). 
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Appendix A – Participant Information and Consent 
Form 
 
Fetal Surgery: Engaging the debate between the balancing of ethical theory, 
scientific progress and the rights of others 
Participant Information and Consent Sheet (Interviews): 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in my PhD project on engaging the debate between 
the balancing of ethical theory, scientific progress and the rights of others in reference to in 
utero genetic interventions.  The following will give you a short overview of what this 
means for you and the information you decide to give me.  Before you decide if you would 
like to participate in the research, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve.  Please take the time to read the following information 
carefully.  Do not hesitate to talk about the study with other people. 
 
Who am I? 
My name is Richardo Childs and I am Economic and Social Research Council funded 1+3 
PhD student at Cardiff University, currently doing my PhD.  I am supervised by Dr Ian 
Welsh from the School of Social Sciences; and Prof Ruth Chadwick of Cardiff Law School.  
If you would be interested in taking part or have any questions concerning the research, feel 
free to contact me at Tel: 07886596585 or email: childsrs@cardiff.ac.uk.  You can also 
contact my supervisor Dr Ian Welsh at +44 (0)29 208 75403 ext.  75403 or email 
welshi@cf.ac.uk.  I would be happy to answer any questions and look forward to meeting 
you. 
 
Why am I doing this research? 
Fetal surgery may have started purely as a form of surgical intervention to correct birth 
defects, but the advent of the genomic revolution has created a situation, where by genetics 
is now a relevant part of fetal surgery through genetic testing and possible in utero 
applications.  The fetus has been viewed as a site where gene therapy and stem cell 
transplantation can overcome current obstacles within research.  However, in using the fetus 
as a possible site for intervention, ethical issues are raised, such as the intergenerational 
aspect of genetic interventions, but are intergenerational issues are evident within the 
research of those who are pushing the practice of fetal surgery forward? 
 
Who can take part? 
I am approaching people who have expertise with in utero gene therapy, either as current 
researchers within laboratories or not, plus those who have previously research within the 
field of in utero gene surgery.   
 
What would be involved? 
If you choose to participate, I would like to discuss your views on the role of public 
confidence within your own research.  The interview would last up to 1 hour.  I would like 
to cover the following topics: 
1. The nature of the research that you are involved in and your role within that 
research. 
2. How decisions are prioritised within your research.  For example, balancing 
personal and professional decision to those of funders.  
3. The approach taken within your present and/or future practice of in utero 
gene therapy. 
4. The place of human dignity in research decision making in your field/work 
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5. Whether intergenerational aspects are important within your work 
6. When explaining issues such as consent to patients what factors are and will 
be important?  Will the impact of potential intergenerational issues be 
explained to patients? 
For those whom are currently MSc students the above questions will be made in 
reference to not just their personnel view but how and whether issues of inter-
generational equity are addressed by their 'seniors'.  An mp3 record of the interview 
will be taken, so that I have a record of what was said. 
 
What will I do with the information? 
I will transcribe the interview data so that I have a written record to analyse.  If you are 
interested, I will provide you with either an audio or written copy of the interview.  The 
transcript will not be used for any other purpose other than being be read and used by me 
and my supervisors for the purpose of the research.  The information from these discussions 
will be the basis of my thesis, which will be assessed in order for me to gain my PhD.  The 
transcripts might also be used to write and publish articles in academic journals.  You are 
welcome to see the final thesis and/ or a copy of the articles before they are published. 
 
Will everything you say to me be kept private? 
You can say as little or as much as you wish.  The audio recording of the interview and 
subsequent transcript will be kept on a data encrypted hard drive for 5 years, due to Data 
Protection law.  Both sets of data can be requested by you within that period.  Within the 
transcript the names of yourself as well as those people who you mention will be 
anonymised so you will not be identifiable. 
 
In addition at the end of the thesis, the anonymised transcripts of the interviews may be 
submitted to the ‘Qualidata’ archive, at the University of Essex, which will store them and 
make them available to future researchers as part of my PhD funding.  There is a separate 
declaration of consent for the uploading, storage and future use of your information process; 
and you are free to opt in or opt out of this data usage but still be able to participate in the 
study.  
 
What if you change your mind about taking part? 
Participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any point you wish, 
without giving a reason. 
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Consent Form: Fetal Surgery: Engaging the debate between the balancing of 
ethical theory, scientific progress and the rights of others 
 
 
Name of Researcher: Richardo Childs  
 
Please initial 
1.  I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study.  I 
have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily. 
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving a reason. 
3.  I consent to have the interview recorded and the use of anonymous quotations in the final 
thesis. 
4.  I agree to take part in the study. 
 
_______________________    ___________   _____________ 
Name of participant     Date    Signature 
 
I confirm that I DO/ DO NOT (please delete as appropriate) give consent for the anonymised 
transcripts of the interviews to be submitted to the ‘Qualidata’ archive, at the University of 
Essex, where the data will be stored and made available to future researchers. 
 
_______________________    ___________   _____________ 
Name of participant     Date    Signature 
 
_______________________    ___________   _____________ 
Name of person taking consent    Date    Signature 
2 copies : 1 for participant (original will be scanned and emailed to you) and 1 for research 
file. 
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Appendix B - Interview Question Schedule 
 
Introduction 
 
1. To start the interviews it would be good if you could give a quick biography 
about yourself and how you become involved/interested in this in utero gene 
therapy?   
 
2. Could you outline the area of your clinical expertise, the nature of the 
research that you are involved in and your role within that research? 
 
3. What do you see as the main factors impacting upon the prioritisation and 
progress of the in utero gene therapy agenda currently? Are there tensions 
between any of these factors? 
 
4. In identifying the factors relevant to the research process, what issues are 
most important when working on an in utero gene project? Are the results 
the most important thing?  Whose interests are paramount? 
 
5. What will be the biggest hurdles for the progress of in utero gene therapy to 
clinical application? Will in utero gene therapy ever move from somatic to 
germ line alterations? If not, why? 
 
6. I am now going to ask about hypothetical issues that if the work that you 
current in utero translate into clinical practice, beyond clinical trials, what 
do you envisage as the factors that would operate within the clinic? Whose 
interests need to be taken into account? 
 
7. Continuing the prospective theme, what is relevant in the literature of 
genetic interventions are the intergenerational issues that are raised by in 
utero gene therapy; therefore, when explaining research issues such as 
consent to patients what factors will be important? What information is 
paramount? Will the impact of potential intergenerational issues be 
explained to patients? 
 
8. What is also raised from the literature is the concept of human dignity.  
Although, it ahs bee argued it is vague what the role, if any, are played by 
guiding principles such as the place of human dignity in shaping the 
research process.  Are you aware of these sorts of factors operating in your 
field of work? 
 
If these factors are not present what principles guide your work? 
 
9. And finally is there anything we have not covered that you think is important to the 
areas we have discussed 
So to wrap up I would like to thank you for your time and your contribution to the thesis.  I 
gratefully appreciate the time and effort that you have given and I hope to do your data 
justice. 
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Appendix C – Institutional Structure 
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Appendix D – UK Court Structure 
 
Her Majesty's Court Services, 2007. The Court Structure of Her Majesty's Court 
Services. Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218200720/ 
http://www.hmcourts- service.gov.uk/aboutus/structure/index.htm [Accessed: 1st 
June 2010]. 
 
European Court of Justice and European Court of First Instance make rulings upon 
issues regarding interpretation of EU law.  A reference can be made from any court 
as governed by the Treaty on the Function of the European Union 2008, Article 267. 
A reference can only be made to the European Court of Human Rights once all 
domestic remedies have been exhausted under the ECHR Article 35.  
316 
 
Appendix E - Decision Tree for GTAC Approval  
 
From Gene Therapy Advisory Committee. 2009. GTAC Decision Tree. Available at 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documen
ts/digitalasset/dh_087984.pdf  [Accessed on: 3
rd
 July 2010]  
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Appendix F - List of Analysed Documents 
International institutions 
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. 2002. International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.  Geneva: 
WHO. 
 
Council of Europe, 2005. Additional protocol to the convention on human rights and 
biomedicine concerning biomedical research.  Strasbourg: CoE. 
 
Council of Europe, 2005. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine explanatory report.  Strasbourg: CoE. 
 
Council of Europe, 1997. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine.  
Oviedo: CoE. 
 
Council of Europe, 1997. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 
explanatory report.  Oviedo: CoE. 
 
Council of Europe. 1950. European convention on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  Strasbourg: CoE. 
 
UNESCO (1997) Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations 
Towards Future Generations. Paris: UNESCO.  
 
UNESCO. 1997. Universal declaration on the human genome and human rights.  
Paris: UNESCO. 
 
UNESCO. 2005.  Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.  Paris: 
UNESCO. 
 
UNESCO.  2003.  International declaration on human genetic data.  Paris 
UNESOC. 
 
United Nations. 1948 Universal declaration of Human rights 1948 (UN Paris). 
 
World Medical Association. 2008. WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles 
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (Geneva: WMA 59
th
 Edition). 
 
World Medical Association. 1949. The Nuremberg Code: Directive for Human 
Experimentation Reprinted from Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law Washington, D.C.: U.S.  Government 
Printing Office, No.  10, Vol.  2, pp.  181-182.   
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European Union  
Council Directive 98/81/EC of 26 October 1998 amending Directive 90/219/EEC on 
the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms [1998] OJ L330/0013. 
 
Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 
2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJ L106/72. 
 
Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use [2001]OJ L121/34. 
 
Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 
2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use [2001] 
OJ L. 
 
Directive 2002/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 
2003 setting standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, 
storage and distribution of human blood and blood components and amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC [2003] OJ  L33/30. 
 
Commission Directive 2003/63/EC of 25 June 2003 amending Directive 2001/83/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use [2003] OJ L159/46. 
 
Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, 
testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells 
[2004] OJ L 102/48. 
 
Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use [2004] OJ L136/34. 
 
Commission Directive 2005/28/EC of 8 April 2005 laying down principles and 
detailed guidelines for good clinical practice as regards investigational medicinal 
products for human use, as well as the requirements for authorisation of the 
manufacturing or importation of such products [2005] OJ L91/13. 
 
Commission Directive 2006/17/EC of 8 February 2006 implementing Directive 
2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards certain 
technical requirements for the donation, procurement and testing of human tissues 
and cells  
tissues and cells [2006] OJ L 38/40. 
 
Commission Directive 2006/86/EC of 24 October 2006 implementing Directive 
2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards traceability 
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requirements, notification of serious adverse reactions and events and certain 
technical requirements for the coding, processing, preservation, storage and 
distribution of human tissues and cells [2006] OJ  L 294/32. 
Directive 2008/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2008 amending Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment 
of genetically modified organisms, as regards the implementing powers conferred on 
the Commission[2008] OJ L81/45. 
Directive 2008/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2008 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use, as regards the implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission [2008] OJ L81/51. 
 
Directive 2009/41/EC of 6 May 2009 on the contained use of genetically modified 
micro-organisms [2009] OJ L125/75.  
 
Commission Directive 2009/120/EC of 14 September 2009 amending Directive 
2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use as regards advanced therapy medicinal 
products [2009] OJ L242/3. 
 
Directive 2010/84/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
December 2010 amending, as regards pharmacovigilance, Directive 2001/83/EC on 
the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use [2010] OJ 
L348/74. 
 
Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 
amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into the legal supply 
chain of falsified medicinal products [2011] OJ L174/74. 
 
Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed [2003] OJ L268/1. 
 
Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified 
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically 
modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC [2003] L268/24. 
 
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a 
European Medicines Agency [2004] OJ L136/1. 
 
Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use and amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1768/92, Directive 2001/20/EC, Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation 
(EC) No 726/2004 (Text with EEA relevance) [2006] L278/1. 
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Appendix G – Glossary of Terms 
Term Meaning 
Agency The capacity to act within the world. 
Agent A being with agency. 
Competing rights Where by two or more agents are making 
claiming the same right but against each other. 
Conflicting rights  Where two or more agents asserting different 
rights to the same issue. 
Correlating duty A duty arising from a positive or negative right. 
Fetus A human between the 56
th
 day of development 
and birth. 
FGT practitioner  Someone who works at any stage of the 
development of FGT.   
Future generation Any generation of genetic offspring 
Germ line cell   Cells involved in reproduction such as an 
oocyte, sperm cell or one of their antecedent 
cells.  
Individual  Any agent, possible or not, within a clinical 
setting. 
Interest Where a being has a duty or right to be 
considered. 
Intergenerational 
issue 
An issues has a possible or proven implication 
between two or more generation 
Mother A person who is currently pregnant or has 
given birth to a child. 
Negative duty The duty to refrain from interfering with 
another's right. 
Negative right  The right not to be interfered with, or the right 
to omit doing something. 
Next generation The immediate genetic offspring of an 
individual including those in gestation 
Patient A agent receiving a doctors service. 
Positive duty The duty to provide assistance to another in 
order to facilitate their right. 
Positive right The right to do something or have an action 
facilitated by someone. 
Somatic cell  Any of the cells of the body that compose the 
tissues, organs, and parts of that individual 
other than the germ cells. 
Therapy A therapeutically aimed intervention.  
   
  
 
A : article B : book/academic input C : case law D : cases from other jurisdictions E : ECHR F : European directive G : european regulation H : foriegn legislation I : International declaration or charter J : legislative K : Policy documents L : statutory instrument
1 : Directive 1998-81-ec 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
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